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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines the radical neo-liberal movement —  commonly labelled the 
‘new right’ — as a hegemonic force in Australia between 1976 and 1996. It argues 
that the movement, through its think tanks, greatly assisted the process whereby the 
Australian state and economy were reorganised. Such assistance took the form of 
disorganising opponents of neo-liberalism; helping to shift elite debate to the Right; 
and offering a language and framework for critiquing the welfare state. It is argued 
that, in doing this, the radical neo-liberal movement acted as a vanguard for neo-
liberal hegemony in Australia. 
 
The thesis critically analyses the ideology of the radical neo-liberal movement as 
well as discussing the ways in which radical neo-liberals cohered as a movement. It 
assesses the relationship between the movement and the capitalist class, the 
commercial media and the Australian state, all of which are key sites and agents of 
hegemonic struggle. It is argued that the effectiveness of the radical neo-liberal 
movement was primarily due to the links it was able to forge with key fractions of 
Australian capital. These fractions — predominantly finance, mining and monopoly 
capital — were also the ones that mobilised to bring about the neo-liberal 
reorganisation of the Australian state and economy. In acting as a vanguard 
movement for neo-liberal hegemony, the radical neo-liberals supported the interests 
of these capitalist fractions. By understanding the radical neo-liberals as a 
movement, this thesis examines the way in which a ‘non-class’ group had an impact 
that was class relevant. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
Beginning in the 1970s under the Whitlam Labor government, and growing in both 
pace and intensity during the 1980s and 1990s, a radical restructuring of the 
Australian state and economy took place. The institutions of arbitration and tariff 
protection — the products of Australia’s turn-of-the-century class compromise — 
which had underpinned Australia’s economic development during the twentieth 
century, were gradually dismantled. Concurrently, the post World War Two class 
compromise, which had bound the leaderships of both the domestic working and 
capitalist classes to a form of Keynesian welfare capitalism, was abandoned. The 
new configuration of the state and economy that emerged out of this restructuring 
can be broadly categorised as a form of neo-liberal capitalism. 
 
In order to be successful, and in order not to rely upon mere force for its imposition, 
any such restructuring requires a concomitant reorganisation of social relations. It 
requires the disorganisation, or neutering, of major opposition and the construction 
of an alliance of social forces committed to its continuation or maintenance. The 
legitimacy of such a restructuring also entails a reorganisation of ‘common sense’: 
the discursive arrangements that mediate people’s understanding of the world, and 
their understanding of the roles of themselves and others within it. In other words, 
the neo-liberal restructuring of the state and economy that occurred in Australia from 
the 1970s onwards entailed a corresponding attempt to secure hegemony. 
 
This thesis analyses the contribution of one group — the group commonly referred 
to as the ‘new right’ — to the struggles that occurred in Australia, until 1996, to 
secure hegemony for neo-liberal capitalism. The thesis argues that the ‘new right’ is 
best understood as an elite social movement with a specific ideological character — 
the radical neo-liberal movement. From its emergence in the mid-1970s, this radical 
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neo-liberal movement attempted to shift the terrain of political debate in Australia, 
to a position more sympathetic with its ideology: that the ‘market’, when free from 
state imposed constraints, was the most efficient, and most moral, way of producing 
and distributing most goods and services in society — whether they be consumer 
items or public goods such as education and healthcare — and, further, that the 
Keynesian welfare state constituted an inefficient and unjust form of social 
regulation. Think tanks and groups such as the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA), the 
Centre for Independent Studies (CIS), the Centre of Policy Studies (CoPS), the 
Australian Institute of Public Policy (AIPP), the H. R. Nicholls Society, Centre 
2000, Crossroads, the Tasman Institute, the Institute for Private Enterprise (IPE), 
and the Australian Adam Smith Club, provided the radical neo-liberal movement 
with its organisational backbone. Employing simplistic dichotomies and emotive 
language, the radical neo-liberals mounted a concerted attack upon the Keynesian 
welfare state, socialism, social justice and their defenders. As an alternative they 
offered a reified model of capitalism in which the state acts as nightwatchman and 
individuals realise their liberty through voluntary market exchanges.  
 
In examining the relationship between the radical neo-liberal movement and 
struggles for neo-liberal hegemony in Australia, this thesis offers three broad 
scholarly contributions: it is the only currently existing analysis to draw upon the 
notion of ‘elite social movements’ as a way of understanding what has commonly 
been referred to as the ‘new right’ in Australia; it provides a framework for assessing 
the ‘impact’ and ‘influence’ of the radical neo-liberal movement.; and it offers a 
contribution to the literature on social movement theory, hegemony and neo-
liberalism. 
 
In understanding the ‘new right’ as an elite social movement, this thesis clarifies 
some of the confusions inherent in the notion of the new right. The idea of the ‘new 
right’ has always been an imprecise one. There is no agreed upon definition. Where 
agreement exists, it is that the think tanks and forums already mentioned are a 
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crucial feature of the new right, and that, as the term itself suggests, there is 
something ‘new’ about them, yet they are also fundamentally grounded in a right-
wing ideology.  
 
What marks the group of academics, journalists, and businesspeople who 
congregated around the IPA, CIS, H. R. Nicholls Society and other similar 
organisations as new, and what defines them ideologically, is their radical critique of 
the welfare state, and their concrete proposals for its dismantling. As Marian Sawer 
argued in 1982: 
 
they are united in the belief that state intervention to promote egalitarian 
social goals has been responsible for the present economic malaise, and 
has represented an intolerable invasion of individual rights.1 
 
There are those who viewed the welfare state and Keynesian economic planning as 
inhibiting Australia’s economic development, who sought to deregulate capitalist 
markets and impose market mechanisms for the delivery of some public goods — 
such as education and health care — and yet who still advocated a strong and 
positive role for the state in the management of the economy and the provision of 
services. In contrast, the groups and individuals who are the subject of this thesis are 
defined by their absolute and unshakable belief in the ability of unfettered markets to 
create a harmonious, prosperous and moral society. While the former might be 
characterised as adhering to a version of neo-liberalism, the latter embody its more 
fundamentalist expression: radical neo-liberalism.  
 
A lack of clarity has also characterised discussion of the ‘new right’s’ organisational 
character. Numerous journalists have written of individuals being ‘members’ or 
holding ‘membership’ of the new right, as if it were a constituted organisation or a 
                                                 
1 Marian Sawer, ‘Introduction’ in Marian Sawer (ed), Australia and the New Right, George Allen and 
Unwin, North Sydney, 1982, p. viii. 
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political party. 2 Others have defined the new right via its think tanks,3 sometimes 
describing them as ‘interest groups’.4 If radical neo-liberal think tanks are interest 
groups, then they are unique among the category. Radical neo-liberal think tanks do 
not engage in traditional lobbying, nor are they interested in the pragmatic 
compromises characteristic of interest group intervention in the policy process. In 
addition, although they are distinct organisations, radical neo-liberal think tanks are 
linked by a common ideology, by an overlapping leadership and participant base and 
by their emergence in a particular historical moment, in response to specific 
economic and political conditions and with common goals and common enemies. 
Furthermore, although think tanks are an important vehicle for radical neo-liberal 
ideology, radical neo-liberals have also acted outside of the their confines. David 
Kemp comes closer to the mark by describing what he calls ‘radical liberalism’, as 
‘linked in a nationwide network challenging traditional conservative centres of 
power'.5 The notion of a ‘network’, however, fails to capture the dynamism and 
energy of the radical neo-liberals, nor does it do justice to the ways in which they 
contested power, engaged in hegemonic struggle and acted both within and outside 
the traditional policy-making structures of political parties and the bureaucracy.  
 
It is only by describing the radical neo-liberals acting as a ‘movement’ that all of 
these features can be accommodated. The term ‘radical neo-liberal movement’, then, 
                                                 
2 See for example: Mike Taylor, ‘New Right poses dilemma for employers but the answer may be 
found in Marx’, Australian Financial Review, 3rd September, 1986, p. 8; Mike Steketee, ‘Desperation 
and despair in heartland of Liberals’, Sydney Morning Herald, 22nd April, 1989, pp. 8-9; Pamela 
Williams, ‘New Right exerts its power on Liberals’, Australian Financial Review, 17th December, 
1987, p. 10; Steve Burrell, ‘The New Right threat: MP warns’, Sydney Morning Herald, 7th October, 
1986, p. 1; Amanda Buckley, ‘Liberal rifts curb celebration’, Australian Financial Review, 29th 
January, 1987, p. 7. 
3 For example: Bette Moore and Gary Carpenter, ‘Main Players’ in Ken Coghill (ed), The New 
Right’s Australian Fantasy, McPhee Gribble, Fitzroy, 1987, pp. 145-160;  David McKnight, ‘The 
New Right: A Consumer’s Guide’, Sydney Morning Herald, 6th September, 1986, pp. 41, 45; Laurie 
Aarons, Here Come the Uglies: The New Right – who they are and what they Think, Red Pen 
Publications, Forest Lodge, 1987. 
4 Trevor Matthews, ‘Interest Groups’ in Rodney Smith, Politics in Australia, 2nd edition, Allen and 
Unwin, St. Leonards, 1993, pp. 241-246. 
5 David Kemp, ‘Liberalism and Conservatism in Australia since 1944’ in Brian Head and James 
Walter (eds), Intellectual Movements and Australian Society, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 
1988, p. 340. 
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captures both the ideological and organisational novelty of what has commonly been 
referred to as the ‘new right’. Under such a description, radical neo-liberals become 
‘participants’ in the movement, or movement ‘activists’, rather than ‘members’ of 
the ‘new right’. This is not however to deny that there have been debates, conflicts 
and differences of opinion within the radical neo-liberal movement. Most important 
among these has been that while some radical neo-liberals adopt a libertarian 
position on social and moral issues, most embrace social and moral conservatism. 
These tensions are largely kept in check through the movement activists’ shared 
commitment to radical neo-liberalism and the solidarity they derive from having 
common enemies: the Left in general and the defenders of the welfare state, 
arbitration and tariffs. More important has been the contradiction between such a 
conservative morality and the radical neo-liberal commitment to a minimal state. 
These issues will be explored further in Chapters Two and Three, but it is enough to 
say for now that one of the strengths of the movement has been the extent to which 
such contradictions have been either masked or accommodated and reconciled 
within a radical neo-liberal framework. 
 
In understanding the radical neo-liberals as a movement, there are clear associations 
with the ‘new social movements’  — such as the environment movement, the 
feminist movement, the peace movement and the gays rights movement — which 
arose in the late 1960s and which many theorists heralded as superseding labour as 
an emancipatory social agent. There is however a crucial difference between the 
radical neo-liberal movement and the new social movements, which, although 
discussed in more detail in Chapters One and Three, is worth noting here because of 
its importance for understanding the dynamics of the radical neo-liberals. The 
fundamental difference between the two is that whereas the new social movements 
have been rooted in resistance and popular protest, the radical neo-liberal movement 
is a fundamentally elitist movement with a small social base and clear links with 
sections of the capitalist class. It is therefore as an ‘elite social movement’ that the 
radical neo-liberals are best described. Although some Australian scholars have 
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labelled the ‘new right’ as a ‘movement’, there has not been any thoroughgoing 
discussion of what this might mean. This thesis will, therefore, partly be an essay in 
definition. 
 
Many claims have been made regarding the influence and impact of the ‘new right’ 
and its think tanks. Journalists have often ascribed strong influence to the radical 
neo-liberals. For example, in 1986, The Australian's Greg Sheridan, in an article on 
the ‘new right’ wrote that they ‘have started to win the battle of ideas’,6 and in the 
same year David McKnight claimed that it was the ‘new right’ which had de-railed 
Labor's successful consensus style of politics, putting in doubt a third term of Labor 
federal government.7 In The Challenge For Unions: Workers Versus The New Right, 
John Wishart endorses the notion that the radical neo-liberals exert considerable 
influence: 
 
Through their network, and with the unfailing assistance of most 
Australian media outlets, they [The New Right], have shifted public 
opinion towards support for 'user-pays' education and health care, labour 
market de-regulation, and the sale of government assets and services to 
private capital.8 
 
Similarly, Marian Sawer argues that free-market think tanks have, ‘played a 
significant role in influencing public opinion’9 and Michael Pusey states: 
 
No one can doubt the tremendous success that the ‘New Right’ 
American and British policy organisations and think tanks have had first 
                                                 
6 Greg Sheridan, 'Just Who Are The New Right?', Weekend Australian, September 6-7, 1986, p.17 
7 David McKnight, 'The New Right: A Consumer's Guide’, p. 41. 
8 John Wishart, The Challenge for Unions: Workers versus the New Right, Left Book Club Co-
operative Ltd, Sydney, 1992, p.31. 
9 Marian Sawer, Public Perceptions of Multiculturalism, Centre for Immigration and Multicultural 
Studies, Canberra, 1990, p.1. 
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in cloning themselves in Australia, and then in reorganising the public 
policy agenda along Anglo-American ‘free market’ lines.10 
 
Ian Marsh, who has written extensively on Australian think tanks, concludes that the 
‘neo-liberal or new right group of think tanks’ have been ‘spectacularly successful in 
popularising’ their ideological agenda.11 
 
More recently, Philip Mendes argues that: 
 
Their political influence over both ALP and Liberal Party governments 
has been significant. They have played an important role in shaping a 
harsher Australian social policy agenda that is less sympathetic to the 
welfare state, welfare producers and welfare beneficiaries.12 
 
In contrast, Roy Green and Andrew Wilson virtually dismiss the influence of the 
radical neo-liberals during the Accord years, arguing that they were: 
 
...an ill-defined and rather marginal force, capable of much noise, but 
lacking really solid support in the organisation of mainstream capital. 
More important was the opposition from modernising forces favouring 
deregulation grouped around the Business Council of Australia, whose 
primary impetus came from the need to orchestrate pressure on the 
Accord.13 
 
                                                 
10 Michael Pusey, Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A Nation Building State Changes its Mind, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 227. 
11 Ian Marsh, The Development and Impact of Australia’s ‘Think Tanks’, CEDA, Melbourne, 1995, 
p. 11. 
12 Philip Mendes, ‘Australian Neo-liberal Think Tanks and the Backlash Against the Welfare State’, 
Journal of Australian Political Economy, No. 51, 2003, p. 50. 
13 Roy Green and Andrew Wilson, 'Labor's Trojan Horse: the 'Third Way' on Employment Policy' in 
Dennis Glover and Glenn Patmore (eds), New Voices for Social Democracy; Labor Essays 1999-
2000, Pluto Press, Annandale, 1999, p.73. 
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These many assertions are often based upon little evidence. Indeed, despite 
numerous journalistic articles on the topic, there exists little scholarly analysis of the 
impact of the Australian ‘new right’ or radical neo-liberal movement. This thesis 
offers both a framework for evaluating the impact and influence of the radical neo-
liberal movement — that of hegemony — as well as providing a detailed 
examination of a few key areas in which the movement attempted to intervene. 
There are several advantages to using hegemony as a framework for interpreting the 
movement’s impact. Focussing upon struggles for hegemony allows account to be 
taken of the movement’s contribution to discursive shifts and ideological conflicts, 
rather than merely its involvement in the policy process. Given that hegemony 
represents one aspect of class struggle, such an approach also allows attention to be 
focussed on the significance of the movement’s relationship with capital. Rather 
than simply inferring the movement’s impact by comparing its policy prescriptions 
with actual policy changes, as suggested by Murray and Pacheo,14 this thesis outlines 
a theoretical framework for understanding such changes, and then undertakes a 
detailed analysis of the movement’s impact within the arenas of the capitalist class, 
the mainstream commercial media and the state. The argument developed in this 
thesis is that the radical neo-liberal movement played the role of a vanguard for neo-
liberal hegemony in Australia. Often acting through think tanks, the radical neo-
liberals helped to disorganise the opposition to neo-liberalism; helped shift political 
debate in Australia to the Right; and provided a language and framework for 
critiquing the welfare state and for justifying neo-liberalism. I argue that primarily 
though its links with capital was the radical neo-liberal movement able to overcome 
its relatively small and narrow participant base to have a hegemonic impact in 
Australia. 
 
The use of hegemonic theory as a framework for understanding changes in 
Australian capitalism is unusual. Despite interest in studies of hegemony in the late 
                                                 
14 Georgina Murray and Douglas Pacheo, ‘Think Tanks in the 1990s’, p. 10, Marxist Interventions 
Website, <http://www.anu.edu.au/polsci/marx/interventions/thinktanks.htm> at 25th May, 2001. 
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1970s and early 1980s15 recent scholarship has been largely devoid of such 
concerns.16 In understanding the impact of the radical neo-liberals, the use of 
hegemonic theory is even more scant.17 Internationally, however, the study of 
hegemony has burgeoned. More importantly, a number of scholars have employed 
theories of hegemony to help understand both the shifts from welfare to neo-liberal 
capitalism internationally,18 as well as to theorise overseas manifestations of the 
‘new right’.19 So, while this thesis is relatively novel in its use of theories of 
hegemony as a framework for understanding both the major changes in Australian 
capitalism and the impact of the radical neo-liberal movement, such a framework 
will be developed through drawing on the substantial international literature on the 
subject. 
 
In developing a framework for understanding elite social movements and then 
examining the impact of one particular elite social movement, this thesis adds to the 
literature on social movements. Social movement literature has tended to focus upon 
movements of subordinated groups, whilst studies focussing on neo-liberalism or the 
                                                 
15 Sere for example: R. W. Connell, Ruling Class, Ruling Culture: Studies of Conflict, Power and 
Hegemony in Australian Life, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977; R. W. Connell and T. 
H. Irving, Class Structure in Australian History: Documents, Narrative and Argument, Longman 
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1980; Alistair Davidson, Antonio Gramsci: Towards and Intellectual 
Biography, Merlin Press, London, 1977. 
16 See however Ed Kaptein, ‘Neo-liberalism and the Dismantling of Corporatism in Australia’ in 
Henk Overbeek (ed), Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The Rise of 
Transnational Neo-liberalism in the 1980s, Routledge, London, 1993, pp. 79-109; Stephen Bell, 
Ungoverning the Economy: The Political Economy of Australian Economic Policy, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, 1997, pp. 116-117. 
17 But see Boris Frankel, From the Prophets Deserts Come: The Struggle to Reshape Australian 
Political Culture, Arena Publishing, North Carlton, 1992, pp. 136-140. 
18 Henk Overbeek (ed), Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The Rise of 
Transnational Neo-liberalism in the 1980s; William Carroll and Murray Shaw, ‘Consolidating a 
Neoliberal Policy Bloc in Canada, 1976-1996’, Canadian Public Policy, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2001, pp. 
195-217; Stuart Hall, ‘The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism Among the Theorists’ in Cary Nelson 
and Lawrence Grossberg (eds), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Macmillan Education, 
London, 1988, pp. 35-57; Colin Hay, ‘Housing Policy in Transition: From the Post-war Settlement 
Towards a ‘Thatcherite’ Hegemony’, Capital and Class, Spring 1992, pp. 27-64; Colin Hay, Re-
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‘new right’ have tended to concentrate their attention on think tanks and elite actors, 
rather than viewing these as cohering through a movement. The thesis contributes to 
the international literature on hegemony by developing, in Chapter One, a multi-
levelled model of hegemony and using it to understand the major shifts in hegemony 
that occurred in Australia in the transformation from welfare to neo-liberal 
capitalism. In its analysis of the major changes that occurred within Australian 
capitalism from the 1970s until the 1990s, this thesis also contributes to international 
understanding of neo-liberalism. The thesis draws upon contemporary literature to 
develop an understanding of neo-liberalism that goes beyond the simplistic notion of 
neo-liberalism as a reduction in the power and size of the state. Rather this thesis 
seeks to understand neo-liberalism as a manifestation of class struggle, and an 
attempt to transfer greater power to capital and shift resources from the public to 
private sectors. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
There are inevitable limitations in undertaking a thesis such as this. First, there is the 
physical limitation that, due to the movement being a relatively recent phenomenon, 
and due to its semi-clandestine nature, important details of the movement’s activities 
do not exist on the public record. Primary documentation regarding minutes of 
meetings of the movement’s think tanks, the financial record of think tanks and the 
personal papers of movement activists are not housed in publicly accessible 
archives. As a non-participant in the movement, and as one unsympathetic to the 
movement’s framework, I have had little success in gaining access to such 
documents. During the research for this thesis I wrote to major movement 
organisations, requesting details of their funding and access to their archives and 
files. These requests were all either denied or ignored. Therefore, in addition to 
secondary sources, this thesis relies upon the published output of radical neo-liberal 
organisations and activists, interviews with movement activists, interviews with key 
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figures from other major social groups regarding their relationships with the 
movement, limited primary documentation of movement activities that is held in the 
archives of employer associations and of the IPA.20  
 
The second limitation is that imposed by the length of the thesis itself. Given the 
enormity of the radical neo-liberal movement’s activities during the period under 
review, and given the need to establish a framework for understanding the 
movement, the analysis of the movement’s relationship with struggles to secure neo-
liberal hegemony undertaken here cannot hope to be comprehensive. It is for this 
reason that the study has been limited to surveying the period between 1976 and 
1996. 1976 marks the beginnings of the movement while 1996 has been chosen as 
the end point because it marks the election of the Howard Coalition government 
federally. This is significant because existing evidence indicates that the role of the 
radical neo-liberal movement changes somewhat at this time. Ending the thesis at 
this point allows for consideration of the movement’s relationship with the key 
changes that occurred in the neo-liberal transformation of the Australian state and 
economy, and allows an indicative discussion of the changes in the movement’s 
relationship with the government and bureaucracy after 1996. 
 
The final limitation of this thesis concerns the difficulties in accounting for influence 
and impact. One of the enduring difficulties for social movement research has been 
to articulate methods for evaluating the impact of movements. As Marco Guigni 
points out, the main difficulty has been ‘the problem of causality, that is, how to 
establish a causal link between a given movement and an observed change’.21 It is 
tempting, for example, when considering the impact of the radical neo-liberal 
movement, to identify the movement’s agenda and then match this against changes 
                                                 
20 Although the IPA archive at the Noel Butlin Archives Centre does not contain internal documents 
for the period under review here, it does contain primary documents from the Australian Lecture 
Foundation, another movement organisation. 
21 Marco Giugni, ‘How Social Movements Matter: Past Research, Present Problems, Future 
Developments’ in Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly (eds), How Social Movements 
Matter, University of Minneapolis Press, Minneapolis, 1999, p. xxiv. 
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in state policy that have occurred during the lifetime of the movement. This 
approach tells us little if anything about the role of the radical neo-liberal movement 
in bringing about such changes. It is possible, for example, that there were other 
sources of the ideas in question as well as other interests contributing to the 
identified changes. What is required instead is an explicit framework for the 
evaluation of the impact of the radical neo-liberal movement. The advantage of 
viewing the impact of the radical neo-liberal movement through the analytical lens 
of hegemony is that a framework can be developed for identifying the key 
components of efforts to secure hegemony. In this thesis these components are 
referred to as the ‘constitutive components of hegemony’ and they are discussed in 
Chapter One. The contours of the struggle to reshape hegemony can then be mapped 
and, through detailed examination of the movement’s relationship with key social 
institutions, the contribution of the movement to these process can be suggested.  
 
The analysis therefore will proceed in the following manner: 
 
1. a framework for understanding hegemony, elite social movements and class 
conflict will be developed; 
2. the core ideas, discursive practices, aims and tactics of the radical neo-liberal 
movement will be identified; 
3. the broad counters of hegemonic struggles in Australia from 1976-1996 will 
be outlined; 
4. the relationships between the radical neo-liberal movement and other key 
groups and institutions involved in hegemonic struggles (the capitalist class, 
the labour movement, political parties, the bureaucracy, state apparatuses and 
the mainstream commercial media) will be identified and critically 
evaluated; 
5. conclusions will then be drawn about the relationship between the radical 
neo-liberal movement and struggles to secure hegemony for neo-liberalism 
in Australia. It will be argued that the radical neo-liberal movement played a 
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vanguard role in this process: rather than directing the process of neo-liberal 
change the movement was at the forefront of attacks upon the old hegemonic 
order of welfare capitalism and its defenders. 
 
 
Thesis structure 
 
Chapter One outlines the theoretical framework that will be employed to analyse the 
radical neo-liberal movement and its relationship with struggles for hegemony. After 
discussing the notion of hegemony in a general sense, the chapter develops a multi-
dimensional model for understanding hegemonic struggle and consolidation. The 
notion of ‘non-class’ agents and ‘class relevant’ impacts are developed in order to 
account for the relevance of elite social movements to struggles for hegemony. 
Finally, Chapter One develops the concept of elite social movements and offers 
some similarities and differences with social movements as traditionally understood.  
 
Chapters Two and Three examine the radical neo-liberal movement itself. Chapter 
Two discusses the ideology of the radical neo-liberal movement: its beliefs, 
assumptions, rhetoric and antecedents. The movement’s core values are examined 
and this provides a basis for understanding the movement’s utopian policy agenda. 
Attempts by the movement to reconcile the inevitable contradictions between radical 
neo-liberal and conservative ideologies are also examined. Chapter Three analyses 
how it is that the radical neo-liberals cohere as a movement. It looks at how the 
movement has developed over time, and examines radical neo-liberal think tanks — 
the mobilising structures of the movement. After outlining the major tactics 
employed by the movement to contest hegemony, the chapter discusses the 
dynamics of the relationship between the radical neo-liberal movement and those 
conservative intellectuals with whom an alliance existed throughout the 1980s but 
who would later become prominent critics of the movement. 
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Chapter Four links the Chapter Two and Three with the final section of the thesis by 
outlining the hegemonic context within which the radical neo-liberal movement 
emerged, grew and attempted to bring about a radical restructuring of common 
sense. In order to provide a basis for understanding the relationship between the 
movement and other key actors in struggles for neo-liberal hegemony, Chapter Four 
focuses upon the changing dynamics of the capitalist class and the Australian state 
from 1976 to 1996. It is argued that, from the 1970s onwards, key fractions of 
capital mobilised in order to bring about a neo-liberal restructuring of the Australia 
state and economy. 
 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven examine the relationship between the radical neo-
liberal movement and some of the major sites of hegemonic struggle and some of the 
key agents of such struggles. Chapter Five investigates the movement’s relationship 
with the Australian capitalist class. As well as discussing the movement’s impact 
upon Australian capital, this chapter reveals that key fractions of capital were crucial 
to the emergence, longevity and impact of the radical neo-liberal movement in 
Australia. Chapter Six analyses the relationship between the radical neo-liberal and 
the mainstream news media in Australia. A case study of the Fairfax media’s 
coverage of the movement, and of the movement’s access to the Fairfax media, 
provides the basis for drawing conclusions about the movement’s relationship with 
the broader commercial media in Australia. It is argued that the commercial media in 
Australia was an important and sympathetic vehicle for the widespread 
dissemination of radical neo-liberal discourse and ideology. Chapter Seven examines 
the impact of the radical neo-liberal movement upon some of the major institutions 
of the Australian state: the bureaucracy; the major political parties; and the pubic 
education system. Particular attention is paid to the ways in which the radical neo-
liberal movement was instrumental in the Coalition’s embrace of neo-liberalism, and 
was used by successive Labor governments as a convenient way of legitimating their 
own, less radical, neo-liberal program.  
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From the examination undertaken throughout these chapters it is concluded that the 
radical neo-liberal movement played a vanguard role in the struggles to secure 
hegemony for neo-liberalism in Australia until 1996. Although the neo-liberal 
restructuring of the Australian state and economy would have proceeded without its 
appearance, the radical neo-liberal movement helped neutralise opposition and open 
up a discursive space in which neo-liberalism could be inscribed onto the discursive 
terrain of common sense. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Hegemony, Class Conflict and Elite Social Movements 
 
 
 
As stated in the Introduction, this thesis analyses the relationship between an elite 
social movement and struggles for hegemony. It analyses the role of the radical neo-
liberal movement in attempts to secure hegemony for neo-liberalism in Australia. In 
order to undertake such an analysis it is first necessary to outline a theoretical 
framework for understanding the key concepts of hegemony and elite social 
movements. This chapter outlines a framework for understanding the terrain and 
dynamics of hegemonic struggles and then examines some of the key agents — 
particularly classes and elite social movements — involved in such struggles. 
 
An important feature of the battles for hegemony examined in this thesis is that they 
occur within the framework of a relatively stable capitalist hegemony. From the late 
1970s until the mid 1990s in Australia, the hegemony of the capitalist organisation 
of society was never seriously threatened. Rather, what occurred were struggles over 
the ways in which the Australian capitalist state was organised. Specifically, the 
hegemony of the Keynesian welfare state was challenged by a series of neo-liberal, 
counter-hegemonic projects. Attempts were made to win ‘consent’ — within the 
state and throughout the broader population — for a new set of state-labour-capital 
relationships, but ones that remained fundamentally capitalist in nature. This chapter 
provides tools for understanding such phenomena by developing a framework which 
recognises distinct but related ‘levels’ of hegemony, in which hegemony can be 
threatened or overturned at one level while remaining secure at other levels. Given 
its importance as both a key site, and object of, the struggles for hegemony analysed 
in this thesis, the capitalist state and its relationship to hegemony is also discussed. 
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The central dynamic of struggles to secure hegemony is that of class conflict. 
Classes however are not the sole agents of hegemony, and classes themselves are not 
monolithic. Within classes there often develop class ‘fractions’ with their own 
distinct sets of interests. Hegemony therefore reflects the outcomes not only of class 
conflict, but intra-class conflict as well. This chapter discusses the notion of class 
‘fractions’ and takes a critical approach to the issue of class interests. It is also 
necessary to account for how movements, which do not neatly fit into the class 
conflict schema, can be agents of change. Specifically, what relevance might non-
class actors, such as elite social movements, have to struggles over the hegemony of 
a particular form of capitalism: neo-liberal capitalism? While retaining the centrality 
of class conflict to hegemonic struggle, this chapter posits that social agents who are 
not ‘class belonging’ can nonetheless engage in struggles that are ‘class relevant’. 
 
Unfortunately, there is little literature which deals explicitly with elite social 
movements — the central ‘non-class’ agent studied in this thesis. Academic 
literature on new social movements tends to focus upon mass movements of the 
oppressed, thus excluding consideration of elite social movements from its 
conceptual frame. Through a critical analysis of the new social movement paradigm, 
this chapter outlines the differences between new social movements and elite social 
movements. However, it is also argued that new social movement theory provides 
useful tools for understanding the internal dynamics of elite social movements and, 
as such, this chapter draws upon social movement theory to sketch an outline of the 
characteristics of elite social movements. 
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Theorising Hegemony 
 
Hegemony refers to the organisation of consent in capitalist society. Specifically, 
hegemony is the organisation of consent to a particular set of class relations.1 The 
notion of hegemony is most often associated with the work of the Italian Marxist 
Antonio Gramsci. Although the term hegemony pre-dates Marxism2 — and in 
Marxist theory pre-dates Gramsci3 — Gramsci used the notion of hegemony to 
develop a unique account of the dynamics of capitalist society. Gramsci attempted to 
explain not only why the European working class had not been able to bring about a 
working class revolution, but also how it was that fascism was in the ascendancy. 
This dilemma, what Stuart Hall calls ‘Gramsci’s question’,4 led Gramsci to develop 
an understanding of capitalism in which class power is exercised and contested 
through culture, as well as through physical force, violence and coercion, as 
understood by traditional Marxism. Hegemony, then, is the organisation of consent 
primarily through non-coercive means. 
 
One of the reasons that Gramsci survives as a theorist of continuing interest is the 
richness of his work. No doubt another reason is that Gramsci’s writing is often 
riddled with ambiguities and imprecision.5 The reason for this is that Gramsci’s 
richest work was undertaken during his ten year internment in fascist prison. Ill 
health and prison conditions meant that Gramsci’s prison writings do not constitute a 
completed body of work. In order that his writings were not identified as Marxist by 
prison authorities, Gramsci engaged in self-censorship.6 Gramsci was also writing 
primarily about social conditions specific to Italy of the 1920s and 1930s, so 
                                                 
1 In this context, ‘consent’ can also refer to the absence of opposition. 
2 Raymond Williams, Keywords: a Vocabulary of Culture and Society, Fontana, Glasgow, 1981, 
pp. 117-118. 
3 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards and Radical 
Democratic Politics, Verso, London, 2001, pp. 7-46. 
4 Stuart Hall, ‘Postscript: Gramsci and Us’ in Roger Simon, Gramsci’s Political Thought: An 
Introduction, Lawrence and Wishart , London, 1991,  p. 115. 
5 See for example Perry Anderson, ‘The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci’, New Left Review, No. 100, 
November 1976 - January 1977, pp. 5-78. 
6 Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, ‘Preface’, in Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the 
Prison Notebooks, International Publishers, New York, 1999, pp. xiii-xiv. 
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applying his analysis to other national contexts and other historical periods is 
difficult. Furthermore, the traditional major text in English that has been used by 
Gramsci-scholars is Gramsci’s Selections from the Prison Notebooks, which is an 
edited version of original Italian text, the content of which was posthumously 
arranged by topic. Translations of the full Prison Notebooks, as they were compiled 
by Gramsci himself, have only recently become available in English. So, while 
Gramsci’s work is incredibly rich in content, deriving from it a comprehensive and 
consistent theory of capitalist society is still a difficult task. What makes the task 
somewhat easier is the wealth of literature that has appeared in English during the 
last three decades devoted to explicating Gramsci’s theories and applying them to 
contemporary capitalist society. 
 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony expands upon Marx and Engels’ argument that ‘The 
ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas’.7 In hegemony, Gramsci 
provides the mechanism whereby this occurs. However, what sets Gramsci’s work 
apart from traditional Marxism is that he goes beyond the deterministic schema that 
the economic base determines the cultural and political superstructure. Hegemony, 
the organisation of consent to a particular configuration of class relations, cannot 
simply be deduced from the economic superstructure of any given period. Rather, as 
Stuart Hall writes: 
 
Hegemony is constructed through a complex series or process of 
struggle. It is not given, either in the existing structure of a society or in 
the given class structure of a mode of production.8 
 
The achievement of hegemony is contingent upon outcome of struggles for political, 
ideological and economic dominance in a given society at a given time. Such 
                                                 
7 K. Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 67. 
8 Stuart Hall, ‘The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism Among the Theorists', p. 53. 
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struggles can have unintended and unpredictable consequences, which means that 
hegemony rarely follows a pre-ordained road map.9  
 
What makes Gramsci’s theory of hegemony so useful for analysing really existing 
capitalist relations is his focus upon agency. Society is not static and neither is 
hegemony. Therefore, hegemony involves a constant process of struggle and 
negotiation: 
 
The overall picture that Gramsci provides is not one of ruling class 
domination. Rather it is a society in constant process, where the creation 
of counter-hegemonic strategies remains open.10 
 
Furthermore, in order to maintain its dominant position, the dominant class must, if 
it does not wish to rely upon coercion as the primary means of governance, 
incorporate, at least to some extent, the interests of other social groups into its 
hegemonic project: 
 
Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of 
the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to 
be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be 
formed — in other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices 
of an economic-corporate kind. But there is also no doubt that such 
sacrifices and such a compromise cannot touch the essential; for though 
hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily 
                                                 
9 A similar point is made by William Carroll: ‘The organisation of consent is not deduced as a 
functional necessity: it arises as a contingent accomplishment, incorporating a mixture of strategic 
interventions and unintended consequences’ in William Carroll, ‘Restructuring Capital, Reorganising 
Consent: Gramsci, Political Economy, and Canada’, Canadian Review of Sociology and 
Anthropology, Vol. 27, No. 3, August 1990, p. 393. 
10 T. J. Jackson Lears, 'The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities', The 
American Historical Review, Vol. 90, No. 3, June 1985, p. 571. 
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be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the 
decisive nucleus of economic activity.11 
 
From this quotation, it is clear that hegemony, for Gramsci, is ultimately based upon 
class interests. Hegemony, however, is not simply reducible to class interest, and the 
need to incorporate the demands and interests of other groups necessarily creates 
contradictions. The strength of a hegemonic project is the extent to which such 
contradictions can be concealed or reconciled. The danger, however, is that the very 
existence of such contradictions throws open the possibility of counter-hegemonic 
strategies. Thus, agency is an integral feature of hegemonic struggle. Whilst the 
capitalist class structure provides the framework within which hegemonic struggles 
take place, the terrain of such struggles is constantly shifting and is created through 
the conflict and interactions of a variety of agents: such as workers, capitalists, 
intellectuals, movements, unions and employer associations. Hegemonic theory, 
then, provides conceptual tools with which to ‘theorize practice within a dialectic of 
structure and agency’.12 
 
It is clear from the preceding analysis that hegemony is always contested, even if 
only weakly. Hegemony is therefore never a system of total capitalist domination. T. 
J. Jackson Lears proposes that hegemony operates within a spectrum between open 
and closed: the more open the hegemonic relations the more susceptible they are to 
counter-hegemonic strategies; the more closed the hegemonic relations the more 
resilient they are to resistance and the fewer opportunities there are for counter-
hegemonic strategies.13 But a hegemonic system is never completely closed, and 
even in a relatively closed system, strategies of resistance are possible. 
 
It is important to distinguish hegemony from mere ideology or ideological 
domination. First, hegemony is power exercised primarily through non-coercive 
                                                 
11 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 161. 
12 William Carroll, ‘Restructuring Capital, Reorganising Consent: Gramsci, Political Economy, and 
Canada’, p. 393. 
13 T. J. Jackson Lears, 'The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities', pp. 573-574. 
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means. It is all of those non-coercive aspects of society that support the dominance 
of one class, one class fraction or one alliance of social forces at any one time. 
Ideology, then is but one aspect of hegemony. Second, hegemony does not conform 
to the ‘dominant ideology thesis’ as critiqued by Abercrombie and Turner.14 
According to the dominant ideology thesis, the capitalist class maintains its power 
through the adoption of its worldview by the subordinated classes. The processes of 
hegemony, in contrast, are much more complex. Subordinated classes may take up 
the ideas of the dominant class only partially, and quite often hegemony is 
maintained through a set of contradictory discursive fields. 
 
The constitutive components of hegemony 
 
In contrast to a simplistic dominant ideology thesis, Gramsci conceived of 
hegemony as constituted by a number of distinct components. Hegemony cannot be 
understood without at least a rudimentary acquaintance with these unique concepts. 
For the following discussion I rely upon the categories identified by Roger Simon, 
who outlines Gramsci’s components of hegemony.15  
 
Central to hegemony are the relations of forces within society.16 In order to achieve 
hegemony, a class must transcend economic-corporate, or sectional, interest and 
construct a program that combines the interests of other groups. It must create an 
alliance of social forces. Such a process necessarily entails compromise. However, at 
the same time, to achieve hegemony a class must also ‘disorganise the alliances of 
the other [class], and … shift the balance of forces in its favour’.17 In addition to 
this, to become hegemonic a class must incorporate other non-class interests, such as 
those of social movements, into its hegemonic project. Thus hegemony incorporates 
                                                 
14 Nicholas Abercrombie and Bryan S. Turner, ‘The Dominant Ideology Thesis’, British Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1978, pp. 149-170. 
15 Roger Simon, Gramsci’s Political Thought: an Introduction, pp. 22-29. 
16 Ibid., p. 24, 30-37. 
17 Ibid., p. 24. 
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what Gramsci termed a national popular element.18 In order to do this, a hegemonic 
project must be inscribed onto the discursive terrain of common sense.19 Common 
sense for Gramsci is the, often contradictory, popular wisdoms and understandings 
of the world which can include the naturalisation of oppression. However, common 
sense can also be used to construct counter-hegemonic understandings of society. 
Related to common sense, but distinct from it, is the notion of intellectual and moral 
reform.20 Hegemony must capture popular consciousness and transform the popular 
sense of morality and moral conduct.  
 
By now it should be clear that the struggle for hegemony occurs not merely within 
the government or bureaucracy but also within civil society, and it is here that 
hegemony is organised.21 Such a conception means that the combatants in struggles 
for hegemony include not just classes but also, potentially, social movements, trade 
unions, churches, voluntary associations, political parties, the media and a whole 
host of other actors within the sphere of civil society. Hegemony then, entails 
leadership in both the sphere of production as well as in civil society. This is what 
Gramsci calls the historic bloc.22  
 
The formation of a historic bloc requires that the sectional interests of the dominant 
class are presented as universal interests.23 As T. J. Jackson Lears writes: 
 
The keys to success are ideological and economic: to achieve cultural 
hegemony, the leaders of a historical bloc must develop a world view 
that appeals to a wide range of other groups within the society, and they 
                                                 
18 Ibid., pp. 24-25, 43-46. 
19 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
20 Roger Simon, Gramsci’s Political Thought: an Introduction, p. 26. 
21 Ibid., p. 27, pp. 68-77. 
22 Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
23 Robert W. Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: an Essay in Method’ in Stephen 
Gill (ed), Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1993, pp. 57-58. 
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must be able to claim, with at least some plausibility that their particular 
interests are those of society at large.24 
 
This is an elaboration of Marx and Engels’ argument that the dominant class must: 
 
… present its interest as the common interest of all the members of 
society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas a form of 
universality, and present them as the only rational, universally valid 
ones.25 
 
Gramsci’s recognition of the need to construct hegemony in civil society as well as 
to control the means of production led him to develop the concepts of the war of 
manoeuvre and the war of position.26 Whilst the Leninist model of revolution 
entailed as a first step to socialism the seizure of state power (the war of 
manoeuvre), Gramsci argued that the precondition of a durable socialist society was 
the achievement of leadership within civil society (the war of position). The 
bourgeoisie, on the other hand, because of its strategic position within the economy, 
is often able to use the apparatuses of the state to reorganise the economic structure 
of a nation without mobilising popular support  and without the use of force. 
Gramsci called this process passive revolution.27 In order to achieve hegemony, 
however, the bourgeoisie would still need to engage in a war of position. That is, the 
capture of state power is not, in and of itself, sufficient to achieve hegemony. 
 
 
Intellectuals and hegemony 
 
Central to these struggles for hegemony are intellectuals. Gramsci has a unique 
conception of intellectuals. He writes: ‘All men are intellectuals … but not all men 
                                                 
24 T. J. Jackson Lears, 'The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities', p. 571. 
25 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, p. 68. 
26 Roger Simon, Gramsci’s Political Thought: an Introduction, p. 29 
27 Ibid., pp. 25-26, 47-51. 
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have in society the function of intellectuals’. What he means by this is that, although 
all men engage in thought and reflect — to varying extents — upon the social 
relations within which they exist (therefore ‘one cannot speak of non-
intellectuals’),28 it is necessary to distinguish between such intellectual activity and 
those who occupy the social category of intellectuals. This social category is defined 
by an ‘organisational function’ in relation to either the capitalist class or the 
proletariat. Gramsci identified two types of intellectuals: organic intellectuals and 
traditional intellectuals. Organic intellectuals are the organisers of ‘social hegemony 
and state domination’.29 They provide ideological leadership to a class and articulate 
and implement the hegemonic project of that class. In addition, organic intellectuals, 
according to Gramsci, give self-awareness and unity to a class: 
 
Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an 
essential function in the world of economic production, creates together 
with itself, organically, one or more state of intellectuals which give it 
homogeneity and an awareness of its own function, not only in the 
economic but also in the social and political fields.30 
 
Traditional intellectuals, in contrast, are those whose positions and functions were 
instrumental to a preceding set of hegemonic relations. Gramsci gives the example 
of the Italian clergy who ‘for a whole phase of history’ held sway over the dominant 
religious, legal and educational institutions of the nation.31 In order to implement a 
new hegemonic project, it is necessary for the organic intellectuals to ‘assimilate and 
conquer “ideologically”’32 the traditional intellectuals: meaning that the functions, 
practices and underlying assumptions of the traditional intellectuals need to be either 
superseded or incorporated into the new hegemonic project. 
 
                                                 
28 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 9. 
29 Ibid., p. 13. 
30 Ibid., p. 5. 
31 Ibid., p. 7. 
32 Ibid., p. 10. 
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Clearly, Gramsci’s conception of intellectuals is germane to this thesis which seeks 
to analyse a movement composed largely of intellectuals in the context of a specific 
hegemonic project. However, the categories into which Gramsci divides intellectuals 
are problematic. Some commentators have interpreted Gramsci’s notion of organic 
intellectuals as having primarily an ideological function. Zygmunt Bauman, for 
example, describes organic intellectuals as: 
 
those intellectuals who articulated the worldview, interests, intentions 
and historically determined potential of a particular class; who 
elaborated the values which needed to be promoted for such a potential 
to be fully developed; and who legitimised the historical role of a given 
class, its claim to power and to the management of the social process in 
terms of those values.33 
 
However, the notion of organic intellectuals would seem to be broader than Bauman 
suggests. Sassoon, for example, argues that organic intellectuals have an ideological, 
organisational and technical role.34 Gramsci himself, at one stage, includes the 
‘industrial technician’ in his definition of organic intellectuals, suggesting a role in 
the organisation of production.35 Others have argued that Gramsci’s distinction 
between organic and traditional intellectuals is ‘incoherent’.36  
 
Incoherent or not, it is clear that the category of organic intellectuals is potentially 
vast — including not only the activist partisan intellectuals under study in this thesis, 
but also, among others, bureaucrats, consultants and theorists of business 
organisation. Of course, Gramsci’s formulation of the function of intellectuals 
suffers from the same problem, already discussed, as the rest of his prison writings: 
                                                 
33 Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity, Routledge, London, 1992, p. 1. 
34 Anne Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci' s Politics, (2nd edition), Hutchinson Education, London, 1987, 
p. 139. 
35 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 5. 
36 T. J. Jackson Lears, 'The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities', p. 572; 
Jerome Karabel, ‘Revolutionary Contradictions: Antonio Gramsci and the Problem of Intellectuals’, 
Politics and Society, No. 6, 1976, pp. 123-172. 
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that of writing under fascist incarceration. But perhaps a further problem can be 
identified specifically in relation to Gramsci’s conception of intellectuals tied to the 
capitalist class. This problem stems from the fact that one of Gramsci’s main 
intellectual tasks in his prison writings was to formulate strategies for working class 
revolution; that is, ways in which the working class could articulate and construct a 
counter-hegemonic project capable of overthrowing bourgeois rule. A pre-condition 
for constructing a counter-hegemonic project was that the working class develop its 
own organic intellectuals. Therefore, much of his writing about intellectuals, 
particularly organic intellectuals, was concerned with this task. Gramsci argued that 
the revolutionary party needed to develop a new type of intellectual who would be 
more than just an effective communicator, but who would, rather, articulate a 
counter-hegemonic project through a synthesis of revolutionary theory and working 
class practice or lived experience: 
 
The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in 
eloquence, which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and 
passions, but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, 
organiser, “permanent persuader” and not just a simple orator.37 
 
Gramsci discussed organic intellectuals of the working class at greater length than he 
did those from the bourgeoisie. Yet, for the purposes of the present study, it is the 
relationship of a specific group of intellectuals to the capitalist class with which we 
are concerned. While it is tempting to theorise the radical neo-liberal movement as 
‘organic intellectuals’ of the capitalist class, it is argued in this thesis that the radical 
neo-liberals played a vanguard, rather than an organisational, role for the capitalist 
class in Australia.38 What can be salvaged, however, from Gramsci’s understanding 
of intellectuals, is that intellectuals are central to struggles for hegemony. Although 
the radical neo-liberals may not fit neatly into Gramsci’s notion of organic 
                                                 
37 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 10. 
38 This is in contrast to my earlier attempt to theorise neo-liberal intellectuals as organic intellectuals: 
see Damien Cahill, ‘Neo-liberal Intellectuals as Organic Intellectuals? Some Notes on the Australian 
Context’, Paper Presented to the APSA Conference, ANU, 2000. 
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intellectuals, they have nonetheless, as will be argued, played a crucial hegemonic 
function. 
 
Discourse and hegemony 
 
The compatibility of discourse analysis with the theory of hegemony has been noted 
by a number of theorists. In his studies of Thatcherism, Stuart Hall proposes a 
complementary relationship between Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and Foucault’s 
conception of discourse.39 Similarly, T. J. Jackson Lears argues that Gramsci’s 
emphasis upon the ways in which particular modes of language discourage the 
conceptualisation of political alternatives ‘anticipated Michel Foucault’s emphasis 
upon the role of “discursive practice” in reinforcing domination’.40 Discourse, for 
Foucault, is the vehicle for the production of knowledge, and thus of truth and 
meaning. The ways in which we speak about the world, and the ways in which the 
world is spoken about to us delimits the ways in which we conceive of the world and 
thus way we act within and upon the world. Discourse is shaped by national, 
institutional and temporal contexts. Foucault argues that, within such contexts, we 
can identify particular discursive formations — a set of linked and regularised 
statements, texts and concepts:  
 
Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements … a 
system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, 
concepts of thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, 
correlations, positions and functionings, transformations) we will say, 
for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with a discursive 
formation.41 
 
                                                 
39 Stuart Hall, ‘The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism Among the Theorists', pp.51-52. 
40 T. J. Jackson Lears, 'The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities', p. 569. 
41 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, Travistock Publications, London, 1977, p. 38. 
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Speaking or acting within a particular discursive formation is, for Foucault, an 
example of discursive practice. So discourse is more than language; it is 
fundamentally about practice as well. 
 
Discourse is one of the major mechanisms of hegemony. Discourse constructs its 
own subjects and objects — we see ourselves and others through discourse. 
Discourse constructs categories of the normal through the identification of difference 
and otherness. It is through discourse that subject positions consistent with a 
particular hegemonic project can be offered, and through discursive practice that 
such subject positions can be realised. It is also through discourse and discursive 
practice that the boundaries of common sense are defined. In any hegemonic project, 
discourse is deployed by social agents — whether it be classes, class fractions, state 
institutions, trade unions, media organisations or social movements — in order to re-
shape common sense, define opponents and offer subject positions consistent with 
that hegemonic project. In order to be successful, such discursive deployment must 
relate to social practice. That is, discourse must make sense in terms of the lived 
reality of its subjects. This has been recognised by the British Marxists who have 
analysed Thatcherism as a hegemonic project. Writing on Britain’s ‘Winter of 
Discontent’, Colin Hay argues: 
 
It was in distorting and simplifying, but above all in interpreting and 
giving meaning to, the events of the Winter of Discontent that 
Thatcherism sowed the seeds of its hegemonic project and secured state 
power.42 
 
Stuart Hall makes a similar point: 
 
‘Thatcherism’s … success and effectivity does not lie in its capacity to 
dupe unsuspecting folk but in the way it addresses real problems, real 
                                                 
42 Colin Hay, Re-stating Social and Political Change, p. 139. 
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and lived experiences, real contradictions — yet it is able to represent 
them within a logic of discourse which pulls them systematically into 
line with policies and class strategies of the right’.43 
 
Just as theorists of hegemony recognise that it is never absolute and always 
contested, so Foucault recognised that, because discourse is both subordinating and 
enabling, the potential for resistance is always present.  
 
State transformation and hegemony 
 
A major site of hegemonic struggle, and an important vehicle for the implementation 
of hegemonic strategy, is the state. The period examined in this thesis is one in 
which the Australian state underwent a major structural transformation: the 
Keynesian-welfare state was superseded by the neo-liberal state. Given that the 
subject of this thesis, the radical neo-liberal movement, had as its aim the 
dismantling of the Keynesian welfare state, it is necessary to establish a broad 
framework for understanding the Australian state: its limitations, potentialities and 
the relationships between the state and hegemony. 
 
A key concept that will be employed in this thesis for theorising the relationship 
between the state and hegemony is that of ‘state projects’. The notion of state 
projects is derived from the work of Bob Jessop. For Jessop it is ‘state projects’ that 
provide coherence to the different strategies and institutions of a state at any 
particular time. A state project is the broad program or logic that provides an 
overarching framework for the trajectory of the state and its relationship with the 
economy and civil society at any given time: 
 
To understand the never-ending and ever renewed process of state 
formation it is not enough to examine its institutional building blocks. 
                                                 
43 Stuart Hall quoted in Colin Hay, Re-stating Social and Political Change, p. 139. 
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We must also consider the ‘state projects’ which bond these blocks 
together with the result that the state gains a certain organisational unity 
and cohesiveness of purpose.44 
 
We can speak for example of the Keynesian welfare state project and the neo-liberal 
state project. State projects may overlay older state projects — such as the 
Keynesian welfare state project which overlay and complemented the earlier class 
compromise of the ‘Australian Settlement’ or ‘domestic defence’ model.  
 
State projects are the product of class struggle.  The state itself is an arena of class 
struggle. That is not to say, however, that the state is a neutral terrain for such 
struggle. To the extent that the state is a capitalist state it is predicated on the 
maintenance of the capitalist mode of production. Furthermore, the structural power 
of the bourgeoisie affords it a ‘privileged position’45 in relation to state project 
formation. Despite this, it is also mistaken to view the state as simply an instrument 
for the use by the bourgeoisie for its own ends. Not only do organised labour and 
other non-class forces such as social movements influence the formation of state 
projects, but, as Ralph Miliband recognised in his later years, the state itself, or 
sections within the state, may be actors in their own right with their own distinct 
interests (political parties, for example).46 It would be wrong, however, to imagine 
that, under normal circumstances, such interests could be completely divorced from 
the interests of capital or of specific fractions of capital. 
 
While the rationality of the capitalist state leads it in attempts to secure the expanded 
reproduction of capital, the outcomes of such attempts are by no means certain. State 
projects may throw up their own contradictions. For example, the provision by the 
                                                 
44 Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990, 
p. 353. 
45 This term is taken from Charles Lindblom, although it is used here more broadly than Lindblom 
intended. See Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets: the World’s Political-Economic Systems, 
Basic Books, New York, 1977, pp. 170-188. 
46 Ralph Miliband, Class Power and State Power, Verso, London, 1983, pp. 65-66. 
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state of accessible higher education may benefit the capitalist class by providing a 
larger pool of skilled labour, however it may also provide such labourers with the 
intellectual arsenal for critiquing the capitalist mode of production as an inherently 
exploitative relationship. To take another example, a state that regulates labour 
power with the aim of full employment may create the conditions whereby the 
power of the capitalist class is threatened by a confident labour movement. Even 
when the capitalist state attempts to work in the perceived interests of capital, the 
fact that the future is unknowable and that perfect knowledge of interests is 
impossible, means that the resulting state project may not, in fact, promote 
conditions for securing continued capital accumulation.47 
 
Jessop’s notion of state projects is part of what he calls a ‘strategic-relational’ 
approach for understanding the capitalist state.48 According to Jessop, while there 
are certain key features that characterise the capitalist state, it is impossible to speak 
of the capitalist state as an entity with a universal form across time and space. For 
example, the capitalist state enjoys a monopoly on the means of violence and 
coercion and through these, and the legal system, guarantees the enforcement of 
private property rights. Through taxation the state funds the development of 
infrastructure essential for the maintenance of a capitalist society. The state provides 
a framework for the sale and use of labour power as a commodity. The inbuilt 
rationality of the capitalist state is the maintenance of the capitalist mode of 
production. Beyond these broad parameters however, it is difficult to generalise 
about the features of the capitalist state. Indeed Jessop talks of the ‘capitalist type of 
state’: recognition that each particular capitalist state is a product of historic 
struggles and particular national and regional contexts.49 For Jessop also there are no 
guarantees that capitalist types of state will always act in the interests of the 
capitalist class as a whole or in a way that will enable the continuation of capital 
                                                 
47 Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place, p. 354. 
48 See for example, Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place, p. 149 and Bob 
Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 34-36. 
49 Bob Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State, pp. 37-42; Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the 
Capitalist State in its Place, pp. 355-358. 
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accumulation.50 The strategic-relational approach to understanding capitalist states 
involves analysing the particular ‘strategic capacities’ of a particular state at a 
particular time.51 This enables an appreciation of which particular groups are 
privileged at any given moment in time, which strategies for change and 
transformation are likely to be successful and what the limitations upon such 
strategies are likely to be.  
 
What does this mean for the relationship between the state and hegemony? Gramsci 
had, at times, a broad conception of the state: ‘One might say that State = political 
society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of 
coercion’.52 The state then, if it is not to govern through coercion alone, must fight 
for hegemony in the institutions and spaces of civil society. This is also true for state 
projects. In order to be successful, each state project requires a concomitant 
hegemonic project which acts upon those outside of the state as well as those 
institutions and individuals within the state itself.53 Conversely, the breakdown of a 
state hegemonic project may require the articulation of a new state project (in 
response to a legitimation crisis for example).54 
 
Hegemony: a multi-levelled approach 
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, theorists of hegemony in the last two decades 
have produced a rich source of tools with which Gramsci’s original work can be 
both interpreted and adjusted to the conditions of late twentieth century capitalism. 
The rise of neo-liberalism as the dominant ideology of governments globally helped 
to renew interest in hegemonic theory. The abandonment of the Keynesian welfare 
state in favour of the neo-liberal state raised questions about how and why 
                                                 
50 Bob Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State, p. 41. 
51 Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place, p. 10. 
52 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 263. 
53 Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place, p. 210. 
54 Colin Hay, Re-stating Social and Political Change, pp. 94-96. 
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fundamental shifts in relations between the state, capital and labour, and 
concomitant shifts in ideology, occur. 
 
Of particular relevance to this thesis are the debates that occurred among British 
Marxists who sought to analyse the phenomenon of ‘Thatcherism’ in terms of 
hegemony. The rise to power and subsequent longevity of Margaret Thatcher forced 
some within the British intellectual and political Left to rethink their analysis and 
political strategy. The Thatcher government set about dismantling many of the 
institutions of the post-war British consensus — of the welfare state. Thatcher also 
mounted a concerted and often violent assault upon the organised working class in 
Britain. At the same time, Thatcher was able to maintain power. She kept getting 
elected and the response by the Labor Party and the Left seemed to be ineffectual. 
So, Thatcher embarked upon a radical restructuring of the British state in the 
interests of sections of the capitalist class, all the while enjoying electoral success. 
This provided the context for Marxist scholars such as Stuart Hall and Martin 
Jacques, Andrew Gamble, Colin Hay and Bob Jessop, Kevin Bonnett, Simon 
Bromley and Tom Ling to attempt to understand the changes within British politics 
in terms of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. Their analyses offer useful insights for 
understanding changes that occurred in Australia during the same period. 
 
The first to make such an attempt — and perhaps the most well known proponents 
of the Thatcherism-as-a-hegemonic-project argument — were Stuart Hall and 
Martin Jacques.55 Hall and Jacques argued that Thatcherism was a hegemonic 
project: an attempt to restructure the British state — to move from a welfare state to 
neo-liberal state — and a concomitant attempt to recast ‘common sense’ in a way 
                                                 
55 See Martin Jacques, ‘Thatcherism — Breaking out of the Impasse’ in Stuart Hall and Martin 
Jacques (eds), The Politics of Thatcherism, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1983, pp. 40-62; Stuart 
Hall, ‘The Great Moving Right Show’ in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (eds), The Politics of 
Thatcherism, pp. 19-39; Stuart Hall, ‘Popular-Democratic vs Authoritarian Populism: Two Ways of 
‘Taking Democracy Seriously’ in Alan Hunt (ed), Marxism and Democracy, Lawrence and Wishart, 
London, 1980, pp. 157-185; Stuart Hall, ‘Authoritarian Populism: a Reply to Jessop et al’, New Left 
Review, No. 151, May/June 1985, pp. 115-124; Stuart Hall, ‘The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism 
Among the Theorists'. 
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that complemented such restructuring. Hall and Jacques described this process as 
‘authoritarian populism’. They argued that ideological space had been created for 
this project because of a crisis of hegemony in Britain during the 1970s.  The 
strength of the Hall and Jacques analysis is that, using insights from Foucauldian 
theory, they focused upon the discursive practices that underpinned the success of 
Thatcherism. However, this also left them open to the criticism that they were 
focusing primarily upon hegemonic discourses and not enough, or not at all, upon 
political economy, and the class interests that underpinned the restructuring of the 
British state.  
 
Where other British Marxists improved upon the Hall and Jacques argument was in 
their understanding of the nature of the hegemonic crisis confronting the British state 
in the 1970s and the concomitant recasting of the analysis of hegemony this 
suggested. It is these insights that I develop further here.  
 
In separate critiques, Andrew Gamble and Colin Hay made the key point that if 
Thatcherism was a hegemonic project, it was a hegemonic project that existed within 
the boundaries of the capitalist mode of production. The economic crisis of the 
1970s did not threaten the ‘basic legitimacy of the Western liberal capitalist 
system.’56 In the transformation from welfare capitalism to neo-liberal capitalism, 
the hegemony of the capitalist system itself was never seriously in doubt. As Colin 
Hay writes of the mid to late 1970s:  
 
… although there is no questioning that there was a crisis of the 
Keynesian Welfare State, the automatic supposition that this was in fact 
a reflection of a deeper crisis of capitalism and bourgeois hegemony is 
untenable.57 
 
                                                 
56 Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism, p. 13. 
57 Colin Hay, ‘Housing Policy in Transition: From the Post-war Settlement Towards and ‘Thatcherite’ 
Hegemony’, p. 34. 
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How then to explain this in hegemonic terms which had been traditionally conceived 
as struggles for and against the capitalist mode of production? The solution of both 
Hay and Gamble was to conceive of hegemony as operating at distinct ‘levels’, such 
that hegemony could be contested and perhaps reconfigured or overturned at one 
level, but remain relatively stable at another.  
 
Hay, for example, proposes that hegemony operates ‘at various levels of abstraction, 
such that at one level a crisis may be contained within the constraints of a stable 
bourgeois hegemony’.58 Under Hay’s schema, the different levels of hegemony are 
connected: ‘Each level from the ‘macro’ downwards is superimposed on all other 
levels below it, such that in sum total they constitute a complete picture of the social 
relations of civil society’.59 Such a conception is useful because it recognises not 
only different levels at which hegemony operates, but also that some levels of 
hegemony can inform others. Hay describes three levels of hegemony — the 
‘macro’, ‘meso’ and ‘micro’ levels. The macro level (‘class hegemony’) represents 
the hegemony of the capitalist organisation of society itself. The meso level 
(‘electoral hegemony’) refers to the hegemony of party and state and operates within 
the constraints of macro-level bourgeois hegemony. Both ‘state strategy’ and the 
‘electoral hegemony’ of the political party ensconced in power at the time are 
included in this level. The micro level (‘localised hegemony’) refers to hegemony 
exercised within a specific ‘micro-population’ — communities, social units such as 
‘the family’ — who give ‘active consent’ to ‘an ideological ‘common sense’.60 
 
Similarly, Andrew Gamble argues that ‘hegemony operates at three levels’: the level 
of the state; the level of the government or regime; and the level of the world 
system. It is worth quoting Gamble in full: 
 
                                                 
58 Ibid., p. 35. 
59 Ibid., p. 37. 
60 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
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At the level of a state, hegemony signifies the fundamental legitimacy 
and acceptance of the basic institutions and values of a social and 
political order, including critically those of the economy and the state, 
which is only questioned in very extreme circumstances, typically those 
of revolution, invasion or civil war. At the level of the government or 
regime, hegemony signifies that one particular party or faction has 
achieved a position of leadership and commands the active support, or at 
least acquiescence, of leading economic sectors and key social groups. 
At the level of the world system, hegemony signifies the political and 
intellectual leadership of a nation-state whose economic and military and 
cultural capacities allow it to take on state functions for the world system 
as a whole.61 
 
Gamble argues that the world-wide economic crisis of the 1970s represented a 
breakdown of hegemony at the level of the world system and this was manifested 
domestically in Britain as a breakdown in hegemony at the regime level. The 
strength of Gamble’s schema is that it identifies regime-level hegemony as a distinct 
field and links state hegemonic formations to the structure of world capitalism. 
Gamble also recognises the durability of capitalist hegemony — he argues that the 
economic crisis of the 1970s did not threaten the ‘basic legitimacy of the Western 
liberal capitalist system’62 — and contrasts this with hegemony at the world system 
and regime levels, which are always contested and subject to change. It is for this 
reason, argues Gamble, that ‘at the level of regimes and world systems political 
projects to win hegemony are encountered much more frequently than hegemony 
itself’.63  
 
                                                 
61 Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism, p. 13. 
62 Ibid., p. 13. 
63 Ibid., p. 13. 
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Both Hay and Gamble outline useful schemas for a multi-levelled understanding of 
hegemony. Both however contain shortcomings. These shortcomings will be 
discussed and a more useful multi-levelled approach to hegemony outlined. 
 
Colin Hay’s conception of ‘meso’ level (‘electoral’) hegemony, includes both ‘party 
ideologies’ and ‘state strategy’. It would seem that Hay is conflating electoral 
hegemony and the hegemony of specific state projects. In this case it means 
conflating the Thatcherite hegemonic project with the hegemonic project of neo-
liberalism in Britain. In the case of Australia it would mean conflating the specific 
hegemonic project of the Hawke and Keating Labor governments with the state 
project of neo-liberalism, to which they were broadly committed. While the two are 
inextricably related, and while the latter certainly informs and conditions the former, 
they are also distinct hegemonic projects. Recognising the differences between these 
two levels of hegemony allows for an appreciation of how opposing political parties 
— such as Labour and Conservative in Britain, or Labor and Liberal in Australia — 
can both be committed to the same broad features of a state-level project — such as 
Keynesian welfare capitalism or neo-liberal capitalism — but still pursue, within 
these parameters, their own distinct hegemonic projects. Such a conflation of 
different levels of hegemony is perhaps a product of the historical and political 
context within which it was written. Given that Thatcherism coincided with and was 
a vehicle for the neo-liberal offensive, it is understandable, and perhaps inevitable, 
that electoral hegemony and state-project-level hegemony would be conflated. 
 
Similarly, in his description of hegemony at the level of the world system, Gamble 
conflates what would appear to be distinct levels of hegemony. Specifically, Gamble 
fails to distinguish between the world system itself and the particular ways in which 
the world system is structured in any given historical period. Immanuel Wallerstein, 
who has been central to the development of world-system theory, describes the 
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contemporary world system as the ‘capitalist world-economy’.64 The capitalist 
world-economy has experienced several transformations in structure (mercantilism, 
Fordism, neo-liberalism) whilst maintaining the fundamental principles upon which 
it is organised: the private ownership and control of the means of production, 
distribution and exchange, and the existence of labour-power as a commodity. 
Therefore, a loss of hegemony of a particular set of relations central to the way in 
which the world system is structured, does not necessarily undermine the hegemony 
of the world system itself. The crisis of Fordism, which Gamble identifies as a 
breakdown in hegemony at the level of the world system, was in fact a breakdown in 
hegemony at the level of the world system structure, and subsequent struggles have 
sought to win hegemony for a new world system structure — that of the Washington 
Consensus. Gamble also does not allow for the possibility that state hegemonic 
projects may sometimes be in opposition to the world-system structure or that, at the 
very least, they may not be a simple reflection of it. 
 
Despite such criticisms, the multi-levelled analysis of hegemony outlined by Hay 
and Gamble offers a significant advance in our understanding of hegemony. I 
propose, however, hegemony is more usefully conceived of as operating at five 
distinct but related levels: the level of the world system; the level of the world 
system structure; the level of the nation-state; the level of the state-project; and the 
level of the regime. This is represented diagrammatically in Figure 1.1 and outlined 
below. 
 
At the level of the world system, hegemony indicates consent to the deep underlying 
structures of the international economic order. Following Wallerstein, since about 
the 1500s this has been the world capitalist economy.65 According to Hay’s schema 
then, hegemony at the level of the world system is ‘class hegemony’. 
                                                 
64 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1979. 
65 Wallerstein says the ‘capitalist world economy came into existence in Europe somewhere between 
1450 and 1550 as a mode of resolving the “crisis of feudalism” that had shaken this same Europe in 
 40
Figure 1.1 Levels of Hegemony 
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The world-system structure refers to the particular institutions, ideologies and 
relations that structure the world system in any historical period — eg mercantilism, 
Fordism or the Washington Consensus. This equates with what Cox refers to as 
‘world hegemony’, which often begins by the ‘outward expansion’ of the hegemonic 
project of the dominant class in a dominant nation (such as the United States, in the 
case of Fordism).66 Hegemony at this level, then, is the consent to and legitimacy of 
these institutions, ideologies and relations.  
 
At the level of the nation-state, hegemony indicates what Gamble describes as: 
 
the fundamental legitimacy and acceptance of the basic institutions and 
values of a social and political order, including those of the economy and 
the state, which is only questioned in very extreme circumstances, 
typically those of revolution, invasion or civil war.67 
 
Examples in Australia are the liberal democratic system, the Constitution, 
Parliament, the High Court and legal system and its enforcement and the private 
ownership and control of the means of production, distribution and exchange.  
 
At the level of the state-project, hegemony denotes the acceptance of the particular 
configuration of capital-state-labour relations and the ideologies which support this 
in any given period — the Keynesian welfare state and the neo-liberal/competition 
state are examples of state-projects. 
 
Hegemony at the level of the regime is as described by Gamble:  
 
At the level of the government or regime, hegemony signifies that one 
particular party or faction has achieved a position of leadership and 
                                                 
66 Robert W. Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method’, p. 61. 
67 Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism, , pp. 12-13. 
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commands the active support, or at least acquiescence, of leading 
economic sectors and key social groups.68 
 
Although distinct, these different levels of hegemony are also related. The 
hegemony of the world system, for example, is often reflected in the hegemony of 
the nation-state. The hegemony of the world system structure often conditions both 
regime-level and state-project-level hegemony. In the period from the end of World 
War Two until the mid 1970s, for example, the state projects of advanced capitalist 
nations — the Keynesian welfare state project — complemented the world system 
structure of the time — Fordism. Furthermore, the hegemony of Fordism depended, 
in part, upon the maintenance of the hegemony of the welfare state in the advanced 
capitalist nations. Hegemonic projects can be overlaid on others — for example the 
hegemony at the level of state-project might overlay, build upon and complement 
the hegemony at the level of the state, whilst hegemony at the regime level might be 
overlaid on hegemony at the level of state-project. 
 
Because hegemony is never total, the rejection of previous hegemonic relations is 
never total. Therefore, a counter-hegemonic project will often incorporate aspects of 
the previous set of hegemonic relations — for example, neo-liberalism in practice 
contains a good dose of Keynesianism. 
 
Hegemony at the level of the regime — that is, the hegemonic projects of particular 
governments or parties — can be further usefully segmented by, again, drawing 
upon debates in British Marxism regarding the theorisation of Thatcherism as a 
hegemonic project. Of particular relevance here is the work by Jessop, Bonnett, 
Bromley and Ling who differentiate between ‘One Nation’ and ‘Two Nations’ 
hegemonic strategies. One Nation hegemonic strategies are primarily inclusive, they  
                                                 
68 Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism, p. 13. 
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aim at an ‘expansive conception of the social and political community wherein all 
interests in the society are ideally able to share its material and symbolic rewards.’69 
Two Nations hegemonic strategies, in contrast, rely upon exclusion through a 
‘conception of the society in which only those who are part of the privileged nation 
can share in its benefits’.70 Furthermore, Two Nations hegemonic projects may 
require attacks — rhetorical or physical — against those excluded from it: 
 
‘two nations’ projects require containment and even repression of the 
‘other nation’ at the same time as they involve selective access and 
concessions for the more favoured ‘nation’.71 
 
These are ideal types, and in order for them to be useful it must be recognised that 
One Nation hegemonic strategies inevitably entail some strategies of exclusion and 
Two Nations hegemonic strategies inevitably entail some strategies of inclusion. 
What concerns us here, however, is the primary characteristic of a regime’s 
hegemonic strategy. 
 
This multi-levelled approach to hegemony is used in Chapter Four to provide a 
framework for understanding the major changes that occurred within Australian 
capitalism from the 1970s through to the 1990s. It provides the basis for analysing 
the relationship between the radical neo-liberal movement and neo-liberal hegemony 
in Australia. Given this, it is worth briefly outlining the application of the multi-
levelled framework to the Australian context. 
 
The context for the rise of the radical neo-liberal movement was the crisis of 
Fordism and the welfare state that confronted Australia in the mid 1970s. The crisis 
of Fordism was a crisis of hegemony at the level of the world system structure, and 
this was manifested domestically in Australia as a crisis of hegemony at the state-
                                                 
69 Bob Jessop, Kevin Bonnett, Simon Bromley and Tom Ling, Thatcherism: a Tale of Two Nations, 
Polity Press, Cambridge, 1988, p. 163. 
70 Ibid., p. 163. 
71 Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place, p. 212. 
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project level: a crisis of hegemony for the welfare state and the ‘Australian 
settlement’. Neither the Whitlam Labor government, nor the Fraser Liberal 
government, were effectively able to resolve these crises. The crisis of hegemony 
provided a window of opportunity for a coalition of interests — led by finance, 
mining and Australian monopoly capital — to articulate a counter-hegemonic state 
project: neo-liberalism. 
 
After its electoral victory in 1983, the Hawke Labor government agreed to the broad 
parameters of this counter-hegemonic project, and undertook a radical restructuring 
of the Australian state and began to dismantle some of the key features of the 
welfare state and Australian settlement. Although there was disagreement over the 
precise form it should take, much of Australian capital, the leadership of both major 
parties, much of the mainstream media and much of the federal bureaucracy were 
committed to the broad parameters of this neo-liberal state project. At the same time, 
the Hawke, and later the Keating, Labor government had to secure hegemony for its 
continued occupation of office federally. In order to do this, successive Labor 
governments pursued a ‘One Nation’ regime-level hegemonic strategy. Labor’s One 
Nation hegemonic strategy was an attempt to minimise the inevitable conflict arising 
from their implementation of the state project of neo-liberalism. Through the process 
of the Accord and close liaison with key capitalists, Labor attempted to incorporate 
the organised working class into its hegemonic project as well as head off the 
possibility of a capitalist revolt. Through the social wage and the expansive 
conception of rights — particularly on issues pertaining to women, migrants and 
indigenous Australians — Labor was able to promise that under the neo-liberal 
restructuring of the state, more people would be able to enjoy the material and 
symbolic rewards of capitalist economic growth. 
 
The Coalition in contrast articulated a Two Nations hegemonic strategy. While in 
opposition, particularly under Howard and Hewson, the Coalition committed 
themselves to pursuing the state project of neo-liberalism with greater vigour than 
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Labor, and specifically attacked trade unions, those on welfare and groups connected 
with the new social movements. In addition, the Coalition mobilised popular racist 
sentiments and insecurities to attack Labor’s multicultural and indigenous affairs 
policies. While promising that everybody would be better off under neo-liberalism, 
their’s was a strategy fundamentally based upon exclusion. Upon winning office in 
1996, this exclusionary Two Nations strategy was pursued with vigour. 
 
 
Class conflict, class fractions and class interests 
 
Just as class conflict is the central dynamic of capitalist society, so is it the central 
dynamic that drives hegemony. But there is much more to this process than simply 
the conflict between an undifferentiated mass of capitalists struggling against a 
similarly undifferentiated mass of workers. It is necessary to explicate the notion of 
classes and class conflict in order to be able to account for the central dynamics of 
struggles for hegemony. 
 
The first conceptual tool for analysing class conflict that requires explication is that 
of interests. This thesis adopts an analytical rather than ethical or normative 
approach to understanding interests.72 That is, interests are understood as providing 
motivation for political action. This is in contrast to the position, exemplified by 
Lukes, whereby ‘real’ or ‘true’ interests can somehow be identified.73 In a capitalist 
society, the central dynamic of that society — class struggle between proletariat and 
bourgeoisie — will shape and structure such interests. Class location has a major 
bearing on how individuals or groups understand the world, their place within it and 
their relationship with other individuals or other groups. The dominant position of 
the bourgeoisie gives it enormous power to shape the perceptions of subordinate 
groups. However, under the analytical approach to interests adopted here, it makes 
                                                 
72 This distinction is taken from Colin Hay, Political Analysis, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002, pp. 182-
187. 
73 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, Macmillan, London, 1974. 
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little sense to speak of false consciousness, or interests that are not recognised by 
individuals, groups or classes. Whilst it may be true that the working class has a 
‘fundamental interest’74 in achieving socialism, if such an interest is not recognised 
by a class, then it is irrelevant in accounting for why a class, fractions of a class, or 
those who occupy a contradictory location within class relations (as discussed 
below), act in particular ways. So, although class conflict is embedded in the 
capitalist mode of production itself, this is not sufficient, in and of itself, to deduce 
class interests. Rather, it is necessary to investigate the particular historical 
contingencies — such as changes to the organisation of production, the alignment of 
other non-class forces and the role of international economic factors — that shape 
interests at any one time. In Chapter Four, the particular circumstances that led to 
certain sections of the capitalist class identifying their interests in the neo-liberal 
restructuring of the Australian state are identified. This provides the context for 
explaining why these capitalists saw their interests served by supporting the radical 
neo-liberal movement and, conversely, why others did not. 
 
The second conceptual tool for understanding class conflict is that of class 
‘fractions’. It is difficult to speak of the interests of the capitalist class as a whole 
beyond its interest in the maintenance of the capitalist system itself. Rather, it is 
more often the case that there are fractions of capital with particular interests who 
seek to translate these interests into dominant interests. Classes are historically 
emergent phenomena and thus the class make-up of a society is not fixed over time. 
As classes develop over time, particular groups — ‘fractions’ or ‘sections’ within 
those classes, with their own specific interests — may emerge. Marx and Engels 
describe the formation of ‘sections’ or ‘fractions’ within the bourgeoisie: 
 
                                                 
74 Erik Olin Wright, Class, Crisis and the State, Verso, London, 1983, pp. 88-91. 
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The bourgeoisie itself develops only gradually together with its 
conditions, splits according to the division of labour into various sections 
and finally absorbs all propertied classes it finds in existence75 
 
Marxists have further developed the concept of fractions to include the possibility 
that fractions can also exist within the proletariat.76 Fractions have their own specific 
interests because they are defined by specific positions within the organisation of 
production. So, we can speak of, for example, different fractions of the Australian 
bourgeoisie, such as finance capital, mining capital, farming capital, retail capital, all 
differentiated by their position within the economy, and all with their own specific 
interests — in addition to the common interest they all share an opposition to the 
proletariat and in maintaining the capitalist system. This means that inter-class 
conflict (conflict between fractions within the one class) is quite common. Marx 
recognised this in the Poverty of Philosophy: 
 
If all the members of the modern bourgeoisie have the same interest 
inasmuch as they form a class as against another class, they have 
opposite, antagonistic interests inasmuch as they stand face to face with 
one another77 
 
Fractions of capital compete with each other, mobilise and seek to transform the 
state and hegemony in their own interests. Furthermore, fractions of the bourgeoisie 
may unite to form what Poulantzas calls a ‘power bloc’78 — an alliance of class 
fractions united by a common interest. 
 
                                                 
75 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, p. 85. 
76 See for example Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, pp. 23-24. 
77 Karl Marx quoted in John Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation and 
Conflict in the Coal Industry, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, p. 2. 
78 Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, p. 24. 
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The third conceptual tool relevant to this thesis for understanding class conflict is 
Erik Olin Wright’s notion of ‘contradictory locations within class relations’.79 This 
perspective accounts for the group of people that rapidly expanded in the second half 
of the twentieth century and that occupies a position between traditional conceptions 
of the bourgeoisie and proletariat: the group commonly referred to as the ‘middle 
class’. Clearly, this is of fundamental importance to the present study which analyses 
a specific group of intellectuals who, in any intuitive classification, belong to this 
‘middle class’. Wright argues that, for the capitalist class, the ownership of 
production has three components: control over the physical means of production; 
control over the labour power of others; and control over investments and resource 
location. Conversely, the proletariat, which is forced to sell its labour, enjoys none 
of these qualities: 
 
capitalists control the accumulation process, decide how the physical 
means of production are to be used, and control the authority structure 
within the labour process. Workers, in contrast, are excluded from the 
control over authority relations, the physical means of production, and 
the investment process.80 
 
These three factors thus form the basis of the central antagonistic relationship 
between capital and labour. If the capitalist class shares all of these factors, and the 
working class is excluded from all of these factors, what about those groups who 
share only one or two of these factors? For Wright, such groups occupy 
‘contradictory locations within class relations’. Examples given by Wright are 
groups such as ‘semi-autonomous employees’ who have no control over the labour 
power of others but might have minimal control over investment and allocation of 
resources and minimal control over the physical means of production.81 They thus 
occupy a ‘contradictory location’.  
                                                 
79 Erik Olin Wright, Class, Crisis and the State, pp. 30-110. 
80 Ibid., p. 73. 
81 Ibid., p. 63. 
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The fourth conceptual tool for understanding class conflict is that of mobilisation. 
This refers to the process whereby a class, class fraction or power bloc organises its 
resources in pursuit of its interests and against the interests of another class, class 
fraction or other non-class actor. Mobilisation describes the process whereby classes, 
class fractions and power blocs act upon their interests. Chapter Four discusses the 
process whereby fractions of capital in Australia mobilised to attack and undermine 
the power of organised labour and fractions of capital, as well as to reorient the 
Australian state — to dismantle the state project of welfare capitalism and replace 
with the state project of neo-liberal capitalism. 
 
The final relevant conceptual tools for understanding the process of class conflict, 
particularly its relation to hegemony, are Bob Jessop’s notions of ‘class belonging’ 
agents, ‘non-class’ agents and ‘class relevant’ struggles.82 While struggle between 
classes may be the starting point of the analysis of political conflict, it is by no 
means its end point. Other social actors, who are not obviously classes or fractions 
of classes, also engage in political struggle and may attempt — themselves or in 
alliance with class forces or class fractions — to transform hegemonic relations. 
Social movements are perhaps the most obvious of such non-class agents. The 
actions of non-class agents can have an impact on the outcome of hegemonic 
struggle. They may also form alliances with classes or class fractions. Thus, 
although not ‘class belonging’, non-class agents such as social movements can have 
an impact that is ‘class relevant’. This thesis examines the impact of one such non-
class agent — the radical neo-liberal movement — in class relevant struggles for 
hegemony. 
 
 
Elite social movements and hegemony 
 
                                                 
82 Bob Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State, pp. 31-32. 
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The major non-class agent examined in this thesis is an elite social movement — the 
radical neo-liberal movement. Later chapters analyse its relationship to struggles for 
neo-liberal hegemony in Australia, and thus examine its class relevance. Before 
undertaking such an analysis however, it is necessary to outline what is meant by the 
notion of an elite social movement.  
 
As its name implies, an elite social movement is primarily comprised of elites. That 
is, the participants in an elite social movement tend to be drawn from contradictory 
locations within class relations or from the dominant class and thus enjoy a 
privileged position in symbol manipulation, access to political decision makers and 
financial resources. Elite social movements are thus distinct from the ‘new social 
movements’ — such as the environment, women’s, gay and Aboriginal rights 
movements — whose roots are in popular protest by groups and individuals from a 
more diverse range of class locations. As a movement, they are also distinct from 
interest groups. Movements do not necessarily rely upon formal categories of 
membership, rather, movement membership is determined by participation. Whilst 
formally constituted organisations and interest groups may be central to their 
survival, movements are more than the sum of their parts, and exist beyond the 
boundaries of such groups. Movements are dynamic social actors who seek not only 
to influence state policies, but, very often, to bring about broad based social, cultural 
and political change in accordance with the ideologies around which they cohere. 
Elite social movements then are a unique political agent, distinct from both the 
celebrated new social movements and from interest groups, but containing elements 
of both. 
 
Only a handful of commentators have suggested the idea of elite social movements 
as a framework for understanding a particular type of political agent. Unfortunately 
none of these provide a comprehensive framework. For example, Bob Jessop 
mentions the term in reference to one type of non-class group that may be involved 
in hegemonic struggles to ‘realign diverse institutional orders, identities and 
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interests’.83 Boies and Pichardo outline a framework for understanding ‘elite social 
movement organisations’ (ESMOs).84 Importantly, Boies and Pichardo conclude that 
ESMOs, in contrast to other movement organisations: 
 
have the advantage of financial and occupational resources. They need 
not worry about maintaining the commitment and dedication of a mass 
following … Because ESMOs lack a mass base, any organisational 
efforts centre on the participants’ monetary and occupational resources.85 
 
Leslie Sklair uses this framework to critique the ESMOs — what she calls ‘social 
movements for capitalism’ — that help cohere the ‘transnational capitalist class’.86 
Other authors similarly study right-wing groups in American through the lens of 
movement theory. Michael Lind argues that, what he terms the ‘conservative 
movement’ is ‘the product of politics from above, not below'.87 Lind argues that the 
elite conservative social movement in the US has been able to use sophisticated 
targeting techniques to mobilise constituencies on particular issues but that the 
movement is very much controlled by ‘tree-tops’ organisations rather than by the 
grass roots. Sara Diamond recognises that right-wing movements tend to be 
supportive of ‘prevailing power structures’, however she also argues that they have 
their own interests which are opposed at least to some aspects of the status quo. Thus 
right-wing movements are ‘partially oppositional and partially … system 
supportive’.88 
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Although underdeveloped, these studies suggest two important features of elite 
social movements. First, following from Jessop, elite social movements, due to their 
class location, are likely to engage in attempts to augment the hegemony of the 
dominant class rather than challenge it. Elite social movements, by their very nature, 
occupy a privileged position in relation to other groups in society. It is therefore 
nonsensical to speak of them as oppressed. Although not oppressed, the agenda of an 
elite social movement may nonetheless be marginal in a given context, at a given 
time. An agenda can be marginal without representing the interests or expressing the 
grievances, of an oppressed group. Importantly, although such an agenda might be 
marginal, the broad ideological commitment of an elite social movement is likely to 
be supportive of dominant social relations. In the case of the radical neo-liberal 
movement, although fiercely opposed to the Keynesian welfare state, it also 
vehemently defends the capitalist organisation of society. Second, elite social 
movements are unlikely to employ mass mobilisations or protests as their primary 
political strategy. Unlike the new social movements they are able to use their 
privileged position to gain access to the media, the capitalist class and political 
decision makers. The fact that they align themselves at least to some extent with the 
interests of the dominant class means that they do not require a mass base for their 
continued existence. Rather, they are able to rely upon support from sections of 
capital. 
 
Elite social movements and social movement theory 
 
Clearly there are differences between elite social movements and, what has been the 
primary object of the study of social movements — the ‘new social movements’ 
(NSM). Social movement theorists have rarely recognised the existence of elite 
social movements. As Sara Diamond notes of social movement studies, 'even the 
best scholarly research has tended to focus disproportionately on social movements 
opposed to the status quo'.89 This is perhaps because movement theorists have 
                                                 
89 Ibid., p. 6. 
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tended to make two major assumptions about the new social movements: first that 
their emergence reflects a broader shift from an industrial to a ‘post-industrial’ 
society (in which struggles occurred around the ‘grammar of forms of life’90 and the 
‘life-world’91 rather than the ‘problems of distribution’ characteristic of class 
politics);92 and second, that social movements are primarily movements of the 
oppressed. It is little wonder then that elite social movements are excluded, apriori, 
from the ‘NSM paradigm’.93 However, if we put the ‘NSM paradigm’ aside and 
focus upon the internal dynamics of new social movements, we can identify a 
number of useful tools within NSM theory for understanding elite social movements. 
 
Definitions of social movements vary, however Verity Burgmann’s encapsulates 
much of the concerns of the literature: a social movement is ‘an enduring process of 
confrontation characterised by capacity for protest’94 and is thus dynamic rather than 
static; a social movement is characterised by an ‘acknowledgement of a common 
interest among a specific group of people against another, equally defined, group of 
people’;95 social movements promote their interests and challenge their enemies 
through collective action aimed at social change;96 social movements engage in a 
dialectical process of ‘agitation’ and ‘articulation’ whereby the perception of, and 
action upon, society is mediated through discourse and this discourse is itself 
conditioned by such action.97 These four categories also provide a useful framework 
for understanding elite social movements. Chapter Three uses these broad criteria to 
discuss the way in which radical neo-liberals cohere as a movement. 
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Collective action is an obvious feature of the new social movements because it 
constitutes their most visible features — public protest. Elite social movements in 
contrast may have less need for public protest. By their very nature, participants in 
elite social movements enjoy privileged social positions and therefore the collective 
action of such movements may take a different form than that traditionally 
associated with new social movements. One branch of social movement theory — 
Resource Mobilisation Theory — helps us to understand this process by focussing 
attention on the resources available to a social movement at any given time.98 This is 
of particular importance in distinguishing elite social movements from other social 
movements because the former may have access to resources from which the latter is 
excluded (such as various forms of corporate support, access to the mass media and 
access to state apparatuses). It will therefore be important to examine the resources 
available to the radical neo-liberal movement and the effect that this has had upon its 
fortunes.  
 
In understanding collective action, social movement theorists have also focussed 
upon the ‘repertoires of contention’ developed by or available to the social 
movements.99 ‘Repertoires of contention’ are the modes of political action available 
to a social movement. The range of such modes may be limited in scope and 
conditioned by historical factors. For example, as is argued in Chapters Two and 
Three, the Australian radical neo-liberal movement inherited many of its repertoires 
of contention from overseas think tanks and networks. 
 
One important internal aspect of social movements is mobilising structures or social 
movement organisations. Mobilising structures are: ‘those collective vehicles, 
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informal as well as formal, though which people mobilise and engage in collective 
action’.100 For the radical neo-liberal movement, the most important mobilising 
structures are the think tank and the forum. Similar phenomena have been noted 
overseas. For example, in his study of the ‘conservative intellectual movement’ that 
grew in America during the decades after World War Two, George H. Nash 
highlights the importance of foundations and think tanks for the movement.101 The 
benefits derived from such organisations were not merely financial. More 
importantly, movement organisations brought activists into a dialogue with each 
other through journals, forums, seminars and fellowships. Given the generally small 
social base of elite social movements, the ability to utilise such well-financed 
organisational structures is clearly crucial if they are to have an impact 
disproportionate to the size of their participant base. 
 
Academic literature on think tanks has grown during the last decade.102 Much of this 
literature provides useful insights for understanding radical neo-liberal think tanks 
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and how they operate. Scholars have, for example, highlighted the importance for 
many think tanks of maintaining an image of independence from vested interests.103 
This is crucial in order that the knowledge they produce has legitimacy and is not 
branded as biased — particularly in the case of think tanks which rely upon 
corporate funding for their survival. Still others have noted that think tanks tend to 
be ‘second hand dealers in ideas’: that is, rather than producing original research, 
think tanks are particularly adept at condensing, applying and popularising existing 
research that conforms to their own world views.104 Some have thus viewed think 
tanks as undertaking the role of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ — a conduit between 
academe and the world of policy making.105 Although much of the literature 
regarding think tanks in fundamentally flawed due to its tendency to treat think tanks 
as ‘a distinct form of political actor’106 and not to view the power of think tanks as 
deriving from the interests and social forces that they represent, or with which they 
are aligned, it is nonetheless useful for understanding the internal dynamics of a 
particular form of mobilising structure or social movement organisation. 
 
While some scholars have focussed upon the mobilising structures of social 
movements, others have drawn attention to the potential for the emergence of social 
movements to produce ‘counter-mobilisations’.107 That is, attempts by social 
movements to challenge prevailing power structures can stimulate the mobilisation 
of groups who wish to defend prevailing power structures. In this sense, the radical 
neo-liberal movement can be viewed emerging, at least partially, in response to the 
successes of the labour, environment, feminist and Aboriginal rights movements.  
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Social movement theorists have long recognised the importance of ‘political 
opportunity structures’108 — the political context within which movements exist — 
as one determinant of a movement’s success, and this thesis proposes that the 
hegemonic context is the appropriate framework for understanding the political 
opportunity structure available to the radical neo-liberal movement in Australia. 
Hegemony as a framework with which to analyse social movements has been 
pioneered by Canadian sociologist William Carroll.109 Carroll suggests that social 
movements can be understood as agents of counter-hegemony. Existing within civil 
society and challenging particular social relations, social movements may be 
involved in ‘a disorganisation of consent, a disruption of hegemonic discourses and 
practices’.110 Like most social movement theory, Carroll’s focus is also upon 
movements of the oppressed, but this need not pose a problem. Given the multi-level 
understanding of hegemony developed herein, it is clear that challenges to 
hegemony can come from dominant as well as from subordinate groups, and 
therefore elite social movements can play counter-hegemonic roles. Elite social 
movements are but one type of non-class agent who nonetheless engage in struggles 
for hegemony, and as such, whose impact may be class relevant. 
 
The deployment of discourse has also been identified as central to the collective 
action of social movements. The notion of framing is used by many theorists to 
describe the process whereby, through discourse and discursive practice, movements 
make sense of the world and construct new identities for their participants as well 
offering new frames of interpretation for those outside of the movement. In 
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evaluating the place of the radical neo-liberal movement in struggles over neo-
liberal hegemony this thesis considers the discursive formation deployed by the 
movement, their relationship to other hegemonic discourses, and the extent to which 
such discursive formations were deployed by other, more powerful, social actors and 
institutions. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined a multi-levelled framework for understanding hegemonic 
struggle, the outcomes of which are conditioned by both class and non-class agents. 
The multi-levelled approach to hegemony recognises that major shifts in hegemony 
can occur within the bounds of relatively stable capitalist hegemonic relations. 
Although class conflict provides the central dynamic of hegemony, hegemony is not 
reducible to class conflict. Within the capitalist class, fractions, with their own 
distinct interests, compete to translate their interests into the dominant interests. 
Fractions may form power blocs or alliances to further such interests. However, 
agents who are not class belonging are also often involved in struggles for 
hegemony and therefore may have effects that are class relevant. The major non-
class agent examined in this chapter is that of the elite social movement. Elite social 
movements differ from the celebrated new social movements in that they are 
comprised of elites — of those drawn from the dominant class or from contradictory 
locations within class relations — and, because of this, seek to augment capitalist 
hegemony rather than overthrow it. Despite these differences there are also many 
parallels between elite social movements and new social movements. Elite social 
movements are dynamic, engage in social protest, employ discursive formations to 
contest hegemonic truths, and cohere through their own form of social movement 
organisations: think tanks. This thesis will employ the framework outlined in this 
chapter to analyse the relationship between the radical neo-liberal movement and 
neo-liberal hegemony in Australia. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Radical Neo-liberal Ideology 
 
 
 
 
This chapter examines the central tenets of radical neo-liberal ideology as they have 
developed in Australia. First, the intellectual antecedents of the movement are 
discussed. This provides insights into the concepts and contradictions that form the 
intellectual inheritance of the movement, and serves to situate the movement 
historically. Second, the core themes of the movement’s ideology are identified. This 
is done by drawing upon the published records of the movement: journals, 
newsletters, books, conference proceedings and speeches. The basic world-view of 
the radical neo-liberal movement remained constant over the period with which this 
thesis is concerned. Its policy priorities have been added to and modified slightly, 
but they have not fundamentally changed. Movement activists have synthesised and 
drawn upon philosophical arguments first articulated by thinkers discussed earlier in 
the chapter, but these ideas have been tailored to suit the Australian political context. 
Indeed, much like their counter-parts overseas, they are 'second-hand dealers in 
ideas'. As activists convinced of the correctness, superiority and morality of their 
own views, their purpose has been not merely to engage with other intellectuals, but 
rather to change the face of the policy landscape and to shift both elite and public 
opinion in a direction more favourable to radical neo-liberal ideas. In line with this 
activist nature, neo-liberal think tanks have tended to produce polemical, 
philosophical and propagandistic, as opposed to technical, knowledge. This forms 
the basis for a discussion of the policy alternatives advocated by the movement. 
Finally, what I term the ‘Markets, Morals and Civil Society Project’ is examined in 
order to identify the ways in which the radical neo-liberal movement has attempted 
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to defend itself against criticisms and reconcile itself with the conservative 
intellectual tradition in Australia 
 
 
Antecedents of radical neo-liberalism 
 
Australian radical neo-liberals are primarily ‘second hand dealers in ideas’. Their 
ideology and language are largely derived from overseas intellectuals and think 
tanks. The most important debt owed by the radical neo-liberal movement is to the 
small group of right-wing academics and journalists actively opposed to what they 
viewed as the Keynesian consensus that was dominant in western democracies after 
World War Two.1 In what was essentially a backlash against social democracy, 
academics such as Friederich von Hayek, Milton Friedman and the Public Choice 
theorists developed a critique of welfare states that was imported to Australian 
radical neo-liberals via think tanks and networks such as the Monty Pelerin Society 
and the Atlas Foundation. 2 For Hayek the welfare state was just one manifestation 
of ‘collectivism’ and would inevitably lead to totalitarianism.3 He argued that 
welfare states subordinated individual liberty to the dictates of a central planning 
authority, and were thus neither free or moral societies. Friedman similarly saw a 
link between ‘economic freedom’ (the freedom from constraint with regard to one’s 
                                                 
1 The importance of Hayek, Friedman and the Public Choice School in the development of radical 
neo-liberal ideology in Australia has been noted by: Marian Sawer, 'Philosophical Underpinnings of 
Australian Libertarianism' in Marian Sawer (ed.), Australia and the New Right, pp. 20-37; David 
Kemp, 'Liberalism and Conservatism in Australia Since 1944', pp. 344-45; Chris James, Chris Jones 
and Andrew Norton, ‘The Liberal Party and Economic Rationalism’ in Chris James, Chris Jones & 
Andrew Norton, A Defence of Economic Rationalism, Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, 1993, pp. 116-
17. 
2 Not only did such organisations facilitate the importation of ideas, they provided organisational 
support as well. In 1981 Mont Pelerin member and founder of the British Institute of Economic 
Affairs, Anthony Fisher, established the Atlas foundation, the purpose of which was to provide 
intellectual and organisational support for the establishment of neo-liberal think tanks around the 
world. (For a discussion of this, see Richard Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think Tanks and the 
Economic Counter-Revolution 1931-1983, Harper Collins, London, 1995, pp. 280-286, 306-308.  
John Hyde credits Atlas as an important influence upon his development of the Australian Institute 
for Public Policy (John Hyde, interview with the author). 
3 Friederich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, Dymock’s Book Arcade, Sydney, 1944. 
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property) and political freedom. By limiting the power of the state in the economy, 
argues Friedman, political freedoms will be safeguarded: 
 
Economic freedom is an essential requisite for political freedom. By 
enabling people to cooperate with one another without coercion or 
central direction, it reduces the area over which political power is 
exercised. In addition, by dispersing power, the free market provides an 
offset to whatever concentration of political power may arise. The 
combination of economic and political power in the same hands is a 
recipe for tyranny.4 
  
The Public Choice School – what has been called the ‘economics of politics’ — also 
attacked social democracy. Academic economists such as James Buchanan and 
Gordon Tullock applied the neo-classical conception of individual behaviour in 
markets to understand the behaviour of individuals in politics. They argued that 
since all individuals are rational, self-interested utility maximisers, the actions of 
government will tend to promote the interests of those working within it – 
bureaucrats and politicians – rather than the interests of the public. According to the 
public choice theorists, the best way of ensuring that the interests of individuals are 
met is by allowing people to pursue their interests by entering into voluntary 
exchanges with others — since these exchanges are voluntary, and since all 
individuals are self interested utility maximisers, then voluntary exchanges, 
according to public choice theory, should lead to both parties satisfying their 
interests because no rational person will enter voluntarily into a disadvantageous 
exchange.5 The theories of the pubic choice school, Hayek and Friedman led them to 
                                                 
4 Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement, Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1980, p. 21. 
5 For a succinct summary of Public Choice theory see James Buchanan, 'From Private Preferences to 
Public Philosophy: The Development of Public Choice' in IEA, The Economics of Politics, Institute 
of Economic Affairs, London, 1978, pp. 3-20. For extended summaries and critical analysis see Hugh 
Stretton & Lionel Orchard, Public Goods, Public Enterprise, Public Choice: Theoretical Foundations 
of the Contemporary Attack on Government, St. Martins' Press, London, 1994 and Peter Self, 
Government by the Market? The Politics of Public Choice,  Macmillan, London, 1993. 
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advocate radical reductions in the fiscal size of government, as well as the 
devolution of many functions of government to the market. All venerated capitalist 
markets and all displayed a profound suspicion of democracy.  
 
The other major international current of crucial importance to the development of 
Australian radical neo-liberal ideology and rhetoric was the American neo-
conservatives: intellectuals such as Daniel Bell, Norman Podhoretz and Irving 
Kristol. From the late 1960s they developed a critique which held that left-wing 
academics and public servants were undermining the free society from within. For 
the neo-conservatives, these people constituted a 'new class', and were gaining in 
power as the state increased its social welfare functions. Business, they argued, had 
much to fear from this powerful new class because: 
 
...they are acting upon a hidden agenda: to propel the nation from that 
modified version of capitalism we call "the welfare state" toward an 
economic system so stringently regulated in detail as to fulfil many of 
the traditional anti-capitalist aspirations of the Left.6 
 
According to the neo-conservatives, the new class has its origins in the student 
radicals of the 1960s. These radicals hoped to bring about a revolution in American 
society, but the decade ended, as Norman Podhoretz writes, ‘not with a revolution 
but with the election of Richard Nixon’7. Thus, the new class resulted from the 
confounded expectations of the student radicals who subsequently changed tactics 
and pursued their revolutionary ends with renewed vigour, "this time working within 
the system".8 Kristol argued that a better option for business than traditional 
philanthropy was to fund counter-intellectual opinion to challenge the dominant new 
class elites and to defend free-market capitalism and limited government against 
                                                 
6 Irving Kristol, 'On Corporate Capitalism in America', The Public Interest, No. 41, Fall 1975, p.134. 
7 N. Podhoretz, The Bloody Crossroads; Where Literature and Politics Meet, Simon & Schuster, 
New York, 1986, pp. 130-131 
8 Ibid., p.131 
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‘collectivist tendencies in society'.9 It is this sense that capitalism was under threat 
from the new class that is the chief intellectual legacy of the neo-conservatives to the 
neo-liberal movement. 
 
While acknowledging the importance of such theorists, Australian radical neo-
liberals also see themselves as the true heirs of the liberal tradition. Furthermore, for 
the radical neo-liberals, there is only one liberalism – laissez faire liberalism — 
which they see themselves as engaged in a 'revival'10 of. While there is some truth to 
such a claim – one can, for example, trace a strong laissez faire tradition running 
through liberal thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham,11 Frederic Bastiat, the neo-
classical economists and Herbert Spencer – it is also ignorant of central aspects of 
the liberal tradition. As Arblaster argues, liberalism: 
 
... should be seen, not in fixed or abstract terms as a collection of 
unchanging moral and political values, but as a specific historical 
movement of ideas in the modern era that begins with the Renaissance 
and the Reformation.'12  
 
Liberalism, considered as a ‘specific historical movement of ideas’ or as an 
intellectual tradition, is much broader and richer than is allowed for by the radical 
neo-liberals’ historical revisionism. Political philosophers such as John Stuart Mill 
(later in his life), L. T. Hobhouse, and T. H. Green, for example, argue for a 
conception of liberty beyond that of freedom from coercion, and therefore advocate 
a positive role for the state in providing education and other social goods. Even 
icons of the radical neo-liberal movement – most notably John Locke and Adam 
Smith – fit much less easily into the dogmatic schema of free market radicalism than 
                                                 
9 Barbara Ehrenreich, Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class, Harper Perennial, New 
York, 1990, p. 157 
10 From the title of Greg Lindsay's article, 'Rekindling the Flame — The Revival of Liberalism', IPA 
Review, April-June, 1979, pp. 38-44. 
11  Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation, Hafner  Publishing, New York, 1948. 
12 Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984, p. 
11. 
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is suggested by movement activists.13 Furthermore, the radical neo-liberal movement 
fails to appreciate the fundamental relationship between this broader liberal tradition 
and the defence of capitalism. Arblaster writes that 'Liberalism grew up together 
with Western Capitalism',14 and liberals have generally situated their political 
advocacy within a capitalist framework. Even John Maynard Keynes, the bete noir 
of radical neo-liberalism, was a liberal whose General Theory was designed to 
sustain capitalism against challenges from fascism and socialism.15  
 
In the domestic context as well, the radical neo-liberals display a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the history of Australian liberalism, while at the same time 
being a product of Australian liberal traditions. According to the radical neo-liberals 
although many Australian intellectuals, politicians and bureaucrats have claimed the 
label of 'liberalism' for themselves, most have been nothing but different varieties of 
collectivism. It is no surprise therefore that Greg Lindsay writes: 'for most of this 
century, liberalism has been all but dormant.' 16 Under such a schema the liberalism 
of many twentieth century Australian figures is denied by portraying them as 
collectivist villains carrying forth the project of 'state paternalism'. 
 
Again, there is some truth to this claim. The state has been central to Australian 
liberalism. What Marian Sawer calls ‘social liberalism’ — which advocates a strong 
role for the state in pursuing equal opportunity agendas17 – has been a major current 
in Australian political thought. Although laissez faire liberalism has found 
expression within some quarters throughout Australian history, it has not been a 
                                                 
13 See for example, Jerry Muller, Adam Smith in His Time and Ours: Designing the Decent Society, 
The Free Press, New York, 1993; Stephan Reglar, ‘Smith and Neoliberalism: From Civility and the 
Res Publica to a Chamber of Gothic Horrors’, Paper Delivered at the Public Policy for the New 
Millennium Conference, Adelaide University, February, 1999. 
14 Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, p.84.  
15 John Maynard Keynes, The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Volume VII: The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan, London, 1973, pp. 372-384. 
16 Greg Lindsay, ''Rekindling the Flame — The Revival of Liberalism', p. 39. 
17 Marian Sawer, The Ethical State? Social Liberalism in Australia, Melbourne University Press, 
Carlton, 2003. 
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strong tradition in Australia.18 What the radical neo-liberals once more ignore, 
however, is the centrality of liberalism to Australian politics, and the centrality of 
capitalism to Australian liberalism. Liberalism, as Rowse argues, 'is by far the 
dominant discourse within which Australian society has been analysed' and one that 
naturalises and legitimises the class nature of a capitalist society while denying the 
very existence of classes.19 With this in mind it is possible to identify the ways in 
which dominant liberal traditions in Australia contributed to the development of 
radical neo-liberal ideology. 
 
After the second world war, the state-liberalism consensus solidified around a 
commitment to Keynesian economic planning and a residual welfare state. 
Nonetheless, there are similarities between the rhetoric of certain bourgeois liberals 
and the later radical neo-liberal movement. For example, while Robert Menzies, as 
head of the newly formed Liberal Party, and sections of the capitalist class gathered 
around the IPA (Vic.) advocated a positive role for government in providing full 
employment and welfare, other sections of the capitalist class were more forceful in 
extolling the virtues of the market against those of governmental regulation. Such 
                                                 
18 As Marian Simms argues, laissez faire ideas were a persistent, but not dominant, feature of 
nineteenth century Australia (Marian Simms, A Liberal Nation: The Liberal Party and Australian 
Politics, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1982, p. 21). In the early years of the century, the ideas of 
James Mill, David Ricardo and Jeremy Bentham provided intellectual weight for attacks by traders 
upon government intervention in the economy (Jan Kociumbas, The Oxford History of Australia 
Volume 2: Possessions, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1995, pp. 116-117). During that 
century's second half, the more radical within the free trade movement, particularly in Victoria, 
resembled the neo-liberals in their defence of free trade, individual liberty and private property 
against the power of the state (Marian Simms, A Liberal Nation, p. 21). Melleuish writes that, 'At the 
level of theory, these years produced some of the fullest defences of free trade liberalism' (Gregory 
Melleuish, A Short History of Australian Liberalism, CIS, St. Leonards, 2001, p. 13). In the twentieth 
century, laissez faire sentiments were expressed through figures like economist Edward Shann who 
argued the case for less government regulation of the economy (Peter Groenewegen and Bruce 
McFarlane, A History of Australian Economic Thought, Routledge, London, 1990, pp. 131-134) and 
Frederic Eggleston, who although, 'believed in planning', did call for a more laissez faire agenda by 
governments (Melleuish, A Short History of Australian Liberalism, p. 31). The far Right organisation, 
the New Guard, and its leader, Eric Campbell, talked of privatising the state owned brickyard, metal 
quarry and coalmine and pronounced that they desired to 'suspend awards and let the law of supply 
and demand come into operation’ (quoted in Andrew Moore, The Right Road? A History of Right-
wing Politics in Australia, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1995, p. 128). 
19 Tim Rowse, Australian Liberalism and National Character, Kibble Books, Melbourne, 1978, p. 
249. 
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rhetoric and arguments were represented primarily by the Associated Chambers of 
Commerce of Australia (ACCA): 'Free democracy means free enterprise, in which 
the greatest virtue is free competition'20 and the IPA (NSW) which, according to 
Simms, 'emphasised the rights of private enterprise and the moral superiority of its 
values'21 Indeed, on the non-Labor side of politics, 'free enterprise' was spoken of as 
a virtue by all. 'Free enterprise' was seen as the key to a free society, however, as is 
clear from Tiver’s description, those on the Right differed as to what they meant by 
'free'.22 Socialism was an evil, and a very real threat in the mind of the Right, and it 
was against this threat that free enterprise was posed as the only moral alternative. 
But how much the government could regulate, direct and involve itself in the 
economy without plunging the country into socialism and without shackling 'free 
enterprise' was the contentious issue. Despite this, such rhetoric found a home within 
the Liberal Party and the Institute of Public Affairs and, by the late 1970s, the 
radical neo-liberals were able to inscribe their values and meanings onto terms such 
as ‘free enterprise’. 
 
Another major intellectual force of the post-war period that contributed to the 
emergence of neo-liberalism was the anti-communist intellectual tradition in 
Australia. Both right and left-wing intellectuals were drawn into this tradition, and 
its epicentre was the Australian Association for Cultural Freedom (AACF).23 This 
anti-communist tradition has maintained continuity in Australian intellectual life 
right up until the present. It was important in the emergence of the radical neo-
liberal intellectual movement for two reasons. First, all radical neo-liberals were 
anti-communists — this was a deeply held commitment, and no doubt the anti-
communist tradition in Australia contributed to this. Secondly, because radical neo-
liberalism was posed against 'collectivism' of all varieties, and communism was 
                                                 
20 Quoted in Marian Simms, A Liberal Nation, p. 30.  
21 Ibid., p, 19  
22 P. G. Tiver, The Liberal Party: Principles and Performance, The Jacaranda Press, Milton, 1978, p. 
100. Of the meaning of ‘free enterprise’ at the time, Tiver writes, ‘Within the broad concept of ‘free 
enterprise’, three main strands of thought can be detected’.  
23 For a description of the AACF, including its use of CIA funds see Cassandra Pybus, ‘Quadrant 
Magazine and CIA Largesse’, Overland, 155, 1999, pp. 9-15. 
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viewed as one variety of collectivism, it was able to find a foothold within the 
intellectual Right, whose strong anti-communism was one of its defining features. 
 
Less important, but still noteworthy, are the nebulous traditions of libertarianism in 
Australian intellectual culture. Sydney philosopher John Anderson, for example, was 
part of the 'Freethought' movement that, in the 1940s, criticised the Labor's 
government's plans for post-war reconstruction. The individualist nature of the 
freethought movement led them to attack the tendency towards the centralisation of 
government in the wake of the War.24 The importance of the libertarian movements 
was keeping alive a tradition of extreme individualistic anti-communism. In the 
1970s, small libertarian groups provided fertile ground for the development of 
radical neo-liberalism.25 
 
Finally, the revival of neo-classical economics in America that was subsequently 
imported to Australia in the 1970s was crucial in the intellectual development of 
many radical neo-liberals. Such theories became widely accepted in university 
economics departments as well as in the federal treasury.26 Furthermore, many early 
movement activists had spent time overseas in US and British universities and in 
organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank, organisations in which neo-
classical economics had become orthodoxy.27 
 
 
                                                 
24 John Docker, Australian Cultural Elites: Intellectual Traditions in Sydney and Melbourne, Angus 
and Robertson, Sydney, 1974, p. 133. 
25 See for example Greg Lindsay’s description in Andrew Norton, ‘The CIS at Twenty: Greg Lindsay 
Talks to Andrew Norton’, Policy, Winter 1996, pp. 16-21. 
26 For the growing influence of neo-classical economics in the Treasury, see Greg Whitwell, The 
Treasury Line, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1986. Groenewegen and McFarlane report that Fred 
Gruen’s survey of the Australian economics profession during the 1970s found a ‘growing right-wing 
libertarian tendency in Australian policy discussion, particularly associated with Monash University 
and the Australian National University’ (Groenewegen and McFarlane, A History of Australian 
Economic Thought, p. 180). 
27 Both Michael Porter and John Stone worked for the IMF. Helen Hughes worked for the World 
Bank. 
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The intellectual core of radical neo-liberalism 
 
Individualism, negative liberty and anti-collectivism 
 
The individual is the starting point for radical neo-liberal ideology. Specifically, the 
individual is conceived of as a rational, calculating, self-interested utility maximiser: 
self-interested meaning that individuals pursue their interests, wants and preferences; 
rational, meaning that individuals are aware of what such interests, wants and 
preferences are; and calculating, referring to the way in which individuals weigh up 
which course of action to take based upon the 'incentives' on offer. 
 
Radical neo-liberals are keen to distinguish this understanding of the individual from 
the claims made about them by their critics. Movement activists have been at pains 
to stress that ‘self-interested’ is not the same as selfishness.28 Self-interest, they 
assert, is merely the pursuit of one's interests, wants and preferences. It says nothing 
of concern, or lack of it, for others.  
 
There is, however, disagreement within the radical neo-liberal camp as to how far 
this conception of the self-interested individual should extend. Some prefer to 
confine such a conception to the sphere of the market. That is, some activists argue 
that while self-interest is an appropriate model for individual behaviour in markets, 
it does not follow that it is an appropriate model for non-market relationships — for 
families, for example. In addition, it says nothing of all of the other qualities that 
make up an individual:  
 
                                                 
28 See for example, Michael James, ‘Markets and Morality’ in Chris James, Chris Jones and Andrew 
Norton, (eds), A Defence of Economic Rationalism, pp. 161-2. 
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The charge that liberals view the individual as an economic rather than a 
moral being may simply be a gratuitous insult, since it presents a picture 
no liberal would recognise as one of himself.29 
 
Others however, such as those inspired by public choice theory, are unequivocal that 
homo economicus provides the appropriate model of individual behaviour in both 
market and non-market spheres. Public Choice theorist Geoffrey Brennan, in 
conjunction with his co-author, James Buchanan, argues that Homo Economicus is 
the most appropriate model for understanding the individual in market and non-
market settings.30 Both of these conceptions raise problems. If self-interested 
behaviour exists only in the market, then it is not clear why this should be the case. 
Why is the market privileged as the site of self-interested utility maximisation? 
Conversely, proponents of homo economicus have to justify how non-market 
relationships, such as those found within families, operate according to the rational 
pursuit of self-interest. There have been attempts to overcome these problems — 
such as Michael James’ argument that self-interest may be more adequate than 
altruism in explaining voluntary gift-giving to charities,31 as well as through the 
Markets Morals and Civil Society Project, discussed later in this chapter – however, 
the theory of the individual remains one of the movement’s largely unacknowledged 
inconsistencies. 
 
Nonetheless, there is a consensus within the neo-liberal movement that, in the 
context of market and market-like relationships at least, it is as self-interested, 
rational and calculating that the individual is properly conceived. Without this 
understanding of the individual, radical neo-liberal ideology, and all of its 
consequent policy positions, falls down in an incoherent heap. 
                                                 
29 Chandran Kukathas, ‘Thoughts on the Conservative Discontent’, in Chris James, Chris Jones & 
Andrew Norton, A Defence of Economic Rationalism, p.147. 
30 Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, pp. 46-66. 
31 Michael James, 'Welfare, Coercion and Reciprocity' in M. James (ed.), The Welfare State: 
Foundations and Alternatives, Centre for Independent Studies, St. Leonards, 1989, pp. 16-22. 
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The liberty of the individual to pursue such interests is, according to the radical neo-
liberals, what must be enabled, defended and extended. But there are different 
conceptions of how exactly individual liberty should be conceived. Chandran 
Kukathas, for example, has mounted an articulate defence of negative liberty,32 
whilst others flit between both negative and positive conceptions of liberty.33 Such 
disagreements are perhaps not surprising given the many intellectual influences 
discussed already in this chapter. Like those theorists discussed in the previous 
chapter, the point of agreement amongst the neo-liberal intellectuals is the primacy 
of the right to private property: that is, the liberty to dispose of one's property as one 
sees fit. The practical policy manifestation of this is that there should be few legal 
constraints upon private property exchanges. Not only is this seen as a right in itself, 
but, as with Friedman, it is often contended that other freedoms flow from this. 
 
Such a conception of liberty leads radical neo-liberals to defend inequalities within 
capitalist systems as the inevitable, but not necessarily lamentable, product of a free 
society. The radical neo-liberals tend to agree with Hayek: that a commitment to 
liberty is 'bound to produce inequality',34 but that 'economic inequality is not one of 
the evils which justify our resorting to discriminatory coercion or privilege as a 
remedy'.35 Many also echo similar statements by, Friedman: 
 
Life is not fair. It is tempting to believe that government can rectify what 
nature has spawned. But it is also important to recognise how much we 
benefit from the very unfairness we deplore.36 
 
For the radical neo-liberal movement, the economic inequalities produced by free 
market capitalism lead to innovations and increases in the net wealth of society. 
                                                 
32 Chandran Kukathas, 'Defending Negative Liberty', Policy, Winter 1994, pp. 22-26. 
33 See Lauchlan Chipman,  Liberty, Justice and the Market, CIS, Sydney, 1981. 
34 Friederich von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Gateway, Chicago, 1972, p.17. 
35 Ibid., p. 88. 
36 Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose, pp. 168-169. 
 71
Ultimately, these inequalities lead to greater opportunities for most of the 
population, and any attempt to legislate for equality, other than equality before the 
law, is coercion. Again, the primacy of property rights becomes evident. Thus, a 
theme which emerges from this discussion is a preference for equality of treatment 
and a hostility to equality of opportunity, or 'equality of outcome'.  
 
In arguing for the virtues of inequality, the liberals discussed here are also engaged 
in a defence of the capitalist system. Economic freedoms, and thus economic 
inequalities, are seen as a precondition for the existence of other freedoms. The free 
society is thus a capitalist society, but not necessarily a democratic one. For radical 
neo-liberals, liberty is a value in and of itself, to be prized ahead of democracy 
which is simply a means to an end. 
 
That the individual is the basic unit of society also means that, for the radical neo-
liberals, the notion of classes is nonsensical. Class is a figment of the Marxist 
imagination. Each individual having unique interests means that it is impossible to 
generalise about the interests of groups. This is similar to Hayek’s argument that 
individuals possess 'known private spheres'37 and only the individual, therefore, can 
know her or his own interests. For Hayek, as for movement activists in Australia, all 
other considerations stem from this. A similar notion is embodied in Friedman's 
statement: 'To the free man, the country is the collection of individuals who compose 
it, not something over and above them'.38 Any notion of classes or class power is 
made a nonsense by such a formulation — individuals can choose to join groups to 
promote their interests, but such interests are necessarily subjective and unique to 
the individual: class interests simply do not exist. Radical neo-liberals thus claim to 
examine the relationships between individuals, not between groups. The movement 
is therefore anti-collectivist. According to the movement, not only does 
‘collectivism’ impose a false view of the individual upon society, it is also 
                                                 
37 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, p. 21. 
38 Milton Friedman (with the assistance of Rose Friedman), Capitalism and Freedom, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962, pp. 1-2. 
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necessarily coercive: it destroys individual liberty by imposing particular 
conceptions of the good society onto individuals with diverse and unknowable 
interests. It is against what it views as the collectivist trend within twentieth century 
Australian politics (which for the radical neo-liberals includes everything from 
Keynesianism to social democracy to socialism) that the radical neo-liberal 
movement has defined itself. 
 
The role of markets and the state 
 
As already stated, the overriding goal of the movement is the dismantling of the 
institutions of the Keynesian welfare state. This goal rests upon two justifications: 
one economic, and one ethical. 
 
The economic argument holds that the welfare state is unable to achieve its aims of 
providing goods and services to all through the redistribution of income via taxation 
and the public provision of services – that is, the welfare state does not work. 
Following the public choice critique, movement activists maintain that governments 
operate according to the individual self-interest of bureaucrats, politicians and lobby 
groups. The upshot of this is that welfare payments of all types simply serve the 
interests of bureaucrats, politicians and lobby groups. Welfare bureaucrats and lobby 
groups have an interest in maintaining their client base, that is they have an interest 
in maintaining levels of disadvantage. For this reason welfare payments are not 
designed to assist those in need. Rather, the welfare state favours 'special interests': 
 
Lobbying by pressure groups and electoral competition between political 
parties interact to produce bigger governments by favouring short-run 
special interests (which benefit from more intervention) at the expense of 
long-run public interests (which benefit from less intervention).39 
 
                                                 
39 Michael James, 'Cutting Government Down to Size, CIS Policy Report, April 1986, p. 1. 
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This 'capture' of the political processes of the welfare state by special interests 
produces a situation where the state redistributes income to the middle class rather 
than to those most in need of assistance. This is because the educated middle class 
are more capable of organising to promote and lobby for their interests than are the 
poor.40 For radical neo-liberals, government agencies and corporations in a welfare 
state operate according to 'non-commercial goals'41 and are thus not subject to the 
neutral pricing mechanisms and discipline of market forces. Government regulation 
of markets creates 'distortions',42 thus creating inefficiencies, and the political 
considerations involved in formulating such regulations means that governments are, 
in effect, 'picking winners'43 by favouring certain industries rather than allowing 
markets to produce optimal outcomes. The monopolistic provision, by the welfare 
state, of services (such as education, health, welfare, air travel etc.) tends to 'crowd 
out' initiatives from the private sector; again, not allowing market forces to run their 
course.44 According to the radical neo-liberals, welfare payments tend to reward 
passivity and destroy incentives to seek employment. 
 
The ethical critique of the welfare state draws upon the movement’s understanding 
of the individual, outlined above, and holds that because the welfare state inevitably 
infringes individual liberty, it is therefore an evil. State regulation in the area of 
industrial relations, for example, constitutes a constraint upon the freedom to choose 
one's own job and negotiate one's own conditions of work.45 Industry regulation 
constitutes an infringement of liberty by constraining the entrepreneur's right to trade 
and the customer’s right to choose freely and without ‘oppressive government 
                                                 
40 See Delia Hendrie and Michael Porter, ‘The Capture of the Welfare State’, IPA Review, August-
September 1987, pp. 52-55; Jacob Abrahami, ‘Governments and Job Destruction’, IPA Review, 
Summer 1985, pp. 186-188. 
41 Des Moore and Michael Porter (eds.), Victoria: An Agenda for Change, Tasman Institute and the 
Institute of Public Affairs, Melbourne, 1991, p. 10. 
42 See for example Alan Moran, ‘Business Regulation – its Scope, Costs and Benefits in Australia’, 
in Michael James (ed), Restraining Leviathan: Small Government in Practice, CIS, St. Leonards, 
1987, p. 142. 
43 Des Moore and Michael Porter, Victoria: An Agenda for Change, p. 8. 
44 See for example, James Cox, Private Welfare, CIS, St. Leonards, 1992, pp. 49-59. 
45 John Stone, ‘How to Achieve Full Employment’, IPA Review, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1993, pp. 29-31. 
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intervention’.46 Movement activists’ use of language such as 'interference' to 
describe governmental activity within a national economy itself suggests what the 
proper role of government should be.  
 
The alternative proposed by the radical neo-liberals is the superiority of markets 
over the government’s provision of services and over governmental regulation of the 
economy. Markets, according to movement activists, are the most efficient means 
for the allocation of goods in society. They are also the most moral. Movement 
activists argue that, when free from government interference, markets involve 
'voluntary exchanges' between individuals (be they individual firms or persons), and 
through such exchanges both individuals benefit because no rational self-interested 
individual would voluntarily enter into a disadvantageous exchange or contract. Free 
markets thus uphold liberty by enabling ‘individual choice’, and provide a means for 
allocating resources based upon the preferences of individuals, thus ensuring 
efficiency. It is on this basis that the radical neo-liberals, following Hayek and 
Friedman, proclaim free markets a more moral means of distributing goods than the 
welfare state. 
 
Evidence of corporate collapse and the failure of markets to deliver goods and 
services to all is generally explained by radical neo-liberals as an example of 
'government failure' rather than of 'market failure' — that collectivist governments 
have failed to provide the proper conditions for the effective and efficient operation 
of markets. As part of their re-writing of economic history, radical neo-liberals 
explain depressions and recessions as resulting from the intervention of governments 
in the economy rather than as the results of boom and bust cycles of a capitalist 
economy. They question the ability of governments to plan effectively, some 
borrowing from Hayek the anti-rationalist critique of knowledge: that individuals 
may differ greatly in their interests and values and therefore individuals, not 
governments, are the best judges of these and that the complexity of modern 
                                                 
46 John Logan, David Green and Alan Woodfield, Healthy Competition, CIS, St. Leonards, 1989, p.4. 
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societies The uncertainty of predicting outcomes of complex market and societal 
relationships means that: 
 
Governments should allow the vast resources of knowledge in their 
societies to be utilised by their citizens in effective decisions, and create 
the conditions in which their citizens can plan as best they can. 
Governments cannot do that planning for them, and the attempts to do so 
simply ends up creating uncertainties. And governments only make life 
more difficult for themselves by attempting to plan to achieve objectives 
when the requisite knowledge and power for success is unavailable.47 
 
In the rhetoric of the radical neo-liberal movement, the state is akin to the Hobbesian 
'Leviathan'48 — powerful, ever growing and desiring the acquisition of more power 
— while the market, through competition, harnesses individual self-interest to 
produce collective goods via Adam Smith's 'invisible hand'.49 Thus, neo-liberals call 
for the state to withdraw from many of the functions within the economy. They stop 
short of calling for the abolition of the state, opting instead for a minimal state, 
where assistance is available to those in 'true need', but where many functions of the 
welfare state are devolved to the private sector. The role of the state then becomes, 
primarily, to 'detect and prevent violence, theft and deception' and to 'enforce 
contracts'.50  
 
                                                 
47 David Kemp, 'Why Governments Do Not Plan Effectively', IPA Review, Autumn 1984, p. 35. 
48 From the title of the CIS book: Michael James (ed), Restraining Leviathan. 
49 Testimonies to Adam Smith are rife throughout radical neo-liberal literature. In addition to obvious 
examples such as the Adam Smith Club and the Tasman Institute’s A Green Thumb for the Invisible 
Hand (Peter Hartley and Michael Porter, A Green Thumb for the Invisible Hand, Tasman Institute, 
Melbourne, 1990) see also John Nurick’s acknowledgements at the beginning of Mandate to Govern: 
‘It is also proper to acknowledge the freedom-loving philosophers and economists from John Locke 
to Adam Smith to the present day, whose work has influenced Mandate’ (John Nurick, ‘Foreword’ in 
John Nurick (ed), Mandate to Govern: A Handbook for the Next Australian Government, AIPP, 
Perth, 1987, p. xvi). 
50 Lauchlan Chipman, Liberty, Justice and the Market, pp.13-14. 
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The ideology of the radical neo-liberal movement is thus both a reified theory of 
how individuals and markets operate under capitalism, as well as a utopian theory of 
an ideal form of capitalism. Indeed, radical neo-liberal theory constitutes an excuse 
for the power, privilege and largesse of the capitalist class. 
 
Although when speaking in general terms about the ills of contemporary society, 
movement activists have targeted bureaucrats, interest groups and businesses who 
have lobbied the state for special consideration or exemptions, and lumped them 
under the pejorative label of 'special interests', they have been largely silent on 
actual examples of 'corporate welfare'. Indeed, they have valorised entrepreneurs as 
the engines of wealth and progress: 
 
The transformation in the space of two hundred years of the people of 
Western Europe, and subsequently some other parts of the world, from 
relatively small populations of predominantly miserable, half-starving 
peasants into hundreds of millions of well-fed, healthy and relatively 
affluent citizens has been wrought in large part by business enterprise.51 
 
The neo-liberals have framed entrepreneurs, and capitalist enterprises in general, as 
persecuted in contemporary society. Baker, for example, is puzzled that although 
'The history of mankind is strewn with distressing stories of persecution and 
prejudice' more of which are being brought to public attention, what is ignored is 
'one of the most ubiquitous of prejudices in the history of mankind: that against the 
entrepreneur or merchant'52 At the same time, they have consistently defended the 
private property rights of entrepreneurs.53 
 
Inequalities of wealth and income are naturalised by the radical neo-liberal 
movement. Those elements within the Christian church who have highlighted with 
                                                 
51 Barry Maley, 'The Current Attack on Private Property', IPA Review, Winter 1984, p. 87. 
52 Ken Baker, 'The Stigma Against Commerce', IPA Review, November-January 1987/88, p. 47. 
53 See for example Barry Maley, 'The Current Attack on Private Property', pp. 87-91. 
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concern inequalities of wealth in Australian society have come in for special 
criticism from radical neo-liberals.54 Radical neo-liberal Reverend, Warren 
Clarnette, for example, argues that when the Bible speaks of the poor it does not 
refer to those who are materially poor, but to those who ‘recognise their need of 
grace’, and thus it is foolish for the church to engage in calls for the alleviation of 
poverty through state spending and regulation.55 Like Hayek and Friedman, radical 
neo-liberals defend inequalities of income and argue that wealth does not equal 
happiness. Also following Hayek, the movement dismisses the whole concept of 
social justice as a dangerous collectivist myth; attempts by the state to legislate 
certain types of equality only results in the advantage of one group at the expense of 
another.56 
 
Ultimately radical neo-liberal arguments about individuals and markets only work 
through a simplistic and utopian conception of markets and a concurrent 
demonisation of state activity within the economy.57 Andrew Norton outlines these 
assumptions: 
 
Implicit in market exchange is that obligations are approximately equal, 
as people will not agree to exchanges that make them worse off.58 
 
Michael James extends this conceit: 
 
the market is to a significant extent a self-correcting mechanism which, 
given time, can often spontaneously overcome its own mistakes59 
                                                 
54 Geoffrey Brennan and John K. Williams (eds), Chaining Australia: Church Bureaucracies and 
Political Economy, CIS, St. Leonards, 1984. 
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57 For a critique of the radical neo-liberal understanding of markets, see Peter Self, Rolling Back the 
Market: Economic Dogma and Political Choice, Macmillan, London, 2000, pp. 1-32. 
58 Andrew Norton, 'The Market Mentality' in Alan Hamlin, Herbert Giersch and Andrew Norton, 
Markets, Morals and Community, Centre for Independent Studies, St. Leonards, 1996, p.45  
59 Michael James, 'Economic Rationalism and the Liberal Tradition', Policy, Spring 1991, p.3 
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Radical neo-liberal ideology is blind to the disparities of power that are a necessary 
part of any capitalist system.  
 
Similarly, radical neo-liberals are ignorant of the centrality of the state to the 
reproduction of capital. That the radical neo-liberals fail to appreciate this is 
symptomatic of their broader misunderstanding of the nature of capitalist society. As 
Jessop writes, ‘the capital relation cannot be  reproduced entirely through market 
exchange’.60 The state is crucial for providing the framework within which capitalist 
relations can exist through such activities as the provision of infrastructure, the 
regulation of markets, the maintenance of ‘social cohesion’61  or the correction of 
‘market failure’.62 As Lindblom argues, the state must “induce” business to perform 
its role in capitalist society.63 Radical neo-liberal ideology is blind to this because it 
is an idealist form of bourgeois individualism – what Evan Jones has recently called 
‘idealist economics’.64 It misunderstands and mystifies capitalist social relations at 
the same time as deifying them. Such misunderstandings and contradictions provide 
the basis for radical neo-liberalism’s ideological function. 
 
 
New class discourse 
 
New class discourse is a crucial feature of the radical neo-liberal movement’s assault 
upon the Keynesian welfare state, and upon the Left in general. Derived from the 
American neo-conservatives, new class discourse holds that a radical tertiary-
educated minority, primarily employed in the public sector, has, since the 1960s, 
replaced the proletariat as the class most antagonistic to capitalism. This ‘new class’, 
                                                 
60 Bob Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State, p. 18. 
61 Ibid., p. 21. 
62 Ibid., p. 41. 
63 Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World’s Political-Economic Systems, pp. 173-4. 
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according to the radical neo-liberals, has its roots in the radical movements of the 
1960s: having failed to bring about their desired radical transformation of society, 
left-wing activists entered institutions such as the bureaucracy, universities, the 
media and the teaching profession, and proceeded to pursue their own ideological 
agendas whilst claiming to be working in the public interest.  
 
For the radical neo-liberals, the notion of the new class provides a theoretical 
framework within which a number of disparate concerns have been drawn together. 
On the one hand it offers an explanation for the major social and cultural changes 
that occurred in Australian society since the 1970s. The thesis of the new class 
identifies those responsible for these changes (the former radicals of the ‘sixties) and 
provides a justification for opposing such changes and those who support them. On 
the other hand the idea of the new class compliments key elements of the radical 
neo-liberal worldview, particularly the public choice argument that governmental 
and bureaucratic activity can be reduced to the self-interest of powerful public 
servants and politicians. As will be detailed in Chapter Three, one of the strengths of 
the new class thesis is its ability to reconcile both radical neo-liberal and 
conservative world views. 
 
A range of synonyms has been employed by the Australian Right to attack this 
common enemy: ‘political correctness’; ‘special interests’; the ‘guilt industry’; the 
‘Aboriginal industry’; and the ‘welfare industry’. Underpinned by the notion of the 
new class, these rhetorical devices comprise a ‘new class discourse’: a set of 
language and associated assumptions whose central organising idea is that of the 
new class.  
 
New class discourse constructs social movements, trade unionists, anti-globalisation 
protestors, Aboriginal activists, feminists, gay rights activists and social justice 
advocates as powerful, well-paid zealots. So this argument goes, whilst claiming to 
represent the public interest the new class members use their privileged positions to 
 80
pursue narrow ideological or self-interested agendas and are out of touch with the 
values and aspirations of ordinary Australians. The object, or target, of new class 
discourse is therefore the Left, broadly conceived. New class discourse identifies the 
Left both as the home of elites (in terms of their income, status and occupation 
relative to ordinary Australians) and as elitist (in terms of their disdain for the 
attitudes of ordinary Australians), positioning the Left in opposition to ordinary 
Australians. 
 
Different rhetorical components of new class discourse construct ‘left-wing elites’ in 
particular ways. Much like the new class thesis, the notion of ‘political correctness’ 
was imported to Australia via right-wing American think tanks. There, the term 
‘political correctness’ was used by right-wing intellectuals to depict a ‘New 
McCarthyism’ emerging on university campuses around the country. According to 
this view, radical left-wing feminist, gay and multiculturalist academics (the former 
radicals of the ‘sixties) were foisting their ideologies on unsuspecting students 
through the enforcement of strict speech codes and the dismantling of the traditional 
canon of Western literature. Those who spoke out against this dogma, so the Right 
argued, faced the threat of censure or of losing their job. Although, as numerous 
writers have demonstrated, there was little evidence for the claims being made by 
the Right, the notion of ‘political correctness’ was picked up by the popular press 
and became the centrepiece of a torrent of articles portraying a supposed ‘crisis’ on 
US campuses.65 ‘Political correctness’ was picked up by the Australian radical neo-
liberals and extended in its application to include all those political positions adhered 
to by the ‘new class’. In 1993, for example, John Stone, attacked Santina Bertone, 
                                                 
65 See Jim Neilson, ‘The Great PC Scare: Tyrannies of the Left, Rhetoric of the Right’ in Jeremy 
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Director of the Workplace Studies Centre at Victoria University of Technology in 
the following way: 
 
Her contribution is also filled with politically correct references to 
women being the ‘main victims of poverty and violence’; the ‘benefits of 
a century of centralised, arbitration-based wages and conditions (for 
those whom that system has not so far put out of a job); and so on, 
including at least a couple of the nowadays obligatory politically correct 
references to Aborigines.66 
 
 
 It is an effective term of denigration because of its suggestion that the opinions of 
the ‘politically correct’ are not deeply held but are a product of intellectual fashion. 
Implicit in the term is the notion of an orthodoxy, and it is no surprise that the Right 
has argued that ‘political correctness’ has been imposed on ordinary Australians by 
new class elites  
 
Although not new to Australian political discourse, the term ‘special interests’ has 
been mobilised in a new context by the Right to attack those groups viewed to have 
wielded influence over the Hawke and Keating Labor governments: particularly 
trade unions, feminist groups, environmental groups and those advocating 
multiculturalism and Aboriginal rights. ‘Special interests’ conveys the sense that 
such groups enjoyed a privileged position under successive Labor administrations; 
that they had a ‘special’ relationship with Labor whilst the interests and values of 
ordinary Australians were being ignored.  
 
The existence of various tax-payer funded ‘industries’ is also posited by new class 
discourse and used to portray the Left as an elite. Most common amongst these are 
the ‘welfare industry’, the ‘Aboriginal industry’, and the ‘guilt industry’. Behind 
                                                 
66 John Stone, ‘The Critics of Economic Rationalism’ in Chris James, Chris Jones and Andrew 
Norton (eds), A Defence of Economic Rationalism, p. 97. 
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such terms is the notion that it is to the economic advantage of welfare and 
Aboriginal advocates to perpetuate notions of poverty and Aboriginal disadvantage 
in order to maintain a constant stream of public funds into the organisations they 
work for — whether it be the public service or non-government organisations. 
According to right-wing activist and former managing director of Western Mining 
Corporation, Hugh Morgan:  
 
The major obstacle within Australian society to improving the quality of 
life of the Aborigines is not the pockets of racism that persist, but the 
guilt industry.67  
 
For the radical neo-liberal movement such rhetoric lends support to their attacks 
upon the very notion that Indigenous Australians were forcibly dispossessed from 
their land. Ron Brunton, for example, criticised the federal government’s discussion 
paper on the High Court’s Mabo decision for ‘always giving the impression that 
dispossession was forced or otherwise involuntary’.68 The ‘guilt industry’ carries the 
twin connotations of economic self-interest and middle-class self-loathing as 
motivations for those who advocate the extension or simply the maintenance of 
Aboriginal rights. The notion that various forms of social justice advocacy constitute 
‘industries’ serves to cast suspicion on the motives of such advocates and to portray 
them as enjoying lucrative careers at the expense of those they are professing to 
assist.  
  
The central claim, then, of new class discourse is that the Left exists outside of the 
‘mainstream’ and stands in opposition to ‘ordinary’ Australians via its values 
privileges and motivations. New class discourse posits the Left as ‘other’: as suspect 
and deviant. Whilst new class discourse is quite explicit about what constitutes this 
other, also implicit in the discourse is a claim about ‘mainstream’ Australia: that it is 
hard-working (not leisured or privileged); individualistic (not collectivist); 
                                                 
67 Hugh Morgan, ‘The Guilt Industry’, IPA Review, May-July, 1988, p. 20. 
68 Ron Brunton, ‘Mabo and Reconciliation’, IPA Review, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1993, p. 19. 
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conservative (not radical); proud (not self-loathing); possessed of common wisdom 
(not ideological); and perhaps even neo-liberal (not socialist). By using new class 
discourse to position the Left as other, the radical neo-liberals attempted to position 
themselves as guardians of the mainstream. 
 
 
The road to utopia: policy preferences for a radical neo-liberal state 
 
Most of the policy alternatives put forward by the radical neo-liberal movement are 
drawn from the intellectual antecedents discussed earlier in the chapter, with the 
work of Friedman being particularly important because of its articulation of an 
alternative policy agenda across a wide range of government portfolios. 
Additionally, Australian radical neo-liberals have drawn lessons from the 
experiences of neo-liberal governments in other countries — particularly New 
Zealand under the Lange/Douglas government, Britain under Margaret Thatcher and 
Reagan's America.69 On the issue of economic policy, the movement favours a 
minimal state. It has generally acknowledged the need for a minimum safety net with 
regards to welfare, and for the state to provide a legal framework within which 
commerce can occur. As will be discussed later in this chapter however, radical neo-
liberals have been divided over the appropriate role and scope of the state on non-
economic issues, such as the enforcement of particular moral codes of conduct. 
Nonetheless, it is with the government’s provision of services and government’s role 
within the economy that the neo-liberals are primarily concerned. 
 
The advocacy of a shift in power and responsibility from the public sector to the 
private sector has characterised radical neo-liberal proposals for policy reform. 
Informed by their understanding of markets and individuals, and their associated 
critiques of the role of the state, the radical neo-liberal movement has formulated a 
range of policy alternatives for transforming the state into something approaching 
                                                 
69 See for example Michael Porter, ‘”Rogernomics” – The Real Challenge’, IPA Review, February-
April, 1988, pp. 19-20. 
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the utopia of radical neo-liberal theory. Although, piecemeal reforms have 
sometimes been advocated, it is the wide-scale dismantling of the Australian 
Keynesian welfare state that has been the explicit goal of the movement.  
 
A shift in power from the public to private sectors has meant, in practical policy 
terms, advocating: a devolution of government activities to the private sector; a 
lessening of the regulations imposed by governments upon markets; a reduction of 
government’s in wealth redistribution and in equalising the opportunities available to 
its citizens; and the creation of new markets for valuing and exchanging public 
goods. 
 
The commitment of the radical neo-liberal movement to these particular policy 
alternatives has remained strong over the period surveyed. Particular policies have 
been elaborated upon, some have been modified and fine-tuned and the benefits of 
time, learning and discovery have provided the movement with the ability to add 
greater detail and sophistication to their proposals. But the radical neo-liberal policy 
agenda of 1996 was remarkably similar to that of the early 1980s.  
 
The radical neo-liberal approach to policy alternatives is summed up in the 
following passage by John Freebairn. After admitting a limited role for government 
in 'establishing and maintaining property rights and the rules and regulations of 
commerce'; in intervening in the rare cases of 'market failure'; and in ensuring some 
kind of minimum safety net for the 'genuinely disadvantaged'; Freebairn argues that 
each area of government policy needs to be interrogated according to the following 
criterion: 
 
Where the rationale for government intervention cannot be established, 
the program becomes a candidate for phasing out. Where intervention is 
deemed desirable, it can take many forms other than direct government 
supply. Providing citizens with the goods and services they require at 
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low cost is enhanced by the existence of potential or actual competitors. 
this is achievable by funding individual recipients rather than suppliers, 
by inviting tenders for the provision of public goods, by reducing 
artificial barriers to entry for competitors and by the use of taxes, 
subsidies and other market means to counter externalities.70 
 
Levels of federal government expenditure in Australia have consistently been 
attacked by the radical neo-liberals as being too high.71 Although simple arguments 
of economic efficiency have been made to support such calls — that public 
expenditure 'crowds out' private savings and that a large and increasing public sector 
increases pressure on politicians for deficit spending, for tax increases in taxation 
and has a generally negative effect upon the competitiveness of the national 
economy — the underlying reason for reductions in public expenditure has been to 
transfer the functions of government, in many areas, to the market. In addition to 
straight cuts to government expenditure, and revenue collection capabilities,72 four 
strategies have been advocated for achieving this: de-regulation; privatisation; 
marketisation; and contracting out. 
 
De-regulation refers to the loosening, or removal, of regulations governing how 
corporations can operate within a particular market. It has a philosophical as well as 
an economic basis. Philosophically, it aims at the removal of the ‘coercive’ 
regulations placed upon the ability of individual corporations to engage in property 
exchanges. Economically, it is justified on the grounds that it removes government 
regulations that constitute impediments to competition and thus to market efficiency. 
Deregulation has been called for in such areas as finance, aviation, 
telecommunications, industrial relations, health, education and transportation — in 
fact, in most of the markets which governments regulate. According to neo-liberals, 
                                                 
70 John Freebairn, 'Dear Minister', IPA Review, Vol. 49 No. 1, 1996, p. 21. 
71 See for example Michael James, 'Cutting Government Down to Size', pp. 1-5, 16. 
72 See for example John Freebairn and Des Moore, 'Why We Need a Flatter Income Tax', IPA 
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instead of 'picking winners'73 and favouring 'special interests' through market 
regulation, governments should ensure the rule of law by implementing transparent, 
non-discriminatory and predictable rules of conduct in the marketplace. Such an 
attitude is expressed by movement activist, Wolfgang Kasper: 
 
much regulation is not just a benevolent reinterpretation of the common 
law, but is a political response to special pleading from economically 
powerful groups. Regulations create their own client lobbies, which then 
perpetuate 'their' regulation, because the regulation has become a 
valuable property.74 
 
Deregulation is often proposed by radical neo-liberals alongside a policy of 
privatisation which involves the transfer of ownership of government companies 
from the public to the private sector: the selling of government owned assets. At the 
federal level, privatisation has been recommended for such corporations as the 
Commonwealth Bank, Qantas, Australia Post, Australian National Shipping Line 
and Telecom/Telstra. The primary arguments for privatisation put by the radical neo-
liberal movement are those of efficiency and the provision of consumer ‘choice’. It 
is argued that public ownership reduces the need of the enterprise to the subject 'to 
the discipline of the financial markets'.75 They are also 'more vulnerable than their 
private counter-parts to political and industrial pressure',76 that is, their decisions are 
more likely to be based upon imperatives of the bureaucracy and of the government 
of the day than private sector companies. Further, the likelihood of trade unions 
within that industry being able to extract uncompetitive concessions and special 
privileges is heightened. The privatisation solution, according to the radical neo-
liberals, forces market discipline upon such companies, making them more 
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responsive to individual preferences and thus more efficient. It is for this reason that 
privatisation is viewed as a more democratic form of service provision: 
 
It takes what is effectively owned by the bureaucrats and puts it not in 
the hands of members of the public ... It is taking a large part of the 
economy which had been appropriated from the people and is giving it 
back to them.77 
 
Generally, privatisation is advocated in tandem with deregulation in order to 
maximise the competitiveness of the market and provide ‘consumers’ with what the 
movement argues will be a choice of services, tailored to the needs of individuals.  
 
Contracting out, or outsourcing, is a policy prescription, the purpose of which, again, 
is to shift responsibility for the provision of services from the public to the private 
sector. It involves either government departments competing with private enterprises 
for the right to carry out the previous functions of that department, or in some cases, 
the direct transfer of bureaucratic responsibilities to the private sector. The thinking 
behind these proposals is that the provision of such services will be made more 
efficient because it will be subject to market forces as well as being less open to 
'bureaucratic capture'. 
 
‘Marketisation’ refers to the creation of markets for public goods, so that instead of 
such goods being subject to the supposed arbitrary and subjective values placed 
upon them by governments, a system of market-based incentives is introduced. One 
example of this is the proposal to introduce education 'vouchers' to replace the direct 
funding of schools and universities by governments.78 Another is the neo-liberal 
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conception of the creation of market mechanisms for valuing the environment.79 As 
well as the economic argument of efficiency, such policies are also justified 
philosophically as creating a system where individual choice is the driving force, 
rather than coercive, 'paternalistic' government apparatuses.  
 
'Constitutional' reforms have been a minor but important area of the radical neo-
liberal policy arsenal. Based primarily upon public choice theory80 this area of 
policy prescription involves changes to the 'rules of the political game'81 that 
encourage (or constrain) politicians to act in a way that produces small and efficient 
government. The goal is to set up incentives that circumvent the coterie of 
bureaucratic ‘rent maximisers’ that public choice theorists have identified as going 
hand-in-hand with democratic government. Like much of public choice theory, it is 
founded upon a profound scepticism regarding the ability of democratic government 
to act 'efficiently'. Examples of 'constitutional' reform proposals are regulations 
forcing governments to produce balanced budgets (first proposed by Milton 
Friedman) and the need for 'reinforced' (two-thirds) majorities in parliament in order 
to enact legislation, thus, theoretically, making it difficult for ‘special interest’ 
lobbyists to prevail over the public interest.82 Sporadic support has also been evident 
for Citizen Initiated Referenda.83 All of this has gone hand in hand with consistent 
hostility towards what is perceived to be an 'activist judiciary'. Such hostility reached 
its height in the movement’s reaction to the Mabo decision.84 
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Often, a combination of these strategies is advocated for any particular government 
sector. Welfare policy is a good example of this. Radical neo-liberals argue that state 
administered welfare payments create a culture of 'welfare dependency' where 'many 
welfare programs encourage individuals to adjust their behaviour so as to qualify for 
the benefits they bestow'.85 Thus, instead of being a temporary stop-gap measure 
between jobs, welfare becomes a way of life. Further, because the welfare state is 
liable to 'capture' by 'special interests', much welfare policy ends up being a form of 
'middle class welfare'86 as these special interests 'organise and lobby for welfare 
policies that favour them'.87 The state thus subsidises and encourages unemployment 
and redistribution to the middle class whilst 'crowding out' those who have been 
providing effective welfare relief for years — private charities and voluntary 
organisations.88 Solutions proposed to dismantle the state-provision of welfare have 
included: straight cuts to welfare payments; decreases in the length of time people 
are eligible to receive payments; and work for the dole schemes to discourage 
‘welfare dependency’, enforce a sense of obligation and provide incentives to find 
work.89 The functions of the Commonwealth Employment Service are to be 
contracted out to the private sector (whether to charities or other service providers) 
and some movement activists have even suggested the introduction of welfare 
'vouchers', thus creating a market for welfare payments.90 Radical neo-liberals 
justify the outcomes of such reductions in the role of the state as welfare provider, 
by stating that the flourishing of the private and voluntary welfare sectors will result, 
thus reducing the need for state intervention. 
 
Similarly with education, the movement desires an end to government being 
primarily responsible for its provision. Again, different options have been proposed, 
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all of which are consistent with the anti-public character of their philosophy. The 
most common policy prescription for both tertiary and secondary education is that 
the limit upon the ability of state schools and universities to charge fees be removed 
(that is, that fees be deregulated) and that 'vouchers' be introduced. Under the 
movement’s voucher regime, governments would abolish the direct funding of 
schools and instead fund individual students (or their parents) through 'vouchers' to 
the value of a certain amount that could be then redeemed at any school or university 
of the student's choice for educational ‘services’ rendered. Because schools and 
universities would be free to set their own fee levels, a market for education is 
created, and, according to radical neo-liberal theory, schools and universities will be 
forced to respond to the preferences of individuals in order to survive. In the 
imagination of the movement, this has the added advantage of removing education 
from the control of state subsidised special interests and new class bureaucrats and 
unions. It also effectively destroys the distinction between public and private 
education, as all institutions compete for government funded students, and, in some 
formulations, for extra government funding.91 
 
Industrial relations holds a special place in the collective consciousness of the 
radical neo-liberal movement. As will be discussed in later chapters it was their 
industrial relations policies proposals that catapulted the radical neo-liberal 
movement to national attention. The system of centralised arbitration which was 
embedded within apparatuses of the state in the early twentieth century, has been the 
movement’s primary target. This system, according to the radical neo-liberals, has 
produced an 'Industrial Relations Club' consisting of unions, employers, industrial 
commission lawyers and bureaucrats, all of whom have an interest in maintaining 
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the status quo.92 Wage increases and award conditions are based not upon 
sustainable market principles, but on deals between these 'special interests'. This 
leads to unemployment and inhibits individuals from entering into their own 
voluntary employment agreements — thus infringing individual liberty. The 
entrenched power of trade unions infringes both the liberty of trade union members 
to dissent to the actions of their own unions and the liberty of employers to be free 
from trade union coercion. The radical neo-liberal solution is to abolish to AIRC and 
to deregulate the process of wage bargaining so that common-law individual 
contracts between employer and employee become the norm. The recognition of 
trade unions as official partners in the bargaining process is to be removed, and the 
rights of employers to take action against unions under the law increased. 
 
What the policy proposals of the radical neo-liberal movement amount to is a 
challenge to the traditional role of government in Australia as it has developed in the 
twentieth century. The aim has been to dismantle the Australian welfare state, 
affording it a negative rather than positive role on broad economic issues. Although 
positioning itself as democratic, the movement has had an ambiguous relationship 
with democracy. On the one hand democracy and liberalism are synonymous in the 
eyes of neo-liberal activists. Following Milton Friedman, they believe that 
concentrations of economic power — in the hands of the state — will lead to 
concentrations of political power that work against democracy. Public institutions 
such as education and health systems are undemocratic because they impose 
particular health and educational regimes upon individuals. Radical neo-liberals 
point to the international trend towards more neo-liberal regimes as evidence of an 
increase in freedoms world-wide, and thus an increase in democracy. 
 
Yet, democratic governance, as it is practiced in many western nations, comes in for 
harsh criticism from neo-liberals, particularly those influenced by the public choice 
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tradition. There is a tendency within Public Choice theory to argue that democratic 
structures do not produce 'correct' outcomes — that is deficit budgets and a 'rational' 
level of government expenditure. In radical neo-liberal rhetoric, this kind of 
criticism is usually levelled at the welfare state, but it is clearly a problem for any 
society that does not conform to the movement’s utopian model. Furthermore, it is 
clear that democracy has not delivered the radical neo-liberal utopia, despite the 
election of a number of neo-liberal governments in Australia and internationally. 
Indeed, after the defeat of the Coalition's Fightback! package at the 1993 elections, 
Michael James argued that neo-liberal parties should not put such policies to the 
public at election time, but should instead wait until elected before announcing a 
winding back of the welfare state and then demonstrate the virtues of neo-liberalism 
by implementing it.93 
 
Democracy, for the movement, is the expression of individual choices and 
preferences through market mechanisms. This can only occur under a political 
system in which the functions of government are limited to maintaining the rule of 
law and 'rectifying market failure'.94 According to movement activist, Tony 
Rutherford, such a system is the best guarantee of accountability, which he views as 
a centrepiece of democracy.95 Ultimately, the radical neo-liberal conception of 
democracy is simplistic, utopian and inconsistent. Clearly, they value economic 
liberty over political liberty. 
 
Looking beyond the national economy, Australian radical neo-liberal activists have 
given strong support to the idea of increasingly 'free' global trade. This has meant 
advocating not only the reductions of tariff barriers but also those non-tariff barriers 
to trade outlined in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), such as 
labour laws, environmental regulations and other regulations affecting economic 
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transactions.96 Generally, such support has come in the form of countering the critics 
of global free trade. Robert Skeffington, for example, while Assistant Director of the 
National Farmers' Federation, attacked those advocates of 'social clauses' or social 
tariffs in international trade agreements, arguing that such interferences with market 
forces often end up damaging those workers they are designed to protect.97 
 
Radical neo-liberalism should be seen as a fundamentalist creed, in the sense that it 
is doubtful that advocates of it would be convinced by any amount of evidence that 
its policies had failed.98 In response to criticisms of neo-liberal policies in action 
(whether in Australia, Britain or New Zealand), movement activists have usually 
responded that such policies have not been fully or properly implemented, or that 
only once the radical neo-liberal utopia has been realised, can such policies be 
judged without market 'distortions' created by interventionist governments. Such 
critics are also often dismissed as either self-interested, anachronistic romantics or as 
fearful of competition. It is also a utopian ideology; and it this which helps to 
explain its grip upon its supporters. The concept of utopia is derived from the Greek 
words for 'no place' and 'the good place'; both of which are appropriate descriptions 
of how neo-liberal ideology functions as an ideology. Radical neo-liberalism 
postulates 'the good place' — the radical neo-liberal society based upon a transfer of 
power and responsibility from the state to the market — but it is also 'no place', for 
there is no clear end point to such a process of winding back the welfare state. 
Radical neo-liberalism demonstrates a profound ignorance regarding the necessary 
role of the state in maintaining, shaping, developing and revolutionising the 
capitalist economy. While there has been debate and disagreement within the 
movement, on questions of fundamental principle, there has been consistent 
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agreement. And on such issues, little evidence is required by radical neo-liberals to 
prove their arguments to each other. 
 
 
The ‘Markets, Morals and Civil Society Project’ 
 
As stated in the Introduction, although the defining feature of the radical neo-liberal 
movement has been its ‘libertarian’ economic philosophy, it has also tended to be 
profoundly conservative on social and moral issues. For example, movement 
activists have valorised the traditional nuclear family structure against what are 
viewed as its feminist and new class critics. Sex education in schools has been 
criticised. ‘Politically correct’ curricula have been consistently attacked and the 
teaching of conservative values in schools has been called for. As shall be outlined 
in Chapter Three, the conservative character of much of the movement, combined 
with the movement’s hostility to the ‘new class’, provided the basis for an alliance 
with conservative intellectuals such as Robert Manne and B. A. Santamaria, who did 
not, however, share the movement’s economic philosophy.  
 
While facilitating the development of a powerful right-wing intellectual force during 
the 1980s, by the 1990s these dynamics created a number of problems for the 
movement. First, the movement had to reconcile the obvious contradiction between 
those movement activists who were socially and morally conservative and those who 
were libertarian on most issues.99 Second, and as shall be discussed in Chapter 
Three, by the 1990s critics of the movement from the Left and the conservative 
Right, charged that radical neo-liberalism was hostile to notions of community and 
to traditional social structures valued by conservatives. 
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It was from the need to salvage radical neo-liberalism from such critics, and to 
resolve such problems, that what I shall call the 'Markets, Morals and Civil Society 
Project' of the radical neo-liberal movement was born. Although never articulated in 
a comprehensive, sustained and coherent argument, three central features of the 
Markets and Morals and Civil Society project can be identified. 
 
First, civil society underpins a market society, and is often the best and most 
appropriate place for providing services, such as welfare, that are presently provided 
by the state. Andrew Norton writes: 
 
many sociologists have shown how the small institutions of civil society 
(particularly the family) are the major forces integrating individuals into 
society, and that state institutions can be remote and alienating. This is 
one reason why many people, including economic rationalists, favour 
handing over functions currently performed by the state to private 
organisations able to provide more personal and flexible services.100 
 
Proposals for the transfer of responsibility for welfare provision from the public to 
the private sector101 are in line with this argument. Under such proposals, private 
charities, and the 'non-market' relationships of family and community which form 
part of civil society, would be given a greater role in the provision of welfare. Doing 
so would circumvent the 'we know best paternalism of the welfare state'102 and 
would assist in fostering individual responsibility, rather than 'welfare dependency'. 
 
Second, the ‘Markets, Morals and Civil Society Project’ holds that market forces are 
not antithetical to virtuous behaviour but are, in fact, inherently moral and promote 
virtuous behaviour. For example, in response to calls for business ethics and codes 
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of conduct, the AIPP publication Clear Thinking argues that 'as more and more 
obligations are imposed upon business ... we might overlook the considerable moral 
content of the free market and its institutions'.103 This argument is fleshed out by 
Michael James: 
 
Market morality expresses the elementary virtues that make 
trustworthiness, like honesty, fairness, truth-telling, responsibility, 
reliability and promptness. The market cannot work unless its 
participants display these virtues, at least to some degree.104 
 
Third, it is collectivism and collectivist programmes that undermine civil society, 
morality and traditional social structures such as the family. In contrast, radical neo-
liberals argue that market mechanisms are one of the best ways of bolstering, 
supporting and sustaining such institutions and values. Norton, for example, argues 
that the 'market mentality' does not undermine communal ties and relationships, but 
may actually serve to strengthen them: 
 
Competition policy is designed to put added pressure on producers. 
What market critics overlook is that this is fundamentally a pressure to 
cooperate. A criticism of centrally planned economies is that they lack 
incentives to cooperate 105 
 
Unlike communist societies, argue radical neo-liberals, the dynamics of the free-
market strengthen civil society. 
 
Most importantly, however, the ‘Markets, Morals and Civil Society Project’ argues 
that a just family policy can only be brought about by the application of radical neo-
liberal principles. Barry Maley, for example, speaks of marriage in a similar way to 
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that which other movement activists speak about market relationships: that is, as 
voluntary and contractual. Although divorce should remain available as a right, he 
argues, the marital contract should be presumed to be permanent, and penalties 
should apply for breaking the contract. This would, he believes, encourage more 
responsible behaviour amongst married couples.106 In contrast to this, Maley says 
the current approach of the welfare state to marriage, 'encourages irresponsibility, 
injustice, welfare dependency and waste'.107 
 
Tapper, in a study commissioned for the AIPP, argues in a similar vein that 
incentives built into the family policy of the welfare state serve to encourage family 
breakdown. It is the welfare state, not markets or other factors, that is the primary 
reason for family breakdown.108 The conclusion reached by many radical neo-liberal 
writers on the subject is that in the interests of fairness, just family policy and 
'horizontal equity', the  state should implement a different taxation policy and not 
'favour' sole parent families — which of course supports the radical neo-liberal 
tendency towards a flatter system of taxation.109 
 
So, from these points at least, it is clear that the radical neo-liberals have managed to 
put forward arguments to the effect that it is the welfare state, not the market, which 
puts pressure upon and unfairly disadvantages traditional families. It is through the 
application of radical neo-liberal principles that this situation can be alleviated and 
made more just. The ‘Markets, Morals and Civil Society Project’ thus proposes that 
there is an affinity between radical neo-liberalism and conservatism: that the 
application of radical neo-liberal principles serves to strengthen and preserve those 
institutions and values prized by conservatives. It also issues a call to conservatives 
that they share, with the movement, a common enemy in the form of the welfare 
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state. The language of 'civil society' and 'co-operation' is quite a way from the sorts 
of things radical neo-liberals were saying in the 1980s, such as John Stone's 
comments that, 'To become truly competitive you have to accept a 'culture' of 
competition for your whole society'.110 
 
The ‘Markets, Morals and Civil Society Project’ informed a number of movement 
publications, articles, and the CIS research programmes 'Taking Children Seriously' 
and 'Social Welfare Research Program'. More obvious and prevalent in the output of 
the CIS than other neo-liberal think tanks, it has been, nonetheless a feature of IPA 
and, to a lesser extent, the AIPP also.  
 
The ‘Markets, Morals and Civil Society Project’ has not received uniform 
acceptance within the radical neo-liberal movement, and those engaged in the 
project are not in agreement upon all points. These disagreements stem from 
philosophical differences as well as from differences over the movement's priorities. 
The different priorities of those involved in the radical neo-liberal movement are 
evident from the fact that whereas the CIS, IPA and to a lesser extent, the AIPP have 
all given various amounts of commitment to the ‘Markets, Morals and Civil Society 
Project’, the Tasman Institute has not engaged with the issue at all, preferring to 
concentrate on areas of policy involving readily identifiable markets, such as 
property rights and the environment. It is clear that there are those within the 
movement who believe that affecting radical change to economic policy is the most 
pressing issue and that it should be pursued over and above other issues philosophy 
or social policy. Indeed it was largely over what he perceived to be the IPA's over 
commitment to such social issues at the expense of economic issues that Des Moore 
left the organization in 1996 to found the Institute for Private Enterprise.111 
 
There are philosophical disagreements within the project and they are an expression 
of the, mostly latent, differences between the libertarian and conservative elements 
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of the radical neo-liberal movement. Family policy is the point around which these 
differences revolve. Whilst all contributors to the ‘Markets, Morals and Civil 
Society Project’ acknowledge the intrinsic importance of the family, a number leave 
open the possibility of different types of family structures being desirable. Maley, 
for example, stresses the importance of family 'autonomy', meaning giving parents 
the freedom to choose how they will arrange and organise their own families. 
According to Maley, the state does not have a role in prescribing how a family 
should live. Furthermore, Cox echoes conservative critics in arguing that it is the 
generous treatment by the state of sole-parent families which constitutes:  
 
at least some of the causes of some of the social problems that so distress 
us in Australia and New Zealand, such as poverty, family break-up, 
domestic violence and poor school performance by many children.112 
 
Andrew Norton, however, is less sure: 
 
To avert Australia falling into a social recession, the policy focus should 
fall upon unemployment. This is not to dismiss the worth of carefully 
examining family policy ... However, the effects of policy changes in 
these areas are likely to be at the margins and in the long term.113 
 
Both Norton and Maley are silent on the issue of same sex relationships. 
 
These differences are not major, but they are worth noting because of the insights 
they give into the character of the movement. Despite such differences, however, 
and despite the occasional glimpse of social libertarianism, the ‘Markets, Morals and 
Civil Society Project’ marks the theoretical amalgamation of conservatism with neo-
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liberalism. And for many conservatives — those who profess the shallow 
reactionary nostalgia typical of much conservative thinking in Australia — this has 
been enough to sustain their alliance with the radical neo-liberal movement. 
Ultimately, the ‘Markets, Morals and Civil Society Project’ has helped to cement the 
conservative commitment to the state project of neo-liberalism by providing a 
theoretical reconciliation between the two philosophies. It has been able to leap-frog 
the more sophisticated attempts by social democratic conservatives to plot a middle 
way for the Right between the warring groups.114 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Radical neo-liberalism is an ideology in the sense that is masks the fundamental 
contradictions of neo-liberal capitalism. There are three aspects to this. First, radical 
neo-liberalism reifies capitalist markets. It assumes that market exchanges produce 
mutually beneficial outcomes, thereby ignoring the power imbalance inherent in 
capitalist market relationships. Second, radical neo-liberal ideology completely 
misunderstands the nature of the capitalist state as a manager of capitalism. The state 
has been integral to the development of capitalism and is necessary for capitalism’s 
continued reproduction. The utopia of radical neo-liberal ideology, in which a 
minimal state confines its activities to administering justice, protecting citizens from 
external threat and providing a basic legal framework for the operation of markets is 
an unlikely model for a capitalist society. Third, the radical neo-liberals are 
desperate to deny that neo-liberalism in practice is inimical to many of the traditions 
and values they hold dear due to their conservative moral dispositions. The moral 
conservatism of many movement activists creates a fundamental contradiction for 
the radical neo-liberals. The next chapter will explore the consequences of this 
contradiction for the alliance between the radical neo-liberal movement and 
conservative intellectuals such as Robert Manne and John Carroll. It will also 
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examine the organisational forms through which radical neo-liberal ideology was 
articulated and disseminated. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Radical Neo-liberalism as an Elite Social Movement 
 
 
 
This chapter examines the central, non-intellectual features that provided coherence 
to the radical neo-liberal movement. It examines the key organisational and tactical 
features of the movement and relates them to its ideology and class location. Given 
that the radical neo-liberals were part of a broader right-wing political culture, the 
dynamics of this relationship will be analysed, with a particular focus on the 
movement’s relationship with conservative intellectuals. 
 
In examining the hegemonic impact of an elite social movement, it is not enough to 
consider its core philosophy. Of critical importance also is an examination of what 
allows an elite social movement to carry forth its philosophy into the broader 
political arena. Key features of any movement are its ability to sustain and build its 
activities over time, as well as the techniques by which its philosophies are 
promoted.  
 
In the case of the radical neo-liberal movement, it is think tanks and similar 
organisations which have been crucial to the movement’s success and longevity. 
Although the movement is not reducible to its think tanks — movement activists 
have operated outside of official think tank activity — it is unlikely that, without 
them, a disparate group of individuals with radical neo-liberal dispositions would 
have cohered into a movement. Think tanks are the primary ‘social movement 
organisation’ and ‘mobilising structure’ that facilitate the collective action of the 
movement. They provide the organisational back bone of the radical neo-liberal 
movement. Such organisations have provided space for the articulation and 
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containment of dissent and alternative points of view within the movement. It is 
primarily through such organisations that radical neo-liberal philosophy has been 
sustained and nurtured. Radical neo-liberal think tanks also provide a vehicle for the 
introduction of new activists into the movement. One section of this chapter 
therefore focuses on radical neo-liberal think tanks and the tactics they have 
employed to further the movement’s aims. 
 
Also crucial to the emergence, longevity and success of the radical neo-liberal 
movement has been its ability to position itself within a broader right-wing political 
culture. Of particular importance within this culture is conservatism. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, radical neo-liberalism itself has often had a conservative character. 
However the radical neo-liberal project has also offended the sensibilities of many 
traditional Australian conservative intellectuals. Despite this, during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, the movement enjoyed an informal alliance with these conservative 
intellectuals. Therefore, after discussing the movement’s think tanks and tactics, this 
chapter will: examine the relationship between the radical neo-liberals and 
conservatives; suggest ways in which this relationship conditioned the philosophical 
character of the movement; and look at the ways in which, during the 1990s, the 
movement engaged in open conflict with conservatives and became hegemonic on 
the Australian Right. 
 
In order to give context for this discussion, a brief historical overview of the radical 
neo-liberal movement will first be provided. 
 
 
The radical neo-liberal movement: an historical overview 
 
It is always difficult to identify the precise beginning of something as diffuse as a 
social movement. 1976 has been chosen here because it is the year in which the 
individuals who would form the basis of the movement began to come together in a 
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purposeful fashion to further radical neo-liberal ideology and begin their assault 
upon social justice and the welfare state. In this year, maths teacher Greg Lindsay, 
founded the Centre for Independent Studies (CIS), which initially existed on a 
shoestring budget and was run from his backyard shed. By the end of the decade the 
CIS had obtained a five-year funding commitment from Hugh Morgan and five other 
major capitalists which enabled the Centre to establish a permanent office in North 
Sydney , above  the retailer Uncle Pete’s Toys, and employ Lindsay as its first full-
time Director. Also in 1976, British radical neo-liberal Antony Fisher visited 
Australia, twice, at the behest of a group of capitalists and economists intent on 
forming an Australian organisation similar to Fisher’s Institute of Economic Affairs, 
a British radical neo-liberal think tank. Although no think tank emerged directly out 
of this group, the individuals involved in bringing Fisher to Australia were central to 
the establishment and funding of other radical neo-liberal organisations. 
 
Prior to this, radical neo-liberal ideas percolated through Australia via a number of 
disparate individuals. Milton Friedman visited Australia in 1975, extolling the 
virtues of radical neo-liberalism and preaching the evils of collectivism, 
Keynesianism and ‘economic planning’. His trip was sponsored by Sydney 
stockbroker, Maurice Newman, who would later become a key movement figure. 
During the same year, the Workers’ Party — a precursor to the radical neo-liberal 
movement with an ultra-libertarian, populist agenda — was founded by Bob Howard 
and advertising executive John Singleton. Howard also had an extensive library of 
neo-liberal and libertarian publications, and some later movement activists claim this 
library exposed them to such ideas.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, all of this occurred during a period of economic 
downturn. In Australia, the phenomenon of stagflation provided the context for 
claims that the welfare state and Keynesian economic policies had been proven 
failures. Most capitalists saw the disciplining of labour and a reduction in state 
spending as the solution. Others feared the crisis was symptomatic of a creeping 
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socialism  as evidenced by trade union militancy, the rise of radical social 
movements and, from 1972-1975, the left-wing elements of the Whitlam 
government. 
 
In the late 1970s and into the early 1980s a host of small organisations such as 
Centre 2000, the Adam Smith Club, The Society for Individual Liberty, the Society 
for Austrian Economics, Taxpayers United and Australians for Commonsense, 
Freedom and Responsibility actively promoted radical neo-liberal ideas, and agitated 
for political change. These were important in bringing radical neo-liberal activists 
into contact with one another and in forming the bonds of a fledgling movement. 
What solidified this process however was the establishment and, in the case of the 
IPA, the reinvigoration of, the larger think tanks. In addition to the CIS, the most 
important of these groups were: the AIPP, founded in 1983 by former Dry Liberal 
MP, John Hyde; the Crossroads Group, which met secretly from 1980-1986 and 
brought together the core of movement activists; and the IPA which, particularly 
after Rod Kemp’s appointment as Director in 1982, moved from an anti-communist 
Keynesian position to a conservative, radical neo-liberal one.  
 
At this time, the radical neo-liberal movement was still in an emergent stage of  
existence. As discussed in Chapter Six, occasional coverage of the movement’s 
activities, publications and organisations appeared in the mainstream commercial 
media, such coverage being particularly favourable and frequent in the Australian 
Financial Review under the editorship of Paddy McGuinness. In addition to its 
proselytising activities, during this period the movement spent much time attracting 
support and patronage from capitalists, academics and some politicians.  
 
The election of the Hawke Labor government in 1983 provided a window of 
opportunity for the movement. Labor’s implementation of some neo-liberal policies 
— most notably the floating of the currency and the deregulation of the finance 
sector — lent legitimacy to neo-liberal ideas and opened up the context for 
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speculation about economic directions for Australia. At the same time, the close 
relationship between Labor and the trade union movement, which was manifested in 
the Accord, allowed the movement’s accusations regarding the power of organised 
‘special interests’ and the nexus between ‘big government’ and ‘big unions’ under a 
welfare state regime, to gain some traction. Added to this was the relatively 
expansive conception of rights underpinning Labor’s social policy which offended 
the conservative disposition of much of the movement. But the issue that catapulted 
the radical neo-liberal movement to public attention was the Robe River dispute in 
1986, in which Peko Wallsend, owner of the iron ore operation, sacked its entire 
workforce, ignoring the orders of the WA Industrial Commission. Specifically, it 
was the revelation during the dispute, late in August 1986, that Peko CEO, Charles 
Copeman, was a member of the H. R. Nicholls Society, a secretive movement 
organisation formed earlier that year that turned the movement into a topic of public 
debate. A flurry of media interest in the ‘new right’ — the common term for the 
movement — ensued. This gave the movement a profile it would not otherwise have 
had.  
 
The rest of the 1980s was a period of enormous activity for the radical neo-liberal 
movement, as it mounted a sustained assault upon the institutions of the post-war 
consensus, organised labour, notions of social justice, and those who supported 
them. It celebrated, and was involved in, other capitalist offensives against trade 
unions and the arbitration system, such as the Dollar Sweets, Mudginberri and 
SEQEB disputes. Movement activists were involved in attempts to shift the 
Coalition further to the neo-liberal Right. The National Priorities Project (NPP) was 
formed and published a series of large books setting out radical neo-liberal 
alternatives for taxation and government spending. In 1987 Michael Porter from the 
Centre of Policy Studies led an attempt to set up a private, fee-charging university. 
The movement continued to attack the welfare state and ‘economic planning’. 
Movement publications railed against the ‘industrial relations club’ and 
‘inefficiencies’ in the economy, promoting the virtues of deregulation, privatisation 
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and marketisation as alternatives. In this they were given impetus by the neo-liberal 
agendas of Thatcher in Britain, Reagan in the United States and Lange in New 
Zealand. Culturally, the radical neo-liberals attacked the Bicentennial Authority, the 
‘culture of welfare dependency’, the decline of conservative values in public 
schools, social movements and other manifestations of the perceived ‘new class’ 
dominance of cultural institutions. Those radical neo-liberal groups that survived the 
1980s emerged with exponentially larger budgets than a decade earlier, which gave 
them a stable basis for continuing their activities. 
 
By the 1990s the terrain of political debate had changed. Deregulation and 
privatisation were high on the agendas of both the Labor government and the 
Coalition opposition. Within the capitalist class, the vicious debates over tariffs and 
industrial relations had largely subsided. The ACTU was moving towards support of 
labour market deregulation in the form of enterprise bargaining. Neo-liberalism had 
become elite orthodoxy. Internationally the collapse of communism in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union heralded the end of the cold war. In this new climate, 
the radical neo-liberals changed their focus as well. The AIPP merged with the IPA 
in 1991, significantly strengthening the latter’s financial position. Michael Porter left 
CoPS to found the Tasman Institute — a radical neo-liberal think tank — and 
Tasman Asia Pacific, a ‘do-tank’ which offered consultancies to states wishing to 
implement radical neo-liberal agendas of their own. While continuing their assault 
upon the remnant institutions of the post-war consensus, other issues took on a new 
importance for the movement. In order to counter the influence of the environment 
movement in setting the policy agenda, the radical neo-liberals attacked 
environmentalists’ credibility and argued that natural resources were best preserved 
through the use of market mechanisms. When the informal alliance between radical 
neo-liberals and conservative intellectuals, such as Robert Manne and John Carroll, 
began to crack in the early 1990s, the morality of markets became a new focus for 
the movement. With the High Court’s 1992 Mabo decision and the Labor 
government’s subsequent Native Title legislation in 1993 a new terrain for the 
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radical neo-liberals opened up: the legitimacy of indigenous claims to land and the 
accuracy of the written history of indigenous Australians. Pubic education came 
under assault as well. A new rhetorical device also entered the radical neo-liberal 
lexicon: ‘political correctness’. This provided a convenient catch-all for undermining 
the movement’s enemies. 
 
The election of the Howard Coalition government in 1996 marked a new era for the 
radical neo-liberal movement. No longer were movement activists outsiders looking 
in. Some movement activists, such as David and Rod Kemp, Peter Costello and Ian 
MacLachlan were now Cabinet members. Movement activist, Bob Officer, headed 
up the government’s National Commission of Audit and David Trebeck was 
contracted to devise a plan for combating the Maritime Union of Australia. 
Furthermore, the government shared some of the movement’s concerns, particularly 
with regard to social, cultural and industrial issues. The Coalition government also 
embraced some of the movement’s putative language such as ‘political correctness’, 
the ‘guilt industry’ and ‘special interests’. Once this occurred the movement gained 
added legitimacy in its assault upon social justice and the Left in general. What was 
once a disparate group of elites whose ideology occupied the fringes of Australian 
politics had, by 1996, become an established part of the political landscape with the 
ear of a sympathetic government.   
 
 
Think tanks: the organisational backbone of the radical neo-liberal movement 
 
Central to the emergence and longevity of the radical neo-liberal movement has been 
a series of ‘think tanks’ and forums. Chief among these are the Institute of Public 
Affairs (IPA), the Centre for Independent Studies (CIS), the Australian Institute for 
Public Policy (AIPP), the Tasman Institute, the H. R. Nicholls Society, The Centre 
of Policy Studies (CoPS), Centre 2000, Crossroads, the National Priorities Project 
(NPP) and the Adam Smith Club. Such groups constitute the ‘Social Movement 
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Organisations’ (SMO’s) and ‘mobilising structures’ of the radical neo-liberal 
movement. They are sites of organised and activist intellectual activity, underpinned 
by a commitment to radical neo-liberalism (and, in some cases, to conservatism 
also).  
 
The radical neo-liberal movement is not reducible to its think tanks. Movement 
activists sometimes operate independently of the movement’s mobilising structures. 
The importance of think tanks, however, is they provide the radical neo-liberal 
movement with its organisational backbone. They are forums for the articulation of 
radical neo-liberal ideas as well as centres for the dissemination of radical neo-
liberal ideas to a broader audience. It was largely through the focus and 
organisational support afforded by these think tanks that the process described by 
Kemp whereby 'comparatively isolated intellectuals became linked in a nationwide 
network challenging traditional conservative centres of power'1 was able to occur. 
Think tanks bring like-minded people together to undertake collective action in the 
service of a radical neo-liberal agenda. However, the form of collective action 
undertaken by the radical neo-liberal think tanks is different, in many respects, to 
that which might normally be associated with social movements. While radical neo-
liberal movement activists have on occasion — as discussed in later chapters — 
engaged in militant direct action (a common form of social movement collective 
action), the form of collective action characteristically undertaken by movement 
think tanks is the seminar, the lecture, the edited publication, the research project, 
and the journal. As well as enabling the movement to intervene in public discourse, 
such collective action also benefits the movement by supporting and emboldening its 
participants. Charles Copeman, for example, reportedly claimed that the H. R. 
Nicholls Society meeting of 1986 provided him with the 'inspiration' to take on the 
unions in the Robe River dispute later in that year.2 
 
                                                 
1 David Kemp, 'Liberalism and Conservatism in Australia Since 1944', p. 340. 
2 Copeman quoted in Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty: Power, Politics and Business in Australia, 
2nd edition, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1994, p.261. 
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After securing a funding base, radical neo-liberal think tanks have been able to 
provide the movement with continuity. This has helped to sustain the movement 
over time. By providing a focus for radical neo-liberal ideas and activity, think tanks 
have also been able to draw new activists into the movement. Conscious efforts at 
such are evident, for example, in the IPA’s organisation of regular lunchtime 
meetings for young business people, at which guests were encouraged ‘to take an 
interest and get involved in public affairs’.3 
 
While they are, to some degree, competitors — Greg Lindsay of the CIS says 
‘There’s a small pot of resources apparently available to people in the think tank 
world and we all guard our patch’4 — with their own areas of speciality, there is 
considerable knowledge sharing and overlap between radical neo-liberal groups. It is 
common, for example, for leading radical neo-liberal activists to publish with a 
variety of movement organisations, and movement activists will often attend 
functions organised by a variety of different movement organisations. There are also 
numerous examples of movement organisations assisting each other or working 
together — such as the IPA and the Tasman Institute’s collaboration on Project 
Victoria; the CIS constitution providing the basis for the constitution of the AIPP 
and the visit of Professor Israel Kirzner to Australia in 1984 was co-sponsored by 
the CIS and CoPS.5 
 
In the development of radical neo-liberal organisations in Australia, overseas think 
tanks have been particularly important. Radical neo-liberal organisations such as 
America’s Heritage Foundation, Britain’s Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA) and 
international networks such as the Mont Pelerin Society and the Atlas Foundation, 
served as examples for the Australian movement to emulate, and provided ongoing 
intellectual and organisational support to their Australian counter-parts. Mont 
                                                 
3 Anon., ‘Get involved, says Hugh Morgan’, IPA Review, August-October, 1988, Vol. 42, No. 2, p. 
63. 
4 Greg Lindsay, correspondence with the author. 
5 CIS, CIS Annual Review 1984, CIS, St. Leonards, 1984, p. 3. 
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Pelerin and Atlas, in particular, provided a focus for the growing international 
radical neo-liberal movement.6 They were able to put Australian activists in contact 
with think tank activists in other countries, and provide first hand knowledge of how 
to establish successful neo-liberal think tanks in Australia. John Hyde, for example, 
borrowed heavily from the Atlas Foundation’s Guidelines and Recommendations for 
Starting an Institute7 — a handbook for setting up and maintaining a radical neo-
liberal think tank — in establishing the AIPP. Indeed, Hyde describes this resource 
as a 'bible' among radical neo-liberal think tanks.8 Furthermore, as noted earlier in 
this chapter, Antony Fisher, founder of both Atlas and the IEA was brought to 
Australia in 1976 by a group of radical neo-liberals in an attempt to draw upon his 
knowledge and establish an 'IEA-style'9 think tank in Australia. Longer established 
and better funded radical neo-liberal think tanks in the USA and Britain have also 
provided their Australian cousins with tactical advice10 as well as a stream of high 
profile international speakers promoting the radical neo-liberal message. Such close 
ties also allow the regular review of overseas radical neo-liberal literature and the 
reproduction of articles and speeches by overseas radical neo-liberals in Australian 
think tank publications. Because of this, the ideas of Hayek, Public Choice theory, 
Milton Friedman and developments in neo-liberal theory and neo-liberal policy 
alternatives have been disseminated in Australia. This has given radical neo-liberal 
ideas an audience beyond the narrow forums and journals of academic economists. 
 
 
Australian radical neo-liberal movement organisations 
 
                                                 
6 See Richard Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable, pp. 306-308. 
7 The current version of this is accessible at the Atlas Foundation’s website: 
http://www.atlasusa.org/toolkit/starterkit.php?refer=toolkit, at 20th March 2004. 
8 John Hyde, interview with the author. 
9 Andrew Norton, ‘The CIS at Twenty: Greg Lindsay Talks to Andrew Norton’, Policy, Winter 1996, 
pp. 16-21. 
10 For one such example of organisational knowledge exchange see Edward Feulner, 'Ideas, Think-
Tanks and Governments: Away from the Power Elite, Back to the People. Quadrant, November 
1985, pp. 22-26. 
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Having outlined the general features of radical neo-liberal think tanks and their 
relationship to the radical neo-liberal movement, the main think tanks will now, 
briefly, be discussed. This is intended both as an introduction to the main players 
within the movement as well as a chance to highlight the differences in focus, 
history and structure between the various movement organisations.  
 
The Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) 
 
Founded in Melbourne in 1943, the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) is the oldest of 
Australia’s radical neo-liberal think tanks. The IPA had its genesis in the vacuum 
created within the non-Labor forces in Australian politics by the disintegration of the 
United Australia Party and the desire, within sections of the capitalist class, to secure 
the hegemony of capitalism upon the cessation of the Second World War. As in 
other countries, during the war the Australian government took a central role in 
planning and directing the national economy. The capitalist class was keen to see 
that this was not used as an excuse for the extension of government regulation of the 
economy after the war. It was scared about the possibility of moves toward socialism 
in Australia, but also about the legitimacy of big business and the capitalist system 
in general.  
 
Given the demands of the working class and organised labour for a share in the 
benefits of capitalist growth after the hardships of the war years, the IPA, during its 
early years, strategically adopted a position that was broadly supportive of 
Keynesian economic planning, while at the same time rejecting any moves towards 
socialism. In adopting such a position, the IPA deliberately repudiated laissez faire 
as a guiding principle of good governance. Thus, from its inception until the mid-to-
late 1970s, the ideology of the IPA could be characterised as anti-socialist 
Keynesianism. 
 
 113
From the late 1970s onwards, and accelerating with the appointment of Rod Kemp 
as Director in 1982, the IPA shed its Keynesian past and embraced radical neo-
liberalism. This has been combined with a conservative moral philosophy.  
 
As a radical neo-liberal think tank the IPA has produced a periodical, IPA Review 
(which, from 1985, has been sold in newsagents as well as through subscription),11  
a regular summary of economic and social indicators , Facts, as well as more 
detailed Backgrounders, Policy Issues, Current Issues, Education Papers, Economic 
Papers and a host of other book and monograph-length publications. In addition, the 
IPA has organised regular forums, seminars and lectures — some private, but many 
open to the general public. 
 
The IPA was originally called the Institute of Public Affairs (Victoria) in order to 
distinguish itself from the Institute of Public Affairs (NSW). Based in Sydney, the 
IPA (NSW) was unaffiliated with its Victorian namesake and, according to Marian 
Simms, was, from its inception, more opposed to government intervention in the 
economy.12 In the 1980s, under the directorship of Gerard Henderson, the IPA 
(NSW) advocated a radical neo-liberal agenda. In 1989 the IPA (NSW) was reborn 
as the Sydney Institute, under Henderson’s directorship.13 This change in 
organisation also heralded a change in philosophy, with the Sydney Institute being 
much more a forum for debate, and less a vehicle for radical neo-liberalism, than its 
predecessor. 
 
The Australian Lecture Foundation 
 
                                                 
11 Michael Bertram, A History of the Institute of Public Affairs, MA Thesis, August 1989, Noel 
Butlin Archives Centre (hereafter NBAC), N136/111, p. 132. 
12 Marian Simms, A Liberal Nation: The Liberal Party and Australian Politics, Hale and Iremonger, 
Sydney, 1982, pp. 18-19. 
13 Gerard Henderson, ‘Comment on Stone’, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, 1991, 
pp. 557-558. 
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The Australian Lecture Foundation was a small group of businessmen and 
academics who brought conservative neo-liberal speakers to Australia during the 
1980s. The foundation underwrote the costs (which could include a fee for the 
speaker,14 first class air travel, accommodation and meals) and organised the 
itinerary for the visiting speaker, as well as making the speaker available for 
movement organisation functions.15 Distribution and publication of the speakers’ 
books in Australia was also organised by the Foundation.16 The Foundation 
facilitated the visit to Australia of Norman Podhoretz (1981), Ken Minogue (1983), 
Roger Scruton (1984), Rick Stroup (1984).17  
 
The Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) 
 
Founded in 1976 by high school maths teacher, Greg Lindsay, the CIS has become 
one of the three largest radical neo-liberal organisations in Australia, alongside the 
IPA and the Tasman Institute. In its philosophical outlook, the CIS owes its debt, 
most obviously, to the work of Hayek and Public Choice analysis. It has maintained 
a strong association with the Mont Pelerin Society, hosting its annual meeting in 
1985. Diane Stone argues that: 
 
More than any other organisation outside of the university system, the 
CIS introduced the ideas of Milton Friedman, Friederich von Hayek and 
the public choice economists to Australia.18  
 
In 1986, the CIS established a sister organisation in New Zealand.19  
                                                 
14 For example, the fee for Norman Podhoretz in 1981 was $10,000. See ‘Australian Lecture 
Foundation — Visit of Norman Podhoretz’ NBAC N136/95. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Christopher Jay, ‘New Right Policy Moves Out of Politicians’ Hands’, Australian Financial 
Review, 11th February, 1986, p. 16. 
18 Diane Stone, Think Tanks: Independent Policy Research Institutes in the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Australia, PhD Thesis, ANU, 1993, p. 204. 
19 CIS, CIS Annual Review 1986-87, CIS, St. Leonards, 1987, p. 14. 
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The flagship publication of the CIS, the periodical Policy (1989-), evolved from the 
Newsletter (Centre for Independent Studies) (1977-84) and the CIS Policy Report 
(1985-1989). Upon the change from Policy Report to Policy in 1989, the journal 
became much broader in its scope, moving from a predominantly economic policy 
focussed journal — exploring issues of privatisation and deregulation — to dealing 
with broader social and cultural issues as well. Predominantly, such issues have been 
framed in a manner consistent with a conservative as well as a radical neo-liberal 
philosophy. In addition to this the CIS has produced a huge range of books and 
monographs. It also holds regular ‘lectures’ — such as the annual John Bonython 
lecture and the Bert Kelly lecture series — at which radical neo-liberal themes are 
engaged with by invited speakers. More than any of the other movement 
organisations, the CIS concerns itself with the philosophical underpinnings of 
radical neo-liberal ideology It is not surprising therefore that the Markets, Morals 
and Civil Society project has had its most consistent articulation from the CIS. 
 
Centre 2000 
 
Founded in 1983, Centre 2000 is by far the most populist of the major movement 
organisations. It is unknown when the organisation folded but its magazine, The 
Optimist — which ‘carried on’ the work of the Adam Smith Club newsletter, 
Optimism20 — was published at least until 1989. During this time, and in contrast to 
most other movement organisations, Centre 2000 focussed heavily upon publicising 
and supporting militant and grassroots manifestations of radical neo-liberal 
sentiment. Examples of this include The Optimist’s celebration of: the actions of 
industrial action by Doctors opposed to Medicare; ‘Tax Freedom Day’; the 
prosecution of businessmen Frank Penhalluriack and Bob Wolstenholme for defying 
bans on weekend trading; and the ‘Joh for PM’ campaign.21 The Optimist also 
                                                 
20 Anon., ‘Adam Smith Club News’, The Optimist, July/August 1986, p. 14 
21 Anon., ‘Weekend Trader Out for Weekend’, The Optimist, May-June 1985, p. 15; Anon., ‘Tax 
Freedom Day Goes National’, The Optimist, May-June 1985, p. 18; Anon., ‘Trading on a “Fine” 
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printed a regular diary of upcoming movement activities — including those hosted 
by other think tanks.22 Centre 2000 operated a bookshop in Sydney boasting ‘over 
500’ radical neo-liberal titles:23 unlike other major movement organisations, it 
produced little research of its own. 
 
The H. R. Nicholls Society 
 
Although not a think tank per se, the H. R. Nicholls Society holds an important place 
in the development of the radical neo-liberal movement. Formed in 1986, the H. R. 
Nicholls Society organises yearly or twice-yearly forums that act, in effect, as a 
gathering for the movement. Its primary concern is with industrial relations. Named 
after an early twentieth century editor of the Hobart Mercury whose claim for 
historical attention was an attack upon Justice Henry Bournes Higgins of the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Court, the Society is primarily concerned with the issue 
of industrial relations — specifically with the curtailment of union power; the 
encouragement of common law suits against trade unions; the advocacy of 
individual contracts between employer and employee; and the dismantling of the 
system of arbitration and wage fixation. The Society meets in secret: 'an "in club" 
affair so that we can discuss these matters without restraint'.24  
 
The Crossroads Group 
 
Crossroads was an initiative of Liberal Dry MPs John Hyde and Jim Carlton, and 
was a clandestine group that brought together about 40 radical neo-liberal activists 
with the specific aim of sharing ideas and planning ways of furthering the radical 
                                                                                                                                         
Weekend’, The Optimist, September-October 1985, p. 17; Nadia Weiner, ‘Editorial’, The Optimist, 
January-February 1987, p. 3. 
22 See Anon., ‘Freedom Agenda’, The Optimist, January-February, 1987, inside back cover. 
23 Nadia Weiner quoted in Christopher Jay, ‘Economic Think Tank is Growing Up’, Australian 
Financial Review, 13th February, 1986, p. 16. 
24 From the letter of invitation to the inaugural meeting of the H. R. Nicholls Society, quoted in H. R. 
Nicholls Society, Arbitration in Contempt: Proceedings of the Inaugural Seminar of the H. R. 
Nicholls Society Held in Melbourne, 28 February-2 March, 1986, H. R. Nicholls Society, Melbourne, 
1986, p. 317. 
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neo-liberal agenda. The name was derived from the then recently published 
movement manifesto Australia at the Crossroads written by movement activists 
Wolfgang Kasper, Richard Blandy, John Freebairn, Douglas Hocking and Robert 
O’Neil. Should the existence of the group have been publicly discovered, it was 
planned to explain it away as a talk-shop devoted to discussing the implications of 
Kasper et al’s book. From its inception in early 1981 until 1986, the Crossroads 
Group met twice yearly.25  
 
Crossroads should be regarded as an important development in the history of the 
radical neo-liberal movement. It brought together radical neo-liberals from 
academia, politics and business and facilitated dialogue between individuals from 
different movement organisations at a crucial time in the movement’s development. 
It thus helped to cohere the movement. That it met secretly, and that its existence 
was deliberately hidden from the public, allowed activists to strategise and debate 
free from scrutiny. 
 
The Australian Institute for Public Policy (AIPP) 
 
Established in 1983 by former 'Dry' Liberal MP, John Hyde, and Bill Clough of 
Clough Engineering, one of the largest firms in Western Australia,26 the Australian 
Institute for Public Policy (AIPP) promoted radical neo-liberal policies until its 
incorporation into the IPA in 1991. By this time its revenue had risen from $105,025 
(in 1985) to $310,889 (in 1990).27 During its existence, the Perth-based think tank 
published on a range of issues advocating radical neo-liberal economic policy 
changes, but also delving into social policy (inviting speakers with both conservative 
and libertarian viewpoints). These views were put forward through its regular 
                                                 
25 Information on Crossroads is from Jim Carlton, interview with author. Carlton says that the 
description of Crossroads by Paul Kelly in The End of Certainty is accurate. Kelly will therefore be 
used as a reliable source for discussions of Crossroads. 
26 John Hyde, interview with the author. 
27 See AIPP, Clear Thinking, No. 43, December 1990. The figure is estimated as higher by Hyde, 
who describes the 'about $400 000 of annual income' that the organisation took with it to the IPA in 
1991 (John Hyde, interview with author). 
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publication for subscribers, Clear Thinking, as well as Economic Witness, each of 
the 53 editions of which gave detailed analysis of a single policy issue. In addition, 
the AIPP published numerous books. The most important of these were Wages 
Wasteland (1985) and Mandate to Govern (1987).28 Wages Wasteland was one of 
the earliest collections of radical neo-liberal attacks upon the system of centralised 
arbitration and wage fixation, while Mandate to Govern, a joint initiative with the 
Australian Chamber of Commerce, was based upon the US Heritage Foundation's 
'Mandate for Leadership' series published before the US elections of 1980 and 1984, 
and outlined a radical neo-liberal policy agenda for the incoming government at the 
1987 Australian federal elections. 
 
Although it did establish an office in Canberra, the Perth-based AIPP had a greater 
focus on Western Australian political issues than did other think tanks, particularly 
WA Inc. In 1991, the AIPP amalgamated with the IPA and Hyde became its 
Director. In Hyde's words: 
 
To wage this struggle most effectively IPA needed a director and we 
needed access to resources and to influence in the heartland of our 
intellectual opponents. Since the AIPP's inception we have co-operated 
closely with the IPA. In short, we are joining forces with old friends.29 
 
The Centre of Policy Studies (CoPS) 
 
Established under the auspices of Monash University in 1979 by economist 
Professor Michael Porter, the Centre for Policy Studies was a university-based 
radical neo-liberal think tank. The Fraser government awarded CoPS a Research 
Centre of Excellence grant for $2.6 million30 which enabled it not only to construct 
                                                 
28 John Hyde and John Nurick (eds), Wages Wasteland: The Australian Wage Fixing System, Hale 
and Iremonger and AIPP, Sydney, 1985; John Nurick (ed.), Mandate to Govern. 
29 John Hyde, 'A Special Message to Members of the AIPP', Clear Thinking, December 1990, p. 1 
30 Michael Porter, interview with the author. 
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elaborate econometric computer modelling for testing neo-liberal proposals, but also 
to bring to Australia a number of American radical neo-liberals as well as those 
involved in implementing radical neo-liberal agendas overseas. As Michael Porter 
says: 
 
the effect of that was to give one Professor, in Australia (me), a budget 
unlike any before or since, so imagine, I brought out Milton Friedman, I 
brought out all the big names, aviation was an issue, so we brought out 
everybody who had been in competition in airlines, Fred Kahn from the 
Federal aviation authority in America who has done the deregulation, the 
president of Continental Airlines in New York, Michael Lavine who is 
now the head of the Yale Business School. We used that money on 
airlines, transport, electricity, labour markets, monetary policy to bring 
out the best and brightest, so for six years I had this massive budget.31 
 
The Australian Adam Smith Club 
 
Better described as a dinner club than a think tank, the Australian Adam Smith Club 
was formed in 1981 in Sydney, reportedly ‘as a result of the fusion of the Libertarian 
Dinner Club and the news-sheet Optimism’.32 Greg Lindsay was its first Chairman.33 
The Club promotes a radical neo-liberal notion of economic freedom and 
erroneously attributes this sentiment to Adam Smith. It is not surprising therefore to 
find that the Club has virtually deified Smith, producing ‘Adam Smith ties’ and 
‘Adam Smith lapel and tie pins’.34 During the 1980s the Club hosted an annual 
Adam Smith Award ceremony at which individuals were recognised for service to 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Anon., ‘Adam Smith Club News’, p. 14 
33 Ibid., p. 14 
34 See the advertisements for such in The Optimist, March-April 1985, p. 19 and The Optimist, May-
June 1985, p. 17. 
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the radical neo-liberal cause. The club also hosted movement activists as speakers at 
regular dinners.35 
 
Beginning as a  Sydney-based club,  branches were also established in Canberra 
(1985) and Melbourne (1982). By the mid 1990s the Melbourne branch had, it 
seems, extended its libertarian approach to social issues as well, decrying in its 
newsletter the mass strip searching for illegal drugs of 463 people at a Melbourne 
nightclub as a ‘loss of individual freedom’.36 In 1995 the Melbourne branch also had 
a favourable review of the NSW Shooters’ Party.37 Publications of the Club included 
Optimism (1981-1984) and Laissez Faire: Newsletter of the Australian Adam Smith 
Club (Melbourne).  
 
The Tasman Institute 
 
After leaving CoPS in 1989, Michael Porter helped to establish the Tasman Institute. 
According to Porter, Tasman 'came out of the ashes of an attempt to form a private 
university’38 in 1987 — Tasman University. Formed in 1990, Tasman (at least 
during the period under review) consisted of two related entities — the Tasman 
Institute and Tasman Economics (later renamed Tasman Asia Pacific).  
 
The Tasman Institute performs a similar role to that of other radical neo-liberal think 
tanks: proposing radical neo-liberal alternatives; critiquing the role of government; 
engaging in public discourse intervention and attempting to shift the parameters of 
elite and public debate. Of his time at CoPS, Porter says 'we were getting our hands 
dirty',39 meaning that they did not merely produce papers and publications, but were 
interested in making radical neo-liberal change a reality. This sort of approach is 
                                                 
35 See Tony Taranto, ‘Adam Smith Club News’, The Optimist, September-October 1985, p. 16. 
36 Anon., ‘Bouquets and Brickbats’, Laissez Faire: Newsletter of the Australian Adam Smith Club 
(Melbourne), August 1995, p. 2. 
37 ‘Shooting from the Lip’, Laissez Faire: Newsletter of the Australian Adam Smith Club 
(Melbourne), April 1995, p. 1. 
38 Michael Porter, interview with the author. 
39 Ibid.  
 121
embodied by Tasman, with Tasman Economics/Asia-Pacific being an organisation 
that does contracting work on projects requiring the implementation of neo-liberal 
strategies — particularly privatisation and deregulation in the Asia-Pacific region. 
So, Tasman is one of the few think tanks that puts neo-liberal theory into practice, 
rather than merely writing about it, or merely advocating it. As Porter writes: ‘For 
Tasman the opportunity is to go forward from being just a “think tank” to becoming 
a “do tank.40”’ 
 
Tasman has been at the forefront of radical neo-liberal advocacy for the creation of 
markets for evaluating the environment. It continued much of the work of CoPS, and 
completed the final book of the National Priorities Project, Markets, Resources and 
the Environment.41 With the IPA, Tasman co-ordinated Project Victoria, the 
blueprint for radical neo-liberal change in Victoria which helped to shape the agenda 
of the Kennett government (see Chapter Seven). 
 
Institute for Private Enterprise (IPE) 
 
Des Moore left the IPA and formed his own think tank, the Institute for Private 
Enterprise (IPE) in 1996. His decision to found IPE was based upon a disagreement 
within the IPA over priorities:  
 
The board of the IPA and the then Chief Executive, John Hyde, took the 
view that we should put less emphasis on economic reform, because the 
Federal Government, after 1996 or even before 1996, was moving in the 
right direction and we should be concentrating much more on social 
issues. I took the view that that was not correct, that economic reform 
had a long way to go and that it’s an ongoing battle and that there was 
plenty to do in the way of economic reform. And I decided that I wasn’t 
                                                 
40 Michael Porter, ‘Executive Director’s Report’, Tasman Institute Annual Report 1991, p. 3 
41 Alan Moran, Andrew Chisholm and Michael Porter, Markets, Resources and the Environment, 
Allen and Unwin, North Sydney, 1991. 
 122
going to continue to have arguments — I was old enough to go out and 
do it myself — and I wasn’t going to continue to have arguments every 
second day or week within an organisation that was pursuing a course 
that I didn’t want to pursue. So I decided to form my own enterprise.42 
 
In line with this, IPE has focussed primarily upon economic issues, promoting a 
radical neo-liberal agenda and critiquing government expenditure. Moore was able 
to attract some corporate funding, and received: 
 
a reasonable amount of support from businesses and the odd foundation 
— not by any means enough to run a major organisation but enough to 
cover my costs43 
 
The IPE remains a relatively small think tank. This is reflected in its output, which 
consists of an newsletter emailed to subscribers, occasional publications, speeches 
and letters to the editor. 
 
University Links 
 
In addition to think tanks and similar movement organisations, there are other 
institutional congregations of movement activists, primarily within universities. The 
Flinders University-based National Institute of Labour Studies (NILS), for example, 
has been home to movement activist, Richard Blandy and prominent sympathiser, 
Judith Sloan. It produces research papers, longer studies and a regular journal, 
Australian Bulletin of Labour, primarily for an audience of academics and 
bureaucrats. The focus of the Institute is on labour market research, and it derives its 
funds through the sale of publications, subscriptions, grants and contracted research. 
According to Blandy, NILS is the model neo-liberal workplace, with flexible 
                                                 
42 Des Moore, interview with the author. 
43 Des Moore, interview with the author. 
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working hours and decentralised management.44 The School of Politics at the 
Australian Defence Force Academy has been home to movement activists Chandran 
Kukathus, William Maley and Andrew Norton. The Australian Graduate School of 
Management  (AGSM) was another centre for movement activists. Greg Lindsay 
argues that ‘the establishment of the Australian Graduate School of Management 
brought us Ray Ball and Malcolm Fisher who became active in the centre in the 
years ahead.’.45 Peter Dodd was also a director of the AGSM. In addition to CoPS, 
also at Monash University were movement activists David Kemp, Ross Parish and 
Geoff Hogbin. The location of these activists lends academic credibility to the 
radical neo-liberal movement. 
 
 
Legitimacy and independence 
 
As shall be discussed in Chapters Five and Seven, the capitalist class was integral to 
the existence of the movement, and the movement also had a close association with 
the Liberal Party. It has therefore been incumbent upon movement organisations to 
establish their credentials as expert commentators on political, economic and social 
issues, and not to be seen as industry lobby groups, or as sub-committees of the 
Liberal Party. Additionally, the radical neo-liberal movement does not enjoy 
anything like a popular support base. Indeed, the participant base of the movement 
itself is quite small, and this base is predominantly comprised of ‘elites’ — of some 
capitalists, but predominantly of those occupying contradictory locations within 
class relations. It is for this reason that the movement is best understood as a ‘non-
class’ force: not predominantly drawn from either capital or labour. The boards and 
research advisory committees of movement organisations are typically comprised of 
capitalists and academics (often professors). Capitalists, academics, bureaucrats, 
                                                 
44 Richard Blandy, Peter Dawkins, Kenneth Gannicott, Peter Kain, Wolfgang Kasper, and Roy 
Kriegler, Structured Chaos: The Process of Productivity Advance, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 1985, pp. vii-viii. 
45 Andrew Norton, ‘The CIS at Twenty: Greg Lindsay Talks to Andrew Norton’, pp. 16-21. 
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politicians and consultants comprise the bulk of those who contribute to movement 
publications. A look at those who consume movement publications reveals a similar 
pattern. In 1981, for example, IPA Review had a circulation of about 21,000 copies. 
Although this is good for an intellectual magazine, it is put into perspective by the 
revelation that over 10 000 of those copies were purchased by corporations or 
associations and over 7 500 were sent to schools. Only 1668 were listed as being 
purchased by ‘individuals’.46 Given that the movement rarely attempted the 
mobilisation of those sympathetic to radical neo-liberal goals or ideology, purchases 
of movement periodicals is a reasonable gauge of an upper limit of movement 
participation. Such a figure is quite small. It is even smaller when the provision of 
copies to schools and workplaces are factored out of the equation. Further evidence 
of the narrow support base of the radical neo-liberal movement can be found in the 
Centre for Independent Studies’ own assessment of its ‘audience’. In its Annual 
Review 1992-1993, the CIS identified five audiences for its activities: 
 
i) the academic community, comprised of teachers and students; ii) the 
corporate sector, public and private companies of all sizes; iii) the 
professional community, including doctors, lawyers, engineers; iv) 
political decision-makers, politicians, their advisers and the public 
sector; v) the media, daily media as well as specialist publications.47 
 
This was little different from the situation a decade earlier when the CIS celebrated 
its sale of books increasing by 200 per cent, but lamented that ‘The main market is 
still university bookshops, academics, schools and government departments’.48 It is 
therefore difficult for the movement to claim that it is speaking on behalf of the 
common interest rather than a narrow or sectional interest. Because of these factors, 
establishing its legitimacy and independence has been crucial to the radical neo-
liberal movement and its mobilising structures. 
                                                 
46 Michael Bertram, A History of the Institute of Public Affairs, pp. 130-131. 
47 CIS, CIS Annual Review 1992-1993, p. 16. 
48 Newsletter (Centre for Independent Studies), May 1983. 
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Radical neo-liberal think tanks are keen to claim the status of 'independent' research 
institutes. All stress their non-partisan political nature, as well as taking great pains 
to argue that, despite the large amounts of corporate funding they receive, they are 
not beholden to the interests or ideologies of their patrons. There are three main 
ways in which this occurs. First, much like academic journals, many think tanks list 
'research advisory boards' who oversee the research projects of the organisation. 
Often these boards comprise highly qualified academics, thus enhancing the 
perception that the organisation is independent rather than partisan, or ideologically 
motivated. Second, many movement think tanks use non-partisan names, such as the 
Centre for Independent Studies, or the Australian Institute for Public Policy, thus 
obscuring their ideological predispositions. Obviously this does not apply to 
organisations such as the H. R. Nicholls or the Adam Smith Club which have openly 
partisan names. Third, all radical neo-liberal think tanks have a high proportion of 
representatives from the business community on their governing boards. This is a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand, respected corporate executives possessing 
awards like the Order of Australia and Knighthoods may add to the legitimacy of an 
organisation, but on the other hand it does lend support to claims that movement 
think tanks represent primarily the interests of business. In an attempt to counter the 
latter claim, think tanks have responded by pointing to the fact that they receive 
subscriptions from many 'individuals' (including individual corporations) and that no 
single subscriber has a monopoly on funding. The IPA for example carried the 
following statement of funding during the 1990s: 
 
The IPA obtains its funds from more than 4,000 private individuals, 
corporations and foundations. No one source accounts for more than 6.5 
per cent of the total and no one industry sector provides more than 16 per 
cent. No donations from political parties or grants from government are 
accepted.49 
                                                 
49 IPA, 'Where the IPA Stands', IPAReview, Vol46, No.3, 1993, p. 56.  
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Tactics of the movement 
 
The radical neo-liberal movement views itself as engaged in a battle of ideas against 
collectivism.50 It has set out to change the climate of opinion in Australia regarding 
the role of the state. Andrew Moore notes the 'messianic flavour' of much radical 
neo-liberal rhetoric.51 In part this stems from a genuine belief in the correctness of 
its own ideas. It reflects a dogmatism that pervades the movement. A glance through 
the records of discussion sessions at movement conferences reveals an unwillingness 
of the part of activists either to moderate their demands in order to better reflect 
public opinion or to admit the possibility that they may in fact be wrong. For 
example, in response to the latter suggestion at a CIS organised conference on small 
government in 1986, Public Choice theorist, Geoffrey Brennan, was treated with 
incredulity by the movement faithful, with Ray Evans of Western Mining 
Corporation proclaiming: 
 
We are in the midst of what Professor Brennan calls an 'ideological 
battle'. But a sense of moral outrage has more to do with it than any 
other factor. People are outraged at being so put upon by bureaucrats and 
politicians. Why should exporters, farmers in particular, have to pay 20 
per cent of their export income to keep protected industries in luxury? 
Professor Brennan reminds me of those ecclestiatics of the early 16th 
century who tried to dampen down the Lutheran fires. Look what 
happened to them! 52 
 
                                                 
50 See for example Lauchlan Chipman, Liberty, Equality and Unhappiness, p. 20. 
51 Andrew Moore, The Right Road? A History of Right-wing Politics in Australia, p. 130. 
52 Ray Evans in ‘Concluding Discussion’ in Michael James (ed), Restraining Leviathan: Small 
Government in Practice, CIS, St. Leonards, 1987, p. 342. 
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For most of its life, the consensus within the radical neo-liberal movement has been 
that it is expressing and articulating philosophies and policies that accord with the 
general sentiments of the majority of adult Australians. This faith has gradually been 
weakened by events such as the rejection by the electorate of the Fightback! package 
in 1993. 
 
The messianic language and mood of the radical neo-liberal movement has also been 
employed for tactical reasons. Wolfgang Kasper argues: 
 
as economist-preachers, we need to distil the results of our research into 
simple propositions ... We have to propagate simple messages, basic 
truths that can be defended. This sometimes conflicts with a personal 
wish to be meek and agnostic.53 
 
In line with this, every conceivable problem has, at some stage, been blamed upon 
'collectivism'. Emotionally potent oversimplifications have often been mobilised by 
radical neo-liberals to attack their enemies. Pejorative language is used to describe 
those who reject radical neo-liberalism. The arguments of their critics are generally 
dismissed as pleas to self-interest. Simplistic dichotomies are employed to hold the 
radical neo-liberal world-view up as demonstrably superior to all others. Except 
when addressed to a specialist audience, movement publications have generally been 
clearly written, and understandable by the general, educated reader. 
 
Although many diverse tactics have been used by the radical neo-liberal movement, 
the think tanks in particular have had a clear strategic focus. Speaking of the CIS, 
Director Greg Lindsay summed up the approach of think tanks in general: 
 
                                                 
53 Wolfgang Kasper in ‘Concluding Discussion’ in Michael James (ed), Restraining Leviathan: Small 
Government in Practice, CIS, St. Leonards, 1987, p. 342.  
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We set out to influence the general ideas environment ... We have talked 
to the public via the opinion-formers rather than directly to the policy 
makers.54  
 
Apart from a few notable instances (such as 'Project Victoria') the movement’s think 
tanks have not engaged in the direct lobbying of politicians or bureaucrats. As 
discussed in Chapter Seven, they have occasionally targeted sympathetic politicians 
and bureaucrats for lobbying — John Hyde for example speaks of the AIPP's 
database of such people55 — but they preferred to use their regular journals, 
publications, seminars, guest speakers and conferences to influence elite opinion, or 
to work within existing elite structures to shape elite frameworks.  
 
Each movement event has provided several vehicles for the promotion of radical 
neo-liberal ideology — the ideas or text of a seminar will provide the basis for a 
think tank journal article, possibly also a more lengthy publication, as well as 
offering a focus for the mainstream media. It is this last aspect that is particularly 
important. It is primarily through the mainstream media, especially the print media, 
that the movement has intervened in public discursive formations. The mainstream 
media has been the vehicle for the movement’s attempt to change the terms of 
debate, and undermine the assumptions of their opponents in the public arena. The 
principle behind this strategy is explained by John Hyde:  
 
a cause can gain and maintain a degree of moral superiority by 
continually and publicly setting its policies in the context of values the 
public holds already — eg it is just, it is democratic, it will assist the 
poor, and so on. defence of the same policies in terms of efficiency or 
ideology will not be as readily accepted.56 
                                                 
54 ‘The CIS at Twenty: Greg Lindsay Talks to Andrew Norton’, pp. 16-21. 
55 John Hyde, interview with author. 
56 John Hyde, ‘Winning the Good Fight’ in Chris Ulyatt (ed), The Good Fight: Essays in Honour of 
Austin Stewart Holmes (1924-1986), Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1989, p. 221. 
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An important feature of the movement is the concerted assault it has conducted upon 
its enemies. The main feature of this assault has been discursive. Trade unions, new 
social movements, social justice advocates, Labor politicians and Wet Liberals have 
all, at various stages in the movement’s history, been labelled as part of the ‘new 
class’ of ‘politically correct’ elites. The movement has charged such groups as 
constituting ‘special interests’, and thus as unrepresentative of ‘mainstream’ 
Australians. The effect of such rhetoric is to demonise, delegitimise and undermine 
such groups and individuals. Less systematically, movement activists and 
organisations have directly confronted their enemies through disruption. For 
example, the AIPP’s Hal Colebatch attended a lecture by left-wing intellectual, Alex 
Carey, on the new right and proceeded to challenge and undermine the speaker.57 
Michael Porter recounts the ways in which, during his involvement in the National 
Priorities Project, he and other activists would target and directly confront left-wing 
groups: 
 
we certainly aimed to knock off the left wing, the collectivists groups, 
and one of the targets we had was one that was then headed by the guy 
who now heads the Australian Institute [Clive Hamilton]. He had an 
environment group that we felt was sort of crazy, and we certainly took 
them on — and the original think tank was wiped out. I mean every time 
he had a conference we’d be there. We took quite seriously the beating 
of those guys.58 
 
As shall be discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven, movement activists also 
pursued their radical agendas through party politics — in the Liberal Party 
especially. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter Four, particularly during the 1980s 
some movement activists were involved in direct action, either on behalf of capital 
or through free market populist mobilisations, such as the ‘Joh for PM’ campaign.  
                                                 
57 Anon., ‘AIPP News’ in Clear Thinking, No. 19, January 1987. 
58 Michael Porter, interview with the author. 
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The radical neo-liberal movement and its conservative critics 
 
After being on the defensive during the late 1960s and early 1970s the  intellectual 
Right in Australia underwent a revival during the 1980s. Integral to this was the rise 
of the radical neo-liberal movement. But also central to the intellectual Right in 
Australia was a strong and articulate conservative wing. From the time of emergence 
of the radical neo-liberal movement there were tensions between these two wings.  
 
In his 1982 introduction to The New Conservatism in Australia, a volume which 
brought together leading conservative commentators of the time, Robert Manne 
explained his reasons for not including anything devoted to the exploration of free-
market economic theories: 
 
I must admit to having no competence in economics whatsoever, and 
little sympathy for some of the social consequences apparently 
acceptable to the more doctrinaire enthusiasts of monetarism and the 
unshackled Free Market (one of whom remarked to me that the problem 
with Margaret Thatcher was that she was too timid in her economic 
policies, a comment which reminded me of  those communists who 
argue that communism has never failed because it has never been tried). 
To those for whom the central question for an Australian 'new 
conservative' ought to be tariff barriers, money supply, tax levels, rural 
subsidies and 'small government, I can only offer apologies and suggest 
they turn to the occasional publications of the Centre for Independent 
Studies59 
 
                                                 
59 Robert Manne, 'Introduction' in Robert Manne (ed.), The New Conservatism in Australia, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, pp. viii-ix. 
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The implication was clear: neo-liberalism, let alone the movement’s more radical 
expression of it, had no place within the conservative world view. Neo-liberalism in 
practice was viewed as an anathema to many of the traditions and values held dear 
by conservatives, and these were to be the central points of contention between the 
two camps, in what continues to be an acrimonious relationship. 
 
Sporadically during the 1980s,60 and much more intensely from 1991 onwards, this 
conflict was played through the pages of the conservative flagship, Quadrant, 
through the various radical neo-liberal journals, and through the publication of 
various books by both sides. It was manifested in direct exchanges and debates, 
challenges to the radical neo-liberal interpretation of economic history, critiques of 
the movement’s arguments and world view, and the posing of alternative economic 
directions for Australia. 
 
Conservatives argued that radical neo-liberalism (or economic rationalism as it has 
often been referred to) in practice destroyed the fabric of society, that it destroyed 
the traditional structures and values that held society together such as the family and 
the bonds of community. John Carroll, for example, talked about neo-liberalism as 
an assault upon 'Australia's Way of Life', such as the family and home ownership,61 
whilst Manne pointed to the social libertarianism of a number of movement activists, 
arguing that: 
 
                                                 
60 See for example: Peter Coleman, 'Editorial: Wet, Dry and Blue All Over', Quadrant, April 1985, 
pp. 9-10; John Hyde, 'A Dry's Philosophy', Quadrant, April 1985, pp. 42-44; Michael James, 'Is 
Small Government Possible?', Quadrant, April 1985, pp. 46-49; Michael James, 'The Free Market', 
Quadrant, June 1983, pp. 29-33; Gerard Henderson, 'Fraserism: Myths and Realities', Quadrant, June 
1983, pp. 33-37. The debate has also been played out through the letters pages of Quadrant, see for 
example: Michael James, ‘Letter’, Quadrant, January-February 1985, p. 7; John Hyde, ‘Letter’, 
Quadrant, June 1985, p. 4; K. Devlin, ‘Letter’, Quadrant, March 1984, p. 3; John Carroll, ‘Letter’, 
Quadrant, August, 1983, p. 3. 
61 John Carroll, 'Economic Rationalism and its Consequences' in John Carroll and Robert Manne 
(eds.), Shutdown: The Failure of Economic Rationalism and How to Rescue Australia, The Text 
Publishing Company, Melbourne, 1992, pp. 24-26. 
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in social affairs they believe not in the need to balance freedom and 
restraint but in the value of freedom without qualification.62 
 
Conservatives saw their own philosophy and politics as 'pragmatic, experimental 
and, ultimately, sceptical about the role of theory in human affairs',63 whilst radical 
neo-liberalism was viewed as 'the latest example of the ideological bent which is 
latent in the cast of liberal thought'.64 Oakeshott's anti-rationalist philosophy was 
counter-posed to the radical neo-liberals' free-market dogmatism. 
 
Philosophically, at stake here were fundamentally different views of the limits of 
human reason and, indeed of human nature. Politically, at stake were fundamentally 
different views of the role of the state in society. Leading conservatives such as 
Robert Manne, John Carroll, Hugh Emy and B. A. Santamaria counter-posed the 
ideal of social democracy to the neo-liberal state. The radical neo-liberal project was 
viewed as ideologically driven and thus 'unfalsifiable'. As Manne writes: 
 
What is rarely made clear is what kind of evidence would be necessary 
for an economic rationalist to admit that even one part of their program 
is mistaken or ill-timed ... Some, moreover, have come to regard the 
market with the reified awe which socialists once used to regard the 
plan.65 
 
Conservatives saw the state as a pragmatic instrument of public policy and authority. 
In order to combat what they viewed as Australia's economic malaise they called for 
the use of tariffs to control imports, a different approach to taxation and industrial 
relations to that of the neo-liberals, and the use of the state to encourage conformity 
with conservative moral norms. 
                                                 
62 Robert Manne, 'Clear Thinking in the Present', Quadrant, January-February 1992, p. 64. 
63 Robert Manne, 'The Future of Conservatism', Quadrant, January-February 1992, p. 54. 
64 Hugh Emy, 'Chandran Kukathas and Conservatism', Quadrant, April 1992, p. 21. 
65 Robert Manne, 'The Future of Conservatism', p. 52. 
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However, until the late 1990s, the conflicts between conservatism and radical neo-
liberalism in Australia had not created a neat cleavage within the intellectual Right. 
One reason for this is the often conservative character of the movement, as discussed 
in Chapter Two. Whilst Chandran Kukathus has argued that 'the differences between 
liberals and conservatives are many fewer than Emy, Manne and other critics 
think',66 others have simply drawn from both traditions unproblematically in their 
writings. As Melleuish notes, IPA Review editor, Ken Baker, was a student of 
leading conservative protagonist, John Carroll, and combined radical neo-liberalism 
cultural conservatism.67 Indeed, since its conversion from Keynesianism to radical 
neo-liberalism, socially conservative and economically liberal arguments have sat 
side by side, usually without conflict, in the pages of the IPA Review and other IPA 
publications. For example, as shall be discussed in Chapter Seven, the IPA's 
Education Monitor and the IPA Education Policy Unit consistently set out a 
conservative and radical neo-liberal agenda for education, arguing for schools to 
uphold conservative moral norms and that they also be accountable to the 
community by being funded indirectly — via educational 'vouchers' provided to 
individuals by the state. 
 
Whilst there have been some movement activists, such as Andrew Hay, who have 
applied a libertarian philosophy to both the economic and social spheres, most have 
been conservative on social issues. These radical neo-liberals with liberal or 
libertarian social views have, for the most part, been content to let such views take a 
back seat. 
 
Such closeness between radical neo-liberalism and conservatism is not surprising. 
As Melleuish notes, there is a long history of liberals and conservatives joining 
                                                 
66 Chandran Kukathas, 'Thoughts on the Conservative Discontent' in Chris James, Chris Jones and 
Andrew Norton (eds.), A Defence of Economic Rationalism, p. 150. 
67 Gregory Melleuish, A Short History of Liberalism in Australia, p. 38. 
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together in an 'alliance'.68 Further, they share similar political philosophies. Both 
liberalism and conservatism evolved alongside the evolution of capitalism, and both 
agree upon the need for some kind of capitalist state. Both also agree upon the 
importance of the rule of law, and modern conservatism shares a commitment with 
radical neo-liberalism to the autonomy of the individual. Exactly how the individual 
should be conceived is where the radical neo-liberals and conservatives begin to 
diverge. For the movement, the individual is the starting point of political 
philosophy and it is the individual's liberty that is sacrosanct. Conservatives, on the 
other hand, understand the individual as existing in a social world: one conditioned 
by inherited traditions, practices, structures and institutions. It is the role of the state 
to preserve an orderly society in which individuals can prosper by adhering to and 
strengthening these traditional structures. Conservatives tend to be anti-rationalist 
and tend to be suspicious of grand theories of human nature.  
 
The other reason why the intellectual Right did not fracture during the 1980s was 
that it was able to unite against a common enemy: the 'new class'. As outlined in the 
previous chapter, this idea and term was borrowed from the American neo-
conservatives. The neo-conservatives argued that the generation of campus radicals 
from the 1960s and 1970s subsequently entered the rapidly expanding public sector 
and pursued their own ideological and self-interest, whilst claiming that they were 
really working in the interests of the public. This critique was imported to Australia 
and mobilised by both conservatives and radical neo-liberals. For conservatives it 
provided an explanation for changes in Australian political culture and justified their 
opposition to it, as is borne out in the following from Manne: 
 
... by the mid-seventies another layer had been added [to Australian 
society] ... the so-called "new class" of university graduates, the products 
of the rapidly expanded tertiary education of the 'sixties. They were now 
present throughout many of the key institutions of our society, and were 
                                                 
68 Gregory Melleuish, 'The Liberal Conservative Alliance in Australia', IPA Review, Vol. 46 No. 2, 
1993, pp. 55-57. 
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dominant in those — like teaching and journalism — where moral and 
social values were defined and disseminated. Their enthusiasms, 
certainties and causes were everywhere to be found. Their hatreds — 
America, Capitalism, Moral Puritanism, Anti-Communism — were 
expressed rancorously and consensually.69 
 
For radical neo-liberals the notion of the new class complemented their critiques of 
the welfare state. Public Choice theory, for example, reduces bureaucratic activity 
and critiques group political activity, arguing that large groups are unable to 
represent the interests of their members, despite what claims may be made by them 
to the contrary.70 Similarly, von Hayek argues that government is unable to satisfy 
the multitude of demands and preferences of its citizens, and indeed is unable to 
ascertain what these preferences might be.71 Milton and Rose Friedman, explicitly 
employ the term 'new class' to refer to: 
 
...government bureaucrats, academics whose research is supported by 
government funds or who are employed in government financed 'think-
tanks', staffs of the many so-called 'general interest' or 'public policy' 
groups, journalists and others in the communications industry.72 
 
For conservatives, and conservative movement activists, the new class was held 
responsible for a 'moral decline' and the 'weakening of core values such as those of 
enterprise, individual responsibility, honesty, the work ethic and a sense of 
service'.73  So, the notion of the new class provided a socio-historic explanation for 
Australia's economic malaise consistent with radical neo-liberal economic theories.  
 
                                                 
69 Robert Manne, 'On Being an Editor', Quadrant, January/February 1983, p. 88. 
70 Mancur  Olson,  The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1965. 
71 Friederich. von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty; Friederich von Hayek,  The Road to 
Serfdom. 
72 Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose, p. 174. 
73 Rod Kemp quoted in Michael Bertram, A History of the Institute of Public Affairs, p.157.  
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Importantly, the idea that there existed a new class served to define a common 
enemy for the intellectual Right. As Frankel writes: 
 
Culturally, 'new class' is a synonym for class betrayal, hedonistic 
narcissism and nihilism. Structurally, it is a synonym for all that inhibits 
economic growth and the development of Australia as a market society. 
Politically it is a synonym for those social forces which, electorally, the 
major parties cannot afford to offend, despite the fact that they are 
supposedly subverting society. 
 
In other words, 'new class' is a shorthand code for a range of right-wing 
attitudes towards the welfare state, contemporary culture, Australian 
history and national identity, Aboriginal rights, feminism, 
environmentalism and multiculturalism.74 
 
The political party that represented the interests of the new class was the Labor 
Party, but 'members' of the new class were to be found within the bureaucracy, non-
government organisations, welfare groups and trade unions. Further binding the 
Right together against the new class was its association with nomenklatura of state 
socialism75 — loathed by radical neo-liberals and conservatives alike. Ironically, at 
the same time that the Right was using political science to deny the relevance of 
class as an explanatory category in Australian life,76 it was re-discovering 'class' as a 
tool for demonising the Left. The Right's mobilisation of the rhetoric of class was 
assisted by the decline of class analysis on the Left from the early 1980s onwards.77 
 
                                                 
74 Boris Frankel, From the Prophets Deserts Come: the Struggle to Reshape Australia's Political 
Culture,  Arena Publishing, Melbourne, 1992, p. 145. 
75 See Damien Cahill, 'Why the Right uses 'Class' Against the Left', Arena Journal, No. 16, 2000/1, 
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That hostility to the new class was the issue which bound the Australian intellectual 
Right together during the 1980s has been noted from within the Right itself. 
Melleuish, for example, argues that: 
 
Conservatives and liberals ... tended to view themselves as members of a 
cultural group that defined itself in terms of its opposition to what it saw 
as the dominant values of the Australian academic and intellectual 
elite.78 
 
An expression of such thinking can be seen in the following from one of Robert 
Manne's exchanges with John Stone over the conflicts between radical neo-
liberalism and conservatism: 
 
Although liberals and conservatives may give different weight to the 
relative importance of funding and structure, on the one hand, and 
philosophy, on the other, as the way out of Australia's dreadful 
educational mess, I have no doubt that all those attached to the liberal 
and conservative worldview are united by a horror felt at the direction in 
which our educational institutions ... are being dragged at present by 
romantic ideologues and new-class bureaucrats. I think contemporary 
Australian liberals and conservatives — whatever their differences — 
are also united by hostility to the strident and powerful expressions of 
the left utopianism and antinomianism as evidenced, in particular, in the 
environmentalist and sexual liberation movements.79 
 
As I have argued elsewhere, not only did this hostility towards the new class bind 
the right together, the new class discourse was a defining feature of right-wing 
                                                 
78 Gregory Melleuish, A Short History of Liberalism, p. 38. 
79 Robert Manne, 'The Future of Conservatism', p. 55. 
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intellectual culture in Australia from the early 1980s until the late 1990s.80 In 1985, 
then Quadrant editor Peter Coleman wrote of his desire that 'the Wets and dries, the 
conservatives and libertarians, could find common ground beyond their opposition 
to socialism and the New Class'. He reported that little had come of an earlier 
attempt at such an meeting of the minds.81 In a portentous letter to Quadrant in 
1983, John Carroll stated: 
 
At this early stage in the debate I find myself drawn to support free-
market radicalism, with a conservative check, but do so with a great deal 
of trepidation — because of the cultural consequences of capitalism.82  
 
Despite the alliance between conservatives and radical neo-liberals, the seeds of a 
future split were being sown.  
 
After 1989, interest grew in investigating what it was that underpinned markets. 
Terms such as 'civil society', 'the moral underpinnings of markets', non-market 
relationships', 'social capital', and a resurrection of Hayek's 'tacit market knowledge' 
became common in movement literature. Such concerns were expressed in the 
‘Markets, Morals and Civil Society Project’, discussed in the previous chapter. In 
part, this interest was sparked by the collapse of communism and the prospects of 
implementing free-market regimes in eastern bloc countries. It was argued that 
communist regimes had destroyed 'civil society' and that this would hamper the 
construction of a neo-liberal alternative. In part also, this interest stemmed from the 
need to explain the success of the Asian Tiger economies, and to engage in the 
question of whether such success was the product of 'Asian values'. In both cases 
failure of market reforms was put down to 'crony capitalism' — a perversion of the 
                                                 
80 Damien Cahill, 'The Australian Right's New Class Discourse and the Construction of the Political 
Community' in Ray Markey (ed.), Labour and Community: Historical Essays, University of 
Wollongong Press, Wollongong, 2001, pp. 345-361. 
81 Peter Coleman, Editorial, 'Wet, Dry and Blue All Over', p. 10. 
82 John Carroll, ‘Letter’, p. 3. 
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free operation of market forces — whilst success was attributed to strong 'civil 
society'. 
 
Primarily this interest was a response to critics of neo-liberalism, from both the 
conservative Right as well as the Left. Neo-liberalism had been under attack both 
from its left as well as from within the ranks of the conservative Right throughout 
the 1980s. What made responding to these attacks all the more urgent was the 
publication in 1991 of left-wing social democrat Michael Pusey's Economic 
Rationalism in Canberra: a nation-building state changes its mind and the 
subsequent publication in 1992 of John Carroll and Robert Manne's edited 
collection, Shutdown: The Failure of Economic Rationalism and How to Rescue 
Australia (which contained contributions from both left and right wing 
commentators). Pusey's book, in particular, catapulted the issue of 'economic 
rationalism' (or neo-liberalism) to national attention. 
 
A sense of how this threat was viewed can be gauged by movement activist, Andrew 
Norton's, review of Pusey's book: 
 
If Pusey's critique is right, it reveals a massive contradiction between 
liberalism's economic and social objectives. In order to avoid social 
collapse, the economically 'rational' reform process would not only have 
to be stopped, but urgent steps taken to reverse changes already made83 
 
In his review Norton went on to repudiate Pusey's claims, arguing instead that there 
existed a 'mutually fruitful interaction between the market and other parts of civil 
society.'84 
 
                                                 
83 Andrew Norton, 'Markets and Civil Society (Review of Michael Pusey, Economic Rationalism in 
Canberra)', IPA Review, Vol. 45, No. 2, 1992, p. 60. 
84 Ibid., p. 60. 
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Four years later, Greg Lindsay, Executive Director of the CIS, quoted remarks by 
Pusey that 'today's market is the deadly enemy of the society it was supposed to 
serve'. Lindsay responded by saying that: 
 
Pusey's view is extreme, but it is in a tradition of hostility towards 
markets fostered by intellectuals of both the Left and the Right, interest 
groups facing competition, and populist politicians. 
 
Opposition to markets, in this tradition of thought, is not primarily 
economic. Rather, the claim is that markets undermine social ties and 
encourage immorality.85 
 
While the conflicts between the radical neo-liberals and conservatives were able to 
be contained during the 1980s, the collapse of communism, the increasing 
implementation by both federal and state governments in Australia of neo-liberal 
policy agendas, and the defeat of the federal Labor government in 1996 exacerbated 
these tensions. It was the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 that 
provided the catalyst which transformed the intellectual conflict within the Right 
into open warfare. As Melleuish notes: 
 
With the collapse of the communist dream they have lost their common 
foe; the time is ripe for disagreements and perhaps even a parting of the 
ways.86 
 
Divisions on the Right over neo-liberalism cut deep. In 1992, Brian Toohey wrote of 
a 'deep chasm' existing between right-wing intellectuals over 'economic 
rationalism'.87 The magnitude of the conflict can be gauged by the writings of C D 
                                                 
85 Greg Lindsay, 'Foreword' in Alan Hamlin, Herbert Giersch and Andrew Norton, Markets, Morals 
and Community, CIS, St Leonards, 1996, p. ix. 
86 Gregory Melleuish, 'The Liberal Conservative Alliance', p. 55.   
87 Brian Toohey, 'The Looming Split on the Right', Modern Times, March 1992, p. 10. 
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Kemp during his final years. Kemp, founder of the IPA and father of neo-liberal 
activists Rod and David, was part of the groundswell against neo-liberalism. In 1991 
he wrote: 
 
The Australian economy has been tragically mismanaged ... This sorry 
situation is largely traceable to the resurrection of an economic 
philosophy which was comprehensively, and it seemed finally, rejected 
after the Second World War. This philosophy is that "the market", left to 
go its own sweet way, would ensure the most efficient use of resources 
and maximise living standards.88 
 
Not only did the unregulated market damage the economy, but it had also led to 'an 
alarming decline in business and professional standards and community morality'89. 
'Extreme market philosophies' he wrote, 'enthrone profit, greed and self-interest'.90 
Kemp attempted to resurrect Keynes from the grave dug for him by the radical neo-
liberal movement and called for the Australian government to pursue a policy of 
'pump-priming' to stimulate employment, a re-regulation of the financial sector and 
the imposition of import controls.91 Although Kemp and other conservatives did not 
oppose radical neo-liberalism in its entirety — Kemp, for example, supported the 
extension of working hours and the reduction of holidays92 — they did attack its 
philosophical and moral basis. 
 
It can be reasonably assumed that an individual of Kemp senior's stature on the 
Right, publicly opposing the tenets of radical neo-liberalism, is symptomatic of 
many other supporters of the Post-War economic consensus. At the very least the 
stance of prominent figures such as Kemp must have legitimated the conservative 
                                                 
88 C. D. Kemp in 'Quadrant Forum: The Australian Economy; What is to Be Done?', Quadrant, May 
1991, p. 26. 
89 Ibid. p. 27. 
90 C. D. Kemp, 'Those Terrible 80 Years?', Quadrant, November 1991, pp. 17-22.  
91 C. D. Kemp, 'A Patron Saint for Economists', Quadrant, September 1992, pp. 20-24. 
92 Ibid.  
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backlash against the radical neo-liberal movement among many on the Right and 
caused uneasiness amongst the ranks of the movement activists themselves. It was 
thus the task of the movement to challenge claims from the Left and Right that the 
free-market undermined civil society, particularly those institutions, values and 
relationships held dear by conservatives. It was from the need to salvage radical neo-
liberalism from such critics that the 'Markets, Morals and Civil Society Project' was 
born. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In addition to a shared ideology, radical neo-liberals were able to cohere into a 
movement through a number of think tanks and other similar organisations. These 
‘mobilising structures’ gave organisational strength to the movement, brought like 
minded individuals into contact with other activists and provided the movement with 
continuity and an institutional memory. However, because of the centrality of 
capitalist funds to survival of these think tanks, as well as the involvement of many 
movement activists in the Liberal Party, the movement’s mobilising structures have 
constantly had to defend their independence. Nonetheless, using the think tanks as a 
base, the radical neo-liberal engaged in tactics designed to proselytise their own 
ideology and demonise that of their opponents. During the 1970s and 1980s, the 
movement was assisted in this task by its alliance with conservative intellectuals. 
This alliance was enabled, primarily, by the movement and the conservatives sharing 
a common enemy in the form of the ‘new class’. Once the phenomena that sustained 
the conservatives’ perception that the new class constituted a threat began to 
disappear, this alliance began to fracture. 
 
The thesis so far has outlined a framework for understanding hegemonic struggle 
and the role of elite social movements as non-class actors within such struggles. It 
has also discussed the broad ideological and organisational dynamics of a particular 
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elite social movement — the radical neo-liberal movement. The rest of the thesis 
analyses the relationship between this movement and the struggles to secure 
hegemony for neo-liberalism that occurred in Australia from the 1970s until 1996. In 
order to provide a context for such an analyse, however, it is first necessary to 
outline the broad parameters of the hegemonic struggles themselves, a task 
undertaken in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
The Hegemonic Context: Conflict and Change within Australian 
Capitalism 
 
 
 
This chapter maps the contours of the major hegemonic struggles that occurred 
from the mid 1970s until 1996 around the restructuring of the Australian state. 
The purpose of this discussion is to provide a context for evaluating the 
relationship between the radical neo-liberal movement and struggles for 
hegemony. 
 
The emergence of the radical neo-liberal movement coincided with a crisis of 
hegemony at the levels of the world system structure and, in Australia, of the 
state project. That is, from about 1974 onwards, the relations and structures that 
underpinned both Fordism and Keynesian welfare capitalism, and which gave 
them legitimacy amongst the leaderships of both labour and capital, were 
undermined. The rise of the radical neo-liberal movement to prominence 
occurred in the context of the attempt, by particular fractions of capital, to 
overturn the state project of Keynesian welfare capitalism and replace it with 
what became the state project of neo-liberalism. As a consequence, this neo-
liberal power bloc came into conflict with other fractions of capital still wedded 
to key aspects of the older hegemonic order. This chapter will first discuss the 
key features of Keynesian welfare capitalism and the hegemonic relations that 
underpinned it, in particular the ‘class compromise’ between labour and capital. 
Second, the chapter will provide reasons for the breakdown of the hegemony of 
Keynesian welfare capitalism among the capitalist class. Third, this chapter will 
examine mobilisation and conflict that occurred within the capitalist class around 
the neo-liberal restructuring of the state and economy and the concomitant 
attempts to secure hegemony for this particular state project.  
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Having discussed the capitalist response to the breakdown of post-war 
hegemony, this chapter will then outline the main features of the state project of 
neo-liberalism and the relationship of the major political parties to it. It will be 
argued that the Whitlam and Fraser governments, although both implementing 
some policies of a neo-liberal hue, were broadly committed to the key features of 
the Keynesian welfare capitalism. Neither engaged in cohesive attempts to 
dismantle the post-war consensus, or the earlier institutions of the Australian 
settlement. Rather, both attempted to manage the economic crisis that beset 
Australia with a piecemeal combination of Keynesian and neo-liberal policies. It 
was not until 1983, under the Hawke Labor government, that the state project of 
neo-liberalism began in earnest. Hawke, and subsequently Keating, articulated a 
One Nation strategy in an attempt to secure electoral hegemony for themselves 
and, more broadly, to secure consent for the neo-liberal restructuring of the state. 
When John Howard won government for the Coalition parties in 1996, he 
undertook a Two Nations hegemonic strategy which was an attempt, through the 
demonisation of and assault upon a significant minority of the Australian 
population to win consent for an even more radical neo-liberal restructuring of 
the Australian state and economy. It was the working class in Australia that bore 
the brunt of these neo-liberal changes. The final section of this chapter will 
discuss the response of the working class to various neo-liberal hegemonic 
projects undertaken by capital and the major political parties. It will be argued 
that, primarily because of the alliance of the trade union leadership with the 
Labor party, no significant counter-hegemonic strategy emerged from the 
working class to challenge neo-liberalism. 
 
 
A breakdown of hegemony 
 
The struggles that occurred in Australia to secure hegemony for neo-liberalism 
resulted from a breakdown of the hegemonic relations that underpinned post-war 
Fordism and welfare capitalism.  In the late 1960s and early 1970s Australia was 
still benefiting from what historians have termed the ‘long boom’. The economy 
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was growing and the nation enjoyed conditions of near full employment. Such 
buoyant economic circumstances were not unique to Australia at the time. 
Rather, they were phenomena common to most social and liberal democracies 
after the Second World War. 
 
At the end of the Second World War, capitalist hegemony was threatened by the 
communist states of the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc satellites and China (after 
1949). The United States, as the post-war hegemon, used the Marshall Plan and 
international economic agencies to create a stable basis for the development and 
reconstruction of capitalism in Europe and Asia after the War. This 
reconstruction took the form of controls upon financial flows across national 
borders, the pegging of currencies to the US dollar and the establishment of the 
‘Bretton Woods’ institutions; the IMF, World Bank and the General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariffs. Military force and counter-insurgency were used to support 
this reconstruction, both in securing new markets for US, Japanese and European 
capital, and in combating threats to capitalist hegemony (for example in Korea, 
Vietnam and Chile). 
 
At the domestic level, capitalist hegemony was threatened, in many states, by a 
strong organised working class and socialist movement. Welfare states were, in 
this sense, responses to the demands of the labour movement for a more 
equitable distribution of the benefits of capitalism, rather than a return to the 
conditions of the Depression years. Also known as the ‘class compromise’ or 
‘labour-capital accord’, the state and sections of the capitalist class agreed to a 
system of regulated capitalism: the state undertaking a redistributionist role, 
whilst moderate elements within the labour movement agreed to support the 
broad parameters and institutions of this system in return for its promised 
benefits to workers.1  At the social level, the state took a greater role in the 
provision of a greater range of universal services, and at the economic level it 
undertook greater regulation of economic activity. This was the welfare state, 
which took different forms in different national contexts, but which most often 
                                                 
1  See Stephen Bell, Ungoverning the Economy, p. 73. 
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carried the prefix ‘Keynesian’.2 Combined with international financial 
institutions and agreements, this made for the international system of regulated 
capitalism known as Fordism. Fordism was the particular structure that 
characterised the world capitalist economy and that was hegemonic from the end 
of the second world war until the early 1970s. 
 
Australia had its own version of this class compromise. The post-war class 
compromise in Australia built upon the existing ‘domestic defence’ model of 
state economic and social regulation.3 ‘Domestic defence’, what Paul Kelly 
refers to as the ‘Australian Settlement’,4 grew out of fierce class conflict in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries and was itself an early example of class 
compromise embedded in state policies and institutions.5 Protection of 
manufacturing through tariffs and import quotas, an arbitration commission with 
powers of industry wide wage determination, and the White Australia policy 
which restricted immigration to those of European origin, were the central 
features of the domestic defence model which characterised the Australian state 
in the first half of the 20th century. After the Second World War, the domestic 
defence model was, as Stephen Bell writes, ‘overlaid’ by a complementary 
model based broadly upon the ‘regulation of aggregate demand, production, 
consumption and employment levels’.6 Beginning with the Curtin and Chifley 
Labor governments of the 1940s, and continued by successive Liberal 
governments thereafter, a moderate social welfare program and large scale public 
works projects were undertaken by Australian federal administrations. The 
systems of protection and arbitration meant that redistribution in Australia 
occurred primarily through wages. Unlike many European countries, Australia 
                                                 
2 This  is  so despite the wide divergences in opinion as to what it is to be ‘Keynesian’. For a 
discussion see Tim Battin, Abandoning Keynes: Australia’s Capital Mistake, Macmillan, 
London, 1997, pp. 20-22. 
3 Bell, Ungoverning the Economy, pp. 63-64. 
4 Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty: Power, Politics and Business in Australia, 2nd edition, Allen 
and Unwin, St Leonards, 1994, pp. 1-9. 
5 Stuart Macintyre, ‘Labour, Capital and Arbitration’ in Brian Head and James Walter (eds), State 
and Economy in Australia, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1983, pp.  Ed Kaptein, ‘Neo-
Liberalism and the Dismantling of Corporatism in Australia’, pp. 82-85 
6 Stephen Bell, Ungoverning the Economy, p. 64. 
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developed a residual rather than comprehensive welfare state, or what Castles 
describes as a ‘wage earners welfare state’.7  
 
Both ‘domestic defence’ and the Keynesian welfare state project were 
hegemonic in Australia from the end of the second world war until the early 
1970s. Both were supported by the leadership of the organised working class and 
by the leadership of the capitalist class, which was concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector. In the early 1970s, however, a number of factors 
converged which led to a breakdown of the hegemony of welfare capitalism and 
domestic defence within the capitalist class. 
 
A picture of the moment of this breakdown in hegemony is provided by Higley, 
Deacon and Smart in their Elites in Australia. The authors undertook a survey of 
the opinions of ‘elites’ (a sample of 370 people drawn from the leaderships of 
major corporations, trade unions, the major political parties, voluntary 
associations, the public service, the mass media and, from within academia, 
several leading vice chancellors and economists) in 1975 and 1977. Despite the 
limitations of their elite theory framework and the authors’ simplistic 
understanding of ‘ideology’, the survey offers a revealing portrait of elite opinion 
at the time. The authors note a perception by Australian elites in 1975 of a ‘lack 
of national direction, purpose and identity’8 which, although partly reflective of 
the turmoil surrounding Whitlam’s last months in office, is also suggestive of a 
breakdown in hegemony. They also note that ‘Business leaders were most 
frequently concerned about general attitudes toward work’, particularly a 
deficient ‘work ethic’ and a general lack of ‘motivation’ among workers.9  
Rather than viewing them as structural consequences of capitalist crisis, business 
leaders attributed unemployment and low productivity to the personal qualities of 
workers. Such attitudes indicate a fertile environment for the emergence of neo-
liberalism as a new common sense among the capitalist leadership. That a 
                                                 
7 Francis Castles, The Working Class and Welfare: Reflections on the Political Development of 
the Welfare State in Australia and New Zealand, 1890-1980, Allen and Unwin, North Sydney, 
1985. 
8 John Higley, Desley Deacon and Don Smart, Elites in Australia, Routledge and Keegan Paul, 
London, 1979, p. 114. 
9 Ibid., pp. 115-116. 
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‘sizeable number’ of right-wing elites also attributed a lack of youth motivation 
explicitly to the effects of the welfare state is further confirmation of this.10 The 
issue of industrial relations figured prominently among elite opinions of the time. 
In 1975 all but Labor and trade union elites ranked the ‘power of trade unions’ in 
the top seven most important issues facing Australia.11 Importantly, the authors 
note that, particularly among business elites who ranked industrial relations as 
Australia’s primary political problem, there was a perception that ‘Australia’s 
elaborate industrial relations system was not working and was degenerating into 
‘chaos’ and ‘anarchy’’.12 Union militancy was also a major concern among these 
elites.13 Furthermore, by 1977,  significant numbers of elites outside of the Labor 
Party and trade unions were singling out wage indexation and trade union wage 
demands as the primary causes of increases in inflation.14 Although some aspects 
of the post-war consensus were breaking down, it is clear that others remained 
secure. For example, a majority of all elites surveyed, irrespective of class 
location, agreed with the statements: ‘Regardless of efforts, each person has a 
right to a living standard sufficient to cover basic needs’ and ‘In recession, 
government should create public sector jobs for those the private sector cannot 
employ’.15 Therefore, the picture that emerges from the study by Higley, Deacon 
and Smart is the erosion of consensus on key issues, but not the total 
abandonment of the principles that underpinned the state project of Keynesian 
welfare capitalism. Opinion among the leaderships of those groups who 
supported the post-war consensus was contradictory. There is evidence of 
confusion about which policy agendas were likely to secure the future economic 
prosperity of Australia and resolve the economic crisis which beset Australia at 
the time. The conditions that led to such views will now be examined in more 
detail as well as the factors that led to the formation of a neo-liberal power bloc 
within the capitalist class. 
 
                                                 
10 Ibid., pp. 152-153. 
11 Ibid., p. 121. 
12 Ibid., p. 117. 
13 Ibid., p. 118. 
14 Ibid., pp. 127-128. 
15 Ibid., p. 175. 
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As Meredith and Dyster argue, OPEC’s announcement of an oil price rise on 
Christmas Day 1973 certainly acted as an ‘inflationary trigger’16 which 
exacerbated structural problems already existing within the Australian economy 
and led to ‘stagflation’. While stagflation was proclaimed as evidence for the 
failure of the Keynesian welfare state,17 it was the broader class conflicts within 
Australia that provided the impetus for capital’s mobilisation to construct a new, 
neo-liberal, state project and a new hegemonic order. 
 
By the 1970s organised labour, its relative bargaining position strengthened by 
full employment and wage fixation, had managed to increase the share of the 
national economy devoted to wages to around 64 per cent of GDP, whilst profits 
had declined to around 12.5 per cent of GDP.18 These figures are partly 
attributable to a wages explosion in 1973-4 prior to the onset of the international 
economic slowdown19 and spiraling inflation induced by the oil crisis, but the 
share of the Australian economy going to wages had been steadily increasing 
since the mid 1960s.  
 
A number of writers have argued that conditions of full employment lead to 
inevitable conflict between capital and labour, as well as between capital and the 
state. Drawing upon Polish economist, Michael Kalecki, such scholars argue that 
full employment was the ‘Achilles heel’ of the post-war consensus.20 By 
strengthening the bargaining position of labour, they argue, and thereby 
increasing working class confidence, the state gave capital an imperative to 
marshal its forces to diminish the power of the organised working class. A 
further wages explosion in 1981-2, driven by trade union militancy, only 
                                                 
16  David Meredith and Barrie Dyster, Australia in the Global Economy: Continuity and Change, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 228. 
17 However, as Battin argues, by this time Keynesian thought in Australia had already ‘been 
significantly obscured by the dominance of the neo-classical synthesis’ (Tim Battin, Abandoning 
Keynes, p. 242). 
18  Stephen Bell, Ungoverning the Economy, p. 93. 
19  Stephen Bell, Ungoverning the Economy, p. 184. 
20  See for example: Stephen Bell, Ungoverning the Economy, p. 89; Melanie Beresford and 
Bruce McFarlane, ‘Economic Theory as Ideology: A Kaleckian Analysis of the Australian 
Economic Crisis’ in Paul Boreham and Geoff Dow (eds), Work and Inequality, Volume 1, 
Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1980, pp. 215-225. See also Kalecki’s analysis: Michael Kalecki, 
‘Political Aspects of Full Employment’ in Michael Kalecki, Selected Essays on the Dynamics of 
the Capitalist Economy, 1933-70, Cambridge University Press, London, 1971, pp 138-145. 
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strengthened capital’s views on this matter, even while increasing unemployment 
helped to strengthen capital’s relative position vis a vis labour. Writing in 1980, 
Connell and Irving noted that during the long boom: 
 
Full employment, from a business point of view, had the happy effect of 
guaranteeing demand for consumer goods and the safety of the loan 
finance system. Unemployment was discovered to be unnecessary as a 
method of labour discipline when most of the workforce accepted wage 
regulation through arbitration.21 
 
By the 1970s working class confidence and the burden of wages upon profits 
became intolerable. It therefore suited capital for a situation of relatively high 
unemployment to persist. In his presidential address to the Australian Chamber 
of Commerce (ACC) in 1974-5, K. D. Williams put the case succinctly: 
 
political obsession with an overly narrow concept of full employment 
can put the economy in a straight jacket by closing off a vitally 
important option in economic management whereby a salutory 
psychological effect can be gained from a downward adjustment 
from an overtight labour situation22 
 
Furthermore, arbitration, wage fixation and militant unionism had led, the 
capitalist class increasingly came to believe, to wage increases outstripping 
productivity gains. Only through reigning in or attacking these institutions and 
practices could wage increases be managed or halted. At the same time, business 
profitability, and thus the ability to combat inflation was threatened, so many 
capitalists argued, by public sector spending. On the wages front the state was 
guilty of capitulating to public sector union demands for excessive increases 
which had flow-on effects for other sectors of the economy. On the expenditure 
front, it was felt that state spending tended to ‘crowd out’ private investment, 
                                                 
21  R. W. Connell and T. H. Irving, Class Structure in Australian History, p. 305. 
22 K. D. Williams, ‘Presidential Address’, ACC 71st Annual Report 1974-75, Australian Chamber 
of Commerce, 1975, p. 5, Alex Carey Deposit, Mitchell Library Sydney (hereafter ML), MLMSS 
5807-6571, Box 30. 
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thus curtailing opportunities for business expansion. Public sector growth, it was 
felt, came at the expense of private sector profits.23 Such sentiments had been 
fermenting within the capitalist class since at least the 1960s, but the 
phenomenon of stagflation made them particularly acute and for this reason they 
gained widespread acceptance across the class as a whole. So, by the mid 1970s 
the Australian capitalist class was united in its resolve that action needed to be 
taken to reign in state expenditure, the arbitration commission and the power of 
the organised working class.  
 
Also during the 1970s, many capitalists feared that the free enterprise system 
itself was under threat. The Whitlam Labor government, the impact of radical 
social movements, and the militancy of a number of left-wing trade unions 
contributed directly to such fears. 
 
Although often characterised as a left-wing government, close examination of 
Whitlam’s Labor administration reveals a number of important fiscal and policy 
initiatives which, in many ways, anticipated the later drift in state ideology 
towards neo-liberalism. Tariffs were cut uniformly by 25 per cent, deregulation 
of the finance sector began, and Trades Practices and Prices Justification 
legislation established a framework for competition.24 Treasurer Bill Hayden’s 
dismissal budget of 1975 contained cutbacks in government expenditure and 
commitments to suppressing wage demands.25 Thus, there is some truth to 
Whitlam’s proclamation to the NSW Chamber of Commerce in 1973 that his was 
the ‘first genuine free enterprise government in twenty-five years’.26  
 
Despite the Whitlam government’s numerous fiscal and policy initiatives which, 
in many ways, anticipated the later drift in state ideology towards neo-liberalism, 
aspects of Labor’s rule worried sections of capital. In the Whitlam government’s 
                                                 
23 Bell, Ungoverning the Economy, p. 131. 
24 Bob Catley, Globalising Australian Capitalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1996, p. 62. 
25 Bob Catley and Bruce McFarlane, Australian Capitalism in Boom and Depression, Alternative 
Publishing Cooperative, Chippendale, 1981, pp. 147-151; Stephen Bell, Ungoverning the 
Economy, p. 140. 
26 Whitlam quoted in Bob Catley and Bruce McFarlane, Australian Capitalism in Boom and 
Depression, p. 125. 
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proposals for the establishment of the Petroleum and Minerals authority, the 
Australian Industries Development Corporation and the Australian Government 
Insurance Office, sections of capital detected moves towards nationalisation of 
industry and socialism.27 Combined with expansive state spending, the ALP’s 
historic association with what was an increasingly militant trade union 
movement and traditional capitalist class suspicion of Labor, these policies 
engendered strong hostility within sections of capital. Such sentiments reached 
their peak in 1975. Reflecting upon this period, Maurice Newman of Bain and 
Company and later of the Centre for Independent Studies said: ‘Market 
arrangements and free enterprise institutions were under attack from the Whitlam 
Government’.28 ACMA President Max Dillon argued in 1975 that ‘behind these 
socialistic principles lies a direct threat to the free enterprise system’,29 whilst the 
ACC President wrote: 
 
The private sector of the Australian economy is under challenge and 
only by a concerted effort by all, will the demands of socialism be 
thwarted.30  
 
Wilfred Brookes, Chairman of Colonial Mutual Life, summed up the business 
view of Whitlam at the time: 
 
What the Labor Government did, in a very short space of time, was 
to engineer a massive shift of resources from the private to the public 
sector of the economy … Is it surprising that trade and industry is in 
such a precarious position?31 
 
Although hostility to the Whitlam government had spread throughout the 
capitalist class by 1975, the most strident and militantly anti-socialist rhetoric 
                                                 
27 IPA, ‘Public or Private Ownership’, IPA Review, July-September 1975, pp. 63-66. 
28 Maurice Newman, ‘Opening Remarks’, Ralph Harris, The Enemies of Progress, Centre for 
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30 K. D. Williams, ‘Presidential Address’, p. 8. 
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was primarily evident amongst specific fractions of that class: most notably the 
Chambers of Commerce; farming capital; and those businessmen congregated 
around the IPA. The experience of Resources Minister Rex Connor’s 
interventionist agenda generated hostility within mining capital. Tsokhas writes 
that the experience of Connor as Minister caused the Australian Mining Industry 
Council (AMIC) to: 
 
broaden its views of the organisation’s tasks, and sharpened its 
awareness of the importance of political and ideological mobilisation 
by mining companies.32  
 
It is important to note that capital did not always think and act as a monolithic 
bloc in relation to the Whitlam government. Yet, by 1975, capitalist hostility to 
Labor was universal, and this common enemy temporarily checked conflict 
within the capitalist class.33 Furthermore, by the final year of the Whitlam 
government’s life there was a significant minority of the capitalist class which 
viewed ‘socialism’ in Australia as a real threat to their interests. 
 
Threats to the interests of capital were detected in areas outside of the Whitlam 
government also. Specifically, militant left-wing trade unions and the new social 
movements that arose in the 1960s were seen as posing not only direct threats to 
profitability but also of harbouring anti-capitalist tendencies. Mining capital in 
particular was concerned about the emerging environment and Land Rights 
movements, and the concomitant increasing social awareness of the 
environmental impact of mining and industry. The former held the possibility of 
increased state regulation of mining34 as well as, potentially, threatening certain 
mining practices. The latter ‘constituted the main threat to the ability of mining 
companies to secure exploration licenses and mining leases’.35 Looking back in 
1999, WMC CEO Hugh Morgan said that the environment movement had ‘over 
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33 Ibid., p. xii. 
34 Ibid., p. 85. 
35 Ibid., p. 83. 
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the last 25 years changed the thinking of virtually everyone in the western 
world’36 – which provides an insight into how much influence mining capital 
ascribed to the environment movement. The ability to tap Australia’s vast 
uranium deposits was a major goal of the mining industry in the 1970s and has 
remained so ever since. This goal was threatened not only by the Land Rights 
and environment movement but by the peace movement also. 
 
Late in 1974 John Elliott remarked upon what he saw as the ‘greatly increased 
power of unions’.37 His observation was shared by many within the capitalist 
class, and what disturbed them even more was what they saw  as trade unions’ 
‘increasing disposition to intervene in matters which should be the sole 
prerogative of the elected representatives of the people’,38 such as union bans 
upon uranium mining, bans on exports to Chile and the ‘dangerous propaganda’ 
of publications such as the left-wing AMWSU’s ‘Australia Ripped Off’, which 
attacked the unequal distribution of wealth in Australia and called for more 
interventionist government measures to ameliorate this.39  
 
By the 1970s, perceived anti-business sentiment was of great concern to sections 
of Australian capital. So much so that a number of business leaders argued that a 
‘defence of liberalism and of the market economy’ was necessary.40 Chairman of 
the Sydney Stock Exchange, John Valder, proclaimed to the IPA Annual 
Meeting in November 1975 that: 
 
The basic problem today is a conflict of philosophies. In my 
opinion it is a conflict between those who wish to pursue a free 
enterprise system in Australia and those who wish to greatly 
extend government control and ownership … 
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What we’ve got to do is go out in the community and prove to 
other people why free enterprise is so vital to the prosperity of 
Australia and everyone who lives init. It is our task to convince 
other people of the merits of free enterprise.41 
 
K. D. Williams, President of the ACC echoed these sentiments: 
 
… many would agree today, that business is being called upon to 
justify its actions, and indeed its very place in the social structure, 
more than in times gone by … 
Expressions of anti-business sentiment seem to be part of an 
international phenomenon at the present time. There is generally a 
restlessness and uncertainty about our social and economic systems 
and business is, I believe, made the scapegoat for much of what 
people feel is wrong in Australia and the western word today … it is 
apparent that the business community must take a much more active 
role in putting a case before the public – a case for a better 
understanding of the part business plays in society and in the lives of 
all of us.42 
 
That such sentiments were much more than mere rhetoric is demonstrated 
by a number of attempts by capital at public opinion management. The 
ACC, for example, established an ‘Economics Education Campaign’ in 
1972.43 The campaign was but one of a number of similar economics 
education campaigns being undertaken by Australian employer 
associations, which aimed to ‘carry a free enterprise message … to 
secondary schools and colleges across Australia’.44 Another response to 
the perceived threat to capitalism was the foundation in 1976 of 
Enterprise Australia, a pro-business think tank.45 Also in the 1970s, 
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Australian corporations began to turn increasingly to professional public 
relations firms to counter perceived threats to their interests. Concerned 
about the growing influence of the environment movement upon public 
consciousness and government policy, the Australian Mining Industry 
Council (AMIC) commissioned a public relations firm in 1972 to provide 
it with strategic options. The firm recommended that the mining capital 
make strategic use of the media to promote an image of itself as an 
environmentally responsible industry and that it distribute propaganda to 
schools promoting a similar message.46 Furthermore, the AMIC resolved 
to counter the industry’s negative publicity through: 
 
Use of sympathetic scientists, academics etc, to counter claims of 
environmentalists in the media. Debate on national programmes such 
as ‘Monday Conference’ to put the industry’s point of view.47 
 
It is clear then that by the late 1970s, sections of capital were concerned about 
public attitudes towards private enterprise and believed that support for public 
opinion management of various kinds was an effective way of addressing this. A 
significant minority within the capitalist class, and mining capital in particular, 
saw the growing influence of social movements and militant trade unions as 
threats to their continued profitability, and some even viewed the system of 
private property ownership as under threat.  
 
This was in addition to the general consensus within capital upon the need for 
reduction in regulations and taxation and for a lessening of the power of trade 
unions. Clearly, capital was heading for a collision course with key elements that 
underpinned the Keynesian full-employment regime. Some sections of capital, 
such as the mining, finance and farming industries, as well as small business, felt 
this more acutely than others. Not surprisingly, these sectors would be crucial to 
the emergence of the radical neo-liberal movement from obscurity. However, 
despite the general consensus on some issues, there were other issues, which, as 
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we shall see, would cause deep divisions within the capitalist class during the 
1980s. Some capitalists still saw their interests as tied to the institutions of 
protectionism and arbitration that had underpinned the labour-capital accord, and 
this was the basis for conflicts within the capitalist class and for the radical neo-
liberal movement’s hostility towards these sections of capital. It is worth briefly 
outlining the conditions conditioning attitudes of some of the key fractions of 
capital in Australia. For the purposes of this thesis, fractions within the 
Australian capitalist class will be identified roughly by economic sector. This is 
because, as John Wanna argues:  
 
While possibly remaining competitors within the sector, related 
business entities share a similar set of structural needs. Such needs 
tend to unite business as sectoral groupings, rather than as an entire 
business sector.48 
 
In addition, as will become evident, monopoly capital constituted an important 
and identifiable fraction of capital at the time. 
 
Finance capital 
 
Integral to the democratic capitalist post-war order was the containment of 
finance capital through the Bretton Woods institutions and international 
exchange controls. While it delivered a stable basis for capitalist reconstruction 
and access to new markets in Europe, Asia, Africa, South and Central America, 
and while states were committed to its maintenance, this system was tolerated by 
finance capital internationally. By the mid 1970s the logic of capital 
accumulation, the global profit slowdown and oil crisis meant that finance capital 
increasingly saw that its interests lay in the dismantling of these regulatory 
regimes. Cracks began to appear in the Bretton Woods controls following a 
number of decisions by US administrations in the early 1970s which partially 
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deregulated the US financial sector.49 Stephen Bell refers to this phenomenon as 
the ‘break out of finance capital’— an apt description because these decisions 
added momentum to the push by finance capital to dismantle the controls 
regulating their activity in other countries, including Australia.50 Further adding 
to this momentum were those international banks ‘flush with funds’ following 
deposits of oil profits from OPEC oil producers after the oil price rise in 1973 
and who were looking for investment opportunities with their newly acquired 
capital stocks.51 Australian finance capital saw domestic regulations upon the 
sector as inhibiting their ability to profit from the new economic dynamics 
unleashed by the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. Further adding to this 
impetus for deregulation were the many inefficiencies that existed within the 
Australian system of regulations upon the finance sector at the time. 
 
Mining and farming capital 
 
Doug McEachern has analysed the support of both mining and farming capital 
for the ‘new right’. His analysis provides a useful way of understanding the 
specific dynamics within these sectors of capital that led them to mobilise for a 
neo-liberal restructuring of the state. McEachern argues: 
 
The mining and farming sectors have share a number of economic 
features. Both are heavily involved in exports, both use expensive 
imported manufacturing equipment, both use relatively small 
quantities of labour but are angry about the role of unions, especially, 
especially in transport and the docks, both have been involved in 
significant confrontations with trade unions.52 
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These factors aligned mining and farming capital against both manufacturing 
capital and the broad trade union movement over the issues of protection and 
arbitration. 
 
Mining capital in particular – and farming capital to a lesser extent – had 
developed by the last quarter of the century, a close relationship with finance 
capital. Indeed, there has been a partial integration of the two. Not only did 
mining companies depend upon domestic financial institutions to facilitate the 
investment of foreign capital crucial to Australian mining projects. This 
integration, what Tsokhas describes as a ‘close coalescence’53 between mining 
and banking capital, certainly lead to a convergence of interests with regard to 
the desirable role of the state. 
 
 Small business 
 
As McEachern argues, wages tend to form a large portion of the expenditure of 
many small businesses.54 Furthermore, as Boris Frankel notes, small businesses 
are less able than large corporations to ‘absorb higher wage costs and taxes’.55 
Small business thus had a direct interest in opposing the institutions of 
arbitration, which tended to pass on the benefits – in terms of wage rises and 
improvements in conditions – to all workers in an industry. When this is 
considered alongside the fact that small businesses often have little direct 
experience of negotiating with trade unions, then it is clear that the small 
business sector was subject to material conditions which would predispose them 
to sympathy with at least the rhetoric of the radical neo-liberals.56 
 
 Manufacturing Capital 
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By the late 1960s, much of Australian manufacturing capital was under 
increasing competitive pressure from abroad. A combination of the sheltering 
effects of protection (both tariffs and import quotas) and the rapid 
industrialisation of many Asian countries meant that many Australian 
manufacturers had come to rely upon protection to ensure their competitiveness. 
In the textile, clothing and footwear industries, low wage manufacturing in Asia 
was a threat,57 whilst the high-tech production of Japan and South Korea 
threatened the motor vehicle industry. It was thus not in the short term interests 
of much of Australian manufacturing capital to support rapid and severe tariff 
reductions, such as the zero-tariff regime advocated by the radical neo-liberals. 
 
As manufacturing capital declined as an employer and producer of wealth within 
the Australian economy, its ‘privileged policy position’58 began to erode. It was 
by tying itself to the Arbitration system that manufacturing capital, through its 
peak associations such as the Confederation of Australian Industry (CAI) and 
Metal Trades Industry Association (MTIA), sought to maintain political clout 
and legitimacy. This was made easier because, although sharing the general 
hostility of the capitalist class towards trade unions and the institutions of 
arbitration and wage fixation, many manufacturers had ‘developed strategies to 
cope with the problems caused by their unions’.59 
 
Monopoly capital 
 
Monopoly capital, that is Australia’s largest companies, had a clear interest in the 
state project of neo-liberalism. Because of their size relative to the Australian 
market, whether they be mining, finance, media or manufacturing companies, in 
order to expand their operations and increase their profits, they needed access to 
markets beyond the confines of Australia. Monopoly capital thus had an interest 
in the internationalisation of the Australian economy, and its further exposure to 
the discipline of globalisation. 
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Other capital 
 
Other sections of capital also had an interest in broadly neo-liberal changes to 
capital-state-labour relations. Retail capital, for example, was constrained by 
regulations governing hours of trading. The construction industry was keen to 
see militant unions disciplined. Export-focused industries were naturally 
disposed towards neo-liberalism, and the Tourism sector, with its seasonal 
nature, saw advantages in a deregulated labour market. For media owners, 
regulations governing Australian content on television and cross-media 
ownership laws were a hindrance to profitability and expansion. Media 
capitalists saw the advantages, in terms of lower costs and higher productivity, 
that would flow from deregulating labour laws. Further evidence for this is given 
by Kaptein who argues that Australian ‘conglomerate builders’ who took 
‘advantage of the liberal availability of foreign capital to build and expand their 
empires’ also ‘acquired an important stake in Australia’s media’.60 
 
The capitalist class is not monolithic. Within each sector and within each 
industry it is possible to find exceptions to the general material conditions 
outlined above. For the present study it is important to be aware of these 
exceptions because there have been isolated capitalists within sectors generally 
hostile to the radical neo-liberal movement that have been strong supporters of 
the movement. John Elliott of manufacturer IXL, for example, was himself a 
radical neo-liberal activist and supporter of the movement. Furthermore, some 
companies had contradictory interests with regard to the radical neo-liberal 
agenda, as their activities were diversified among more than one sector of the 
economy.  
 
 
Contesting hegemony: mobilisation and conflict within the capitalist class 
 
The breakdown of the hegemony of welfare capitalism and domestic defence 
precipitated a mobilisation by key fractions of capital Australia during the 1980s 
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and into the 1990s. This mobilisation was initiated by a ‘neo-liberal coalition’, or 
what Kaptein describes as a ‘neo-liberal power bloc’, which set out to construct a 
new state project and new relations of forces out of the ashes of the Keynesian 
welfare state.61 
 
Initially the coalition of interests aggressively pushing the neo-liberal 
restructuring of the Australian state centred around finance capital, export 
oriented sectors such as mining and farming capital, small business sectors, with 
a smattering of others drawn from the ranks of the retail, manufacturing, 
media/entertainment, construction and tourism sectors. Added to this was 
monopoly capital, represented through the Business Council of Australia (BCA), 
who, like in other western countries, led what Galbraith calls a ‘revolt of the 
rich’.62 The major vehicles for this mobilisation of capital were employer 
associations, particularly the National Farmers Federation (representing pastoral 
and agrarian capital), the Australian Chamber of Commerce and its affiliates 
(representing small to medium sized enterprises), the Business Council of 
Australia (representing Australia’s eighty largest companies), COSBOA (small 
business) and the rogue Australian Federation of Employers (AFE), which will 
be discussed later. Others, associations such as the Housing Industry Association 
(HIA), Retail Traders Association (RTA) and the Australian mining Industry 
Council (AMIC) and individual capitalists such as Hugh Morgan, Arvi Parbo, 
John Elliott and Charles Copeman played a part in this mobilisation, but the 
aforementioned employer associations were the main vehicles for the capitalist 
advocacy of neo-liberalism. 
 
However, as the Australian state and economy came to be set on a broadly neo-
liberal course, ‘globalisation as discipline’63 ensured that it was in the short term 
interests of Australian capital as a whole to support and argue for the extension 
of such changes. Nonetheless, particularly during the transitional phase from 
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welfare capitalism to neo-liberalism (during the early to mid 1980s) those 
elements of the capitalist class advocating the rapid neo-liberal transformation of 
the state came into conflict with sections of their own class still wedded to 
aspects of domestic defence. At the same time, those sections of capital allied to 
the old order desperately defended their immediate economic interests amid a 
rapidly changing political and economic climate. Inter-capitalist conflict broke 
out. 
 
The tactics adopted during this mobilisation varied according to employer 
association and industry. Militant, confrontational and activist tactics and 
language were adopted by the ACC, COSBOA, the NFF as well as by a number 
of mining companies and their CEOs. These ranged from direct confrontations 
with trade unions, to the organisation of rallies and protests, to the formation of 
the rogue employer associations, such as the AFE. The industrial relations 
context of the mid 1980s is well documented, however the conflicts that occurred 
between capital and labour during this period are best understood as part of a 
broader struggle by sections of capital to transform the state and economy more 
generally. This neo-liberal capitalist mobilisation had a militant and a more 
moderate wing. Whilst there were many employer associations involved with 
both wings of the mobilisation, only the key associations will be discussed here. 
Those in the militant camp that will be discussed are the NFF, ACC, COSBOA 
and AFE and those in the moderate wing are the BCA and the AMIC. Although 
most members of associations such as the CAI and MTIA agreed with the 
general push towards deregulation, cuts to government expenditure and taxation, 
they failed to mobilise effectively on these issues and they opposed the neo-
liberal capitalists on the issues of labour market deregulation and tariffs.  
 
 The Militant wing 
 
The rationale of militant wing of the neo-liberal capitalist mobilisation was to 
challenge the hegemony of welfare capitalism and domestic defence. Its primary 
strategy for achieving this during the 1980s but also, as was evident from the 
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MUA dispute, into the 1990s,64 was to shift political debate in Australia further 
to the Right and to undermine the power of trade unions and the hold of the 
institutions of Arbitration. Rick Farley, former Executive Director of the NFF 
outlines the way the NFF attempted to do this:  
 
the position that NFF deliberately took in those days was to be 
further to the Right and therefore draw the debate to the Right and 
create a new centre.65  
 
By making radical and provocative statements, by creating public spectacles and 
by manufacturing a support base for such statements and spectacles, the militant 
capitalists helped to create a climate of opinion in which previously radical ideas 
seemed reasonable. Andrew Hay explains this strategy: 
 
It’s a question of climate of opinion. Therefore, if Andrew Hay 
and others are at the extreme edge of the debate and the Labor 
Party were at the other end, then they [Labor] could quite 
comfortably move into the middle — the middle prior would have 
been the end of the spectrum. So, it’s shifted the whole spectrum 
and allowed them [Labor] to do things, while still saying that 
there are dangerous right wing ideologues out on the boundary of 
the debate.66 
 
A number of confrontational tactics were employed to realise such a political 
shift. Most notably, the militant capitalists engaged in a number of direct 
confrontations with trade unions which were designed to have political 
ramifications beyond the immediate workplaces in question. During the Dollar 
Sweets, Robe River and Mudginberri disputes common-law suits were taken out 
against trade unions. These disputes were heralded by the militant capitalists and 
the radical neo-liberal movement as groundbreaking, and they urged other 
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employers to adopt similar tactics. This was viewed as ground-breaking by the 
militant capitalists as well as by the radical neo-liberal movement because, since 
the gaoling of union leader Clarrie O’Shea in 1969, the Arbitration Courts had 
been unwilling to use the full extent of the powers available to them to prosecute 
recalcitrant unions. That such powers had not been used until the 1980s was 
often cited by radical capitalists and radical neo-liberals as evidence of collusion 
by the ‘industrial relations club’ to protect the interests of its own members. Both 
the Dollar Sweets and Mudginberri disputes were underwritten by employer 
associations – the ACC and NFF respectively67— who were part of the radical 
wing of the neo-liberal capitalist mobilisation, whilst the Robe River dispute was 
undertaken by mining company Peko-Wallsend and spearheaded by its CEO, 
Charles Copeman. In the eyes of both the militant capitalists and the radical neo-
liberal movement, the broader significance of these conflicts was twofold. 
Firstly, it demonstrated that employers need not be fearful of confronting militant 
trade unions. Secondly, it threw up a challenge to the consensus-based approach 
articulated by the Hawke government, the ACTU leadership and those employer 
associations such as the CAI, ACM and MTIA wedded to the arbitration process. 
 
In the industrial disputes of Mudginberri, Dollar Sweets, Robe River and 
SEQEB, the primary motivation behind the corporations’ confrontation with the 
trade unions was immediate economic self-interest. Nonetheless, the militant 
capitalists also saw these disputes as vehicles for furthering their broader neo-
liberal agendas. They hoped that by sponsoring confrontation against ‘repressive 
behaviour by unions’,68 other employers would be emboldened to do the same. 
By agreeing to underwrite the costs of key industrial disputes, organisations such 
as the NFF and the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce were not merely 
protecting the interests of their own members, they were actively trying to 
reshape the Australian political landscape and key institutions of the Australian 
state. Furthermore, by working outside of the institutions of Arbitration they 
hoped that the authority of the Arbitration system as a whole would be 
undermined and that issues of trade union power and ‘restrictive work practices’ 
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would be put on the public and political agendas. For the leadership of 
organisations such as the NFF and ACC, these conflicts were part of a long-term 
process of undermining the power of the organised working class in Australia. 
Nothing exemplifies this more than the NFF’s Fighting Fund. The Fighting Fund 
was a pool of money set aside by the NFF, and added to by private donations, to 
be used for their ‘conscious positioning out to the Right to draw the [political] 
debate more to the Right’.69 As NFF Executive Director Andrew Robb exhorted 
to Australian business leaders ‘We need money to change attitudes and win 
issues’.70 In 1985 Andrew Robb claimed that the fighting fund stood at over $1 
million,71 and the plan was to increase that to $10 million.72 In addition to 
underwriting the costs of the Mudginberri dispute, the fighting fund was used to 
fund other industrial disputes that the NFF was supporting.73 From its formation 
in 1979, the NFF involved itself in a number of militant confrontations with trade 
unions, and this was to culminate with the Waterfront dispute of 1998.74 
 
The NFF’s fighting fund was part of a broader campaign by the NFF. In 
February 1986 it initiated a Direct Action Strategy Group which contracted a 
former Army Brigadier, Peter Badman, to advise on the merits of various types 
of direct actions75 (the NFF would again turn to former military personnel in 
their campaign against the Maritime Union (MUA) of Australia during the 
waterfront Dispute of 1998).76 The Group planned a number of actions for 1986, 
including blockades, picket breaking, the targeting of MPs in marginal seats, 
phone-ins to  and harassment of MPs and public servants, refusal to make 
compulsory superannuation payments to Superannuation trusts with trade union 
representation as well as boosting the fighting fund to $10 million.77 At a Fund 
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Raising dinner in Toowoomba in 1986 McLachlan outlined the NFF’s Direct 
Action strategy, saying ‘civil disobedience will be the key’.78 
 
The direct actions strategies undertaken by the NFF were well organised. 
Through their affiliates, the NFF tapped into large networks of farmers willing to 
vent their anger against the Labor government, trade unions and public servants. 
During ‘Operation Canberra Phone In’, for example, which targeted federal 
politicians and bureaucrats over the issue of high interest rates, the NFF provided 
farmers with extensive lists of contact numbers for public servants and MPs in 
marginal seats as well as possible ‘one liners’ that could be used by farmers to 
register their protest.79 A measure of how successful this mobilisation was is 
evident from an NFF press release claiming Telecom reported that approximately 
83,000 calls above the average to Canberra during the two-and-a-half days of the 
protest.80  
 
During 1985 and 1986 the NFF also supported and helped organise a number of 
‘farm rallies’ both in rural areas and in Canberra. To coincide with the tax 
summit the NFF organised an estimated 30,000 strong rally outside parliament 
House, Canberra on 1 July 1985.81 At the Canberra rally NFF president, Ian 
McLachlan, said farmers would ‘fight to the death’ on the capital gains tax and 
that: 
 
‘We will never give in. If the government wants to legislate on these 
subjects then let them do it and bear the political consequences’.82 
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Also taking direct action during the period under study (but again primarily 
during the mid 1980s) was the petit bourgeoisie. As part of his attempts to build 
support for the formation of the Australian Federation of Employers, John Leard 
organised a series of ‘Business Survival Rallies’ in early 1986, aimed at 
attracting small business owners.83 The Small Business Association (NSW) also 
organised a series of rallies in regional centres in early 1986.84 Small business 
was also active around elections. In the 1985 Victorian State elections 
businessmen Frank Penhalluriak and Bob Wolstenholme, both of whom had been 
prosecuted for opening their stores on weekends, stood for the Weekend Trading 
Party.85 Around the same time Small Business People (SBP) was formed, 
standing a candidate against NSW Premier Barrie Unsworth  in the Rockdale by-
election in 1986 (which Unsworth narrowly won by 27 votes) and supporting 
independent candidates in by-elections in the seats of Heathcote and 
Bankstown.86 SBP saw itself as the ‘activist wing’ of the small business 
movement, and, under its accountant president, Paul Greenwood, claimed to 
have ‘nearly 30 “incorporated” branches in NSW.87 Its activist orientation was 
reflected in its rhetoric such as the following description of its origins:  
 
SBP grew out of the need for small business people to actually get 
down to the “coal face” of political activism and fight for the survival 
of Small Business.88 
 
A small cadre of doctors, led by Bruce Shepherd, would also adopt militant 
tactics during the mid 1980sin defence of private health care, and in opposition 
to Labor’s Medicare proposals.  
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The issue that brought the various aspects of these populist mobilisations 
together was the short-lived ‘Joh for PM’ campaign of 1987. Across the country, 
farmers and small business owners rallied to hear speakers such as John Leard, 
Bruce Shepherd, Des Moore and Joh Bjelke-Petersen himself extol free market 
populist rhetoric.89 However, the campaign was unable to attract substantial 
business support. Doug McEachern notes that ‘There was no sense in which even 
the most ‘new right’ of business figures was willing to line up openly with the 
Joh campaign’.90 Although initially supportive of the campaign, NFF president 
Ian McLachlan later withdrew this endorsement.91 Militant capitalists were less 
keen to support direct action initiatives that they could not directly control. 
 
A number of employer associations, and at least one union, were formed as part 
of the neo-liberal capitalist mobilisation in the mid 1980s. The aim of forming 
such groups was to destabilise, undermine, challenge the arbitration system and 
the groups wedded to it. During the SEQEB dispute Wayne Gilbert helped 
establish the Queensland Power Workers Association, the purpose of which, 
according to Simmons and bramble, was to ‘marginalise the Electrical Trades 
Union’.92 According to Gilbert 400 workers joined the ‘many of whom were by 
this time solidly hostile to the union [the ETU]’.93 In 1986 the National Transport 
Federation (NTF) was formed to challenge the dominance of the Australian Road 
Transport Federation (ARTF) and the Australian Road Transport Industrial 
Organisation (ARTIO) within the transport industry. Paul Gaynor, a protagonist 
from the Dollar Sweets dispute was its first CEO, and the group adopted a 
militant industrial relations ideology. Along with the Long Distance Road 
Transport Association (LDRTA) they mobilised owner drivers and small fleet 
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owners to undermine the leading employer associations within the transport 
industry.94 
 
Perhaps the most important of these rogue groups was the Australian Federation 
of Employers (AFE). Formed in early 1986, the AFE brought together leading 
radical neo-liberal activists and militant capitalists from the small business and 
farming sectors. The National Farmers Federation was one its major financial 
supporters. From the outset the AFE had a clear ideological character. At 
meetings of business representatives in February 1986 where the initial proposal 
for the establishment of the AFE was put, the role of the body was suggested as 
being for the ‘Preservation and development of the Private Enterprise ethic in 
Australia’.95 Delegates at this meeting were informed that: ‘Australians need to 
be reminded that as Private Enterprise and Democracy go hand in hand, so too 
does Socialism and Servitude’.96 Promotional leaflets described the AFE’s 
objectives ‘To unite and nationally voice the concerns of supporters of Private 
Enterprise in Australia’.97 Such strident ideological polemic was mirrored in the 
AFE’s combative press statements. The March 1987 National Wage Case 
Decision was described by Andrew Hay as ‘a sell-out to the trade union 
movement’ and the Arbitration Commission as ‘lining in a fool’s paradise, 
oblivious to Australia’s rapidly increasing spending’.98 Acting AFE chairman 
Peter Boyle sounded a call for business to unite against the Labor government’s 
proposed industrial relations legislation: 
 
Business people and farmers who have fought hard to defend the 
legal rights of business are not going to take the government’s 
actions lying down. We intend to fight this issue out in the 
electorate and make sure that ordinary men and women realise the 
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gravity of the government’s sell-out to the vested interests of the 
union movement.99 
 
But the AFE’s activities were not confined to strident rhetoric. The 
organisation’s goal was to ‘establish a campaign for change and to tackle the 
Confederation of Australian Industry head on’.100 It aimed to undermine the 
legitimacy of the CAI as the major voice for employers and attempted to shift 
business opinion and attitudes towards militancy to the Right. The reasons for 
this were twofold. Firstly, although the CAI had a large and varied membership 
(not surprising given that it was an ‘association of associations’),101 it was 
perceived as controlled by manufacturing interests. There is some truth to this, 
for although small business accounted for 85 per cent of the CAI’s membership, 
when the Australian Chamber of Manufacturers (ACM) disaffiliated from the 
CAI, it took with it a quarter of the Confederation’s revenue (ironically, 
manufacturing groups viewed the CAI as ineffective in halting the erosion of 
tariffs).102 Secondly, the CAI was viewed as part of the ‘Industrial Relations 
Club’ for its willingness to work within and support the framework of the system 
of Arbitration. 
 
A number of tactics were employed by the AFE to further its aims. Its initial 
‘Profile of Organisation’ described the AFE as ‘an action organisation, not 
simply a reaction group’ and stated that the leader of the organisation ‘will 
develop attack strategies to deal with the immediate areas of concern’.103 Initial 
momentum and support for the group was generated through a series of public 
rallies in Sydney, Brisbane and Melbourne which attracted 2,000, 1,000, and 700 
people respectively.104 As the ‘Profile of Organisation’ suggests, confrontational, 
activist tactics were not eschewed by the AFE. A campaign against the Hawke 
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government’s proposed Fringe Benefits Tax was organised as well as the 
‘Canberra Business Summit’ to coincide with and challenge the Labor 
government’s Tax Summit. 
 
The AFE did not confine its activities or public statements to industrial relations. 
Rather, it set out to articulate neo-liberal alternatives to policies being put 
forward by the Labor government, the ACTU, the Wets inside the Liberal Party 
and those employer associations tied to the institutions and processes of 
arbitration. In press releases the AFE outlined means for slashing government 
expenditure by $3-$4 billion through the restoration of ‘incentives to work’.105 
Such ‘incentives’ included the restriction of social security payments to ‘a 
maximum of 10 weeks in any one year’ and the cessation of family allowance 
payments for a family with two children once the family income reached 
$25,000. Other radical neo-liberal policy proposals advocated by the AFE 
included the reintroduction of higher education fees and the abolition of 
Medicare.106 The AFE’s most comprehensive articulation of radical neo-liberal 
policy alternatives occurred through its sponsorship and guidance of the National 
Priorities Project (NPP), which is discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Those employers involved in the militant wing of this mobilisation were, by and 
large, also those who were marginalised by the Accord process. Among these 
capitalists, reports Andrew Hay, ‘a great deal of coordination’107 occurred and a 
network of radical neo-liberal capitalists developed. A key forum for the 
development of this network was the H. R. Nicholls Society, however the 
network of radical capitalists also operated as a means of providing concrete 
support in anti-union struggles. Law firm Kroger and Kroger for example, home 
of movement activist lawyers Michael Kroger and Peter Costello, was the law 
firm of choice after their victory in the Dollar Sweets dispute. Western Mining’s 
CEO Hugh Morgan was, according to Andrew Hay, ‘strongly supportive of the 
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Chamber of Commerce and the things that it was doing’.108 In 1984 the NFF, 
AMIC and ACC met to establish ‘closer links on issues of common interest’ and 
agreed to ‘closer liaison and to “informal” joint action on mutually supportable 
policies’.109 Although the AMIC was not as publicly strident and militant as 
some other capitalists, behind the scenes, they and individual mining capitalists, 
such as Hugh Morgan, supported the militant capitalist mobilisation. 
 
Conflict and consensus within the capitalist class 
 
Such neo-liberal agitation brought the militant capitalists into conflict with other 
members of their own class, particularly manufacturing capital. The 
manufacturers were not, on the whole, philosophically opposed to neo-
liberalism. Indeed, employer associations such as the CAI agreed with many 
aspects of the neo-liberal assault upon the Australian state, particularly 
reductions to taxation, reductions in state expenditure and the curbing of trade 
union power and militancy. Where the manufacturers and their employer 
associations came into conflict with the militant neo-liberal capitalists was over 
arbitration and tariffs. The CAI, MTIA and ACM had pragmatic reasons for 
supporting such state regulatory systems. Arbitration provided them with a 
means of mediating industrial conflict as well as ensuring their recognition as 
legitimate representative bodies of capital. On the tariffs front, decades of 
protection without the requirement of efficiency improvements had created 
industries dependent upon tariffs to survive. Nonetheless economic pressures led 
many manufacturers to reassess their positions on these issues, although, as Bell 
points out: 
 
where they [manufacturers] have accepted the need to reduce 
protection, this has been accompanied by requests for positive 
assistance policies.110 
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To the extent that the manufacturers and their representative bodies were tied, for 
strategic political and pragmatic economic reasons to the institutions of the 
Australian settlement, they came into conflict with the militant neo-liberal 
capitalists. 
 
One of the leading advocates of reductions to tariffs was the National Farmers 
Federation. In 1982 it argued for the reduction of tariffs to 15 per cent across the 
board over a 15 year period.111 In this push it won strong support from many 
within the mining sector, one mining company executive describing high tariffs 
as ‘a threat to the Free Enterprise System’.112 While manufacturers did not reject 
outright the need for tariff reductions, they argued that this needed to be 
undertaken as part of a broader process of economic restructuring, including 
industry assistance. The CAI accused the NFF, with its obsessive focus on tariffs, 
of ‘diverting attention from the real issues facing the Australian private 
sector’.113 But it was the issue of industrial relations that created the greatest 
tensions within the capitalist class during the 1980s. Not only did farming and 
mining capital view the CAI, MTIA, and ACM as ‘rent seekers’ due to their 
support for tariffs, they joined a number of small business groups in labelling 
them part of the ‘industrial relations club’. Although most employers were to 
come together and present a unified voice of opposition to the Hawke 
government’s proposed industrial relations bill arising from the Hancock inquiry 
– which would have offered greater protection to unions who undertook strike 
action – the issue of industrial relations created great divisions within the 
capitalist class during the 1980s. 
 
 The moderate wing of the neo-liberal capitalist mobilisation 
 
The single most important participant on the moderate wing of the capitalist neo-
liberal mobilisation was undoubtedly the Business Council of Australia. Formed 
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in 1983 and comprised of Chief Executive Officers of Australia’s eighty largest 
companies, the BCA had similar broad policy goals to those of the militant wing 
of the capitalist neo-liberal mobilisation, but differed fundamentally on tactics. 
Although its broad philosophy and policy goals were neo-liberal – reflecting the 
needs of monopoly capital to expand beyond the borders of Australia— the BCA 
adopted quite a pragmatic strategy for influencing the direction of public policy 
in Australia.114 It was formed in order to give big business in Australia a coherent 
political voice and to give it access to state actors. It did this successfully by 
capitalising on the privileged position of big business in order to gain the BCA 
access to political agenda-setters. Further, it combined this with quality, focused 
and well argued research that articulated an incremental neo-liberal agenda for 
Australia. Geoff Allen, Executive Director of the BCA in its early years 
describes this strategy: 
 
We are conscious that a number of key strategies cannot be resolved 
quickly and in many areas, major vested interests and entrenched 
attitudes and practices – even sacred cows – will have to be tackled 
and changed over time. An approach however which  puts “a light on 
the hill” for guidance and direction is overdue and essential. In this 
way, when we deal, as we must constantly do, with the relatively 
trivial, short-term, ad-hoc and incremental, we are working 
consistently along a desired path.115 
 
Such an approach was adopted for both strategic and political reasons. 
Strategically, such an approach was sound because it allowed the BCA to work 
within and extend the boundaries of political reality at the time. With a Labor 
government in office federally it was clear that a rapid and radical neo-liberal 
transformation of the Australian state was unlikely to be implemented. For 
example, although it later adopted a position calling for the extension of the 
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Howard government’s radical Workplace Relations legislation, during the Labor 
years the BCA advocated a change from the existing processes of arbitration and 
wage fixation to the policy of ‘enterprise bargaining’, still a substantial change, 
but much less radical than what was being advocated by the radical neo-liberal 
movement and by the militant wing of the capitalist neo-liberal mobilisation.116  
 
Politically, the pragmatic neo-liberalism of the BCA was a necessary 
compromise between the sectors and ideologies represented by its 
membership.117 Within the BCA were radical neo-liberals such as Hugh Morgan 
and Arvi Parbo, as well as a number of manufacturers who favoured a less 
radical approach to economic restructuring. 
 
Also worth mentioning is the Australian Mining Industry Council (AMIC). It too 
advocated a broad neo-liberal agenda during the 1980s. Not surprisingly, the 
AMIC advocated the reduction of tariffs on imports coming to Australia.118 It 
called for reductions in taxation and regulations affecting the mining industry. 
But the AMIC did not confine its economic advocacy to areas directly affecting 
the mining sector. It also advocated a broader agenda of  deregulation and 
privatisation. However, the stridency of rhetoric and calls for huge and 
immediate reductions to state spending which characterised the militant wing of 
the capitalist mobilisation was absent from the AMIC’s journal, Mining Review. 
This is despite the fact that the AMIC included among its ranks radical neo-
liberals such as Hugh Morgan, Arvi Parbo and Charles Copeman.119 
 
Judging from The Mining Review, the issues of most concern for the AMIC 
during this period were the environment movement and Aboriginal land rights, 
both of which were viewed as threatening access of mining companies to land 
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and the former of which was viewed as a threat to the mining industry’s 
customer base – those companies who refined and distributed fossil fuels and 
their associated products. In 1984 The Mining Review editorialised that: 
 
In the last decade or so the role of government at all levels has 
changed from one of encouragement to that of intervention. The 
result has been that the once relatively simple decision making 
process in the industry has become clogged with obstacle by a mass 
of legislation, regulation and bureaucratic approvals … 
 
The cause of this growing government intervention has been a 
combination of new issues (environmental, land rights, foreign 
investment to name a few) and a “perceived” need by governments to 
“control” the industry.120  
 
So, government regulations, responding to the growth of new social movements, 
had led to greater restrictions being placed upon the mining industry. The 
editorial went on to conclude: 
 
As a nation we would do well to remember that nature’s obstacles to 
minerals discovery are impressive, and that governments should 
resist the temptation to compound them.121 
 
Although it clearly felt threatened by the growing awareness of environmental 
and Aboriginal issues and the consequent legislative changes that responded to 
such awareness, the mining industry was also very aware of its public image. A 
number of articles in The Mining Review during the 1980s and 1990s argued that 
a negative image of the mining industry existed within the Australian 
community. The solution, therefore, was to publicly affirm the mining industry’s 
support for the preservation of the natural environment and Aboriginal rights, but 
to argue for legislation to be watered down and for a balanced approach to policy 
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making – which meant undermining those voices from the environment and 
Aboriginal rights movements who advocated greater impediments to the 
industry’s access to land.122 In the case of debates around the greenhouse effect 
the AMIC questioned the scientific credibility of the phenomenon, thus washing 
the industry’s hands of responsibility to act.123 The other issue to dominate 
AMIC thinking was the problem of reducing costs in the transport industry, 
which inevitably led to the issue of industrial relations and the breaking of the 
power of militant unions such as the SUA, WWF and later the MUA.124 
 
The conflict and consensus that occurred within the capitalist class regarding 
neo-liberalism provide much of the context for understanding the role played by 
the radical neo-liberal movement in struggles for hegemony. The contours of the 
struggles to secure hegemony that remain to be outlined are those concerned with 
the state itself, the regime-level projects pursued by the major political parties, 
and the response by the working class to neo-liberalism. 
 
 
The state project of neo-liberalism 
 
In Australia, the state project of neo-liberalism involved a dismantling of the 
institutions of the early twentieth century class compromise, as well as those of 
the post war consensus over Keynesian welfare capitalism. Although the origins 
of this project can be located in various actions by the Whitlam and Fraser 
governments, it was not until the Hawke Labor government came to power in 
1983 that neo-liberalism became state ideology. However, the state project of 
neo-liberalism did not simply involve a series of governmental legislation that 
dismantled key aspects of the welfare state. Rather, it entailed the 
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institutionalisation of a neo-liberal logic within the apparatuses of the state. This 
ensured that, regardless of the particular regime in power at any given time, neo-
liberalism would be the guiding philosophy against which most state actions 
would be measured. Such logic was institutionalised in bodies such as the 
Industries Assistance Commission, the Productivity Commission, the Economic 
Planing and Advisory Committee and the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission. Furthermore, the state project of neo-liberalism fundamentally 
altered the framework within which capitalist relations existed and were 
reproduced. It changed the way capitalists did business. The most obvious 
example of this is the deregulation of the financial sector through the floating of 
the Australian dollar (1983), the abolition of many foreign exchange controls 
(1983) and of restrictions on foreign banks operating in Australia (1985). 
Financial deregulation subjected Australian capitalism much more to the 
discipline of globalisation. This put pressure on domestic capitalists to 
restructure their operations in order to be competitive, and upon the Australian 
state to introduce further neo-liberal restructuring. 
 
The state project of neo-liberalism was a response to four main pressures: the 
desire, of Australian capital as a class, to weaken the power of labour; the need 
by Australian capital as a class to secure conditions for increased profitability; 
the desire, by particular fractions of Australian capital (most notably mining, 
framing, finance and monopoly capital) to increase their power vis a vis labour in 
their own sectors and to increase their own profitability vis a vis other fractions 
of capital; and the discipline of globalisation, which increased significantly 
during the 1980s after the deregulation of finance and floating of the Australian 
dollar and as financial markets took increasing note of the pronouncements by 
credit rating agencies such as Moody’s, and of supra national bodies such as the 
IMF. As Stephen Bell argues, ‘neoliberalism is as much a political as an 
economic project’.125 Neo-liberalism as a state project has brought about not only 
a restructuring of the Australian state and economy, but also a fundamental shift 
in power and resources. In the period surveyed, the size of the Australian state 
did not decrease (when measured as a proportion of GDP). Rather, the neo-
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liberal transformation of the Australian state has seen a transfer of state resources 
from the public to the private sector, and the redistribution of wealth upwards. It 
has assisted the increase of profits as a share of GDP and the concomitant 
decrease in the wages share. Increasingly, responsibility for ‘market failure’ has 
been shifted to citizens. Contrary to neo-liberal rhetoric, neo-liberalism in 
practice has meant: 
 
a market re-regulation to guarantee new and profitable markets to 
large corporations, and a social re-regulation to restrict the meaning 
of citizenship, where this conflicts with the delivery of profitable 
markets to large corporations.126 
 
As Martin and Schuman argue, neo-liberalism has entailed a ‘freedom struggle 
on behalf of capital’.127 On the issue of industrial relations, for example, the 
introduction of enterprise bargaining, and later the Workplace Relations Act, 
regulated the labour market such that the interests of capital were further 
privileged. Furthermore, by exposing the Australian state and economy to the 
discipline of globalisation, by transferring public assets into private ownership 
and by subordinating policy to the institutionalised logic of neo-liberalism, the 
state project of neo-liberalism has curtailed the ability of the Australian state to 
pursue agendas that diverge significantly from the interests of the neo-liberal 
capitalist power bloc. Dick Bryan is thus correct to argue that neo-liberalism has 
entailed ‘an explicit agenda to enforce the power of capital’.128 
 
By the 1990s, new relations of forces had emerged around a commitment to the 
state project of neo-liberalism. Tariffs had already been significantly reduced and 
labour market deregulation was being advocated across the capitalist class. Thus, 
the two issues that constituted the main source of capitalist disharmony were 
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largely resolved. The capitalist class as a whole was supporting the continuation 
and extension of the state project of neo-liberalism. 
  
 
Labor and the Coalition: regime-level hegemonic projects 
 
The Whitlam Labor government inherited a state project whose contradictions 
and weaknesses were gradually being exposed. Although Australia’s state project 
of Keynesian welfare capitalism had brought continuous economic growth since 
the Second World War, it had also created ‘an inflationary bias’ within the 
economy. Another problem stemmed from the fact that, although the intellectual 
framework informing this reconstruction generally attributed to the economics of 
John Maynard Keynes, the reality was different. Australian economic policy was 
an amalgam of theoretical perspectives, inherited traditions and pragmatic 
agendas. As John Quiggin argues, it ‘lacked any real coherence or intellectual 
basis’.129 Furthermore, Australian manufacturing had developed numerous 
inefficiencies, at least in part resulting from decades of state commitment to  
tariff protections. At the same time, the radical mobilisation of students and 
workers in the 1960s resulted in contradictory critiques and demands of the state 
emanating from elements within the Labor Party. On the one hand sections of the 
Left critiqued the welfare state as an oppressive regulatory apparatus working in 
the interests of capital. On the other hand many within the Left saw a positive 
role for the state in providing an increased range of services and opportunities for 
disadvantaged groups. There was not yet anything resembling a neo-liberal 
counter-hegemonic movement in Australian society at the time. 
 
This contradictory context was reflected in the legislative program of the 
Whitlam government. John Quiggin, again, says it contained a ‘mixture of 
interventionist and laissez faire ideas’.130 On the one hand the Whitlam 
government pursued a state program which put extra funds into tertiary 
education, abolished university fess and expanded the social welfare system. On 
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the other hand Whitlam cut tariffs across the board by 25 per cent, implemented 
limited financial deregulation and established the Priorities Review Staff within 
the Prime Ministers’ Department and which outlined a free market agenda for the 
government to draw upon. The 1975 dismissal budget also contained 
commitments to curbing state expenditure. It was thus the Whitlam Labor 
government that took Australia’s first steps down the path to neo-liberalism. 
Whitlam did not, however, not have a consistent neo-liberal philosophy nor did it 
have a neo-liberal vision of Australia’s future.  
 
The Fraser Liberal government that succeeded Whitlam similarly pursued a 
mixture of interventionist and neo-liberal policies. Although Fraser did introduce 
sections 45D and 45E of the Trade Practices Act— which curtailed the ability of 
unions to undertake industrial action – and although Fraser’s razor gang 
identified large cuts to public expenditure as well as adopting the monetarist-
inspired ‘fight inflation first’ strategy, this was not part of a coherent neo-liberal 
state project. Indeed, as Paul Kelly has argued, ‘it is wrong to attack Fraser for 
not implementing’ neo-liberal policies, because, in the early years of the Fraser 
government, ‘virtually nobody was calling for them’.131 Rather than attempting 
to secure hegemony for a coherent state project, both the Whiltam and Fraser 
governments were forced into managing the economic crisis that beset Australian 
and international capitalism during the 1970s and early 1980s. 
 
It was under the leadership of Hawke and Keating that Australian governments 
first embraced and vigorously pursued the state project of neo-liberalism. Part of 
securing electoral hegemony for themselves was the need also to secure 
hegemony for this broader state project. It was through a One Nation hegemonic 
strategy that this was attempted. Labor’s One Nation strategy was inclusive 
through its ‘consensus’ approach, its promise of the social wage and its 
legitimation of some of the less radical demands of social movement and 
minority groups. 
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As stated in Chapter One, Labor’s One Nation strategy was an attempt to 
minimise the inevitable conflict arising from their implementation of the state 
project of neo-liberalism. The key to this was the disciplining of labour by tying 
the organised working class, via the ACTU leadership, into the Accord process. 
Under the Accord most trade unions agreed to moderate their industrial militancy 
and wage demands in return for the promised ‘social wage’. This allowed the 
ALP to pursue a radical, neo-liberal restructuring of the state and economy. 
Successive Labor administrations deregulated the financial sector and other 
markets, introduced market mechanisms into the public service and corporatised 
some public owned enterprises whilst privatising others. Both income tax and 
corporate taxation rates were reduced. The ‘social wage’, to the extent that it was 
a reality, materialised in the form of measures such as the expansion of 
Medicare, the provision of training schemes for the unemployed, the expansion 
of the higher education sector and the introduction of compulsory superannuation 
payments by employers. However, even some of these were achieved through 
neo-liberal mechanisms. For example, the introduction of a partial user-pays 
scheme for students helped provide the basis for the expansion of higher 
education. Superannuation shifted responsibility for provision of retirement 
income, at least partially, onto individual workers. The capitalist class did not 
support the concept of the Accord. Nonetheless, through the pursuit of a broad 
neo-liberal agenda, the staging of regular business-government-labour summits 
and a close liaison between senior Labor ministers and key capitalists, the Hawke 
and Keating governments ensured that outright capitalist hostility was confined 
to a minority within that class. This is the essence of Labor’s ‘consensus’ 
approach. 
 
At the same time Labor committed itself, at least rhetorically, to a relatively 
expansive conception of rights and justice. As Frankel argues, successive Labor 
governments ‘combined economic restructuring with anti-conservative socio-
cultural policies’.132 Such policies were framed in consultation with moderate 
feminist, multicultural, gay, environment and indigenous movement leaders. At 
                                                 
132 Boris Frankel, ‘Beyond Labourism and Socialism: How the Australian Labor Party Developed 
the Model of ‘New Labour’’, New Left Review, No. 221, January-February 1997, p. 24 
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the symbolic level, such expansive conceptions of rights and justice were tied to 
a new national identity that constructed Australia as a cosmopolitan, socially 
diverse and economically vibrant part of the Asian region. As well as being an 
expression of Labor’s social justice commitments, there was also a strategic 
dimension to its expansive conception of rights. It appeased Labor’s Left factions 
and gained the support of numerous social movement organisations and their 
politically moderate leadership. It also allowed Labor to articulate a vision of 
Australia consistent with its embrace of new markets in Asia.133 
 
There were, however, limits to the inclusiveness of Labor’s One Nation 
hegemonic strategy. In particular there was no sympathy for working class 
groups that attempted to operate outside of the ‘consensus’ model. The militant 
Builders Labourers Federation, for example, was deregistered under Labor134 and 
the Hawke government used military forces and supported Australian airline 
companies to break the Pilot’s dispute in 1989. These latter two examples 
highlight that Labor’s corporatism operated, ultimately, ‘through force, not 
consent’.135 Furthermore, by the mid 1990s, the One Nation strategy had been 
largely exhausted. The state project of neo-liberalism combined with the 
passivity of trade unions under the Accord had delivered real wage decreases for 
many workers. Ultimately, the effect of Labor’s strategy was to disadvantage 
many people materially. The resulting anxiety and resentment felt by many was 
mobilised by the Coalition against Labor’s socially inclusive rhetoric, 
particularly its expansive conception of rights on issues of multiculturalism, 
feminism and indigenous issues. 
 
During their time in Opposition from 1983-1996, the Coalition gradually 
articulated a Two Nations hegemonic strategy. This strategy was an attempt to 
counter Labor’s electoral hegemony while at the same time affirming the 
Coalition’s commitment to the state project of neo-liberalism and incorporating 
                                                 
133 Ibid., p. 25. 
134 Ed Kaptein, ‘Neoliberalism and the Dismantling of Corporatism in Australia’, pp. 101-102. 
135 John Burgess and Richard Sappey, Corporatism in Action: the Australian Pilots’ Dispute 
1989, Department of Economics Research Report or Occasional Paper No. 182, University of 
Newcastle, 1992, p. 2. 
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the traditional social and moral conservatism of the non-Labor side of politics. 
Perhaps the first articulation of this Two Nations strategy by the Coalition was 
the 1988 policy document Future Directions.136 The Coalition’s Two Nations 
strategy excluded significant sections of the population both symbolically and 
materially. It created an imagined mainstream community through the exclusion, 
through demonisation, of ‘special interests’ and unproductive citizens. 
 
The rhetoric and policy program of the Howard Coalition government since 1996 
has been premised upon this Two Nations hegemonic strategy. It is based upon 
exclusion in three ways. Materially, Howard’s neo-liberal agenda entailed a 
transfer of wealth and power upwards, and a transfer of resources from public to 
private. While this was true, to some extent, of the previous Labor government, 
the compensatory social wage was scrapped by Howard. Unemployment 
assistance was made more difficult to access and more stringent regulations and 
greater surveillance were placed upon the unemployed. Numerous indigenous 
assistance programs were cut. The ability of workers to organise collectively was 
curtailed as were minimum award provisions. At the symbolic level, Howard’s 
Two Nations hegemonic project entailed a vehement attack upon the notion of 
social justice and its defenders. This was largely achieved through the 
mobilisation of new class discourse. Culturally, Howard privileged a particular 
image of national identity, based upon a narrow and rosy interpretation of 
Australian history.  
 
The hegemonic strategy employed by the Howard government is not surprising. 
Neo-liberal regimes have often bolstered their economic policies with a 
conservative social agenda. Internationally, the Two Nations hegemonic strategy 
has been the most common neo-liberal project. In this sense, the success of 
Labor’s One Nation neo-liberal strategy is something of an aberration. Henk 
Overbeek and Kees van der Pijl explain the dynamics of this process: 
 
                                                 
136 For a discussion of this see Carol Johnson, Governing Change: Keating to Howard, 
University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 2000, pp. 38-40. 
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a project which consists only of liberalisation, privatisation and 
internationalisation (not to speak of unemployment and falling real 
incomes), will have the greatest difficulty in becoming hegemonic, or 
even, particularly in parliamentary democracies, dominant. A 
hegemonic project needs a 'politics of support' as much as it needs a 
'politics of power' 
 
Neo-conservatism provides the neo-liberal bourgeoisie with an 
effective 'politics of support': moral conservatism, xenophobia, law-
and-order, the family are the themes which provided the basis for a 
relatively stable electoral coalition, which even today seems to have 
relegated social democracy to the past for good.137  
 
The material, symbolic and cultural aspects of Howard’s project are integrally 
related and have been essential to his continued electoral success. Although 
Howard’s neo-liberal social and economic agenda have seen an exacerbation of 
inequality in Australia, this has been offset somewhat by limited concessions, 
such as the first homebuyers grant. But the real success of the Howard years has 
been the displacement of resentment and anxiety away from neo-liberal 
economics onto ‘special interests’ – Aboriginal groups, mulitculturalists, trade 
union leaders, feminists – through the use of new class discourse. By mobilising 
traditional images of Australian identity and nationalism, and by creating a series 
of ‘others’, Howard has been able to position the Coalition as representative of 
mainstream values – all the while transferring wealth and opportunities to an 
already wealthy minority.  
 
The working class and neo-liberal hegemony 
 
During the period under review, the working class was unable to pose a serious, 
organised threat to the state project of neo-liberalism.  Indeed, significant 
sections of the organised working class leadership actively assisted the 
                                                 
137 Henk Overbeek and Kees van der Pijl, ‘Restructuring Capital and Restructuring Hegemony: 
Neo-liberalism and the Unmaking of the Post-War Order’, in Henk Overbeek (ed), Restructuring 
Hegemony in the Global Political Economy, p. 15. 
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implementation of neo-liberalism. This is despite the clear assault upon the 
working class constituted by neo-liberalism. The primary reason for this was the 
ACTU’s acceptance of the conditions of the Accord structure.138 Commitments  
to wage restraint and the fear of a possible  Coalition government ensured that, 
under the Accord, the industrial militancy and advocacy of radical alternatives, 
that at least characterised  the left-wing trade unions during the Fraser years, was 
largely abandoned. Under the Accord, the trade union leadership increasingly 
undertook the role of responsible managers of capitalism first, and 
representatives of the interests of their membership and distant second. During 
the Accord period there was a steady decline in trade union membership. 
 
Other centres of working class resistance also offered little challenge to neo-
liberalism. By the 1980s the Communist Party of Australia was but a shadow of 
its former self and had thrown its support behind the Accord.139 The new social 
movements that were able to mobilise perhaps hundreds of thousands of people 
from the late 1970s until the mid 1990s were very much focussed upon their own 
specific issues, such as environmental protection, nuclear disarmament and 
Aboriginal Land Rights, but rarely upon broader issues of class power or 
economic ideology. As stated earlier, under Labor, some of the leaders of these 
movements became incorporated into the process of state policy making. 
Furthermore, at the time when the state project of neo-liberalism was developing 
a tendency was emerging on the Left that militated against a critique of neo-
liberalism. The rise of postmodernism within the academy precipitated the 
jettisoning of class analysis, or, at best, the relegation of class to but one among 
many ‘identities’ or ‘subjectivities’. What Frankel calls ‘an uncritical celebration 
of ‘popular culture’’140 spread throughout the academic Left during the 1980s 
and into the 1990s. With the analytical framework of class largely delegitimised, 
the identification of neo-liberalism as a class-based project was unlikely. The 
                                                 
138 For an extended critique of the Accord, see Peter Ewer, Ian Hampson, Chris Lloyd, John 
Rainford, Stephen Rix and Meg Smith, Politics and the Accord, Pluto Press, Leichhardt, 1991. 
139 See Boris Frankel, From the Prophets Deserts Come, pp. 319-320. 
140 Ibid., p. 84. 
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demise of class analysis on the Left also opened up the discursive space for the 
radical neo-liberal movement’s deployment of new class discourse.141 
 
While the relative absence of organised opposition to neo-liberalism during the 
survey period is apparent, it is difficult to measure the extent to which neo-
liberalism managed to secure a social base for itself during this time. Several 
commentators have used opinion poll and survey data to challenge the notion 
that neo-liberalism has become the new common sense among non-elites. Using 
opinion poll data conducted during the 1990s, Hayward has highlighted strong 
popular antipathy to the neo-liberal policies of privatisation and tariff 
reduction.142 Papadakis uses survey data to conclude that ‘There is no sign that 
public opinion … has abandoned or is in the process of abandoning, most aspects 
of the welfare state’.143 That Australians have returned neo-liberal governments 
in every federal election since 1983 does not necessarily confirm neo-
liberalism’s popularity. Many aspects of the neo-liberal agenda have not been put 
directly to the electorate. For example, as John Quiggin points out, National 
Competition Policy ‘has never been democratically endorsed’.144 Because of 
their apparent unpopularity, argues Hayward, neo-liberal regimes in Australia 
have ‘chosen the path of electoral deceit as a means of securing office’145- that is, 
parties have obscured the neo-liberal nature of their agendas during election 
campaigns. Arguably, voters have expressed their dislike of neo-liberalism via 
the ballot box. The 1993 election, in which the Coalition ran on an explicitly 
neo-liberal platform, and in which the ALP run an anti-neo-liberal scare 
campaign, produced a massive defeat for the Coalition, despite the general 
dislike within the electorate of Prime Minister Keating. In addition, as Marian 
Sawer argues, the 1996 federal election can be interpreted as a defeat for 
                                                 
141 See my discussion of this in Damien Cahill, ‘Why the Right Uses ‘Class’ Against the Left’, 
pp. 159-161. For a more detailed critique of the abandonment of class analysis by one section of 
the academic Left in Australia see Boris Frankel, ‘Confronting Neoliberal Regimes: The Post-
Marxist Embrace of Populism and Realpolitik’, New Left Review, 226, November/December 
1997, pp. 57-92. 
142 David Hayward, ‘The Democratic Paradox and Socialist Strategies’, Journal of Australian 
Political Economy, No. 44, December 1999, pp. 46-56. 
143 Elim Papdakis, ‘Conjectures about Public Opinion and the Australian Welfare State’, 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, Vol. 26, No. 2, August 1990, p. 230. 
144 Quiggin quoted in David Hayward, ‘The Democratic Paradox and Socialist Strategies’, p. 55. 
145 David Hayward, ‘The Democratic Paradox and Socialist Strategies’, p. 55. 
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‘economic correctness’ – the ‘belief in the beneficence of free markets’146 – by a 
working class suffering under over a decade of the state project of neo-
liberalism. Such evidence must be balanced against the support given to neo-
liberalism from sections of the Australian population outside of the capitalist 
class. Kaptein, for example, argues that ‘state employees and urban 
professionals’ comprised part of the support base for neo-liberalism in 
Australia.147 Another example of the extent of penetration by neo-liberalism of 
the discursive terrain of common sense is the widespread use of new class 
discourse, particularly the term ‘political correctness’. Neo-liberal hegemony is, 
however, contradictory. For example, it is unlikely that the rise of Hansonism as 
a political force — at the end of the survey period — would have been possible 
had it not been for the effects that neo-liberal restructuring was having upon 
many rural and working class communities. Interestingly, it was new class 
discourse that Hanson turned against the architects of neo-liberalism in order to 
mobilise opinion against ‘elites’. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined the broad contours of struggles to secure neo-liberal 
hegemony in Australia from the 1970s until 1996. In doing so it has also 
examined some of the factors that led to the loss of hegemony of welfare 
capitalism and domestic defence among sections of the capitalist class, and to the 
consequent attempts to articulate a new state project and a concomitant 
hegemonic strategy. 
 
This chapter has found that international pressures that led to the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system put similar pressures upon the institutions and 
hegemonic alliances that had underpinned the labour-capital accord and welfare 
capitalism in Australia. The OPEC oil crisis occurred of 1973-4 exacerbated 
                                                 
146 Marian Sawer, ‘A Defeat for Political Correctness?’ in Clive Bean, Marian Simms, Scott 
Bennett and John Warhurst, The Politics of Retribution: the 1996 Federal Election, Allen and 
Unwin, St. Leonards, 1997, pp. 73-79. 
147 Ed Kaptein, ‘Neo-liberalism and the Dismantling of Corporatism in Australia’, p. 104. 
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these pressures. Furthermore, the system of full employment had created a 
situation whereby capital saw a need to weaken the power of the organised 
working class. So, by the late 1970s, the capitalist class as a whole saw its 
interests lying in a broad agenda of deregulation, a weakening of the power of 
unions and a greater transfer of public resources to private interests.  
 
There were also fractions of the capitalist class who saw their interests lying in a 
more radical restructuring of capital-state-labour relations in Australia. These 
capitalists – most notably finance, mining, farming, small business and 
monopoly capital – had as their goal the dismantling of the systems of protection 
and arbitration which had underpinned Australian economic development during 
the twentieth century. In order to achieve such ends, these capitalists mobilised. 
into two ‘wings’: a militant wing and a more moderate wing. The militant wing, 
represented predominantly by farming capital and small business, supported and 
financed confrontationalist tactics against both trade unions and those employer 
associations tied to the institutions of arbitration and protection. They also 
proposed a radical neo-liberal restructuring of the Australian state. The more 
moderate wing of this mobilisation, represented in this study by the Business 
Council of Australia and the Australian Mining Industry Council, tended to 
advocate a gradual neo-liberal restructuring of the Australian state and tended, at 
least publicly, to favour working with the government of the day to achieve such 
changes. 
 
In addition, during the 1970s and 1980s, there were fractions of capital— 
primarily manufacturing— which, although favouring deregulation, a transfer of 
public resources to private interests and a weakening of trade union power, were 
still wedded to the institutions of arbitration and protection. These capitalists thus 
came into sometimes quite vituperative conflict with the neo-liberal capitalist 
mobilisation. By the mid 1990s, these conflicts has largely been ameliorated as 
the neo-liberal restructuring of the state forced Australian capital to succumb to 
the discipline of globalisation. 
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The changing dynamics of Australian and international capitalism stimulated 
state elites to dismantle some of the key features of welfare capitalism and 
domestic defence. This was the state project of neo-liberalism. Both major 
political parties were committed to this project, however each adopted a different 
regime-level hegemonic strategy for its implementation. From 1983 until 1996, 
successive Labor federal governments pursued a One Nation hegemonic strategy 
which relied upon an expansive conception of rights and justice as well the 
promise of the ‘social wage’ in return for the labour movement’s acceptance of 
industrial discipline. This allowed Labor to implement the state project of neo-
liberalism without significant opposition from trade unions whose membership 
bore the brunt of such changes. The Liberal Party, in contrast, articulated while 
in opposition, and then implemented while in government, a Two Nations 
hegemonic strategy. This strategy was based upon the exclusion, demonisation 
and material as well as political deprivation of significant minorities in order to 
force further neo-liberal restructuring upon a the population. 
 
Having outlined the major contours of the struggles to secure neo-liberal 
hegemony, the following chapters will analyse the relationship between the 
radical neo-liberal movement and these struggles. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
The Radical Neo-liberal Movement and the Capitalist Class 
 
 
 
This chapter examines the relationship between the radical neo-liberal movement 
and the capitalist class. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the movement has 
had a relatively small participant base. Furthermore, unlike the environment and 
the peace movements for example, the radical neo-liberal movement has not 
relied upon mass mobilisations in order to contest hegemony. It will be argued 
here that the relationship between the radical neo-liberal movement and the 
capitalist class is crucial to an understanding of the movement’s ability to 
transcend the limitations of its relatively small size and of its role within 
struggles for neo-liberal hegemony in Australia. Specifically, it was through 
support from certain sections of the capitalist class that the movement was able 
to emerge, within a relatively short period of time, from being a fringe movement 
to being a key player in Australian political conflict. Such support has also 
allowed the movement to sustain its activities over a period of two decades. The 
explanation for such support is to be found in the hegemonic struggles discussed 
in the previous chapter. In funding the movement, fractions of capital involved in 
the mobilisation to dismantle the state project of welfare capitalism were able to 
ensure the existence of a radical, ideologically motivated group that would attack 
supporters of the post-war consensus and the Australian settlement, as well as 
promote alternatives broadly consistent with the aims of such capitalists in 
making neo-liberalism a reality. 
 
Investigating the relationship between the radical neo-liberal movement and the 
capitalist class is not unproblematic. Indeed, its relationship with capital is the 
issue that the movement is most sensitive and guarded about. Therefore, there is 
a lack of transparency in public accounts by the movement of this relationship. 
Detailed and systematic data regarding the relationship between the radical neo-
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liberal movement and the capitalist class is not publicly available. Australian 
radical neo-liberal think tanks and forums rarely identify their financial 
supporters. Where they do, the amounts contributed by each corporation, 
individual and sector are rarely made public. Furthermore, membership lists of 
the boards of radical neo-liberal think tanks and forums are not always publicly 
available. It is perhaps not surprising then that my requests for such details were 
either refused or ignored by the movement organisations to which I wrote.1 
 
The proceeding analysis therefore draws together the diffuse, publicly available, 
information which sheds light on the relationship between the radical neo-liberal 
movement and the capitalist class and combines this with interview data to 
critically evaluate the significance of this relationship. This chapter first 
examines the types of support given by capitalists to the movement, particularly 
funding, brokerage of funding, board membership and other resources, as well as 
the activist role undertaken by some capitalists within the movement. The 
chapter then looks at which fractions of capital were most prominent in their 
support for the movement. Although relying upon fragmentary evidence, it is 
possible to outline a broad picture of which capitalists supported the movement. 
Reasons for this support will also be suggested. Finally, this chapter discusses 
the relationship between the movement and those sections of capital that did not 
offer support – including those capitalists who expressed outright hostility 
towards the movement — as well as considering the impact that the movement 
had upon the capitalist class itself. 
 
 
Capitalist support for the radical neo-liberal movement 
 
Funding 
 
                                                 
1 During the course of researching this thesis I wrote to the Tasman Institute, the CIS, IPA and 
IPE requesting details of their funding – both the sources and amounts of funds received. 
Tasman’s Michael Porter and the IPE’s Des Moore declined to reveal the sources of their 
organisations’ funding, stating that it was a matter of confidentiality. Neither Greg Lindsay of the 
CIS or Mike Nahan of the IPA answered my correspondence. 
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The central and most important relationship between the radical neo-liberal 
movement and the capitalist class has been that of funding. Financial support 
from key sections of the capitalist class provided the radical neo-liberal 
movement with a secure launching pad for its assault upon the welfare state and 
the Left in general. It is clear that without such financial support the radical neo-
liberal movement would have found it very difficult to achieve the national 
exposure and impact that it did during the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
As stated in Chapter Three, in the mid to late 1970s, before it received 
substantial corporate support, the Centre for Independent Studies was housed in 
the back-yard shed of Director Greg Lindsay’s suburban home.2 It managed to 
organise a few conferences and existed primarily through the hard work of 
Lindsay and ‘some financial support’ from businessmen Neville Kennard and 
Ross Graham-Taylor, which allowed Lindsay to take leave without pay from his 
high school teaching job in 1979.3 It wasn’t until Hugh Morgan and others 
provided seed funding of about $40,000 per year for five years that the Centre 
was able to establish an office in the commercial district of North Sydney and 
provide Lindsay with a full-time income for being Director.4 This secure funding 
base gave the CIS the platform it needed to promote its message and increase its 
financial support base. Five years later, in 1984, the total income of the CIS had 
grown to $225,273 – of which $172,514 (76 per cent) consisted of ‘donations’.5 
As will be discussed later, it is reasonable to assume that such ‘donations’ are 
derived primarily from corporate sources. By 1996, the yearly income of the CIS 
had increased to $971,182 of which $772,077 (79 per cent) was derived from 
‘donations’.6 With only limited income derived from subscriptions, conferences 
and the sale of publications, corporate donations to the CIS provided the basis of 
its income. Thus, corporate support was crucial to the inception, growth and 
longevity of the Centre for Independent Studies. 
 
                                                 
2 Andrew Norton, ‘The CIS at Twenty: Greg Lindsay Talks to Andrew Norton’, pp. 16-21. 
3 Ibid., pp. 16-21 
4 Ibid., pp. 16-21 and Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty, p. 47. 
5 CIS, CIS Annual Review 1984, CIS, St Leonards, 1984, p. 12. 
6 CIS, CIS Annual Review 1996, CIS, St Leonards, 1996, p. 18. 
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Similar circumstances prevailed at the other major radical neo-liberal 
organisations. The Australian Institute for Public Policy (AIPP) derived $65,116 
(62 per cent) of its $105,025 income from supporters in 1985.7 In 1989 the 
dependence on supporters had increased with the organisation’s financial report 
revealing $191,365 (66 per cent) of its $286,876 income derived from such 
sources.8 By the following year however, the Institute had managed to increase 
its income while decreasing its reliance upon supporters: $158,477 (51 per cent) 
of its $310,889 income came from its corporate supporters.9 Figures for IPA 
revenue for 1988 indicate that around $800,000 (81 per cent) of its $978,774 
income came from corporate donations.10  
 
Although the annual reports of the major radical neo-liberal think tanks do not 
detail specific sources of ‘donations’, there are a number of reasons to suppose 
that they are derived primarily, perhaps almost exclusively, from corporate 
sources – whether from individual capitalists or their companies. First, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, the radical neo-liberal movement is a small 
movement concentrated among political and economic elites within Australian 
society. Because of its small size it is unlikely that non-corporate supporters of 
the movement would have been in a position to provide anything like the near 
one million dollar budgets that radical neo-liberal think tanks such as the CIS and 
IPA were operating with in the late 1980s and 1990s. In 1988, when its budget 
was approaching the one million dollar mark, the IPA had only 3,378 individual 
(non-corporate) subscribers.11 Furthermore, it is clear that corporations 
comprised a high proportion of movement supporters. From the late 1970s until 
the late 1980s, corporations (who paid a higher rate) accounted for between one-
third to one-fifth of subscribers to the IPA.12 By 1992 this figure had dropped to 
                                                 
7  AIPP, Clear Thinking, No. 19, January 1987. Although listed as ‘Subscriptions’, it is clear that 
this figure represents supporters who subscribed to the organisation rather than those who 
subscribed to the AIPP’s newsletter or other publications and services which are listed under 
‘Member Subscriptions’. ‘Subscriptions’, therefore, in this case are akin to ‘donations’ and are 
likely to be derived primarily from capitalist sources. 
8 AIPP, Clear Thinking, No. 37, January 1990. 
9 AIPP, Clear Thinking, No. 43, December, 1990. 
10 Michael Bertram, A History of the Institute of Public Affairs, MA Thesis, August 1989, NBAC, 
N136/111, p.117. 
11 Ibid., p. 118. 
12 Ibid., p. 118. 
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around one-sixth, but it is still a significant proportion.13 More evidence of a bias 
towards corporate funding can be found by the fact that, for the IPA at least, 
there was a concentration of income derived from the larger corporate 
supporters, so much so that in 1992 the IPA revealed that: ‘Our largest subscriber 
provided only seven per cent of our revenue and our top 10 subscribers only 32 
per cent of it’.14 
 
The importance of corporate funding to the sustenance of the movement and its 
think tanks is evidenced by the attention paid by the think tanks to their large 
subscribers. A regular ‘Benefactors Dinner’ was begun in 1993 by the CIS 
exclusively for the enjoyment of its ‘top level supporters’.15 This built upon the 
Centre’s ‘Trustees’ Forum’ which gave the organisation’s major sponsors access 
to CIS Board Members and international guest speakers as well as providing ‘an 
opportunity to discuss CIS activities and have some input into their 
development’.16 
 
An examination of specific projects undertaken by the radical neo-liberal 
movement further highlights the centrality of corporate funding to movement 
output. The National Priorities Project, for example, was almost wholly funded 
by capitalist organisations.17 Australia at the Crossroads – an early movement 
publication which outlined a radical neo-liberal agenda for Australia – was 
underwritten by Shell Australia.18 Specific campaigns and publications driven by 
think tanks were also often supported by targeted funding from capitalists. For 
example, the joint undertaking of the IPA/Tasman Institute, ‘Project Victoria’, its 
numerous launches, publications and presentations were supported financially by 
                                                 
13 John Hyde, ‘The Director’s Report to the 1992 AGM’, IPA Review, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1992, p. 
62. 
14 Ibid., p. 62. 
15 CIS, CIS Annual Review 1993, CIS, St Leonards, 1993, p. 17. 
16 CIS, CIS Annual Review 1986-87, CIS, St Leonards, 1987, p. 15. 
17 For example, in the period from 28th October 1987 to 17th May 1988, total income for the 
National Priorities Project was $196, 757.89. Only $1, 952.29 of this was derived from sources 
other than corporate subscriptions. See ‘Statement of Income and Expenditure for the Period 28 
Oct 87 to 17 May 88’ in NPP., National Priorities Project – Combined Meeting of the Trustees 
and the Research Management Group, NBAC Z383/14. 
18 Wolfgang Kasper, Richard Blandy, John Freebairn, Douglas Hocking and Robert O’Neil, 
Australia at the Crossroads: Our Choices to the Year 2000, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Sydney, 
1980, p. xi. 
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a number of employer associations.19 The same is true of the IPA’s ‘Reform and 
Recovery’ which outlined a radical neo-liberal policy agenda for the Western 
Australian government.20 Mandate to Govern was a joint publication of the AIPP 
and the Australian Chamber of Commerce.21 The Centre for Independent Studies 
‘Taking Children Seriously Program’ was financially supported by  E. L. & C. 
Ballieu Limited, Coles Myer, Commonwealth Bank, Esso Australia, McDonalds 
Australia, News Ltd and Seafirst Australia.22 
 
It is clear then that the radical neo-liberal movement has had a fundamental 
dependency upon corporate funding in the period studied. 
 
Brokerage of funding 
 
Capitalists also played an important role in the brokerage of funding from other 
capitalists for the radical neo-liberal movement. Typically, those who brokered 
funding for the movement were both capitalists and movement activists. They 
served as a bridge between the movement and the capitalist class. As 
businessmen they were more likely to be able to convince capitalists of the 
benefits of funding organisations that didn’t offer them immediate financial 
benefits than were the academics who formed the majority of movement 
activists. 
 
Andrew Hay, himself a key broker of funds for the movement as well as being a 
radical neo-liberal activist, explains the importance of this brokerage function: 
 
to get these things underway one needs funds — and academics are 
notoriously bad at being able to accumulate funds for these sorts of 
purposes — so therefore business organisations and particularly the 
Chamber of Commerce style of organisations, which had large 
                                                 
19 Des Moore and Michael Porter, ‘Preface’ in Des Moore and Michael Porter (eds), Victoria: An 
Agenda for Change. 
20 Mike Nahan and Tony Rutherford (eds), Reform and Recovery: An Agenda for the New 
Western Australian Government, IPA, Perth, 1993, p. vii. 
21 John Nurick (ed), Mandate to Govern, p. xv; John Hyde, interview with the author. 
22 Barry Maley, Brigette Berger, Patricia Morgan, Lucy Sullivan, Alan Tapper, Home Repairs: 
Building Stronger Families to Resist Social Decay, CIS, St Leonards, 1996, p. ix. 
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memberships, were able to attract funds. We were able to assist a lot 
of these individuals in forming linkages with individual businesses 
and businessmen who were philosophically persuaded in a market-
based direction.23  
 
There were numerous ways in which this brokerage function was performed. 
One was through the system of trustees attached to a number of the radical neo-
liberal think tanks. The Centre for Independent Studies, for example, has long 
had a Board of Trustees consisting of prominent capitalists from the major 
Australian States who served as a bridge between the think tank and the financial 
resources of the capitalist class. Another was through actively promoting the 
radical neo-liberal movement, and the benefits of funding it, within the capitalist 
class. With reference to Hugh Morgan, perhaps the most important capitalist 
broker of funding for the movement, the CIS describes this process as 
‘convincing the business community that ideas as well as factories and 
equipment must be supported’.24 This brokerage function ranged from the ability 
to contact fellow capitalists and secure commitments of funding – as was the 
case with Hugh Morgan’s brokerage of funding for the Centre for Independent 
Studies – to speaking at forums designed to encourage future sponsorship of and 
participation in the movement, such as the IPA’s lunch for young business 
people at which Hugh Morgan ‘stressed the need for young men and women to 
take an active interest in public affairs’.25 
 
As discussed earlier, Australia has a history of the corporate sponsorship of right-
wing ideas. However this practice was never widespread amongst the capitalist 
class. This meant that brokerage was important to secure funding for the radical 
neo-liberal movement. Because the radical neo-liberal activists were, by and 
large, not part of the capitalist class, and therefore not part of the culture of that 
class, it was essential for those capitalists who were themselves movement 
                                                 
23 Andrew Hay, interview with the author. 
24 Anon., ‘CIS Enjoys Tenth Anniversary Tributes’, CIS Policy Report, Vol. 2, No. 4, August, 
1986, CIS News p. i. 
25 ‘Get Involved Says Hugh Morgan’, IPA Review, Vol. 42, No. 2, August-October, 1988, p. 63. 
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activists to facilitate the flow of funds from the capitalist class to the radical neo-
liberal movement. 
 
Resources 
 
Using their position as owners and controllers of the means of production and the 
privileged position that this affords, capitalists were able to provide a number of 
valuable non-financial or in-kind resources to the radical neo-liberal movement.  
 
The control of labour was used to donate staff time to the movement for specific 
projects. For example, Shell Australia had its staff members do proofing and 
typing for the book Australia at the Crossroads,26 whilst part of the joint 
Tasman/IPA Project Victoria was completed with the research support of staff 
seconded from Wetspac.27 Control of labour also allowed capitalists to purchase 
bulk orders of movement publications for distribution to their employees. 
Examples of this were the advance ordering of National Priorities Project 
publications by member groups28 as well as the distribution in 1977 by Ansett 
Airlines and ICI to their employees of 21,000 copies of the IPA’s Free 
Enterprise via their own in-house journals.29  
 
The class position of capitalists allowed them to offer their authority and prestige 
to the movement, which, in turn, enabled the movement to reach a wider 
audience – both within and outside of the capitalist class. One way this occurred 
was by capitalists launching movement publications. In 1991, for example, Dick 
Smith launched the IPA’s Reconciling Economics with the Environment; a book 
that advocated environmental protection through market mechanisms and 
claimed there existed no contradiction between unregulated capitalism and 
environmental protection.30 Dick Smith, a well known entrepreneur who ran his 
own nature journal, Australian Geographic, offered credibility to the publication. 
                                                 
26 Kasper et. al., Australia at the Crossroads, p. xi. 
27 Anon., ‘Project Victoria – The Imperative for Reform’, Tasman Report, No. 6, March, 1992, p. 
7. 
28 Robert Campbell, National Priorities Project Expenditure Review Marketing Plan, NBAC 
N143/289-290. 
29 Michael Bertram, A History of the Institute of Public Affairs, p. 130. 
30 Anon., ‘New Approaches to the Environment’, IPA Review, Vol. 44, No. 4, 1991, p. 63. 
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It was a classic example of ‘greenwashing’. Another way capitalists used their 
class position to assist the radical neo-liberals was through the placing of 
movement articles in company journals or in the journals of employer 
associations.31 This gave the movement access to a wide audience within the 
capitalist class. 
 
Equipment, infrastructure and other assets owned or regularly used by capitalists 
were also often put at the disposal of the radical neo-liberal movement by its 
capitalist supporters. Corporate premises were often donated by capitalists for 
use by the movement for forums, speeches and other similar functions. For 
example the IPA’s Essington Lewis Speakers group was regularly ‘hosted’ by 
various corporations (such as Philip Morris, Pasminco, Potter Warburg Securities 
and Shell Australia), and hosting involved the donation of their boardrooms or 
other suitable premises for the event.32 When the Tasman Institute wanted a 
suitably impressive and private venue to host its inaugural ‘Infrastructure Forum’ 
to which capitalists, public servants and politicians were invited, they were able 
to call upon the services of their Chairperson, Ballieu Myer, who allowed the 
exclusive ‘Cranlana’, the original Myer family residence, to be used for the 
occasion.33 Another example of a resource regularly used  by capitalists and 
donated to the movement was the transportation arranged for Norman Podhoretz 
when he was brought out to Australia by the Australian Lecture Foundation in 
1981. Chauffeured transportation around Melbourne was provided by Hughes’ 
Hire Cars and billed to Western Mining Corporation, marked to the attention of 
Hugh Morgan.34 
 
                                                 
31  See for example: Richard Blandy and Cliff Walsh, ‘Public Sector Reform – The Role of the 
States’, Business Council Bulletin, No. 61, February 1990, pp. 24-28; Richard Blandy, ‘Labour 
Market Reform – Building on Common Ground’, The Mining Review, March 1991, pp. 23-26; 
Alan Moran, ‘Property Rights: Creating the Incentive to Search Without Delaying Development, 
The Mining Review, December 1991, pp. 21-26; David Trebeck, ‘More Neutral Investment 
Environment Required’, The Mining Review, June 1982, pp. 22-23. 
32 Anon., ‘Government Spends Beyond its Means’, IPA Review, Vol. 47, No. 2, 1994, p. 64; 
Anon., ‘New Role for Managers’, IPA Review, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1995, p. 64; Anon., ‘Speakers’ 
Group Named After Captain of Industry’, IPA Review, Vol. 45, No. 2, 1992, p. 63, Anon., ‘Two 
Views on Australia’s Problems’, IPA Review, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1993, p. 64. 
33 Anon., ‘The Infrastructure Forum’, Tasman Update, July 1996, p. 1. 
34 Australian Lecture Foundation, ‘Mr Norman Podhoretz: Melbourne Programme’, NBAC, 
N136/95. 
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Finally, capitalists were able to give in-kind donations to the movement by 
providing their regular services free of charge. For example, Price Waterhouse 
donated their accountancy services to the AIPP for its auditing purposes.35 
During the aforementioned Australian Lecture Foundation-sponsored tour of 
Norman Podhoretz to Australia in 1981, The Macmillan Company decided not to 
charge the Foundation a fee for the Australian publication of Podhoretz’s book, 
The Present Danger, and would assist the Foundation with publicity.36 
 
Board membership 
 
Capitalists often formed a majority on the councils and governing boards of 
radical neo-liberal think tanks and other movement organisations. The 
Chairperson of movement organisations has almost always come from the 
capitalist class. Capitalist membership of movement organisation boards and 
councils provided the movement with a number of assets. First, it lent legitimacy 
to the organisations. Having prominent members of the business community on 
the board helped to increase the credibility of the organisation in the eyes of the 
media, within the capitalist class and, to a limited extent, amongst the broader 
public. No doubt for some the endorsement by capitalists of the organisation’s 
aims, symbolised by sitting on a Board, helped to offset the perception that the 
organisation was simply an academic curiosity. More importantly, however, the 
fact that capitalists sat on the Boards of such organisations would have helped to 
assure other capitalists that the organisations were being soundly managed by 
members of their own class rather than by amateurs.  
 
However, this has been a double-edged sword. One of the major concerns of the 
radical neo-liberal think tanks was to be identified as independent research 
organisations, not tied to any vested interest or political party. Particularly during 
the 1990s, the Left used the fact that radical neo-liberal think tank boards were 
dominated by capitalists to its advantage, alleging that they were merely 
                                                 
35 AIPP, Clear Thinking, No. 19, January 1987. 
36 Australian Lecture Foundation, ‘Visit of Norman Podhoretz: Bulletin No. 2 – 11th September, 
1981’, p. 2, NBAC, N136/95. 
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expressions of corporate interests.37 Clearly the think tanks were sensitive to 
such accusations. The CIS has consistently emphasised its ‘Independent’ nature, 
arguing that it is captured by no vested interest.38 The IPA has regularly 
emphasised that despite its reliance upon corporate funding, no single business 
sector controls its purse strings: ‘No one source accounts for more than 6.5 per 
cent of the total [funding] and no one industry sector provides more than 16 per 
cent’.39 
 
Capitalist membership of movement organisation boards and councils has meant 
that a small number of capitalists have taken an active role in shaping these 
organisations. This has brought valuable business experience to the movement – 
skills that the academics of the movement may not have possessed – and has 
helped to expand and sustain its financial base. For example, the revival of the 
IPA after its decline in the mid to late 1970s has been attributed largely to the 
efforts of Jim Balderstone, Charles Goode and Hugh Morgan, who drove the 
Institute’s Finance Committee.40 
 
Capitalists as radical neo-liberals 
 
A small number of capitalists are themselves radical neo-liberal movement 
activists. Clearly, those who served on the Boards of Management of movement 
organisations can also be classified as movement activists because they had an 
active involvement in shaping the direction of the movement. Presumably they 
were also active in soliciting corporate support for the movement organisations 
they were involved in. Some capitalists have been members of multiple 
movement organisation boards – people such as Hugh Morgan, the Cloughs 
(who were the initial and major financial supporters of the AIPP), Will Bailey 
and John Elliott. In addition to fulfilling their duties as Board members these 
radical neo-liberal capitalists would often be invited as keynote speakers to 
movement functions, conferences, forums and dinners. The IPA, for example, 
                                                 
37 See for example Alex Carey, Taking the Risk out of Democracy, pp. 109-132. 
38 Andrew Norton, ‘The CIS at Twenty: Greg Lindsay Talks to Andrew Norton’, pp. 16-21; CIS, 
‘General Funding’, CIS Annual Review 1986-87, p. 15. 
39 IPA, ‘Where the IPA Stands’, IPA Review, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1994, p. 4. 
40 Michael Bertram, A History of the Institute of Public Affairs, p. 118. 
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would often use Council members as keynote speakers for regular events such as 
the Essington Lewis Speakers’ Group and the IPA Young Professionals Group.41 
Thus, they provided a readily accessible pool of capitalist class speakers for the 
movement which helped to strengthen the legitimacy of the movement amongst 
that class. 
 
There are others who were movement activists beyond the walls of the 
movement’s organisations; who took the message of the movement into the 
public arena. During Peko-Wallsend’s clash with the trade union movement at 
Robe River in 1986, Charles Copeman promoted his own radical neo-liberal 
vision for Australia which included the devolution of most federal government 
powers to the States and the dismantling of the Arbitration system. This was 
publicised through interviews and reports in the mainstream media.42 Andrew 
Hay, as well as brokering funding for radical neo-liberal organisations (he was a 
Trustee of the AIPP)43 and projects, such as the National Priorities Project, was, 
during the mid 1980s, one of the most identifiable public faces of the radical neo-
liberal movement. Using his leadership positions in the Australian Chamber of 
Commerce and the Australian Federation of Employers he promoted an agenda 
of economic and labour market deregulation as well as advocating massive cuts 
to government spending both of which he was regularly able to publicise through 
media interviews and reports. Hugh Morgan, the capitalist most readily identified 
with the radical neo-liberal movement, consistently promoted the movement’s 
philosophies during the period under study. A true believer, Morgan incorporated 
the movement’s message into his numerous speeches and articles to a wide range 
of audiences and in a diverse range of publications.44 He has been a Board 
member of the CIS, IPA, Tasman Institute and the Australian Lecture 
                                                 
41 Anon., ‘Increase Exports, Says ICI Chairman’, IPA Review, Vol. 42, No. 1, May-July 1988, p. 
64; Anon., ‘What Type of Tax System?’, IPA Review, Vol. 42, No. 4, March-May, 1989, p. 63; 
Anon., ‘Having a Ball’, IPA Review, Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn, 1990, p. 64. 
42  Paul McGeough, ‘Vision of the New Right’, Sydney Morning Herald, 2nd September, 1986, p. 
1. 
43 AIPP, ‘AIPP News’, Clear Thinking, No. 31, January 1989. 
44 See for example Morgan’s comments at the BCA’s 4th National Business Summit in 1993 
about the imperative for business to engage in the ‘political battlefield’ against Aboriginal and 
environmental interests: Anon, ‘Secret Agenda on Aborigines Alleged’, Australian Financial 
Review, 12th March, 1993, p. 4. See also Hugh Morgan, ‘Change and Cultural Conflict in 
Australia: The Clash Between Despair and Confidence’, Business Council Bulletin, May 1993, 
pp. 34-38. 
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Foundation.45 This is only a snapshot of some of the activities of the more 
recognisable capitalist activists within the radical neo-liberal movement. Others 
who have similarly been movement activists in the public arena include John 
Elliott, Arvi Parbo and Ian McLachlan.46  
 
Integral to the establishment of the movement as well as being key drivers of the 
movement, particularly in its early years, were a small group of capitalists 
centred around, but not exclusively drawn from, mining, resources and finance 
capital. In the late 1970s and early 1980s these capitalists helped to kick-start the 
radical neo-liberal movement in Australia. Most important in this process was 
the ‘IEA group’ of capitalists and academics who had brought Antony Fisher, 
founder of the British neo-liberal think tank Institute of Economic Affairs, to 
Australia in 1976.47 They hoped to initiate a similar venture in Australia. The 
IEA capitalists included Maurice Newman (Bain and Co.), Hugh Morgan 
(WMC), Bruce Kirkpatrick (ICI), John Bonython (The Advertiser), Derek Sawer 
(BHP) as well as company economists John McLeod (CRA), John Brunner 
(BHP) and Douglas Hocking (Shell).48 This group seems to have met regularly 
during the late 1970s49 and formed the nucleus of capitalists who, through the 
provision of financial resources, brokerage and business experience, wedded the 
radical neo-liberal movement to sections of the capitalist class. A number  of 
them would become Board/Council members during the formative years of the 
movement as well as providing the capital that enabled think tanks such as the 
IPA and CIS to re-mould themselves into well-resourced, professional 
organisations. It was largely members of this IEA group who, at the behest of 
                                                 
45 For evidence of Morgan’s Board Membership of these organisations see: Anon., Australian 
Lecture Foundation – Visit of Norman Podhoretz, p. 4; CIS, CIS Annual Review 1985, CIS, St. 
Leonards, 1985, p. 13; IPA, IPA Report 1991, IPA, Melbourne, 1991; Tasman Institute, Annual 
Review: Tasman Institute and Tasman Economic Research Pty Ltd 1991, Tasman Institute, 
Melbourne, 1991. 
46 Both Parbo and Elliott, for example, were Members of the Tasman Institute’s Advisory 
Council (Tasman Institute, Annual Review: Tasman Institute and Tasman Economic Research 
Pty Ltd 1991). McLachlan was an IPA Councilor (Michael Bertram, A History of the Institute of 
Public Affairs, p. 202). 
47 Andrew Norton, ‘The CIS at Twenty: Greg Lindsay Talks to Andrew Norton’, pp. 16-21. 
48 Ibid., pp. 16-21; Kelly, The End of Certainty, p. 47. 
49 Andrew Norton, ‘The CIS at Twenty: Greg Lindsay Talks to Andrew Norton’, pp. 16-21. 
Lindsay first heard of the ‘IEA Group’ in 1976. In 1978 Lindsay flew to Melbourne to meet 
them, and in 1979 Lindsay met with Hugh Morgan, also a part of the IEA Group. It would seem 
therefore that the group met, at least informally, during the latter years of the 1970s. 
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Hugh Morgan, provided the CIS with a stable financial base upon which to 
grow.50 John Bonython would become the first Executive Director of the CIS, 
Maurice Newman its Chairman and Hugh Morgan a Board member and 
Chairman of the Board of Trustees.51 In 1980, Douglas Hocking became a 
member of the IPA’s Executive and Editorial Committee,52 with Hugh Morgan 
joining him, as treasurer, in 1981.53  
 
This core of capitalists joined others who were already involved in supporting 
the emerging movement, such as Neville Kennard and Ross Graham-Taylor of 
the CIS54 and Jim Balderstone and Charles Goode (IPA) who helped transform 
the IPA from an anti-communist Keynesian to a neo-liberal and conservative 
group.55 In Western Australia, Clough funded and with John Hyde, helped 
establish the AIPP.56 Most of these capitalists were also involved in the 
Crossroads Group (named after the 1980 Shell-sponsored publication, Australia 
at the Crossroads) which met in secret twice a year from 1980 until 
approximately 1986.57 Meetings involved the presentation of papers and 
strategising about ways to intervene on key issues of public policy. Capitalists 
involved in Crossroads were: Andrew Hay; Hugh Morgan; John Elliott; Maurice 
Newman; Mark Johnson; Don Swan; Phil Scanlan; Neville Kennard; Ross 
Graham-Taylor; Andrew Kaldor as well as company economists John Brunner, 
Don Stammer and John McLeod.58 Beyond Crossroads many of these capitalists 
became involved in the management of movement organisations. 
                                                 
50 Ibid., pp. 16-21; Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty, p. 47. 
51  See Newsletter (Centre for Independent Studies), Vol. 3, No. 1, September 1979, CIS, The 18th 
John Bonython Lecture – The CIS 25th Anniversary Dinner, CIS Pamphlet, 2001; Newsletter 
(Centre for Independent Studies), February 1983; CIS, CIS Annual Review 1989, CIS, St. 
Leonards, 1989, p. 17. 
52 Anon., ‘Executive and Editorial Committee’, IPA Review, Vol. 34, No. 1, January/March 1980, 
inside front cover. 
53 Michael Bertram, A History of the Institute of Public Affairs, p. 114. 
54 Andrew Norton, ‘The CIS at Twenty: Greg Lindsay Talks to Andrew Norton’, pp. 16-21; Paul 
Kelly, The End of Certainty, p. 47. 
55 Michael Bertram, A History of the Institute of Public Affairs, pp. 114, 119. Bertram writes: 
‘With the backing of J. S. Balderstone (the new President since 1981 and, subsequently, the 
Chairman of BHP) and Hugh Morgan (appointed Treasurer of the IPA in January 1981) a major 
recasting of the IPA structure and modus operandi was instituted. This process was further 
continued under the fifth President, Charles Goode’ (p. 114). 
56 John Hyde interview with the author; Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty, p. 47. 
57 Jim Carlton interview with the author; Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty, pp. 41-42. 
58 Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty, p. 42. 
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Radical neo-liberals as capitalists 
 
For a small number of radical neo-liberal activists the movement was a vehicle 
for their entry into the capitalist class. At an individual level, Dame Leonie 
Kramer and John Stone were elevated to the boards of companies with strong 
neo-liberal sympathies. Kramer became a board member of Western Mining 
Corp and ANZ Banking Group59 and Stone a member of the Peko-Wallsend 
Board in 1986 – at the time when Charles Copeman was its CEO.60 Before 
heading up the AIPP John Hyde was a wheat farmer. Tim Duncan, the radical 
neo-liberal journalist and activist, moved from the news media to corporate 
public relations first joining Pratt Industries and later Rio Tinto as head of 
External Relations as well as working briefly for the BCA.61 Australian Graduate 
School of Management Dean, Peter Dodd, closely associated with the Centre for 
Independent Studies, later sat on the Boards of Delta Electricity, Macquarie 
Goodman Industrial Property Trust and Warburg Dillon Read.62 Ray Evans, one 
of the founding members of the H. R. Nicholls Society was employed by Hugh 
Morgan as his adviser and, according to Paul Kelly, acted as ‘speechwriter, 
soundingboard and intellectual activist’.63 
 
When Michael Porter left the Centre for Policy Studies his movement 
connections were integral in founding the Tasman Group, of which the Tasman 
Institute is a part, as a capitalist enterprise. Porter describes the Tasman as a ‘do-
                                                 
59 Valerie Lawson, ‘Leonie Kramer is Comfortable with Everything but Very Ambitious Men’, 
Australian Financial Review, 6th March, 1987, p. 50. 
60 John Stone, ‘Presentation of the Charles Copeman Medal’, The Changing Paradigm: Freedom, 
Jobs, Prosperity – Proceedings of the XXIIIrd H. R. Nicholls Society Conference, Melbourne, 22-
23 March 2002, H. R. Nicholls Society Website, 
http://www.hrnicholls.com.au/nicholls/nichvo23/stone2002.htm, at 25th May 2003. 
61 See James Chessall, ‘Greed’, The Age, 5th April, 2002 at: http://www.theage.com.au/cgi-
bin/common/printArticle.pl?path=/articles/2002/04/04/1017206240224.html, at 20th March 2003, 
and Anon., ‘People – Tim Duncan’. 
62 See CIS, ‘CIS Board of Directors’, http://www.cis.org.au/CISinfo/directors.html, at 20th March 
2004 and Natalie Lau, ‘Dodd Joins ABN Amro’, FinanceAsia.com, 19th May, 2000, 
http://www.financeasia.com/articles/9BA7566E-26E9-11D4-B95C0090277E174B.cfm, at 20th 
March 2004. 
63 Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty, p. 46. 
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tank’64 rather than a think tank because, although there is a propagandistic think 
tank component to Tasman, a major source of revenue for the organisation is its 
consultancy work. Tasman has conducted consultancy work for numerous 
government, non-government and private organisations and corporations in the 
Asia-Pacific region and Eastern Europe, providing advice on ways of 
implementing neo-liberal strategies such as privatisation and deregulation.65 
 
Corporate outreach 
 
Forums, seminars and lecturers were successful tactics employed by the radical 
neo-liberal movement for conveying its message to the capitalist class. Although 
many of the regular seminars held by the movement were deliberately small 
affairs, the ability to attract high profile speakers to their less frequent events, 
such as the yearly John Bonython lecture organised by the CIS, meant that large 
crowds of capitalists would often attend.66 Such gatherings were a chance to 
appeal for funding as well as an opportunity to promote the movements 
ideological message to a powerful audience. 
 
 
Who supported the radical neo-liberal movement and why? 
 
As already mentioned, the radical neo-liberal movement’s relationship with the 
capitalist class is a sensitive one for the movement. Movement organisations 
have often felt the need to defend themselves against accusations of being 
captured by vested interests and of being mouthpieces of big business. Despite 
such professed independence, movement organisations have rarely provided 
details about their funding sources. Furthermore, when capitalist supporters are 
listed — as they occasionally have been in Annual Reports — the amount 
provided by each company does not appear. Such secrecy poses a number of 
                                                 
64 Michael Porter, ‘Executive Director’s Report’ in Tasman Institute, Annual Review: Tasman 
Institute Pty Ltd and Tasman Economic Research Pty Ltd 1991, Tasman Institute, Melbourne, 
1991. p. 3. 
65 See for example Michael Porter, ‘Tasman Asia Pacific Managing Director’s Report’, in 
Tasman Group, Tasman Annual Review 1997, Tasman Group, Melbourne, 1997, p. 6. 
66 See for example the descriptions of the 3rd John Bonython Lecture: Anon, ‘CIS Enjoys Tenth 
Anniversary Tributes’, CIS News pp. i-iii. 
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difficulties in identifying the precise sources and amounts of funds channelled 
from the capitalist class into the Australian radical neo-liberal movement.  
 
However, through a close examination of what sources are publicly available, as 
well as through the use of interview data, general conclusions about which 
fractions and individual corporations have been the major supporters of the 
movement can be drawn. Three areas will be considered in this examination: the 
role of capitalists in the early years of the movement’s emergence; capitalist 
involvement in the leadership of the movement; and general capitalist support for 
the movement. Where relevant, support from capitalist fractions is given as a 
percentage of the total support. Given that names of corporate supporters are 
usually listed without details of the amounts they contributed, this technique is 
necessarily imprecise. What it does allow, however, is the construction of a 
broad, indicative picture of which capitalists supported the movement. 
 
The early years (1976-1986) 
 
The years 1976-1985 were formative ones for the radical neo-liberal movement. 
It was during this period that the movement emerged from being an obscure and 
loose collection of zealots to become a publicly recognised feature of the 
Australian political landscape. Crucial to this emergence was the formation of 
movement organisations such as the CIS and the Crossroads group as well as the 
takeover of the IPA Executive by radical neo-liberals. The rise of such radical 
neo-liberal groups provided an organisational backbone around which the 
movement was able to cohere. Not only did a number of capitalists play a central 
role in this process, but funding from key corporations allowed such 
organisations to expand and provide a secure base for movement activities. 
Given that the radical neo-liberal movement at this time did not enjoy a 
particularly large public profile, and given that radical neo-liberal ideas still 
occupied the margin of political debate in Australia, it is reasonable to conclude 
that more than at any other time, the capitalists who supported the movement in 
these early years were firm supporters of the radical neo-liberal ideology. There 
is perhaps more information regarding the role of capitalists in this period of the 
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movement’s history than any other, and an examination of this period provides 
an insight into which capitalists and fractions of capital were part of the 
movement’s driving force. 
 
IPA Executive 
 
Between 1976-1983, the IPA was transformed from an anti-communist  
Keynesian organisation into a conservative neo-liberal think tank. Crucial to the 
transformation of the IPA into an important organisational base for the radical 
neo-liberal movement was the new blood that entered the Institute during this 
period. Examining the changing make-up of the IPA Executive which, like other 
movement organisations, has always contained a high proportion of capitalists, 
provides an insight into which capitalists, companies and sectors helped drive 
these changes and, consequently, which of these were crucial to the development 
of the movement itself. The following capitalists joined the executive from 1976-
1984: David L. Elsum (Finance), Hon Vernon Wilcox 
(Manufacturing/Agriculture); Sir Frank Espie (Mining); Douglas Hocking 
(Mining/Manufacturing); Sir Wilfred Brookes (Finance); James Balderstone 
(Finance, Mining, Agriculture); Hugh Morgan (Mining); Peter Bunning;  and 
Charles Goode (Finance).67 
 
The Crossroads Group 
 
The following capitalists were members of the Crossroads group which, as 
outlined in Chapter Three, provided an important early space for the emerging 
movement to network and strategise: Phil Scanlan (Manufacturing); Andrew Hay 
(Manufacturing/Small Business); Hugh Morgan (Mining); Neville Kennard (Bus 
Services); Maurice Newman (Finance); John Elliott (Manufacturing); Mark 
Johnson (Finance); Don Swan(Construction, Agriculture, Mining); Ross 
                                                 
67 See: IPA Review, Vol. 30, No. 3, July-September, 1976, inside front cover; IPA Review, Vol. 
31, No. 2, April-June 1977, inside front cover; ; IPA Review, Vol. 32, No. 1, January-March, 
1978, inside front cover; IPA Review, January-March, 1979, inside front cover; IPA Review, Vol. 
34, No. 1, January-March, 1980, inside front cover; IPA Review, Vol. 35, No. 1, January-March, 
1981, inside front cover; IPA Review, Vol. 36, No. 1, January-March, 1982, inside front cover; 
IPA Review, Vol. 37, No. 1, Autumn 1983, inside front cover. 
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Graham-Taylor (business unknown); Andrew Kaldor (Manufacturing).68 John 
Brummer, Don Stammer, John McLeod, all company economists from the 
mining and finance sectors, were also participants in the Crossroads group69 and 
perhaps acted as a bridge between academia and capital. They may also have 
acted as brokers of funding. 
 
Early funding for the CIS 
 
The earliest financial supporters of the Centre for Independent Studies were 
Neville Kennard of Kennard’s Hire & Storage (Business Services) and Ross 
Graham-Taylor (business unknown).70 Hugh Morgan was later able to secure 
recurrent funding of $5,000 each per year for five years from Western Mining 
Corporation (Mining), CRA (Mining), BHP (Mining/Manufacturing), Santos 
(Mining), Shell (Mining/Manufacturing) and The Advertiser 
(Entertainment/Media).71  
 
Centre 2000 
 
In 1986, at the time it was attempting to expand its operations, Centre 2000 had 
on its advisory Board three capitalists – Charles Copeman (Mining), Sir Noel 
Foley (Finance) and Dame Leonie Kramer (Mining and Finance).72 In 1985 
Centre 2000 was the recipient of $30,000 (between one-half and one-third of the 
organisation’s total income) from mining capitalist Peter Wright to help with 
costs of The Optimist.73 
 
Australia at the Crossroads 
 
Australia at the Crossroads was the first published comprehensive articulation of 
a radical neo-liberal alternative policy agenda for Australia. It was published at a 
time when the movement was still very much in its inception and the ideas it 
                                                 
68 Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty, p. 42. 
69 Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty, p. 42. 
70 Andrew Norton, ‘The CIS at Twenty: Greg Lindsay Talks to Andrew Norton’, pp. 16-21. 
71 Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty, p. 47. 
72 Anon., ‘Centre 2000 News’, The Optimist, May-June 1986, p. 2. 
73 Christopher Jay, ‘Economics Think Tank is Growing Up’, Australian Financial Review, 
February13, 1986, p. 16. 
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represented were still generally regarded as radical. That Shell Australia decided 
to fund its production speaks of their strong sympathy for radical neo-liberal 
ideas.74 
 
 Leadership 
 
Given the importance of movement organisations to the radical neo-liberal 
movement, those who held Executive or Board memberships of such 
organisations enjoyed a leadership position within the movement. For capitalists, 
the decision to involve oneself in such leadership positions was a product of 
much more than simple public spiritedness. A leadership role within the radical 
neo-liberal movement, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, would have done 
little for the public image of the capitalist or company concerned, and 
presumably carried no remuneration. It is therefore reasonable to assume that 
capitalists who took on leadership roles did so out of a conviction that the 
promotion of radical neo-liberal ideology was either a moral imperative, or 
served the broader class, fractional or company interest. An examination of those 
capitalists who took leadership roles within the radical neo-liberal movement 
provides an insight into which companies and sectors were most important to the 
movement and which companies and sectors aligned themselves strongest with 
the movement. The following examination is drawn from the extant publicly 
available documents from the largest movement organisations. 
 
CIS Executive Board – 1984-1991 
 
Between 1984 and 1991 the Centre for Independent Studies had quite a stable 
Executive Board with few changes. During this period the following capitalists 
sat on the Executive: Neville Kennard (Business Services); Hugh Morgan 
(Mining); Maurice Newman (Finance); Peter Ritchie (Retail); Will Bailey 
(Finance); Michael Darling (Finance & Mining); Andrew Kaldor 
                                                 
74 Wolfgang Kasper (et al), Australia at the Crossroads, p. xi. 
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(Manufacturing); Peter Dodd (Finance & Energy); Leonard Ian Roach (Finance); 
Alan McGregor (Manufacturing).75 
 
Tasman Institute Advisory Council 1990-1991 
 
The following capitalists sat on the Advisory Council of the Tasman Institute 
between 1990 and 1991: S Ballieu Myer (Retail); Will Bailey (Finance); Dr 
Roderick Deane (Communications, Energy, Finance); William L. Dix 
(Communications, Mining, Manufacturing); John Elliott (Manufacturing); Kevan 
Gosper (Mining); Dame Leonie Kramer (Mining and Finance); Eric A. Mayer 
(Finance); Hugh Morgan (Mining); Sir Arvi Parbo (Mining, Finance); Richard 
Pratt (Manufacturing); James Strong (Transport, AMIC lobbyist); Sir Ronald 
Trotter (Manufacturing); Sir William Vines (Agriculture).76 
 
IPA Committee 1991 
 
In 1991 the following capitalists sat on the IPA Committee (Board of Directors): 
Charles B. Goode (Finance); David J. Brydon (Finance, Mining), J. A. Calvert-
Jones (Finance); J. F. H. Clark (Mining); John C. Dahlsen (Finance, 
Manufacturing); Bruce Scott Dyson (Finance); G. E. Littlewood (Mining); Hugh 
Morgan (Mining); Professor David Pennington (Manufacturing); Eda Ritchie 
(Agriculture); Michael B. Robinson (Business Services, Construction); John 
Hyde (Agriculture).77 
 
General Support 
 
The following section is drawn from those publicly available documents that list 
capitalist contributors to the radical neo-liberal movement. Such documents are 
rare, hence the brevity of this section. What they identify is those capitalist 
                                                 
75 CIS, CIS Annual Review 1984, p. 13; ; CIS, CIS Annual Review 1985, CIS, St Leonards, 1985, 
p. 13; CIS, CIS Annual Review 1986-87, p. 17; CIS, CIS Annual Review 1989, p. 17; CIS, CIS 
Annual Review 1991, CIS, St Leonards, 1991, inside front cover. 
76 Tasman Institute, Tasman Report, No. 1, July 1990, p. 4; Tasman Institute, Annual Review: 
Tasman Institute Pty Ltd and Tasman Economic Research Pty Ltd, December 1991, inside front 
cover. 
77 IPA, IPA Report 1991, IPA, Melbourne, 1991, inside front cover. 
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enterprises, organisations and fractions which saw their interests served through 
the donation of funds to the radical neo-liberal movement. 
 
1996 CIS Corporate Supporters 
 
In its 1996 Annual Review, the CIS listed 135 corporate supporters.78 There are 
no details of how much each of these supporters each contributed to the Centre. 
Out of the 135 supporters 35 (25 per cent) were from the Finance Sector of the 
capitalist class, 30 (22 per cent) from Manufacturing, 18 (13 per cent) from 
Mining, 8 (5 per cent) each from Business Services and Construction, 5 (3 per 
cent) from the Wholesale as well as from the Culture and Recreation sector, 4 (2 
per cent) from each of the Retail, Energy and Communications sectors, 3 (2 per 
cent) from each of the Transport/Storage and Agriculture/Forestry sectors, 2 (1 
per cent) from the Health sector and 1(0.7 per cent) from the Government and 
Administration sector. Four of the Centre’s supporters were private foundations 
or corporate lobby groups, such as the Tobacco Institute. 
 
1991 Tasman Institute Corporate Supporters 
 
The Tasman Institute, in its 1991 Annual Review, listed 38 Corporate 
Members.79 Of these, 9 (23 per cent) came from the Mining sector, 7 (18 per 
cent) from Finance, 6 (15 per cent) from Manufacturing, 5 (13 per cent) from 
Business Services, 2 (5 per cent) each from Retail, Energy and Recreation and 1 
(2 per cent) each from the Construction, Agriculture/Forestry and 
Communications sectors. There was 1 private foundation and 1 movement 
organisation also listed as members. 
 
National Priorities Project 
 
During its five year life span the National Priorities Project was sponsored by a 
host of employer associations, with the Business Council of Australia, Victorian 
Automobile Chamber of Commerce, Australian Mining Industry Council, 
National Farmers Federation, Australian Coal Association and Australian Small 
                                                 
78 CIS, CIS Annual Review 1996, p. 19. 
79 Tasman Institute, Annual Review: Tasman Institute Pty Ltd and Tasman Economic Research 
Pty Ltd, December 1991, p. 17. 
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Business Association contributing the highest subscription payments for 
Spending and Taxing II.80 
 
Project Victoria 
 
Project Victoria was sponsored by a number of employer associations and ‘12 
major corporations’, who remain anonymous.81 The employer associations who 
sponsored Project Victoria were the Australian Chamber of Manufacturers; 
Building Owners and Managers Association; Business Council of Australia; Bus 
Proprietors Association; Confectionary Manufacturers Association; Insurance 
Council of Australia; Real Estate Institute of Victoria; Retail Traders Association 
of Victoria; State Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Vic); Victorian 
Automobile Chamber of Commerce; Victorian Brick Manufacturers Association; 
Victorian Employers Federation; Victorian Farmers’ Federation; Institute of 
Chartered Accounting Australia; Victorian Chamber of Mines.82 
 
Reform and Recovery 
 
The IPA’s publication, Reform and Recovery, was sponsored by the following 
capitalist organisations ANZ; Argyle Diamonds; Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of Western Australia; Hadson Energy Ltd (Mining); Hancock 
Prospecting (Mining); Hartley Poynton Ltd (Finance); Hospital Benefit Fund of 
Western Australia (Finance); M. G. Kailis Group of Companies 
(Agriculture/Fishing); Voyager Enterprises Ltd (Agriculture); and Wesfarmers 
Ltd (Mining/Manufacturing).83 
 
Analysis 
 
                                                 
80 Anon., National Priorities Project Financial Report 28 Oct 87 to 17 May 1988, NBAC, 
Z383/14. 
81 IPA, Towards a Healthier State: the Restructuring of Victoria’s Public Health Services, 
Institute of Public Affairs, Melbourne, 1992, p. iii. 
82 IPA, Towards a Healthier State, p. iii; Des Moore and Michael Porter, ‘Preface’ in Des Moore 
and Michael Porter (eds), Victoria: An Agenda for Change. 
83 Mike Nahan and Tony Rutherford (eds), Reform and Recovery: An Agenda for the New 
Western Australian Government, p. vii. 
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What do these findings tell us about capitalist support for the radical neo-liberal 
movement? First, it is clear that the movement has received support from a broad 
range of corporations and employer associations. Within this broad range, 
however, there are a few sectors which stand out as more represented than others 
in terms of funding; within some of these sectors there are particular types of 
companies that have tended to fund the movement; and certain sectors have been 
more represented in the leadership of the movement than others.   
 
Mining, Finance and Manufacturing capital have been the mainstays of the 
financial base for the movement. They have been the industries most strongly 
represented as a proportion of the corporate sponsors. Further evidence of this is 
found in the 1992 statement by the IPA:  
 
Our largest subscriber provided only seven per cent of our revenue 
and our top 10 subscribers only 32 per cent of it. About 15 per cent 
of IPA’s revenue comes from mining companies – slightly less than 
from manufacturing.84 
 
These IPA figures regarding sectoral funding correlate with what is known of the 
other movement organisations discussed earlier, and, if we assume that the IPA 
is not unique in its top 10 subscribers contributing around one-third of its 
funding, then, although it is not clear how much each company contributed, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the most consistent supporters, including 
capitalist neo-liberal activists themselves, provided a large proportion of the 
movement’s funding. What is also clear from this is that, relative to profit, the 
contributions of corporations to the radical neo-liberal movement were actually 
quite small. For, if we assume that the IPA had an income of about one million 
dollars in the early 1990s,85 then its top subscriber contributed only around 
$70,000 of that amount: a minor sum for a top 100 company.  
                                                 
84 John Hyde, ‘The Director’s Report to the 1992 AGM’, IPA Review, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1992, p. 
62. 
85 This seems a reasonable assumption given that in 1988 its total income was $978,774, and had 
been growing through the 1980s. See Michael Bertram, A History of the Institute of Public 
Affairs, p. 117. 
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It might seem a little strange that the manufacturing sector is one of the largest 
contributors to the radical neo-liberal movement, given that that the lobby groups 
associated with that sector clashed fiercely with the movement. A look at the 
manufacturing companies which supported the radical neo-liberal movement, 
however, reveals a high proportion of companies linked to the mining and 
construction industries as well as companies who had much to fear from 
increasing public interest regulation: chemical, tobacco and alcohol 
manufacturers. For example, the 6 manufacturing firms that supported the 
Tasman Institute in 1991 included Fosters Brewing (whose main business was 
the production of alcohol), ICI Australia (involved in the manufacture of 
chemicals and petrochemicals), Minsup Mining Supplies and BP Australia (both 
involved in refining the products of the mining industry). The 30 Manufacturers 
listed as corporate supporters of the CIS in 1996 included a number involved in 
the manufacture of lime, cement and plaster such as Adelaide Brighton, 
Cockburn Cement, Comtec, James Hardie Industries, and Queensland Cement. 
Amongst the Centre’s manufacturing supporters were also a number involved in 
refining, such as Shell, Reynolds Australia Aluminia and other aspects of the 
mining or mining-related activities, such as Wesfarmers and Henderson’s 
Industries. There were also a number involved in the manufacture of 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals such as Bayer, Boehringer Ingelheim, E. H. 
Faulding & Co, Glaxo Pharmaceuticals and Koppers. Also among the 
manufacturers were those involved in tobacco or alcohol production such as 
Fosters, Lion Nathan, Philip Morris, Rothmans and the Tobacco industry-funded 
ginger group, the Tobacco Institute. In addition, some manufacturers were 
involved in the forestry industry, such as North Ltd and Amcor. It is clear then 
that amongst those manufacturers who supported the radical neo-liberals were a 
high proportion of companies whose profit margins were sensitive to public 
interest regulations brought about by the new social movements and changing 
social attitudes. 
 
By 1992, the CAI, one of the employer associations most hostile to the radical 
neo-liberal movement, had merged with the ACC to form the Australian 
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Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI). The ideological stance of this new 
organisation was much closer to that of the radical neo-liberals, arguing for a 
decentralised system of industrial relations and accepting the inevitability of 
tariff reductions, than was the CAI. It therefore should not be surprising that 
sections of manufacturing capital, many of whom would have come under the 
umbrella of the ACCI, would have supported the radical neo-liberal movement 
during the 1990s. 
 
Although mining, as a sector, may not have always been the largest contributor 
to movement organisations, its support has been crucial and consistent, and the 
mining sector has contributed a greater amount as a proportion of its size than 
has manufacturing. Mining companies comprise far fewer of the largest 
Australian companies than do manufacturers, and account for a smaller 
percentage of GDP. That is, there are simply more manufacturing companies 
than any other sector. It is therefore not surprising that  manufacturers are well 
represented amongst movement sponsors. 
 
If we look at who took leadership roles within the movement, it is clear that 
mining and finance dominate. One company in particular stands out: Western 
Mining Corporation (WMC). Hugh Morgan has obviously played a large part in 
WMC’s strong links to the radical neo-liberal movement, but its consistent 
sponsorship of the movement has no doubt also been facilitated by the leadership 
roles taken within the movement by other WMC figures such as Arvi Parbo, Ray 
Evans, Dame Leonie Kramer and David J. Brydon. Such corporate activism pre-
dates Morgan’s involvement in the movement. In 1975 the IPA Review reported 
that L. C. Brodie Hall, resident Director of WMC in Western Australia had 
helped to establish a ‘very active’ IPA committee in Western Australia.86 
 
Agricultural capital is surprisingly little represented, given the militancy of the 
NFF. The NFF did support the NPP, and it is possible that it supported the think 
tanks, however the fact that it was able to act as a radical neo-liberal vanguard 
                                                 
86 ‘New Members of IPA Council’, IPA Review, January-March 1975, p. 13. 
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organisation in its own right perhaps meant that it had little need to fund external 
organisations and chose to spend its money on projects it could directly control. 
 
In conclusion, mining, finance and anti-regulation manufacturing capital were 
the most important corporate supporters of the radical neo-liberal movement. 
Because of its consistent, reliable, substantial and strategic funding (coming at 
times when the movement needed it most), as well as its unparalleled leadership 
within the movement, mining capital is the most important of these three. Next 
comes finance capital: its strong financial support coupled with its leadership 
within the movement, which was second only to mining’s, assures it of this 
place. Third are the anti-regulation manufacturers who sometimes provided more 
funds than the mining capitalists, but who nevertheless played a less important 
leadership role. Big capital did not shy away from funding the movement, but 
small business was also important, however primarily in the funding of specific 
projects, such as Project Victoria and the National Priorities Project. Other 
sectors such as Construction, Retail, Media and Business Services were 
consistent supporters, but made up a smaller proportion of total funds than did 
the aforementioned capital. 
 
Why did capital fund the movement? 
 
Neo-liberalism has been an attack upon the fundamental features of the post-war 
consensus, both domestically and internationally. In Australia it has also meant 
an attack upon the domestic defence model that underpinned national economic 
development for the first seven decades of the twentieth century. The radical 
neo-liberal movement has been the most self-consciously ideological and 
fundamentalist component of this attack. It has been the vanguard of neo-
liberalism. In examining the relationship between the radical neo-liberal 
movement and the capitalist class, the question that needs to be addressed is why 
sections of the capitalist class gave support, not merely to a new pattern of state-
capital relationships – neo-liberalism – but also to what, in the mid to late 1970s, 
was a relatively obscure and loose grouping of intellectuals – the radical neo-
liberal movement. 
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No doubt part of the explanation for the support by capitalists of the radical neo-
liberal movement is simply that the ideological preferences of individual 
capitalists happened to coincide with those of the movement. This is particularly 
true for those capitalists who were also movement activists. Hugh Morgan, for 
example, shared both the economic ideology of the movement as well as the 
conservative social views of many of its participants. Such capitalists would have 
been in a position to argue for the disbursement of funds from their companies to 
the movement.  
 
Another possible explanation is that the corporate funding of the radical neo-
liberal movement was simply part of the philanthropic activities that many 
businesses engage in. Just as some businesses provide money to charities, such 
as the Smith Family and other non-profit organisations, so they also provided 
money to the Centre for Independent Studies, the Institute of Public Affairs, the 
Tasman Institute and the Australian Institute for Public Policy. Such an 
explanation however ignores the crucial question of why certain sections of the 
capitalist class chose to channel funds into what were overtly ideological and 
what were viewed as, particularly in the early to mid 1980s, fringe and quite 
politically radical organisations?  
 
The most satisfying answer to these question lies in accounting for the interests 
of such corporations and how the funding of movement organisations served 
these interests. Broadly speaking, those who funded the radical neo-liberal 
movement tended to be corporations that had an interest in the flourishing of a 
neo-liberal agenda, as well as those who stood to lose from public interest 
regulation, environmental regulation, or the enlargement of Aboriginal land 
rights. Not coincidentally, the major supporters of the radical neo-liberal 
movement were also part of the capitalist neo-liberal mobilisation. That Mining 
and Finance capital are two of the leading supporters of the radical neo-liberal 
movement is telling, for they were also leaders of the capitalist neo-liberal 
mobilisation. The radical wing of this mobilisation however, while supporting 
some projects, and while involved in the movement, was not a driving force of 
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the movement. Many of these capitalists were able to transform their own 
employer associations into combative organisations for the militant wing of the 
capitalist mobilisation. They didn’t need to fund external groups to do this work 
for them. For other neo-liberal capitalists, however, funding the radical neo-
liberal movement allowed them to radicalise public political debate and 
undermine and attack their enemies without getting their own hands dirty. Neo-
liberal capitalists wanted not merely to restructure the Australian state but to 
weaken the power of the organised working class in Australia. Not only did the 
radical neo-liberals provide a constant stream of polemic denouncing the trade 
union movement, they also heroicised militant capitalists such as Charles 
Copeman, Jay Pendarvis, Fred Stauber and Wayne Gilbert. They also provided 
intellectual justification for the militancy of such capitalists. The fact that it has 
been so difficult to gain access to precise funding sources for the movement is 
testament to the anonymity enjoyed by many of the movement’s financial 
supporters. This enabled corporations to support radical ideas without themselves 
being publicly associated with such ideas. For the movement’s leaders and 
capitalist activists, this was not a problem, but other corporations would have 
been keen, particularly during the 1980s when the radical neo-liberals were 
actually publicly viewed as radical, to retain their anonymity. 
 
For those companies and CEOs involved in the moderate wing of the neo-liberal 
capitalist mobilisation then, the radical neo-liberal movement acted as a 
surrogate for their activism. On the one hand, mining companies could claim to 
have a strong record of working with Aboriginal communities, whilst on the 
other hand pouring funds into organisations that questioned the very notion of 
Aboriginal sovereignty – and thus of Land Rights themselves – and who labelled 
Aboriginal activists part of an ‘Aboriginal Industry’. On the one hand 
construction companies would negotiate with trade unions over wages and 
conditions, on the other they would fund organisations who celebrated militant 
capitalist assaults upon unionised workplaces and who envisaged a utopia where 
individuals, not unions, negotiated their own wages and conditions.  
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The link between the capitalist neo-liberal mobilisation and the funding of the 
radical neo-liberal movement is most apparent in the funding statistics of the 
IPA. Between 1973 and 1994 there was a shift in the funding base of the 
Institute. In 1973, manufacturers made up the overwhelming proportion of 
corporate subscribers to the IPA – ‘Mining’ and ‘Primary Production’ companies 
comprised only 22 out of 515 corporate subscribers, or 4 per cent. The total 
subscriber numbers for ‘Metal Trades’, ‘Food Drink and Tobacco’, ‘Building 
Materials’, ‘Printing and Paper’ and ‘All Other Manufacturing’ was 286 
companies or 55 per cent of all corporate subscribers.87 By 1992, as noted before, 
mining capital contributed about 15 per cent of the IPA’s revenue, with 
Manufacturing contributing only slightly more.88 In the intervening 20 years 
mining capital was an important part of the capitalist neo-liberal mobilisation 
whilst many within the manufacturing sector continued to tie themselves to the 
‘Settlement’ institutions of tariffs and arbitration and were hostile towards the 
radical neo-liberals. As the IPA shifted from anti-communist Keynesianism to 
conservative neo-liberalism, so its funding base shifted from manufacturers tied 
to welfare capitalism, to mining and finance capital who agitated for the neo-
liberal transformation of the Australian state. This division is reflected in the 
funding of the movement as a whole. 
 
Although many of its membership were strong supporters of the radical neo-
liberal movement (30 of the 135 corporations who funded the CIS in 1996 were 
drawn from the ranks of Business Review Weekly’s Top 100 Australian 
corporations), the BCA supported, financially, only a few projects of the 
movement – the NPP, Project Victoria and the IPA’s federalism project.89 
Despite this support the BCA did not rely upon the movement for advice or 
research support. This is in line with its pragmatic political strategy. The NPP 
and Project Victoria served the interests of the BCA by publicly promoting and 
                                                 
87 Michael Bertram, A History of the Institute of Public Affairs, p. 117. 
88 John Hyde, ‘The Director’s Report to the 1992 AGM’, p. 62. 
89 Anon., ‘Federalism Project Underway’, IPA Review, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1994, p. 63; Des Moore 
and Michael Porter, ‘Preface’ in Des Moore and Michael Porter (eds), Victoria: An Agenda for 
Change,; and Anon., ‘Statement of Income and Expenditure for the Period 28 Oct 87 to 17 May 
88’ in NPP, National Priorities Project – Combined Meeting of the Trustees and the Research 
Management Group, NBAC Z383/14. 
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legitimating radical neo-liberal ideas. By helping to shift the centre of political 
debate in Australia, these projects created a favourable environment in which the 
BCA could pursue less radical neo-liberal policies that had a chance of being 
implemented by the Labor federal government of the time. By funding Project 
Victoria, the BCA was helping to provide policy ideas to a zealous State 
government that, it was hoped, would have a flow on effect beyond the 
boundaries of that State. 
 
As for the conservatism of much of the movement, for many capitalists this 
probably fit, broadly, with their own world view. Some capitalists may have seen 
the benefits for their corporation of promoting conservative ideology. 
McDonald’s support for the CIS  ‘Taking Children Seriously Project’ may be 
explained because the promotion of conservative notions of family buttressed the 
image of ‘McDonalds Family Restaurants’. But for other capitalists, conservative 
ideology had long since faded as a necessary buttress for the capitalist system. 
Where once the nuclear family was central to the process of capital 
accumulation, by the 1990s, this was no longer the case. Female entry into the 
workforce and the increasing visibility of the gay and lesbian community 
provided more terrain for capitalist commodification. For such capitalists, the 
embrace of conservatism was perhaps a small price to pay for the promotion of 
neo-liberalism and the undermining of the ‘enemies of capital’. The 
libertarianism of some of the movement may have offset any objections that 
similarly minded capitalists may have had. 
 
By 1996 the movement  had much more legitimacy within the capitalist class. 
There had been a shift in political debate to the Right and a largely sympathetic 
media (as discussed in the next chapter) had framed the movement’s 
organisations as independent research institutions. Twenty years of interaction 
between the movement and sections of capital had sown strong roots and a 
number of Australian capital’s leading figures – Rupert Murdoch, S. Ballieu 
Myer, Hugh Morgan, Michael Darling, John Calvert-Jones, Arvi Parbo – were 
publicly associated with the movement. This of course did not mean that all 
capitalists wanted to support the product offered by the movement. What it did 
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do was significantly lessen the stigma attached to sponsorship of the radical neo-
liberal movement by capital. 
 
 
Relationship with the broader capitalist class 
 
Corporate funding and support was clearly crucial to the development and 
longevity of the radical neo-liberal movement, however only a relatively small 
number of Australian businesses provided such support, and an even smaller 
number of capitalists involved themselves directly in the movement itself. One 
possible reason for this is that the majority of radical neo-liberals were 
academics and former bureaucrats rather than businesspeople. As Doug 
McEachern notes, ‘the most vocal members of the H R Nicholls Society were 
often those with least direct experience of business’90 and therefore it is possible 
that many capitalists did not believe that such ideologues understood the reality 
of the problems confronting Australian businesses, nor that the radical neo-
liberals were in a position to offer them solutions. There are other sectoral and 
strategic reasons why other sections of capital did not give wholehearted support 
to the radical neo-liberal movement, and these are explored through a discussion 
of some of the more important employer associations during the period under 
review. 
 
 Business Council of Australia 
 
Generally, the Business Council of Australia as an organisation had little to do 
with the radical neo-liberal movement, at least publicly. This is despite the fact 
that the Business Council of Australia was prepared to fund some individual 
projects of the movement (including Project Victoria, NPP, the IPA’s federalism 
project); despite some prominent BCA members also being involved in the 
movement (Hugh Morgan, Arvi Parbo, Will Bailey, Peter Ritchie) and despite 
movement activists John Freebairn and Tim Duncan working briefly for the 
                                                 
90 Doug McEachern, Business Mates, p. 51. 
 225
Council.91 Presumably, many BCA members had some contact and sympathy 
with the movement because many of Australia’s top 100 corporations were, by 
the 1990s, providing it with financial support. We can conclude then that 
although monopoly capital was a strong supporter of the movement, its major 
representative organisation, the BCA, tended to keep its distance from the radical 
neo-liberals.  
 
An examination of the Council’s regular journal, the Business Council Bulletin, 
reveals only occasional articles by movement activists. Very little of the research 
and consultancy work commissioned by the BCA was undertaken by movement 
organisations (except by NILS). Rather, the Council tended to rely upon groups 
such as Access Economics, McKinsey, the Australian Graduate School of 
Management, as well as their own in-house research staff for such work. 
 
One reason for this is possibly that the radical neo-liberal movement, with the 
exception of Michael Porter and his associates, rarely had the resources or 
expertise to conduct detailed economic modelling. However the main reason for 
the BCA’s reluctance to engage research consultancy from the radical neo-
liberals has to do with the Council’s pragmatic political strategy outlined in the 
previous chapter.92 First, the BCA was loathe to alienate the Labor government 
by allying itself too closely with the radical neo-liberal movement which had 
been identified by the trade union movement and by many within the Labor 
caucus as a threat to the labour movement. Second, given the strident ideological 
nature of most of the output of the radical neo-liberal movement, it is unlikely 
that they would have produced research and policy recommendations that fell 
within the bounds of what was considered to be politically realistic under a 
federal Labor government. It is for this reason that on one of the BCA’s most 
                                                 
91 Duncan was a policy adviser for the BCA, see: 
http://www.brisinst.org.au/people/duncan_tim.html. Freebairn was Research Director for the 
BCA from 1984-1986, see Profile of Professor John Freebairn: 
http://melecon.unimelb.edu.au/staffprofile/jfreebairn/home.html. 
92 Michael Codd who, after leaving the public service went on to become a Board Member of 
several large Australian corporations says: ‘generally speaking the business community, certainly 
at the top end, is putting some effort through the BCA into funding research efforts to try and 
influence the government on taxation policy … They are happy to do that through their own club, 
if you like, but its pretty unusual to find people who also want to then give financial support to 
any of the other think tanks’ (Michael Codd, interview with the author). 
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influential  campaigns – the campaign to persuade the Labor government to 
legislate for enterprise bargaining – the Council turned, as John O’Brien has 
demonstrated, to Fred Hilmer and the McKinsey company for research and 
advice, rather than to the radical neo-liberals.93 Furthermore, the strident 
ideological outpourings of the radical neo-liberals were quite removed from the 
official position of the BCA on several issues. For example, the BCA had a much 
more realistic appreciation of the relationship between state and economy than 
did the radical neo-liberals: 
 
Recent debate in Australia has centred on the degree to which 
government should ‘intervene’ in the market and the degree to which 
government should ‘get out of the road’. Those who advocate 
minimal government in favour of an uninhibited market fail to 
recognise the way in which government is woven into every aspect of 
our lives. Good government is not peripheral to the market: it is an 
essential prerequisite which allows any market to function.94 
 
So, while the radical neo-liberal movement was advocating the full dismantling 
of the system of arbitration, the BCA was pushing for less radical, but 
nonetheless significant, neo-liberal change.  
 
Capitalist hostility 
 
One of the defining features of the radical neo-liberal movement, and indeed, the 
issue which catapulted them to national media attention was their opposition to 
the system of centralised industrial arbitration and wage fixation. The term 
'Industrial Relations Club' was coined to describe the trade unions, lawyers, 
journalists and employer associations — particularly the Confederation of 
Australian Industry (CAI) and the Metal Trades Industry Association (MTIA) — 
                                                 
93 John O’Brien, ‘McKinsey, Hilmer and the BCA: The ‘New Management’ Model of Labour 
Market Reform’, Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 36, December 1994, pp. 468-490. 
94 Paul Anderson (ed), Australia 2010: Creating the Future Australia, BCA, Melbourne, 1993, p. 
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who had a vested interest in preserving the industrial relations status quo.95 This 
'club' was, according to the neo-liberals, the chief obstacle to industrial relations 
change. Neo-liberals argued that such change should take the form of the 
abolition of the Arbitration Commission, and its replacement with: 
 
a network of conciliation commissioners and arbitrators whose 
function would be to facilitate collective bargaining and act as 
arbitrators on request, without the pretence of power to enforce their 
decisions.96 
 
and a curbing of trade union power through the extension of legal sanctions 
against strike action. 
 
This led the Confederation of Australian Industry (CAI), for example, to make 
quite overt gestures to distinguish its approach to industrial relations from that of 
neo-liberal intellectuals. Whereas neo-liberals called for the abolition of the 
Arbitration Commission, the CAI argued for the maintenance of the centralised 
system of arbitration. Sections of its 1984 submission to the Hancock Review of 
Industrial Relations, for example, are a direct repudiation of the neo-liberal 
intellectuals' industrial relations agenda, describing it as ‘radical’ and as 
potentially harmful to the economy.97 
 
Furthermore, the radical neo-liberals argued for the rapid and total abolition of 
the system of tariff protections that had evolved in Australia during the twentieth 
century. With manufacturers making up the core of these employer associations 
the issue of tariffs naturally created further hostilities between them and the 
radical neo-liberals. The radical neo-liberals were also major players in conflicts 
within the capitalist class, supporting, as they did, the assault by farmers and 
small business associations upon the CAI.  
                                                 
95 P. P. McGuinness, The Case Against the Arbitration Commission, p. 15; Gerard Henderson, 
‘The Industrial Relations Club’ in John Hyde and John Nurick (eds), Wages Wasteland, p. 42. 
96 McGuinness, The Case Against the Arbitration Commission, p. 29. 
97 CAI, Submission to the Review of Australian Industrial Relations Law and Systems, February, 
1984, CAI, Melbourne, 1984, pp. 131-141, NBAC, Z196/190. 
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The depth of hostility of many within the manufacturing sector can be gauged by 
their use of terms 'fascist' and 'escapist' to describe the radical neo-liberals in 
1986.98 Indeed, through aiding and supporting the major capitalist representative 
bodies, the radical neo-liberals have been important players in conflicts within 
the ruling class. Typical of their position as vanguardists, the radical neo-liberals 
have also called upon business associations to embrace neo-liberal policies and 
ideas with greater vigour, such as the new industrial relations environment to be 
created by the Liberal government’s Workplace Relations Act.99 
  
 
Impact of the radical neo-liberal movement on the capitalist class 
 
The radical neo-liberal movement was not responsible for converting the 
Australian capitalist class to neo-liberalism. This was rather a product capitalists 
identifying their interests as lying in new economic conditions that could only be 
achieved through a radical restructuring of the Australian state and the 
abandonment of many of the institutions and values that had underpinned the 
development of the Australian economy during the twentieth century. What the 
radical neo-liberals did do, however was to provide sections of the capitalist class 
with the language and arguments with which to articulate these interests. They 
provided general policy frameworks and alternative visions that capitalists could 
draw upon to critique the Australian welfare state. It was largely through the 
radical neo-liberal movement that notions such as deregulation, privatisation and 
marketisation were first popularised in Australia. Alternative policy agendas 
such as Project Victoria, the National Priorities Project and Australia at the 
Crossroads provided sections of the capitalist class with ideas on how to convert 
interests into policy agendas. Importantly, the radical neo-liberals provided moral 
and philosophical arguments and justifications for what, for most capitalists, 
                                                 
98 Anon., 'Employer attack on New Right "fascists"', Sydney Morning Herald, 2nd October, 1986, 
p.10, M. Cockburn, 'CAI Attacks "Escapist Fantasies" of New Right', Sydney Morning Herald, 
21st November, 1986, p.2. 
99 See for example T. Circovic, ‘The Role of Registered Employer Organisations in Maintaining 
and Upholding our Present Labour Market Regime’, Proceedings of the H. R. Nicholls Society 
XVII Conference, 1996: www.hrnicholls.com.au/nichvol17/volx009.htm. 
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were primarily economic considerations. The radical neo-liberals also furnished 
particular sections of capital with a language with which to understand and 
critique Australian society. During the 1980s the Australian Chamber of 
Commerce, particularly under the Presidency of Andrew Hay, and the NFF 
mobilised the language and arguments of the radical neo-liberals, making use of 
such terms as the 'Industrial Relations Club' and the 'Welfare Industry'.100 During 
its brief lifetime the ACC Review (the official journal of the Australian Chamber 
of Commerce between April/May 1986 and July 1987) was quite aggressive and 
polemical and thus resembled the tenor of movement publications such as the 
IPA Review and Policy. 
 
Fundamentally, capitalists are motivated by perceived interest, rather than by 
ideology. This is the primary reason for the hostility of some sections of capital 
towards the movement. It is also the reason why the movement has not 
influenced the capitalist class so much as providing certain sections of that class 
with some convenient tools for furthering their own interests. However, as will 
be become clear in the following chapters, the radical neo-liberal movement 
acted as a vanguard for the capitalist class in its attempts to restructure the 
Australian state, and this was been particularly true in the case of combating 
those groups and individuals who opposed the neo-liberal agenda. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Corporate funding and support were crucial to the establishment, development 
and longevity of the radical neo-liberal movement. Particular sections of capital 
were more important than others in providing this funding and support. It is no 
coincidence that capitalist support for the radical neo-liberal movement came 
from the neo-liberal power-bloc described in the previous chapter. Those 
capitalists who sponsored and took leadership roles within the movement were 
the capitalists who stood to gain most from the radical neo-liberal agenda and 
                                                 
100 ACC, Poll Confirms Accord Failure, Press Release No. 8601, 14th October, 1986, NBAC, 
Z196/153; ACC, Social Welfare Should Not Be Immune From Spending Cuts, Press Release No. 
8661, 23rd July, 1986, NBAC, Z196/153. 
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who stood to lose most from regulatory agendas, particularly those advocated by 
the new social movements. The most important and notable of these were 
mining; finance; the anti-regulation manufacturers and monopoly capital. By 
funding the movement, capitalists ensured that radical neo-liberal ideas would 
circulate from sources other than themselves. The movement thus acted as a 
surrogate for those involved in the moderate wing of the neo-liberal capitalist 
mobilisation. This was another way of combating those opposed to the state 
project of neo-liberalism without capitalists themselves having to ‘get their hands 
dirty’, or directly confront their enemies such as unions and environmentalists. 
Capitalist support for the radical neo-liberal movement was thus part of the 
broader struggle to secure neo-liberal hegemony in Australia. It constituted a 
backdoor attempt by capitalists to disorganise the opposition to neo-liberalism 
and to institute a new hegemonic ‘common sense’. At the same time, the radical 
neo-liberals provided sections of the capitalist class with a discursive framework 
with which to articulate the sectional interests of neo-liberal capitalists as 
universal interests. Therefore, while the radical neo-liberal movement was a 
‘non-class’ force, it was fundamentally class related and, as shall be argued in the 
following chapters, had class relevant impacts. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
The Radical Neo-liberal Movement and the Mass Media 
 
 
 
The mass media is both a vehicle for hegemony and a site of hegemonic 
struggle. As capitalist enterprises, media institutions are also agents within 
hegemonic conflicts. Crucial therefore to any analysis of hegemony is the role of 
the mass media. This chapter analyses the relationships between the radical neo-
liberal movement, the mass media and struggles for neo-liberal hegemony in 
Australia. It examines how effectively the radical neo-liberal movement was able 
to use the media as a vehicle for its worldview. How sympathetic was the media 
to the movement? How did the media frame the movement? What influence did 
the radical neo-liberal movement have upon the media, and what influence did 
the media have upon the movement? 
 
The first section of this chapter briefly discusses the hegemonic function of the 
mass media. It is argued that while the mass media is a key institution in the 
maintenance of capitalist hegemony, the content of such media is itself subject to 
contestation at the levels of production and reception. As a key vehicle for the 
transmission of political information, the mass media has been targeted by the 
radical neo-liberals as a means of promoting their ideology to a wide audience. 
The movement has attempted to make its own activities the subject of 
sympathetic media coverage, promote its values through the mass media, and 
influence broader political and economic reporting in a radical neo-liberal 
direction. This has included attempts to shape the way in which media 
practitioners frame issues. Various tactics have been employed in this endeavour. 
The second section of this chapter outlines such tactics, while the bulk of the rest 
of the chapter is concerned with evaluating the success of such tactics. Due to 
constraints of time, funding and space, this chapter cannot give a comprehensive 
analysis of the movement’s relationship with the mass media. Instead, this 
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chapter uses a detailed case study of the movement’s relationship with the 
Fairfax media between the years of 1985 and 1996 to provide an indicative 
picture of this relationship at the broader level. 
 
 
The construction of news and hegemony 
 
As perhaps the primary source of information about politics for most 
Australians, the mass media is one of the key mediating institutions of 
hegemony. Although, as Kellner argues, ‘media culture’ is a ‘contested terrain’,1 
it is not a neutral one. As capitalist enterprises, media organisations are key 
players within the international capitalist economy. Ultimately, media content 
reflects this reality. That is, media content will tend to be biased in favour of the 
class to which the owners of media enterprises belong: capital. Media owners do 
not normally require direct day-to-day intervention to ensure that their broad 
interests are reflected in media content. As Parenti argues: 
 
There is no need for ubiquitous supervision, just occasional 
intervention. The anticipation that superiors might disapprove of this 
or that story is usually enough to discourage a reporter from writing 
it, or an editor from assigning it. Many of the limitations placed on 
reporting come not from direct censorship, but from self-censorship.2 
 
The mass media, however, is not monolithic: it does allow for dissenting voices, 
usually within a framework that does not challenge dominant interests, but 
occasionally outside of such a framework. 
 
This chapter employs the notion of media frames as the key theoretical tool for 
examining the Australian media’s coverage of the radical neo-liberal movement. 
                                                 
1 Douglas Kellner, Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics Between the Modern 
and the Postmodern, Routledge, London, 1995, p. 2. 
2 Michael Parenti, Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media, St. Martin’s Press, New 
York, 1986, p. 36. 
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Here I am borrowing the concept of media frames from Todd Gitlin, who writes 
that media frames are: 
 
consistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of 
selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers 
routinely organise discourse, whether verbal or visual. Frames enable 
journalists to process large amounts of information quickly and 
routinely: to recognise it as information, to assign it to cognitive 
categories, and to package it for effective relay to audiences.3 
 
So, frames are regularised frameworks of interpretation routinely employed by 
journalists and editors in order to understand and package information for an 
audience. Further, as Entman notes, what is omitted from frames can be just as 
important as what is included.4 The construction of news relies upon a process of 
selection and interpretation by journalists and editors. Frames facilitate such a 
process. Particularly when people have little alternative information regarding an 
issue or event, media frames can also serve to condition the audience’s 
understanding of that event.5 Just as media frames are used by journalists to 
interpret, process and present information, so they can be internalised by the 
public. This accords with Stuart Hall’s observation that, in audience ‘decoding’ 
of ‘encoded’ media texts: 
 
Unless they are wildly aberrant, encoding will have the effect of 
constructing some of the limits and parameters within which 
decodings will operate.6 
 
Frames in news reporting are therefore one mechanism for the media’s 
mediation and construction of hegemony. As Meyer argues: 
                                                 
3 Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the 
New Left, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980, p. 7. 
4 Robert Entman, ‘Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm’, Journal of 
Communication, Vol. 43, No. 4, p. 54. 
5 Ibid., pp. 53-54. 
6 Stuart Hall, ‘Encoding/decoding’ in Stuart Hall (ed), Culture, Media, Language: Working 
Papers in Cultural Studies, Hutchinson, London, 1980, p. 135. 
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Legitimacy, the lifeblood of democratic politics, can be acquired 
only through citizens’ consent to what they perceive as the decisions 
made by political elites. And the chief source of those perceptions, 
except in the more personal venues of local, interest group and party 
politics, is normally what the  media choose to portray on their 
“stage”.7 
 
It therefore follows that media frames play a key part in determining both what 
counts as legitimate, and how such an assessment is interpreted by the public. 
Through the use of these theoretical tools this chapter will examine the 
relationship between the radical neo-liberal movement, its framing by the media, 
and the significance of these relationships for struggles over neo-liberal 
hegemony. 
 
 
Case Study: the Fairfax press and the radical neo-liberal movement 1986-
1996 
 
The following case study is intended to provide an indicative picture of the 
relationship between the radical neo-liberal movement and the mass media in 
Australia. It examines the way in which the movement was framed by the 
Fairfax media during the eleven-year period between 1986 and 1996. 
 
Methodology 
 
Using the Dow Jones database, searches were conducted in order to find articles 
from the Sydney Morning Herald (1986-1996),8 Australian Financial Review 
(1986-1996) and the Age (1991-1996) in which one or more of the following 
movement organisations were mentioned: Centre for Independent Studies, 
                                                 
7 Thomas Meyer (with Lew Hinchman), Media Democracy: How the Media Colonize Politics, 
Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 52. 
8 Sydney Morning Herald includes the Sun Herald and the Northern and Eastern Heralds, 
although there are few examples of such publications mentioning movement organisations. 
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Institute of Public Affairs, H. R. Nicholls Society, Australian Institute for Public 
Policy, Tasman Institute, Centre of Policy Studies. These were chosen because 
they have been the most important of the radical neo-liberal think tanks and 
forums.  
 
A list was then compiled of the results, the articles were located and their 
coverage of the movement organisations examined. The articles were classified 
according to the following descriptors: whether the coverage of the organisation 
was hostile or non-hostile; whether the organisation's publications, personnel or 
events were quoted (either directly or indirectly); whether the article was an 
editorial; and whether the organisation was identified as either right-wing or 
conservative. Mentions of think tanks in by-lines were not included in the study. 
Letters to the editor were excluded, as were regular tongue in cheek pieces (such 
as 'Bourse Sauce') and articles that amounted to nothing more than an 
advertisement for a upcoming movement event. 
 
The descriptors ‘hostile/non-hostile’ were based upon the overt description by 
the journalist of the organisation. This method was used in order to minimise the 
room for subjective interpretation. That is, rather than attempting to interpret 
how the organisation was framed within the overall context of the article, the 
organisation's coverage was evaluated in terms of how the author described, 
referred to and used the organisation within the article. For example, if the 
organisation was criticised by a source quoted in the article, but the author made 
no criticisms of the organisation, then the article would be classified as 'non-
hostile'. If, on the other hand, the author attempted to undermine the claims made 
by that organisation, then the article would be classified as 'hostile'. The ‘non-
hostile’ descriptor was then broken down further into ‘endorsement’ and 
‘acknowledgement’. ‘Endorsement’ refers to those articles in which the 
journalist explicitly praises or endorses the movement organisation or its claims. 
‘Acknowledgment’ refers to those articles in which the movement organisation 
is mentioned, whether in passing or as an authoritative source of commentary, 
without having its aims, ideology or arguments explicitly applauded or endorsed 
by the journalist. In labelling articles as either hostile or non-hostile and as either 
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endorsements or acknowledgments, the study errs on the side of caution. That is, 
for borderline articles the least flattering coverage of the movement was chosen. 
For example, if a journalist described the movement in a way that contained 
elements of both hostile and non-hostile coverage, then it was labelled as hostile. 
Similarly, if it was not clear whether a journalist in a non-hostile article was 
endorsing the movement or simply acknowledging it, then the descriptor 
‘acknowledgement’ was used. 
 
Searches were also conducted on the selected newspapers during the same period 
for the incidence of radical neo-liberal activists as authors of opinion pieces or 
columns.  
 
In addition to the author and organisation searches, a close reading was made of 
the period 1986-1988, as this was the time of the Fairfax media’s discovery of 
the radical neo-liberal movement – what it referred to as the phenomenon of the 
‘new right’. 
 
Limitations and justification of the study 
 
Due to constraints imposed by time, funding and the availability of databases, 
there are a number of limitations to this case study.  First, only Fairfax 
publications are covered by this survey and specifically only the Sydney Morning 
Herald, Sun Herald, Australian Financial Review and Age. This excludes other 
Fairfax papers as well as the entire stable of News Ltd. papers and other media 
such as radio and television. Second, the dates chosen for the survey are limited 
by the constraints of the Dow Jones database. Word searches in the Australian 
Financial Review were able to be performed as far back as 1982, whilst only as 
far back as 1986 for the Sydney Morning Herald, and only back to 1991 in the 
case of the Age. These limitations meant that for the sake of comparison, figures 
were compiled for the Sydney Morning Herald and Australian Financial Review 
from 1986-1996 and from 1991-1996 for the Age. It is possible that not all of the 
references to neo-liberal organisations were captured by the database searches, 
as sometimes journalists, particularly during the 1980s, used incorrect names 
 237
when referring to think tanks. Finally, there is of course an element of 
subjectivity in the determination of the articles as either hostile or non-hostile, 
but as explained, this has been minimised as far as possible. 
 
Although limited in scope by the databases available, this study does, 
nonetheless, provide a ten year overview of the coverage of the major Australian 
neo-liberal organisations by two of Australia's most important newspapers — the 
Australian Financial Review and the Sydney Morning Herald — and a five year 
overview of the coverage of the same organisations in the Melbourne-based Age. 
Thus, the survey covers the period from the public emergence and consolidation 
of the radical neo-liberal movement until the election of Howard government in 
1996. 
 
Focussing upon the major radical neo-liberal think tanks necessarily excludes 
others  — Centre 2000 and the Adam Smith Club, for example — as well as 
missing those articles which refer to the movement without mentioning any of 
the think tanks. However, given the close identification by the media of the 
movement with its think tanks, the likelihood of such occurrences is low, as is 
the likely incidence of coverage of the lesser known think tanks. The fact that 
they are less well known in itself means that media coverage of their activities is 
likely to have been low.  
 
This survey allows for the identification of trends in the coverage of the radical 
neo-liberal movement by the Fairfax media. More than this however, the survey 
results provide an indicative picture of the coverage by the broader print media 
of the radical neo-liberal movement. Because of the high concentration of print 
media ownership in Australia, examining the Fairfax media constitutes a 
substantial swathe of the major print media in Australia. Given that the Fairfax 
stable of newspapers is generally regarded as more to the left than the other 
major commercial print media conglomerate, Murdoch’s News Ltd., we may 
reasonably assume that the Murdoch media’s coverage of the movement would 
be at least as sympathetic as the survey results indicate that the Fairfax media has 
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been. Radio and television are not covered by this survey, but will be discussed 
briefly later in the chapter.  
 
Results 
 
A total of 996 articles were found which mentioned at least one of the radical 
neo-liberal think tanks and which were not letters, advertisements or regular 
comedic pieces. This is an average of approximately three articles per 
publication per month. The results are outlined in table 6.1. 
 
 
Table 6.1 Fairfax media coverage of select radical neo-liberal movement 
organisations 
Australian Financial Review 1986-1996 
Sydney Morning Herald Sept. 1986-1996 
The Age 1991-1996 
 
 
Total 
articles 
Hostile Non-hostile Quoted Right-
wing 
Editorial 
  acknowledged endorsed    
996 96 816 84 626 154 40 
 
 
During the survey period 900 articles (90 per cent) were identified as non-
hostile, while 96 (9 per cent) were identified as being hostile towards the 
movement. Of the non-hostile articles, 816 (81 per cent of the total articles) 
simply acknowledged the movement, while 84 (8 per cent) offered endorsement 
of the movement, its ideology or public statements. The incidence of the radical 
neo-liberal organisations being quoted is relatively high at 626 articles (62 per 
cent), while incidence of movement organisations being labelled as either 'right-
wing' or 'conservative' is a relatively low 154 articles (15 per cent). 
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Although comprising only four per cent of total coverage, the 40 editorials 
mentioning movement organisations had a significantly higher level of 
endorsement (22 per cent) for the radical neo-liberal movement than did other 
articles, while the incidence of hostile editorials was slightly higher than average 
at 10 per cent. 
 
As Table 6.2 demonstrates, a number of columnists for the Fairfax publications 
surveyed were themselves radical neo-liberal activists. Between 1988 and 1996, 
John Stone was a regular weekly columnist with the Australian Financial 
Review. For much of this time he was also an employee of the Institute of Public 
Affairs, and he often used his columns to promote IPA publications and referred 
to the organisation’s work as authoritative source material.9 Rarely did he 
mention his association with the Institute.10 P.P. McGuinness was also a regular 
Fairfax columnist during the survey period. At various times he wrote a regular 
back page column for the Australian Financial Review, and was a columnist for 
both the Sydney Morning Herald and Age newspapers. Many of his Sydney 
Morning Herald articles were also syndicated to the Age. McGuinness wrote 
approvingly of radical neo-liberal organisations as well as quoting from and 
referring to their publications as authoritative sources.11 In addition to these 
regular columnists, many other movement activists were able to have opinion 
pieces published in the Fairfax press. Table 6.2 lists a further 26 such movement 
activists.12 All of these columnists used their regular columns to promote radical 
neo-liberal opinions and arguments. Often these commentators' articles would 
appear without their organisational affiliation in the by-line. The survey also 
                                                 
9 See for example: John Stone, ‘Provocative Claims Slide on Ice’, Australian Financial Review, 
26th May, 1994, p. 19; John Stone, ‘The Danger of Going to PCs’, Australian Financial Review, 
16th March, 1995, p. 19; John Stone, ‘Lies and Lies, and that’s Stats’, Australian Financial 
Review, 30th November, 1995, p. 19.  
10 Among the few examples are John Stone, ‘Praise Due for Staying on Track’, Australian 
Financial Review, 8th September, 1993, p. 4; John Stone, ‘Provocative Claims Slide on Ice’, p. 
19. 
11 See for example P. P. McGuinness, ‘The Market for Conservation’, Australian Financial 
Review, 21st July, 1988, p. 76; P. P. McGuinness, ‘Protection Programs are Nonsense, not 
Commonsense, The Age, 13th April, 1995, p. 16; P. P. McGuinness, ‘Young People are the 
Losers’, Sydney Morning Herald, 14th December, 1996, p. 34; P. P. McGuinness, ‘All Worked 
Up – But Where’s the Evidence’, Sydney Morning Herald, 20th July, 1996, p. 36. 
12 Although every attempt was made to be as comprehensive as possible in this search, it is 
possible that not all movement activist surnames were searched, and thus that table 6.2 is not 
exhaustive. 
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reveals that the movement was able to place articles or speeches originally 
appearing (or soon to be appearing) in movement journals or forums, in the 
opinion pages of the Fairfax press.13  
 
 
  
Table 6.2 Radical neo-liberals as columnists 
Australian Financial Review 1986-1996 
Sydney Morning Herald Sept. 1986-1996 
The Age 1991-1996 
 
Name Number of 
articles 
Name Number of 
articles 
P. P. McGuinness 1762 Michael Warby 2 
John Stone 393 James Cox 2 
Des Moore 35 Ken Baker 2 
Barry Maley 16 Ron Brunton 2 
Michael James 15  Robert Albon 2  
Alan Moran 13 Geoffrey Brennan 1 
Richard Blandy 8 Andrew Chisholm 1 
Michael Porter 8 Andrew Hay 1 
Bert Kelly 7 Hugh Morgan 1 
Mike Nahan 5 Chandran 
Kukathas 
1 
Geoff Hogbin 5 Wolfgang Kasper 1 
Leonie Kramer 4 Ray Evans 1 
Susan Moore  4 Warren Hogan 1 
Peter Swan 3   
Andrew Norton 3   
                                                 
13 See for example, Chandran Kukathus, ‘Land of the Free and the Fearful’, Sydney Morning 
Herald, 5th December, 1996, p. 17; Stephen Kirchner, ‘Dumping Can Opens up a Bargain 
Basement’, The Age, 5th January, 1993, p. 11; Jeffrey Petchey and Perry Shapiro, ‘It’s Time to 
Hand Back Taxing to the States’, Australian Financial Review, 11th May, 1995, p. 17.  
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Although not themselves activists in the neo-liberal intellectual movement, a 
number of other Fairfax columnists were sympathetic to the radical neo-liberal 
agenda, or parts thereof. The columnists listed below quoted approvingly from 
neo-liberal publications and framed the radical neo-liberal intellectual movement 
as a legitimate and worthy commentator in public debate. 
 
David Clark wrote a regular column for the Australian Financial Review during 
the survey period, entitled 'On the Other Hand'. Although some articles Clark 
wrote displayed a facetious attitude toward movement organisations,14 it is 
apparent that Clark was at least a semi-regular attendee at movement 
conferences and gatherings.15 He also employed the language of the radical neo-
liberal movement, such as the term 'industrial relations club'.16 Furthermore, 
Clark defended the radical neo-liberals from their opponents.17 Clark also wrote 
the Australian Financial Review’s 'Student Economic Briefs' — a regular 
column designed for high school economics students. In these articles, Clark 
would regularly include references to publications of the IPA — either directly 
in the text or as suggested further reading.18 Each year these articles were revised 
                                                 
14 David Clark, ‘Despite Bleatings by Premiers, State Finances Won’t Really be Reformed’, 
Australian Financial Review, 25th May, 1987, p. 10; David Clark, ‘Federal Election Campaign 
Promises to be Nothing More than Hot Air’, Australian Financial Review, 1st June, 1987, p. 10. 
15 David Clark, ‘H. R. Nicholls Society Will Continue to Grow – in Influence and Strength’, 
Australian Financial Review, 9th June, 1987, p. 14; David Clark, ‘Opposition Still Unable to 
Expand on its Industrial Relations Policy’, Australian Financial Review, 22nd February, 1988, p. 
12; David Clark, ‘It’s High Time We Cut Off the Funds to Our Molly-Coddled ‘Aristocracy’’, 
Australian Financial Review, 21st July, 1988, p. 14. 
16 David Clark, ‘Let’s Stop Kicking the Can and Look Hard at the Labour Issue’, Australian 
Financial Review, 6th October, 1986, p. 12; David Clark, ‘Popular Subject of Discussion Among 
Economists is not Economics’, Australian Financial Review, 31st August, 1987, p. 12. 
17 See for example David Clark, ‘Opposition Still Unable to Expand on its Industrial Relations 
Policy’, p. 12. In David Clark, ‘Direct the Public Subsidies to Left and Right — then Watch the 
Arrows Fly’, Australian Financial Review, 15th December, 1986, p. 16, he gives a qualified 
defence of the CIS. In David Clark, ‘A Topsy-turvy World where the Left is Right and the Right 
is Left’, Australian Financial Review, 8th September, 1986, p. 16, he writes ‘groups like the H. R. 
Nicholls Society have an important role to play’. 
18 David Clark, ‘Managing Australia’s Magic Pudding’, Australian Financial Review, 15th June, 
1994, pp. 38-39; David Clark, ‘White Paper or Election Whitewash?’, Australian Financial 
Review, 20th July, 1994, pp. 30-31; David Clark, ‘Public Good or Private Satisfaction?, 
Australian Financial Review, 3rd August, 1994, pp. 30-31. 
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and updated, published in book form and marketed to final year high school 
students.19 Supplementing this written material each year was a series of lectures 
given by Clark in capital cities and regional centres. Clark's sometimes 
ambiguous relationship with the radical neo-liberals was evident in these 
publications and lectures, for, although offering think tank sources as further 
reading, he characterised the Centre for Independent Studies as tending to 
'concentrate on bolstering academics' CVs rather than public education'.20 
 
Former Labor federal Finance Minister, Peter Walsh, wrote a regular column for 
the Australian Financial Review under the moniker 'Cassandra' from 1990 
onwards. Although demonstrating, in the early years of this column, occasional 
hostility towards the radical neo-liberal movement and its attacks upon the Labor 
government's economic record,21 he also used neo-liberal publications as 
authoritative sources,22 and, as the ‘nineties progressed, increasingly framed his 
arguments within a radical neo-liberal framework. Walsh also enthusiastically 
took up the movement’s new class discourse in his columns.23 
 
Maximillian Walsh was economics editor for the Sydney Morning Herald and 
wrote regular columns for both it and the Age. As well as generally employing a 
neo-liberal framework, Walsh regularly quoted approvingly from IPA and CIS 
publications and sometimes used his column to advertise their upcoming 
events.24 He wrote about the H. R. Nicholls society in a non-hostile manner, 
                                                 
19 See for example David Clark, Student Economic Briefs 1990/91, The Financial Review 
Library, 1990. 
20 David Clark, Student Economic Briefs 1997, AFR Books, Sydney, 1996, p.241. 
21 See for example, Peter Walsh, ‘GST ‘Advantages’ do not Quite Add Up’, Australian 
Financial Review, 23rd April, 1992, p. 9. 
22 See for example: Peter Walsh, ‘How Australia can Save $3bn’, Australian Financial Review, 
14th March, 1995, p. 15; Peter Walsh, ‘Child-Care Scheme Flawed’, Australian Financial 
Review, 8th December, 1992, p. 15; Peter Walsh, ‘Offshore Oil Fallacies Exposed’, Australian 
Financial Review, 26th October, 1993, p. 17. 
23 See for example: Peter Walsh, ‘New Class is Just More of the Same’, Australian Financial 
Review, 28th August, 1990, p. 13; Peter Walsh, ‘Immigration Policy Continued at a Cost’, 
Australian Financial Review, 30th July, 1991, p. 11; Peter Walsh, ‘Self-Interest Boosts 
Unemployment Rate’, Australian Financial Review, 10th December, 1991, p. 13; Peter Walsh, 
‘Choice of Bias on the ABC’, Australian Financial Review, 18th August, 1992, p. 16. 
24 See for example: Max Walsh, ‘Best Fiscal Policy can be Swamped’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
11th May, 1993, p. 31; Max Walsh, ‘Pork-barrelling at its Worst’, Sydney Morning Herald, 26th 
July, 1995, p. 41; Max Walsh, ‘Keating’s J Curve Delivers the Goods’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
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viewing it as an important, authoritative voice in industrial relations policy 
debates.25 
 
Glenda Korporaal and Shaun Carney, both regular columnists for the Age in the 
1990s, not only regularly sourced movement think tanks in their articles, but also 
wrote a number of positive reviews of their work and influence.26 Carney, for 
example, credited the H. R. Nicholls Society with changing ‘the broad 
assessment of Australians about industrial relations’.27 
 
As a journalist for the Australian Financial Review, Tom Dusevic often sought 
quotations and used information from movement think tanks, as well as 
promoting their events.28 In 1990 he authored an investigation of the think tank 
phenomenon, with a sympathetic treatment of the radical neo-liberal 
organisations — other than the H. R. Nicholls Society and Adam Smith Club 
which he labelled 'masonic like dinner clubs'.29 Similarly, Rowan Callick often 
quoted as authoritative sources neo-liberal think tank publications, statistics and 
opinions, and later became a columnist for the Australian Financial Review, 
giving sympathetic coverage to the radical neo-liberals.30 
 
                                                                                                                                   
2nd March, 1993, p. 29; Max Walsh, ‘Why ‘Family’ Won’t Look in the Closet’, Sydney Morning 
Herald, 2nd August, 1994, p. 43. 
25 Max Walsh, ‘Scarify, Vilify, Bananafy’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1st September, 1986, p. 11. 
26 See for example Glenda Korporaal, ‘States Need a Firm Push to Common Accounting’, The 
Age, 24th May, 1991, p. 13; Glenda Korporaal, ‘The Perils of Gradualism’, The Age, 28th August, 
1991, p. 13. Korporaal described the H. R. Nicholls Society sympathetically as ‘dedicated to 
freeing up Australia’s industrial relations system’ in Glenda Korporaal, ‘Aspiring Treasurer Not 
Big Spender’, The Age, 25th November, 1995, p. 39. 
27 Shaun Carney, ‘Spell of New Right Shows Signs of Breaking’ , The Age,  23rd January, 1992, 
p. 13. 
28 Tom Dusevic, ‘Step in the Right Direction, but Forecasts ‘Too Optimistic’’, Australian 
Financial Review, 27th February, 1992, p. 4; Tom Dusevic, ‘Keating Promises Hard Line Against 
the States’, Australian Financial Review, 29th March, 1990, p. 5; Tom Dusevic, ‘Hayden Backs 
Free Economy’, Australian Financial Review, 27th November, 1990, p. 3. 
29 Tom Dusevic, 'The Idea Factories', Australian Financial Review, 25th May 1990, pp. 1, 3. 
30 Rowan Callick, ‘Charity’, Australian Financial Review, 1st June, 1993, p. 12; Rowan Callick, 
‘Wages Survive NZ Reforms’, Australian Financial Review, 5th February, 1996, p. 8; Rowan 
Callick, ‘Australia: The Land at the Point of no Return’, Australian Financial Review, 22nd June, 
1995, p. 1; Rowan Callick, ‘Labor’s Economic Policies Causing Unemployment: Hughes’, 
Australian Financial Review, 1st December, 1994, p. 4. Of radical neo-liberal think tanks, Brian 
Toohey says ‘journalists who shared those views would be happy to report them as though they 
were authoritative or independent’ (Brian Toohey, interview with the author). 
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Criticism of the radical neo-liberals has, however, come from a small number of 
Fairfax columnists. Age columnist and economics editor, Ken Davidson, was one 
of the few consistent critics of the movement in the Fairfax press. He 
consistently undermined the economic reasoning of the radical neo-liberal 
movement, pointing out that they were based upon ideology rather than sound 
economic reasoning, and argued that their policy prescriptions would have 
dangerous consequences if implemented. The IPA and Tasman Institute's Project 
Victoria came in for special attention from Davidson.31 
 
The radical neo-liberals were a common target of Robert Manne's columns in the 
Sydney Morning Herald and The Age. Economic rationalism, argued Manne, was 
an ideology destructive of the traditions that had brought Australia economic 
prosperity and social cohesion and had infiltrated the Liberal Party via well 
funded think tanks, such as the IPA, Tasman Institute and CIS.32 
 
In his regular columns in the Sydney Morning Herald, Gerard Henderson 
directed occasional criticism at some in the radical neo-liberal movement. Whilst 
sympathetic to the radical neo-liberal agenda himself, Henderson was 
particularly scathing of the involvement of movement activists such as Des 
Moore, John Stone and Michael Porter in the ‘Joh for PM’ campaign.33 In 
addition, Henderson would sometimes snipe form the sidelines of the movement 
at inconsistencies in the radical neo-liberal position.34 As outlined in Chapter 
Three, Henderson was an early participant in the radical neo-liberal movement, 
but his establishment of the Sydney Institute — a more mainstream forum of 
debate than its predecessor, the IPA (NSW) —  in 1989 marked his public break 
with the movement. 
                                                 
31 See Kenneth Davidson, ‘Economic Change – It’s all a Matter of Choice’, The Age, 2nd May, 
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34 Gerard Henderson, ‘Will Our Politicians Ever Be the Toast of the Town?’, Sydney Morning 
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Morning Herald, 28th December, 1993, p. 17;  Gerard Henderson, ‘Dear Dame: A Dose of Self-
Criticism Would Not Go Astray’, Sydney Morning Herald, 28th November, 1995, p. 13. 
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Regular Sydney Morning Herald economics commentator, Ross Gittins, is 
difficult to classify as either supportive or inimical to the radical neo-liberals. 
Whilst supporting some of the broad thrusts of the movement’s ideology, Gittins 
was critical of many of the militant methods advocated by the neo-liberals for 
achieving these. Gittins also believed that the radical neo-liberals had little 
understanding of the realities of industrial relations at the workplace level. 35  
 
Michael Stutchbury maintained a sceptical, and sometimes openly hostile, 
attitude towards the economic analyses and prescriptions of the radical neo-
liberal movement in his columns for the Financial Review.36 The exception to 
this was in his legal columns in which he gave much favourable coverage to the 
Tasman Institute publication Monopolistic Restrictions in Provision of Advocacy 
Services.37 
 
Former Whitlam Minister, Jim McLelland, also used a number of his regular 
columns for the Sydney Morning Herald to attack the radical neo-liberals.38 
Other regular columnists who occasionally attacked the radical neo-liberals were 
Geoffrey Barker, Mike Steketee, Adele Horin and John Quiggin.39 
 
Sydney Morning Herald journalists, Pamela Williams and David McKnight 
demonstrated an interest in the radical neo-liberal movement in a number of 
                                                 
35 Ross Gittins, ‘Why Peko Approach Doesn’t Work Against Lurks’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
10th September, 1986, p. 15. 
36 Michael Stutchbury, ‘How Much Carrot can Mr Keating Give for Reform of the Workplace?, 
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articles written during the 1980s. Both cast doubt upon the desirability and 
credibility of the movement's aims, and were keen to draw together the linkages 
between the elements of the radical neo-liberal movement, and to trace its 
influence within other organisations and with other individuals.40 
 
The Fairfax media's discovery of the 'new right' 
 
Although the term had been used earlier in Australia,41 in 1986 the media as a 
whole discovered  the 'new right' as a political phenomenon. It was at this time 
that the 'new right' became a major referent for the Australian print media. The 
catalyst for this was the Robe River industrial dispute in the Pilbara region of 
Western Australia. Specifically, it was the revelation in August 1986 that Peko-
Wallsend Chief Executive, Charles Copeman, was a member of the H. R. 
Nicholls Society that created a flurry of interest in the new right. On August 27th, 
1986, the Sydney Morning Herald reported upon Copeman's disclosure from the 
previous day that he was a member of the H. R. Nicholls Society, described by 
the Herald journalist as 'an informal group of outspoken businessmen who, Mr 
Copeman says have "fellow feelings about the benefits of deregulation."'42 It was 
in this context that, the following day, the Sydney Morning Herald carried an 
article investigating the H. R. Nicholls Society in more detail. Attendants of the 
inaugural meeting were referred to as 'hard-line right-wingers' and a 'group of 
ultra-right wing professionals', and it was suggested that the group may have 
'caused a toughening of the Liberal Party's industrial policy'.43  
 
Although the H. R. Nicholls Society had held its inaugural meeting six months 
earlier on the weekend of 28th February- 2nd March, this went largely unnoticed 
by the mainstream media at the time, apart from an article a few weeks later in 
                                                 
40 See David McKnight, ‘The New Right: A Consumer’s Guide’, pp. 41, 45;  David McKnight, 
‘Something’s Ailing the Doctors’, Sydney Morning Herald, 8th February, 1989, p. 13; Pamela 
Williams, ‘New Right Exerts Power on Liberals’, p. 10; Pamela Williams, ‘New Right Regroups 
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41 See for example Marian Sawer (ed), Australia and the New Right. 
42 Anon, 'Social Security Decides Robe River Workers Entitled to Dole', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 27 August, 1986, p. 2. 
43 Anon, 'The Professionals Form Private Club to Swing Liberals to the Right', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 28 August, 1986, p. 4. 
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the Bulletin.44 Once Copeman's H. R. Nicholls Society membership was 
revealed, however, at the height of a militant campaign against its unionised 
workforce by Peko-Wallsend, the Society itself became synonymous with the 
Robe River dispute. The media's coverage of Copeman's H. R. Nicholls Society 
membership lead to public criticism of the mining chief by Labor politicians, 
such as Bob Hawke's branding of the Society as 'political troglodytes',45 which 
itself generated more mentions of the Society in the Fairfax press.  
 
The 'new right' was the term used by many journalists to describe the network of 
politicians, businessmen and academics (the radical neo-liberal movement) who, 
it now turned out, had been discussing strategies to dismantle the arbitration 
system for at least six months prior to the Robe River dispute, and from late 
August through the month of September 1986, the 'new right' became front page 
news in the Fairfax press. Background pieces were published on the 'new right',46 
and the 'new right' was often mentioned in connection with radical neo-liberal 
think tanks and forums, as well as in connection with individuals and groups 
such as Andrew Hay, Charles Copeman, John Stone, the Australian Federation 
of Employers, and the National Priorities Project.47  
 
The accuracy of the print media's analysis and understanding of the new right 
varied, but some general trends can be identified. Rather than describing it as a 
movement, journalists tended to write about the new right as if it were an 
organisation or a lobby group. Andrew Hay, for example, was described on a 
number of occasions as a 'leader'48 of the new right, and 'membership' of the new 
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right 'group' was often referred to.49 Those more sympathetic to labour market 
deregulation tended to have a more accurate description of the nature of the 
movement, whilst ignoring the crucial organisational role played by think tanks 
and forums and the radical nature of their ideology. The Australian Financial 
Review, for example, editorialised that the new right 'operates mainly through 
networking' and was but ‘one more manifestation of the gathering unease over 
the present direction of Australian industrial relations, now widespread in the 
community’.50 Similarly, Max Walsh labelled the H. R. Nicholls Society as 
simply 'a collection of critics of the industrial system of this country'.51 Such 
authors also tended to downplay the power of the radical neo-liberals and argue 
that, whilst their tactics may be radical, their goals of labour market deregulation 
were not. While some derided the ‘new right’, in the face of criticisms of the 
new right by the CAI as 'fascists', and Hawke's labelling of them as 'political 
troglodytes', a number of commentators argued that the ideas of the radical neo-
liberals should be judged on their merits, rather than according to prejudice or 
ideology.52 Michael Stutchbury, a consistent critic of radical neo-liberalism, 
described the H. R. Nicholls Society as a 'smokescreen' for the source of the real 
push for labour market deregulation: the financial markets.53 
 
For other Fairfax journalists, the new right was 'fragmented but powerful'54 and 
primarily responsible for the Labor Party's declining support in opinion polls.55 
While some critics of the radical neo-liberals ascribed a sinister, conspiratorial 
character to the 'new right', such an analysis was rejected by most of the press 
reports of the new right. A federal election was due to be called sometime in 
1987-88, and speculation abounded that the 'new right' would be a force at those 
polls — whether indirectly through the Liberal Party, or directly by standing its 
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own candidates. The new right was taken as evidence of a general shift to the 
right, and it was assumed, in hindsight, that the new right was responsible for 
'changing the broad assessment of Australians about industrial relations’.56 
 
Interest in the new right as a phenomenon continued into 1987, but began to 
subside from 1988 onwards. After this there were still occasional articles on the 
‘new right’, and the new right was generally only mentioned by its critics within 
the media, or in reference to the histories of movement activists such as Peter 
Costello, Ian MacLachlan, David Kemp, Rod Kemp, John Stone — all of whom 
became Coalition MPs in 1987 or after — as well as Michael Kroger, who was 
becoming a leading functionary within the Liberal Party.  
 
Interpretation 
 
Between 1986 and 1996 the radical neo-liberal think tanks received generally 
sympathetic coverage from the Fairfax newspapers surveyed. While articles that 
endorsed the radical neo-liberal movement constituted only 8 per cent of the 
surveyed articles, the fact that 90 per cent of the total coverage was non-hostile 
indicates that the organisational arms of the radical neo-liberal movement have 
been treated, by the Fairfax media, as legitimate actors on the Australian political 
stage. That 62 per cent of the articles surveyed quoted movement sources, 
strengthens this contention. Perhaps the most telling statistic, however, is that 
despite the obvious ideological bias of the radical neo-liberal think tanks, only 
15 per cent of articles surveyed described them as either right-wing or 
conservative. This suggests that movement organisations have tended to framed 
as independent, non-ideological and authoritative sources of public comment, 
rather than as ideologically motivated and partisan organisations. These findings 
bear out the comments made by both Greg Lindsay and John Hyde that the 
                                                 
56 Shaun Carney, ‘Spell of the New Right Shows Signs of Breaking’, p. 13. 
 250
media has tended to view their think tanks as 'independent and authoritative' 
organisations.57 
 
Also telling is the Fairfax editorial coverage of movement organisations. While 
the overall non-hostile coverage of the movement accords with the average of 90 
per cent, part of this figure is made up of the 22 per cent of all editorials that 
overtly endorsed the activities, ideology or output of the movement. That this is 
significantly higher than the average is important because editorials are 
expressions of the general position of a newspaper. It is therefore significant that 
the Australian Financial Review, for example, in numerous editorials between 
1986 and 1988 quoted approvingly from reports and publications by the Centre 
for Independent Studies.58 In a similar vein, the Sydney Morning Herald 
editorialised that the Liberal Party would do well to take note of the reports 
produced by right-wing think tanks such as the IPA and CIS, while an Age 
editorialist in 1991 spoke of the 'rigorous' IPA study on state spending.59 
 
The exception to this trend is the H. R. Nicholls Society. Even when it was not 
explicitly labelled as either 'right-wing' or 'conservative', it was generally framed 
in the context of a discussion about the 'new right'. It was unable to shake off the 
tag of a radical, right-wing group. Around 30 per cent of articles mentioning this 
group described it as either right-wing or conservative (compared with 15 per 
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cent overall) whilst about 20 per cent were overtly hostile towards it (compared 
with 9 per cent overall).  
 
Perhaps even more significant than the favourable coverage received by the 
radical neo-liberals was the adoption, by numerous journalists, of the language 
and ideological frameworks of the movement. The two most successful 
examples of such discursive infiltration are the Fairfax media’s adoption of the 
terms ‘industrial relations club’ and ‘political correctness’. As outlined in 
Chapter Two, both terms, in their contemporary usage, are derived from the 
radical neo-liberal movement. The term ‘industrial relations club’ came to be 
employed not only by those sympathetic to the movement but also by those 
inimical to it. Not surprisingly, movement activists such as Paddy McGuinness 
and John Stone employed the term in their regular columns to attack the 
arbitration system and to undermine the legitimacy of trade unions.60 Movement 
sympathisers, such as Max Walsh, Glenda Korporaal, Gerard Henderson and 
Peter Walsh, also mobilised this discourse.61 David Clark was another regular 
user of the term.62 But those not necessarily sympathetic to the movement also 
employed the term in a similar vein. Michael Stutchbury, for example, regularly 
employed the term in reference to the peak union and employer bodies 
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supportive of the institutions of arbitration,63 as did Ross Gittins, albeit less 
frequently.64 In 1996 the Herald’s Industrial Relations Editor, Brad Norington, 
called it ‘an apt term’.65  Editorials from the Fairfax papers also used the term. In 
1987, for example, the Sydney Morning Herald editorial belittled ‘the Industrial 
Relations Club – that cosy coalition of unions, employers’ associations, quasi-
judges and the Department of Employment and Industrial Relations’.66  
 
A similar phenomenon is observable in relation to the terms ‘political 
correctness’ and ‘politically correct’. Movement columnists such as Stone and 
McGuinness were regular proponents of the term, as were sympathisers Peter 
Walsh and Les Carlyon.67 Editorials also attacked ‘political correctness’.68 But, 
unlike the ‘industrial relations club’ terminology, the notion of ‘political 
correctness’ was quickly adopted both by regular journalists and by those 
reporting on culture, entertainment and art.69 In the Fairfax press, ‘political 
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correctness’ entered the journalistic lexicon in 1992 and rapidly increased in 
usage, peaking in 1996.70 
 
What both of these examples demonstrate is that aspects of the movement’s 
discourse infiltrated journalistic common sense during the 1980s and 1990s in 
the Fairfax press. Implicit in the use of such terms is an acceptance of the 
ideological framework informing them: a demonisation of the opponents of neo-
liberalism. Clearly this capture of common sense bolsters the struggle for neo-
liberal hegemony. 
 
The ability of the radical neo-liberal movement to use the Fairfax media to 
promote its ideology can be attributed to the relationship between the 
movement’s tactics and the processes of news production; and, perhaps most 
importantly, to the interests and values that permeate the Fairfax press by virtue 
of its position as a capitalist enterprise. 
 
Greg Lindsay, Executive Director of the CIS, believes that: 'The media likes us 
because we give them a lot to write about and we have authoritative voices 
available to comment on many things.'71 This is certainly correct, but it belies the 
extent to which, as outlined in Chapter Three, the radical neo-liberals have 
actively courted journalists and sought to intervene in public discourse via the 
media. Through their conferences, journals and other publications, the radical 
neo-liberal think tanks have had a wealth of material for the media to draw upon. 
Because of their preference for polemic, emotionally potent oversimplifications, 
and easily digestible information, this material was in a form readily adaptable to 
the needs of the media. One survey establishes that 20 per cent of economics and 
finance journalists view ‘think tanks’ as ‘important’ or ‘very important’ sources 
of information.72 Edited versions of journal articles and conference speeches 
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provided a ready source of material for opinion ‘op ed’ columns. Within 
movement organisations, bodies such as the CIS’s ‘media centre’ provided a 
conduit between this information and journalists.73 Selected journalists were 
regularly invited to radical neo-liberal events. It seems reasonable, then, to assert 
that the tactics employed by the radical neo-liberal movement have contributed 
to their success in promoting their ideology through the Fairfax media. 
 
The relationship between movement tactics and journalistic processes is evident 
also in the Fairfax media’s discovery of the ‘new right’. The period from 1986 to 
1988 was a time when the radical neo-liberal movement was undertaking a 
variety of initiatives. Indeed it was a time of intense neo-liberal activism. In 
1986 the Australian Federation of Employers (AFE) was formed, the National 
Priorities Project (NPP) was launched and the H. R. Nicholls Society was 
founded. In 1987 the ‘Joh for PM’ campaign was in full swing, with radical neo-
liberals speaking at supporters' rallies and assisting in the formulation of policy. 
Michael Porter was attempting to get the Tasman University project off the 
ground, CoPS was de-funded by the federal government, and Bruce Shepherd, as 
head of the AMA, was employing militant tactics to achieve neo-liberal changes 
to the public health system. Throughout this period, the radical neo-liberals were 
a target of criticism for senior Labor figures, representatives from manufacturing 
employer associations, as well as from the 'wets' within the Liberal Party. 
 
Media savvy as many in the movement were, there can be little doubt that the 
activities of the radical neo-liberal movement during this period were deliberate 
attempts at public discourse intervention through the vehicle of the mainstream 
media. On the one hand the radical neo-liberals employed forms of collective 
action that were readily understood by the mainstream media, as they conformed 
to the norms of protest activity established by social movements — the forming 
of organisations, public meetings, and so on — and thus their activism was 
tailored to suit the mainstream media. On the other hand, such activities were 
also disruptive of traditional media frames for interpreting the role of 
                                                 
73 CIS, CIS Annual Review, 1992-1993, CIS, St. Leonards, 1993, p. 18. 
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establishment figures, such as right-wing academics and businessmen. Far from 
inhibiting the coverage of the movement, such a disruption, caused by 
employing repertoires of collective performance normally associated with social 
movements, was itself the subject of media interest. It helped to create the new 
right as a novel phenomenon within the interpretive grid of media practitioners. 
 
The Fairfax media's discovery of the new right was a turning point for the radical 
neo-liberal movement. Not only did it bring neo-liberal ideas to national 
attention, it also demonstrated that there was a well-organised movement 
committed to advocating them. From 1986 the movement received publicity 
disproportionate to its size. No doubt the radical neo-liberals were emboldened 
by the publicity generated through their activism. It encouraged them to think 
that public discourse intervention was a constructive way of achieving their 
aims. For some within the movement, the movement's support for employer 
militancy — such as the Peko Wallsend lockout — would have been vindicated. 
As for the wisdom of engaging in direct action themselves, opinion was divided. 
Whilst highlighting a number of neo-liberal policy preferences, the ‘Joh for PM’ 
campaign and its associated public rallies were a disaster for the Coalition's re-
election prospects. Although Paul Kelly is undoubtedly correct to write that, at 
the time the new right 'was not interested in popularity',74 it did have an interest 
in its own credibility, and some saw this threatened by being associated with the 
‘Joh for PM’ campaign.75 
 
Direct involvement in direct action was eschewed by most of the movement after 
this point. They preferred to focus upon more traditional tactics. And, partly as a 
result of the media's discovery of the ‘new right’, the climate was favourable for 
such tactics. During its discovery of the ‘new right’, the media tended to portray 
the radical neo-liberals as possessing greater influence than they actually had, 
and portraying them, sometimes, as part of a radical, popular groundswell. The 
former was to become a persistent media frame for interpreting the movement. It 
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is therefore no coincidence that it was around this time that corporate funding of 
the radical neo-liberal movement soared. The media's discovery of the ‘new 
right’ helped to put radical neo-liberal ideas on the national agenda. It helped to 
provide momentum for radical neo-liberal ideas and, in doing so opened up a 
space for less radical neo-liberal ideas. In time, the ideas of the radical neo-
liberals would come to be less radical as they began to be reflected in state and 
federal policy. 
 
The negative consequences for the movement were that, for some journalists, 
they were inextricably linked with vested interests and an inflexible ideology. 
This opened them up to criticism from unions, the Labor Party and the Left. As 
discussed in previous chapters the movement was concerned to head off such 
criticism. Such criticisms, however, constituted a minority of Fairfax media 
accounts of the movement. 
 
The period 1986-1988 should be viewed as a battle over the interpretation of the 
radical neo-liberal movement within the Australia media. It was the outcome of 
this battle that shaped the general frame employed by journalists for 
understanding the movement and for presenting it to the public. Between 1986 
and 1988 the 'new right' was a common point of reference within the Fairfax 
media. During this time there were journalists, such as David McKnight and 
Pamela Williams, who, as already stated, drew links between the neo-liberal 
think tanks and activists and the support that they received from certain sections 
of the capitalist class, as well as demonstrating the links and networks that 
existed between the various participants in the radical neo-liberal movement. It 
was these journalists who were closest to an accurate description of the 
movement. After 1988 however, the 'new right' faded as the Fairfax media's 
primary referent to the radical neo-liberal movement. After this period, apart 
from the occasional piece on think tanks in general, the Fairfax media tended to 
treat neo-liberal think tanks and forums separately, and to view them as 
authoritative, independent public policy institutes. 1986 is the year with the 
highest percentage (24 per cent) of neo-liberal think tanks and organisations 
being identified as either right-wing or conservative by the Fairfax media. There 
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is a sharp decline the following year, to 14 per cent, and a small decline the year 
after, to 13 per cent. This is illuminating because it tells us that, despite the 
awareness at the time within the Fairfax media of the ideological nature of the 
think tanks and organisations associated with the radical neo-liberal movement, 
and therefore the relatively high level identification of them as right-wing, it was 
not translated into a general trend in subsequent years. Part of the reason for this 
may lie in the abnormally high coverage of the H. R. Nicholls Society during this 
year, however this is not enough to explain the statistical variance. 
 
Another explanation is that the battle over the media's interpretation and framing 
of the neo-liberal movement was lost by those who sought to see it as a 
movement integrally linked to the interests of sections of the ruling class. Thus, 
the ruling class-biased nature of the radical neo-liberal movement was obscured, 
or ignored by the Fairfax media. The outcome of this media battle was for the 
media's frame for interpreting the neo-liberal movement to accord closely with 
the neo-liberal movement's and think tanks' views of themselves. It is because of 
this that the media's discovery of the ‘new right’ did not significantly effect the 
portrayal of neo-liberal think tanks within the Fairfax media. In 1986, neo-liberal 
think tanks were already being used as authoritative sources of comment by the 
Fairfax media, and this continued after the media's discovery of the ‘new right’. 
 
But the relationship between the tactics of the movement and the processes of 
news production are not sufficient to explain why the radical neo-liberals 
received such sympathetic treatment by the Fairfax media. It seems reasonable to 
argue that the interests of the owners of the Fairfax media played an important 
role as well. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, media capitalists were 
important supporters of the radical neo-liberal movement. Even those that did 
not financially support the movement had a direct interest in the neo-liberal 
transformation of the Australian state and economy. Media capitalists were part 
of the broader struggle for neo-liberal hegemony in Australia. Crucial to that 
struggle was the articulation of the new common sense complementary to the 
neo-liberal state project, and the concomitant undermining of those ideologies 
opposed to neo-liberalism or supportive of welfare capitalism. That the radical 
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neo-liberal movement was able to obtain sympathetic coverage through the 
Fairfax media is reflective of the general shift, particularly among opinion 
columnists, to those sympathetic to the broad neo-liberal worldview and away 
from those opposed to it. 
 
Summary 
 
The preceding survey reveals that the radical neo-liberal movement received 
generally sympathetic coverage from the Sydney Morning Herald, Australian 
Financial Review and the Age during the period 1986-1996. Specifically, the 
frame established for interpreting the activities of movement organisations was 
that they were non-ideological, authoritative sources of expert commentary. 
Such framing assisted the movement in using the Fairfax media as a vehicle for 
promoting its ideology. Not only did journalists report upon and quote the output 
of movement organisations, but the movement was able to infiltrate the 
journalistic discourse itself through terms such as the ‘industrial relations club’ 
and ‘political correctness’. The Fairfax media provided a further vehicle for the 
promotion of movement ideology by publishing numerous opinion pieces written 
by movement activists. Only rarely were the authors of such pieces identified as 
being participants in the radical neo-liberal movement or its organisations. 
 
 
The Fairfax case study as indicative of the broader Australian media’s 
relationship with the radical neo-liberal movement 
 
It is the contention of this thesis that the relationship between the radical neo-
liberal movement and the Fairfax media is indicative of the movement’s 
relationship with the broader media in Australia. The rest of this chapter outlines 
the grounds for such a contention. Four broad arguments will be made. First, it 
will be argued that the print media, in particular the Australian Financial Review 
and the Australian, played an important role in the emergence of the radical neo-
liberal movement in the years prior to 1986. Second, it will be argued that the 
radical neo-liberals had at least as much access to the broader print media as they 
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did to the Fairfax media already surveyed. Third, it will be argued that the frame 
employed by the broader commercial media (whether in print, radio or 
television) for interpreting the radical neo-liberal movement, was at least as 
sympathetic as that which characterised the Fairfax media’s coverage. Fourth, it 
will be argued that the broader commercial media in Australia has been a vehicle 
for neo-liberal hegemony, and that the radical neo-liberal movement has been a 
key component of this. 
 
The commercial news media and the emergence of the radical neo-liberal 
movement 
 
Numerous commentators credit the Australian Financial Review as being one of 
Australia’s earliest converts to the neo-liberal agenda.76 Max Newton, one of its 
early editors, used the paper to push an anti-protectionist agenda.77 Bert Kelly 
articulated such an agenda in his regular ‘Modest Member’ and ‘Modest Farmer’ 
columns between 1969 and 1987.78 The paper’s neo-liberal agenda was 
continued and broadened by successive editors. Fred Brenchley, editor from 
1978-1980, writes of the paper's 'low protection agenda'79 during his tenure. 
Brenchley took over from movement sympathiser Max Walsh, and was replaced 
by movement activist Paddy McGuinness who edited the paper from 1980 to 
1982 and served as editor-in-chief between 1982 and 1985. McGuinness claims 
that during his editorship, he 'wrote the majority of editorials',80 and he clearly 
had a major influence upon the general direction of the paper, as former editor 
(1982-1985) Tony Maiden's description of McGuinness as the paper's 'opinions 
custodian' attests.81 Importantly, during this period the paper not only had neo-
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liberal sympathies, it was an early advocate of neo-liberal policies. As Maiden 
argues:  
 
Much of what the AFR advocated from the wilderness — lower 
tariffs, competition as an essential driver of growth — were 
becoming the orthodoxy they are today.82  
 
It therefore should not be surprising that the newspaper accorded respect to the 
emerging radical neo-liberal movement. Jim Carlton says that Paddy 
McGuinness was able to place articles for the Crossroads Group. Several 
editorials raised awareness of movement organisations such as the Centre for 
Independent Studies and the Centre of Policy Studies. Movement activist John 
Hyde wrote a regular weekly column entitled 'On the Dry Side' for the 
Australian Financial Review from 1984 to 1985. He would often refer 
approvingly to and quote from neo-liberal think tank publications, including 
those of his own Australian Institute for Public Policy. Like Stone, he rarely 
acknowledged his links with the AIPP, nor was this affiliation mentioned in his 
by-line. Other articles promoted the activities of movement organisations. An 
example of this coverage can be seen in Paddy McGuinness' 1978 article 'Where 
Friedman is a Pinko', in which the author reported favourably upon one of the 
early conferences organised by the Centre for Independent Studies and even 
included the Centre's phone number. According to CIS Executive Director, Greg 
Lindsay, 'days of messages' resulted from this article.83 Lindsay credits the 
publicity generated through the article with the CIS being taken seriously by a 
group of businessmen and academics who were looking to establish their own 
neo-liberal think tank. It was Hugh Morgan, a part of this group, who, the 
following year, brokered the initial 5-year financial support crucial in lifting the 
CIS above a shoestring budget, and into an organisational base for the emerging 
radical neo-liberal movement.84  
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This is indicative of the effect of such sympathetic coverage by the Australian 
Financial Review of the early activities of the radical neo-liberal movement. Not 
only did it help to put the movement on the map, it also gave the movement a 
legitimacy and authority that, in some cases, led to concrete financial support for 
the movement.  
 
The Australian performed a similar role. As David McKnight has demonstrated, 
in the early 1980s, under the editorship of Les Hollings, the Australian reported 
favourably upon the activities of movement organisations such as the IPA and 
CIS.85 In the March 16-17th, 1985 edition of the Weekend Australian, an 
extensive, sympathetic survey of Australia’s radical neo-liberal think tanks was 
accompanied by an editorial suggesting that business should put more money 
into such  organisations.86 Also during this period, movement activists Greg 
Sheridan and Peter Samuel were journalists for the Australian and publicised the 
movement’s activities.87 
 
As national dailies serving relatively small, but elite audiences, the Australian 
and the Australian Financial Review perform an important agenda-setting role. 
That they provided such sympathetic coverage to radical neo-liberal 
organisations at a time when the movement was emerging from relative 
obscurity could only have assisted the movement’s drive to establish its 
legitimacy among the capitalist class and the broader public. 
 
The movement’s access to the broader print media 
 
Despite a lack of extensive statistical data it can reasonably be argued that the 
radical neo-liberal enjoyed at least as positive coverage within, and access to, the 
broader print media in Australia as it did in relation to the Fairfax media. There 
are two main reasons for this. First, the Fairfax media is generally considered to 
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be the more left-leaning of the major print media in Australia. We might, then, 
reasonably expect the Murdoch and Packer-owned media to be at least as 
sympathetic to the movement. Second, available evidence suggests a similar — 
if not a stronger — relationship between the radical neo-liberal movement and 
the Murdoch press in particular to that which was the case with the Fairfax 
media. 
 
In addition to Greg Sheridan and Peter Samuel, a number of other journalists for 
non-Fairfax papers were themselves activists in the radical neo-liberal 
movement. Tim Duncan, an occasional contributor to the IPA Review,88 has 
variously worked as a journalist for the Bulletin, Business Review Weekly, and 
was the national business writer for the Australian. Rod Kemp was also a 
journalist before taking up the directorship of the IPA.89  
 
A number of journalists were friends of the movement — fellow travellers rather 
than activists. The Herald Sun's Terry McCrann was not only a regular attendee 
at IPA and Tasman Institute events, he also has given seminars for the IPA.90 
Similarly, Paul Kelly has given seminars for movement organisations as well as 
contributing to the movement publication  A Culture for Full Employment.91 
Kelly’s The End of Certainty provided a sympathetic portrait of the radical neo-
liberals as well as offering a version of Australian history which cast neo-
liberalism as an heroic overturning of outdated traditions which shackled 
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Australia to an uncompetitive past.92 Frank Devine and Des Keegan also gave 
speeches at and were regular attendees at neo-liberal events. Another 
sympathiser was Alan Wood, who has been praised by John Hyde for his 
‘advocacy of dry economics’.93 The Bulletin’s David Barnett — later to become 
John Howard's biographer – was also a friend of the movement. As Laurie 
Aarons argues, in the mid 1980s the packer-owned Bulletin carried a series of 
prominent articles and cover stories, authored by Barnett and Sheridan, 
promoting the movement.94 Not only were such articles sympathetic, they also 
described movement activists as ‘serious thinkers concerned with serious issues’ 
who were responsible for a ‘resurgent’ Australian conservatism.95 Clearly there 
was a close relationship between numerous journalists writing for the Murdoch 
and Packer press and the radical neo-liberal movement. Furthermore, the 
movement’s own media monitoring reveals a consistent stream of articles from 
the non-Fairfax press either endorsing or acknowledging the movement during 
the 1980s and 1990s.96 
 
Like the Fairfax media, the Murdoch media also employed a number of radical 
neo-liberal activists as opinion columnists. Movement activists John Hyde, 
Dame Leonie Kramer, Paddy McGuinness, Peter Shack, Katherine West and 
Lauchlan Chipman all wrote regular columns for the Australian during the 
period under review. In addition, the Murdoch press also carried occasional 
opinion pieces by other movement activists such as Des Moore, Barry Maley, 
Alan Moran, Susan Moore, Ken Baker, Ron Brunton, and Michael Warby. 
 
                                                 
92 Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty. 
93 John Hyde, Dry: In Defence of Economic Freedom, p. 98. 
94 Laurie Aarons, Here Come the Uglies, pp. 83-85. 
95 Tim Duncan, ‘New Right Crusaders Challenge the Labor Line’, The Bulletin, October 2, 1984, 
p. 28; David Barnett, ‘Toe to Toe with the Unions’, The Bulletin, 9th September, 1986, pp. 34-36; 
David Barnett, ‘Taking the Right’s Road’, The Bulletin, 12th July, 1988, pp. 32-33; Tim Duncan, 
‘Waving a Mischievous Kerr Flag’, pp. 27-29. 
96 There are numerous examples of this. See CIS, CIS Annual Review, 1992-1993, p. 18. This 
CIS report also points to the movement’s coverage in the broader, non-print media, stating that in 
1993, the CIS ‘had over 100 radio interviews across Australia on issues ranging from no-fault 
divorce, constitutional reform in Australia and the excess of government intervention to 
unemployment’. 
 264
Also like the Fairfax media, other print media journalists have embraced the 
rhetorical arsenal provided by the radical neo-liberal movement. Murdoch 
columnists have employed the labels ‘political correctness’ and ‘politically 
correct’ to attack social justice issues, the ABC and the Left in general. Frank 
Devine, for example, labelled the campaign against the construction of the 
Hindmarsh Bridge a ‘politically correct scam’,97 while Christopher Pearson 
attacked the ‘politically correct brigade’.98  
 
All of this suggests that the relationship between the radical neo-liberal 
movement and the broader print media was similar to the patterns observed in 
the Fairfax media. Given the close relationship between many within the 
Murdoch stable in particular, and the radical neo-liberals, their treatment of the 
movement may even have been more favourable, and their adoption of the 
movement’s language even more vigorous, than was the case in the Fairfax 
media. 
 
Television and radio 
 
Due to its primary focus upon news, newspapers, particularly the broadsheets, 
were always more likely to cover the movement than television and radio. 
Indeed, John Hyde has suggested that the very nature of television militated 
against influence from the ‘Dries’.99 Although coverage in this media may have 
been less frequent, there is evidence to suggest that the frame used to interpret 
the movement in television and radio was similar to that of the print media, and 
that the movement was able to use television and radio to promote their 
ideology. A number of television and radio commentators were close to the 
movement or sympathised with its aims. Talkback radio hosts Alan Jones and 
Brian Wilshire were both supporters of Centre 2000 – the organisation’s 
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magazine, The Optimist, carried endorsements from both on its inside cover.100 
Regular radio and television finance commentator, Robert Gottliebsen, was also 
attended numerous movement functions.101 In 1995, movement activist, John 
Stone, was a regular commentator on Channel Ten’s ‘The Last Shout’ program. 
Reports from movement organisations suggest that it was not uncommon for 
radio in particular to seek radical neo-liberals for comment on current issues. 
International speakers invited to Australia by the movement were also likely to 
receive radio and television coverage. Furthermore, senior political and 
economics journalists are often sought for commentary on television and radio 
news and current affairs programs. That many such senior journalists were also 
movement sympathisers gave the radical neo-liberals another potential vehicle 
for their ideology. As Geoffrey Craig points out, the print media plays an 
important role in setting the agenda for the broader news media,102 so we might 
expect the print media’s framing of the movement to be replicated by television 
and radio news programs. Like the print media, radio provided a fertile ground 
for movement discourse. New class discourse in particular was embraced by 
talkback radio hosts such as John Harker, Alan Jones, Stan Zemanek and John 
Laws.  
 
The commercial media as a vehicle for neo-liberal hegemony 
 
This discussion of the media’s coverage of the radical neo-liberal movement 
should be viewed in the context of the media’s role as a vehicle for neo-liberal 
hegemony. As a the major source of political and economic information in 
Australia, the commercial media has an important role in shaping ‘common 
sense’. The ways in which the commercial media frames issues conditions the 
ways in which people think about such issues. A number of commentators have 
noted the shift that occurred within the Australian media during the 1980s such 
that neo-liberalism became the new common sense, and thus governed the way 
in which issues were framed: that is, interpreted by journalists for the public. 
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Based on interviews with twenty of Australia’s leading political and economic 
journalists, Brian Toohey, for example, argues that a broad consensus was forged 
amongst journalists in the 1980s about the correctness of the economic 
rationalist understanding of the economy and its critique of the role of 
government.103 Paul Kelly said the Canberra Press Gallery during the period was 
‘essentially what I would describe as economic rationalist’.104 Such a sentiment 
is echoed by economics editor of the Sydney Morning Herald, Ross Gittins: 
 
It can fairly be said that economic rationalism and its policy 
expression, micro-economic reform, were ‘sold’ by the econocrats to 
a Hawke government … With a few notable exceptions, the 
economic commentators needed little persuading to join in selling 
the job.105 
 
 A survey of 105 economics and finance journalists by Matolcsy and Schultz 
provides further confirmation of this analysis. They found that a high proportion 
of journalists surveyed believed that journalists during the 1980s had pushed the 
dry ‘Treasury view’ of the economy.106 A high percentage also broadly agreed 
with individual neo-liberal policy measures, such as the floating of the dollar, the 
deregulation of finance and the deregulation of the labour market and that the 
media ‘uncritically promoted the interests of business during the 1980s’.107 
Clearly there were prominent exceptions to this consensus, such as Ken 
Davidson and Philip Adams, who were consistent critics of neo-liberalism. Such 
journalists were, however continually attacked and marginalised by the more 
strident of the neo-liberal commentators and labelled part of the ‘politically 
correct elite’. Clearly the radical neo-liberal movement played a part in attacking 
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and undermining dissenting journalists. By portraying particular journalists 
(notably Press Gallery, Fairfax and ABC journalists) as unrepresentative left-
wing elites, the radical neo-liberals have engaged in a sustained assault upon 
left-leaning opinion and critical, investigative reporting in the media. This 
assault has, no doubt, constrained the space within the media for the articulation 
of opinions antagonistic to conservative neo-liberalism, and helped to establish a 
new common sense within the press corps about the inevitability of neo-liberal 
policy directions. 
 
Not only did a neo-liberal consensus develop within the Australian media, but 
certain journalists and newspapers actively campaigned and agitated for neo-
liberalism. Ross Gittins for example, writes that some activist journalists in 
particular were important in transforming elite opinion in Australia into a neo-
liberal consensus: 
 
you would also have to give a lot of credit to the economic 
commentators, who – led by Alan Wood – also campaigned tirelessly 
[for tariff reform] over many years. To put it bluntly: the IAC made 
the bullets and the commentators fired them.108 
 
A more blatant example of the media's promotion of radical neo-liberalism is 
that of the 'Tax revolt' campaigns undertaken by both the Australian and the Sun 
Herald. Both are examples of a series of articles which manufacture the 
existence of a popular groundswell calling for tax cuts and cuts to government 
expenditure. There is no evidence to suggest that such a movement existed to 
any significant degree outside of the fledgling radical neo-liberal movement and 
sections of the petite bourgeoisie and ruling class. Indeed, the Sun Herald, in its 
'Tax Revolt' articles, could present little direct evidence of the 'revolt'. 
Nonetheless, on March 1st, 1987 the newspaper ran a five page feature under the 
heading 'The Great Tax Revolt'.109 The feature consisted of a series of articles, 
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vox pops, opinion poll results and a table comparing Australian taxation with 
other OECD countries. It was adorned throughout by a recurring stylised ghost-
busters-like symbol depicting a suited arm stealing money from a person's 
pocket, with a line struck through it. CoPS head and radical neo-liberal activist, 
Michael Porter, was quoted in support of tax and expenditure cuts. Whilst the 
headlines proclaimed 'Why you demand cuts' and 'Cut welfare to reduce tax', the 
copy was inconclusive. The vox pops also revealed a mixture of responses 
ranging from people advocating the slashing of welfare expenditure to finance 
tax cuts and deficit reductions, to people who favoured cuts to defence, to those 
who opted for no change to the status quo. What did emerge from the feature 
was that the flat tax option, being proposed by Joh Bjelke Petersen at the time, 
was framed as undesirable, but that cuts to welfare in order to finance welfare 
cuts and deficit reductions were framed as desirable.  
 
Of the Australian's similar campaign in 1978, McKnight writes that the 'tax 
revolt': 
 
represented a quite conscious decision by the newspaper to adopt a 
campaigning style ...these campaigns went beyond editorials and 
affected the selection and prominence of suitable news stories, 
commissioning special features and using populist language.110 
 
The same can be said of the Sun Herald's campaign. This points to an attempt by 
these newspapers’ controlling companies to engender support for cuts to 
government expenditure and taxation, which the ruling class as a whole viewed 
as in its interests, by creating the impression of a popular groundswell in favour 
of such policies. And of course, all of these were causes also championed by the 
radical neo-liberal movement. 
 
Among the many possible reasons for the media’s embrace of a broad neo-liberal 
consensus are the proselytising effect of the radical neo-liberal movement, the 
                                                 
110 David McKnight, ‘The Role of the Press in the Rise of Neo-liberalism in Australia’. 
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educational backgrounds of journalists,111 and the broader shift in elite opinion 
that was occurring at the time. Perhaps most important among the reasons 
however is role of the media proprietors themselves. As noted in the Chapter 
Four, media capitalists had an interest in the neo-liberal restructuring of the 
Australian state and economy. Furthermore, as noted in the previous chapter, 
media corporations and proprietors have seen it as in their interests to support the 
promotion of radical neo-liberalism.  
 
Rupert Murdoch's corporations have given direct financial support to the radical 
neo-liberal movement: for example, News Ltd is listed as a sponsor of The 
Centre for Independent Studies. Individually, the Murdochs themselves have 
been intimately involved in the movement — through Rupert's membership of 
the Tasman Institute Advisory Council, his delivery of the CIS John Bonython 
Lecture in 1994, and Lachlan's membership of the Board of Tasman Asia 
Pacific. Rupert Murdoch's interest in the flourishing of radical neo-liberal ideas 
is not confined to Australia. As McKnight points out, 'it is expressed by his 
membership of the board of the Cato Institute, a Washington-based libertarian 
think tank and his generous financial support for the Weekly Standard, a national 
neo-conservative magazine'.112 
  
Other media corporations have also been important sponsors of the radical neo-
liberal movement. The 1996 CIS Annual Review reveals that Cumberland 
Newspapers, Davies Brothers, the Hobart Mercury, John Fairfax Group, 
Queensland Newspapers and Time Australia were, in addition to News Limited, 
corporate supporters of the think tank. But support from this sector is not new. 
The Centre's Annual John Bonython Lecture is named after the former owner of 
the Adelaide Advertiser, who was the inaugural chair of the CIS Board and one 
of the earliest financial supporters of the organisation. Peter Wright, a financial 
supporter of Centre 2000, owned the Sunday Independent, and, according to his 
                                                 
111 Ross Gittins, ‘The Role of the Media in the Formulation of Economic Policy’, pp. 11-12. 
112 David McKnight, ‘The Role of the Press in the Rise of Neo-liberalism in Australia’. 
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eulogist, Sir Valston Hancock, used the newspaper ‘to publicise his economic 
philosophy’.113  
 
It is therefore not surprising that neo-liberalism has become common sense 
within the Australian media, and that news outlets have become key players in 
the struggle for neo-liberal hegemony in Australia. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The commercial media in Australia has been a receptive forum for the promotion 
radical neo-liberal ideology. News outlets have tended to frame the movement in 
a positive fashion: as authoritative, non-ideological sources of comment. This 
has given legitimacy to the ideas of what is a minority movement. Through 
reportage of its activities, and by employing movement activists as columnists, 
the commercial media has helped to broadcast the message of the movement 
beyond the narrow confines of its support base. Whilst perhaps having little 
direct influence over public opinion (Chapter Seven will discuss the general 
unpopularity of neo-liberalism), what the media's coverage of the movement did 
do to generate an awareness amongst elites, opinion makers and policy makers, 
of neo-liberal policy options. The movement has also furnished journalists – 
particularly fellow traveling sympathisers — with the movement’s rhetorical 
arsenal: an arsenal which has been vigorously used to demonise the Left and 
social justice advocates, and a language which brings with it its own logic about 
the desirability and inevitability of neo-liberal change. Although the impact of 
the movement has been has been most noticeable in the print media, evidence 
suggests that radio and television have given similar, although less frequent, 
coverage to the movement. The radical neo-liberal movement thus contributed to 
shaping the discourse of one of the key vehicles for the production of hegemonic 
‘common sense’: the commercial media. That it was able to do this was due to 
several factors, most important of which was the class position of the media 
                                                 
113 Valston Hancock, ‘Eulogy – Peter Wright’, The Optimist, November-December, 1985, p. 15. 
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proprietors themselves and the direct interest they saw in the promotion of neo-
liberalism. Media capitalists were willing to use their businesses to contest the 
hegemony of Keynesian welfare capitalism and to attack opponents of neo-
liberalism. In this the radical neo-liberals proved useful shock troops. 
 
The commercial media’s relationship with the radical neo-liberal movement also 
added to the movement’s legitimacy. When the media discovered the 'new right' 
in 1986 it had the effect of facilitating the emergence of the radical neo-liberal 
movement from relative obscurity, giving it a profile and impetus it otherwise 
may not have had. It was around this time that corporate support for the 
movement began to increase dramatically. Had it not been for the commercial 
media’s generally sympathetic treatment of the movement, it is unlikely that it 
would have developed its finances so rapidly and had an impact on Australian 
society that belied its small social support base. 
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The Radical Neo-liberal Movement and the State 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
 
 
Like the media, the state is a key site of hegemonic struggle and a vehicle for the 
construction of hegemony. Between 1976 and 1996, the state project of Keynesian 
welfare capitalism was gradually dismantled, to be replaced with a neo-liberal state 
project. In order to secure hegemony for this state restructuring, as well to secure 
electoral hegemony, successive Labor governments from 1983 articulated a One 
Nation, regime-level hegemonic project. When Labor lost office in 1996, it was 
replaced by a Coalition government committed to expanding upon the state project 
of neo-liberalism. In Opposition the Coalition had developed an exclusionary Two 
Nations strategy for the continuous struggle to secure hegemony for neo-liberalism, 
and electoral hegemony for themselves. 
 
This chapter examines the relationship between the radical neo-liberal movement 
and these struggles for hegemony within the major political parties and the 
Australian state itself. The method for undertaking this examination is a 
consideration of the movement’s relationship to and impact upon the apparatuses of 
the state; the Australian Labor Party; and the Coalition parties. Although movement 
organisations claim to be primarily concerned with shaping the ‘climate of opinion’ 
and the ‘general ideas environment’, the radical neo-liberal movement has 
consistently engaged in attempts to directly influence state policy through political 
parties and public servants. The movement has also attempted to reshape hegemony 
by intervening directly in the arena of public education. This chapter will first 
consider such attempts to intervene directly in the public service and public 
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education, then consider the movement’s relationship with and impact upon the 
Labor and Coalition parties. 
 
 
The radical neo-liberal movement and the apparatuses of the state 
 
Despite numerous radical neo-liberal activists being drawn from the ranks of the 
federal bureaucracy, the movement itself has had little direct influence within the 
apparatuses of the Australian state. That is, at the federal level, the radical neo-
liberal movement has been largely ineffective at using or influencing the 
bureaucracy to shape Australian public policy in accordance with radical neo-liberal 
ideology. In contrast, the movement has been quite successful at intervening in the 
institutions of public education. The following discussion will consider the 
relationships between movement activists and the spheres of the federal bureaucracy 
and education, and evaluate their success in using these spheres to further the radical 
neo-liberal agenda. 
 
Radical neo-liberals as federal bureaucrats 
 
As Table 7.1 illustrates, numerous radical neo-liberal activists were — sometimes 
senior — federal bureaucrats prior to, or even during, their involvement with the 
movement. This does not mean, however, that such activists were able to use the 
bureaucracy as a vehicle for the radical neo-liberal agenda. Rather, although 
movement activists were instrumental in shifting sections of the federal bureaucracy 
(most notably Treasury) from a predominantly Keynesian inspired policy framework 
to a predominantly neo-liberal inspired framework, they were unable to make their 
own, more radical version of neo-liberalism, the dominant policy framework. It is 
possible that there were those who chose not to use their position within the 
bureaucracy to pursue their own ideological ends – whether because they thought it 
unprofessional or because they thought that such agendas would be unrealistic in the  
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Table 7.1 Radical Neo-liberals as Federal Public Servants 
 
 
 
 
then prevailing political climate. However, those who clearly attempted to use the 
bureaucracy as a platform for their ideological agenda had only limited success.  
 
Scholars have noted and analysed the paradigm shift that occurred within the federal 
bureaucracy, particularly the central agencies of Treasury, Finance, Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, during the 1970s and into the 1980s.1 At the most basic level this shift 
was from a broadly Keynesian-inspired paradigm to a broadly neo-liberal paradigm, 
                                                 
1 See for example Michael Pusey, Economic Rationalism in Canberra: a Nation Building State 
Changes its Mind, and Greg Whitwell, The Treasury Line. 
Movement Activist Movement Activity Public Service 
William Cole Became Canberra Director of the 
AIPP in 1989. 
Secretary, Department of Finance 
(1976-8); Chairman, Public Service 
Board (1978-83); Secretary, 
Department of Defence (1984-7) 
Des Moore IPA Deputy Secretary, Department of 
Treasury, (1981-87) 
John Stone IPA, CoPS Deputy Secretary (Economic) 
Department of Treasury (1971-79); 
Secretary, Department of Treasury, 
1979-1984 
Hugh Morgan IPA, CIS, Crossroads, Tasman 
Institute 
Board of Reserve Bank during 
Fraser government. Reappointed  
under Howard government. 
Helen Hughes CIS, IPA Member, Fitzgerald Committee 
Keith Hughes CIS Economist, Parliamentary Library 
David Brydon IPA Approached by John Button to 
become Member, Automotive 
Industry Authority, 1988 
Alan Moran Tasman Institute, IPA Head, Business Regulation Review 
Unit, First Assistant Commissioner, 
Industry Commission. Resigned 
1990 
Ron Brunton IPA Office of National Assessment 
Tony Cole IPA Secretary to Treasury 
Brian Tucker IPA Chief of Division of Atmospheric 
Research, CSIRO. Resigned 1992 
Ric Charlton CIS President, Business/Higher 
Education Roundtable, 1995 
David Anderson IPA Department of Foreign Affairs. 
Former ambassador to Vietnam, 
France, UN, Belgium 
Michael Warby IPA Federal Bureaucrat 
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or as Whitwell describes it, ‘from a predominantly Keynesian model to a 
predominantly neo-classical model’.2 There can be little doubt that the small number 
of bureaucrats who were, or who would later become, radical neo-liberal activists 
were important in this transformation. However, they were unable to transform the 
bureaucracy in their own image. The best example of this, and perhaps the most 
important, is that of the Commonwealth Treasury.  
 
Greg Whitwell has analysed Treasury’s gradual ideological shift from the mid 1950s 
until the 1980s. According to Whitwell, from the mid-1970s onwards the ‘Treasury 
line’ came more and more to lay blame on government spending as the cause of the 
stagflation that wracked the Australian economy at the time.3 From the mid-1970s 
onwards, Treasury thus embraced the broad principles of neo-liberalism. During this 
period John Stone and Des Moore, both later prominent movement activists, held 
senior positions within the Treasury. Stone was Deputy Secretary (Economic) from 
November 1971-1979 and then Secretary from 1979 until his resignation in 1984.4 
Des Moore was Deputy Secretary from 19815 until his resignation in 1987.6 While 
there can be no doubt that both Stone and Moore, by virtue of their senior positions, 
were instrumental in the ideological shift within Treasury during the 1970s and early 
1980s, they were not primarily responsible for it.  
 
A confluence of factors explains Treasury’s ideological shift. Neo-classical 
economic theory had already begun to colonise the university economics 
departments at which treasury officials received their initial training. Within the 
economics discipline, the ground for the neo-liberal takeover of economics had been 
laid by the habilitation of Keynesian macro-economics within a neo-classical 
framework – the so called ‘neo-classical synthesis’.7 Numerous Treasury officials 
                                                 
2 Greg Whitwell, The Treasury Line, p. 262. 
3 Ibid., pp. 205-235. 
4 Ibid., p. 179. 
5 Samuel Griffith Society website: 
http://www.samuelgriffith.org.au/papers/html/volume6/v6app1.htm, at 20th March 2004 
6 Jonathan Chancellor, ‘Today’s People’, Sydney Morning Herald, 7th January 1987, p. 20. 
7 Tim Battin, Abandoning Keynes, pp. 62-66. 
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had served with the World Bank and the IMF, which were among the first 
institutions internationally to embrace neo-liberal doctrine.8 Furthermore, neo-
classical economics and neo-liberal ideology provided the basis for a policy 
framework which offered policy solutions consistent with the professed interests of 
capital at the time. Therefore it seems that Stone’s and Moore’s contribution to the 
shift to neo-liberalism was one among many.  
 
As Whitwell points out, we should be wary of ‘great man’ or ‘mono-causal’ 
accounts of this ideological shift.9 He goes on to argue that: 
 
Without denying that Stone was a powerful intellectual force in the 
department and without denying the importance of his deep sympathies 
for the neo-classical model, Stone’s position in the department is best 
seen not as a shepherd leading a flock of sheeplike Treasury officers, 
but, to offer a more satisfactory metaphor, the zealot among the devout.10 
 
Confirmation of their being ‘zealot[s] among the devout’ can be found in the 
circumstances of their departures from the public service. Both Stone and Moore 
resigned, it would seem, due to frustration at their inability to have their ideological 
agendas implemented. Both Stone and Moore had alienated themselves from their 
respective Ministers and many of their fellow senior public servants. Both, it would 
seem, towards the ends of their careers at least, placed ideological conviction ahead 
of practical policy outcomes. Former senior bureaucrat Michael Keating says Stone 
was unlikely to offer ‘second best’ policy solutions to his Ministers,11 preferring 
instead options which involved no compromise with his ideological utopia.12 The 
radical neo-liberal movement, in contrast, offered Stone and Moore a sympathetic 
                                                 
8 Greg Whitwell, The Treasury Line, p. 272. 
9 Ibid., p. 272. 
10 Ibid., p. 272. 
11 Michael Keating, interview with the author. 
12 It should be noted, however, that Stone did not support Labor’s floating of the Australian dollar. 
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audience and the freedom to pursue their ideological convictions without the 
restraints required by bureaucratic office. 
 
The Treasury example is illustrative of the impact of radical neo-liberal public 
servants at the Commonwealth level. Although numerous radical neo-liberals held 
— often senior — positions within the federal public service, this did not translate 
into the adoption by the public service of a radical neo-liberal agenda. Rather, they 
were part of a broader shift away from the Keynesian welfare paradigm to a broadly 
neo-liberal paradigm. They were but a small cadre of bureaucrats among many who 
were advocating the abandonment of key planks of the Keynesian-welfare paradigm. 
Under Fraser, Hawke and Keating, this was a more moderate form of neo-liberalism 
than was advocated by the movement. In order to be effective public servants, the 
imperative was to work within this paradigm. It is likely that some activists within 
the public service used the movement, rather than the apparatuses of the state, as the 
forum for their dogmatic pronouncements. As can be seen by Stone’s opposition to 
the floating of the Australian dollar, there is no guarantee that radical neo-liberals 
will advocate a consistently radical neo-liberal agenda in public office. Particularly 
under Labor governments, several movement activists found that their own 
ideological convictions clashed with those of the new administration. Hugh Morgan, 
for example, was replaced on the Board of the Reserve Bank under the Hawke 
government.13 Another movement activist, Alan Moran, left his senior public service 
position in 1990 to join the Tasman Institute ‘after a series of controversial 
statements on the environment’.14 Upon his departure, Labor’s Environment 
Minister, Graham Richardson, said Moran displayed a ‘complete lack of 
understanding’ of sustainability issues.15 Moran thus joined others who had left the 
public service for the radical neo-liberal movement out of frustration at their 
                                                 
13 Symptomatic of the changed relationship between the radical neo-liberal movement and 
government under the Howard administration was Hugh Morgan’s reappointment to the Reserve 
Bank Board to replace Bill Kelty in 1996, see Bob Wilson, ‘Morgan Takes Kelty’s RBA Seat’, The 
Daily Telegraph, 15th August, 1996, p. 31. 
14 Julie Power, ‘Moran Leaves IC for Think-tank’, Sydney Morning Herald, 29th August, 1990, p. 7. 
15 Ibid., p. 7. 
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alienation within the bureaucracy and their inability to use the bureaucracy to 
implement their own ideological agendas. This lends further weight to the argument 
that although the federal bureaucracy was shaped according to the state project of 
neo-liberalism, it was largely resistant to the radical neo-liberal agenda. 
 
Radical neo-liberals and policy influence 
 
We can now examine the impact of the radical neo-liberal movement upon the 
bureaucracy when it acted as a movement, rather than as a series of isolated 
individuals. Despite not being lobby groups, radical neo-liberal movement 
organisations did attempt to influence individual bureaucrats directly. As noted in 
Chapter Three, the AIPP had a database of bureaucrats which it used to target 
sympathetic public servants with publications and information about upcoming 
events. The meetings of the Crossroads group involved strategising about the most 
effective ways to influence public servants and to intervene in key issues of public 
policy. Jim Carlton argues that several senior public servants – such as Ken Baxter 
of the Egg Board and Peter Johnson of the Reserve Bank – were sympathetic to the 
Group but felt that their public positions made it inappropriate for them to join. The 
importance of the Reserve Bank’s Austin Holmes as a proselytiser of neo-liberal 
ideas has been noted by a number of movement activists.16 Public Servants were 
regular attendees of movement functions and conferences. Furthermore, the fact that 
a number of movement activists were former public servants meant they had an 
understanding of the bureaucratic policy process, and could tailor their strategies 
accordingly.17 It also brought the movement a network of contacts and sympathisers 
within the bureaucracy. 
 
Such factors, however, must be evaluated within the broader context of the 
rationality of the federal bureaucracy from the late 1970s until the mid 1990s. As 
                                                 
16 Jim Carlton, interview with the author; John Hyde, Dry: In Defence of Economic Freedom, pp. 99-
100. 
17 Michael Porter, interview with the author. 
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already noted, although the federal bureaucracy was moving at this time in a broadly 
neo-liberal direction, it was doing so, for most of the period, with a Labor 
government in power. This meant that many of the policy options of the radical neo-
liberal movement were viewed as either too radical or as having the potential to 
alienate too many constituents. It would seem that many of the senior bureaucrats 
most heavily involved in shaping Labor’s neo-liberal policy had little if any contact 
or regard for the radical neo-liberal movement.18 Further evidence of this is that the 
movement produced few commissioned reports for the federal government or its 
agencies.19 
 
Radical neo-liberals and public education 
 
Perhaps the arena of the state into which movement activists have insinuated 
themselves most is that of public education, at all levels: primary, secondary and 
tertiary. As discussed in Chapter Three, a feature of the movement has been the 
involvement of university academics. All of the radical neo-liberal think tanks have 
had significant involvement from social science and humanities academics, many of 
them professors. This has been one of the keys to the movement’s ability to establish 
its legitimacy. In addition, some movement activists have also held senior positions 
at some of Australia’s public universities — Dame Leonie Kramer was Chancellor 
of Sydney University, Ric Charlton of CIS became Chancellor of Newcastle 
University in 1994, and Lauchlan Chipman the Vice-Chancellor of Central 
Queensland University in 1996. 
 
Occasionally, movement organisations have achieved formal relationships with 
public universities. For example, ‘The Full Employment Project’ was a ‘joint 
                                                 
18 This assessment is agreed upon by former senior bureaucrat Michael Keating. Of the radical neo-
liberal think tanks, Keating says ‘They had little influence. I doubt that most politicians in the Labor 
Government had ever read them and I doubt many senior bureaucrats ever read them’ (Michael 
Keating, interview with the author). Ross Garnaut, former adviser to Bob Hawke, says of the radical 
neo-liberals ‘They weren’t very central to the story’ (Ross Garnaut, interview with the author). 
19 An exception however is IPA, Efficiency of States Spending, Background Paper No. 7, Office of the 
Economic Planning Advisory Council, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1990. 
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venture’ between the IPA & Melbourne University’s Institute of Applied Economics 
and Social Research,20 and in 1995 the IPA jointly organised the ‘Risk, Regulation 
and Responsibility Conference’ with the ANU’s Centre for Applied Economics.21 
The most far reaching of these relationships however was the formal affiliation in 
1995 of both the Tasman Institute and Tasman Asia Pacific with Melbourne 
University.22 
 
Radical neo-liberal activists have also joined with capitalists in an attempt to 
establish two private universities in Australia. The Australian Simon University was 
an initiative of Lady Fairfax, using the brand name of the University of Rochester’s 
William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administration. It was to be a fee-
paying educational institution based in Sydney. CIS activists were well represented 
on the management council, including capitalists Maurice Newman, James Beatty 
and Andrew Kaldor, and intellectuals Peter Dodd and Greg Lindsay.23 A similar 
venture was the Tasman University project, driven by then Director of the Centre of 
Policy Studies, Michael Porter, and backed financially by radical neo-liberal 
capitalists John Elliott, Hugh Morgan and Will Bailey.24 Both institutions planned to 
offer business degrees and both failed to establish themselves as viable operations.25 
Clearly, both were attempts to challenge the hegemony of welfare capitalism by 
putting radical neo-liberal philosophies into practice; to establish educational 
institutions based, both pedagogically and organisationally, around such 
                                                 
20 Helen Hughes, Achieving Full Employment, Full Employment Project, Institute of Applied 
Economics and Social Research, University of Melbourne, Parkville, 1994, back cover; and Anon., 
‘Full Employment Project Launched’, IPA Review, Vol. 46, No. 4, 1994, p. 63. 
21 Anon., ‘Prosperity Reduces Risk’, IPA Review, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1995, p. 64. 
22 Melbourne Univeristy, Statute 9.46, Melbourne University Website: 
http://www.unimelb.edu.au/Members/tasman.htm and Anon, ‘Melbourne University Affiliation 
Agreement’, Tasman Report, July 1996, p. 4. 
23  Steve Lewis, ‘Private Universities on Parade’, Sydney Morning Herald, 14 November 1989, pp. 
41-42, Valerie Lawson, ‘University of Broken Dreams’, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 December 1990, 
p. 46. 
24  Mark Davis, ‘Private Sector Supports Trans-Tasman Uni Project’, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 
November 1987, p. 5, Glenn Milne and Anne Susskind, ‘Foster’s: the Beer behind the Uni’, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 27 November 1987, p. 3. 
25 Out of the ashes of the failed Tasman University project was born the Tasman Institute in 1990 
(Michael Porter, interview with the author). 
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philosophies; and in doing so, to challenge the legitimacy of public education in 
Australia. 
 
The radical neo-liberal movement also attempted to influence, directly, high school 
students, their teachers, and university students. In 1976 the Brisbane-based 
Foundation for Economics Education (Australia) was founded,26 one of its aims 
being to promote the radical neo-liberal ideology within schools.27 Based upon the 
American Foundation for Economic Education,28 one of its founders, Viv Forbes, 
received the Adam Smith Award in 1986.29  
 
Building upon such activities, both the IPA and CIS co-ordinated well-organised 
attempts to intervene at the ‘grass-roots’ level in education. In 1989 the CIS 
established the Economics Education Resource Centre (EERC), the aim of which 
was to target a radical neo-liberal agenda to high school economics teachers: 
 
An interventionist position is often adopted in textbooks and by teachers 
in their exposition of controversial issues associated with many school 
topics … The main aim of the EERC is to update teachers’ knowledge of 
economic theory and policy and to promote an understanding of the role 
of markets in creating wealth through an efficient allocation of resources 
in the Australian economy.30 
 
The EERC produced  the Economics Education Review — a bimonthly newsletter 
— organised the annual National Economics Teachers’ Conference, and held 
‘Professional Development Activities’ for economics teachers which consisted of a 
                                                 
26 Marian Sawer, ‘Political Manifestations of Australian Libertarianism’ in Marian Sawer (ed), 
Australia and the New Right, p. 7 and Viv Forbes, ‘The Tide Turning?’, The Optimist, 
November/December 1986, p. 6. 
27 Marian Sawer, ‘Political Manifestations of Australian Libertarianism’, p. 7. 
28 Ibid., p. 7 
29 Viv Forbes, ‘The Tide Turning?’, pp. 5-8. Peter Samuel was also a key activist (Marian Sawer, 
‘Political Manifestations of Australian Libertarianism’, p. 7). 
30 CIS, CIS Annual Review 1991, p. 13. 
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series of lectures on major economic topics. The Economics Education Review 
contained many articles interpreting economic issues from a neo-liberal framework, 
including re-prints from movement publications.31 Advertisements for upcoming 
CIS events and CIS publications, including Policy, were also common in the pages 
of the Review. In 1991 “more than 300 schools” had subscribed to Policy,32 and in 
1993 the CIS boasted that EERC professional development days had attracted 600 
teachers, while more than 800 schools, colleges and libraries had subscribed to the 
Education Economics Review.33 As its name suggests, the EERC also provided a 
‘resource centre’, and by 1993 this was reportedly ‘utilised regularly by individual 
students, teachers and student teachers alike. Class visits are becoming a regular 
occurrence’:34 the radical neo-liberals were not only talking to teachers, but to 
students as well. The CIS also attempted to bring university students into the radical 
neo-liberal fold through its ‘Liberty and Society’ program. Beginning in 1996, the 
program brought ‘over ninety outstanding students’ together over two separate 
weekend seminars to discuss radical neo-liberal themes.35 
 
The IPA has a long history of promoting its agenda through the school system – both 
to teachers and their students. Such activities continued after its conversion from 
anti-communist Keynesianism to conservative neo-liberalism. Between 1980 and 
1989 the IPA’s Queensland branch (IPAQ) had involved ‘about 7 000 teachers and 
businessmen’ in its ‘Business-Teacher Workshops’ which brought together teachers 
and capitalists in after-school forums. In 1988 the IPAQ organised these workshops 
with the assistance of the Queensland Department of Education.36 Also at this time 
the IPA established its Education Policy Unit, under the leadership of Dame Leonie 
Kramer. The Unit’s brief was to bring a radical neo-liberal and conservative critique 
                                                 
31 Such as Ian Harper, ‘The Operation of Monetary Policy in a Deregulated Financial System’, 
Economics Education Review, Vol. 4, No. 4, July/August 1993, pp. 1-?, which was reprinted from the 
IPA publication Can Monetary Policy be Made to Work?, IPA, Melbourne, 1992. 
32 CIS, CIS Annual Review 1991, p. 14. 
33 CIS, CIS Annual Review 1993, p. 15. 
34 Ibid., p. 14. 
35 CIS, CIS Annual Review 1996, p. 10. 
36 Anon., ‘Business-Teacher Workshops’, IPA Review, December-February, 1988/89, Vol. 42, No. 3, 
p. 64. 
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to bear on the nation’s public education system, and attempt to influence both the 
curriculum and the policy agenda.37 In addition to regular publications, seminars and 
media statements, the Education Policy Unit produced Education Monitor, a thrice 
yearly magazine. Education Monitor took over from Aces Review, the Alan Barcan 
edited journal of the Australian Council for Educational Standards.38 It provided a 
forum for debating education policy amongst educators and education policy 
makers, but its editorial line was consistently conservative and radical neo-liberal. 
Education Monitor folded in 1996, citing ‘relatively high production and distribution 
costs’,39 however, during its lifetime it had a circulation of 3,800.40 Thus, the 
movement was able to intervene directly in what was taught and what was read by 
students and teachers in Australia’s public education system. 
 
 
The radical neo-liberal movement and the Australian Labor Party 
 
Although successive federal Labor governments between 1983 and 1996 pursued a 
neo-liberal policy agenda, there is little evidence that this agenda was driven by the 
radical neo-liberal movement. Indeed, Labor’s One Nation hegemonic strategy was 
quite inimical to the strident ideological pronouncements of the movement. This is 
not to say that the movement had no impact upon the Labor Party nor that there have 
been no links between the two. However, it is important to identify precisely what 
the relationships between the two are in order to ascertain the impact of the 
movement on public policy during the years of Labor government.  
 
Labor members as movement activists 
 
                                                 
37 As shall be discussed later in this chapter, in New South Wales the IPA had some success in direct 
policy intervention. 
38 Editorial, ‘The Challenge Ahead’, Education Monitor, Winter 1989, pp. 2-3. 
39 Anon., ‘Notice to Readers’, Education Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1996, p. 2. 
40 IPA Report 1991, IPA, September 1991, p. 2. 
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There have been  some overlaps between the radical neo-liberal movement and the 
Labor Party and labour movement. Some of the most prominent activists of the 
radical neo-liberal movement began their political life in the labour movement or 
Labor Party. Paul Houlihan was an official with the Federated Clerks Union41 prior 
to his involvement with the National Farmers Federation and H R Nicholls Society. 
Paddy McGuinness was a libertarian who had worked for the Moscow Narodny 
Bank as chief economist and who, from 1974, worked for then Minister for Social 
Security, Bill Hayden.42 McGuinness was among a number of former Keynesian or 
socialist economists who made the conversion to neo-liberalism from the late 1960s 
onwards.43 Michael Porter also, a former Keynesian,44 had ‘facilitated the ALP 
club’s formation at Adelaide University’, was offered a position working for the first 
Dunstan Labor government, and worked for the Whitlam government on its 
Priorities Review Staff.45 
 
Former National Secretary of the Federated Ironworkers' Association of Australia, 
Laurie Short, wrote for IPA Review during the 1980’s advocating privatisation and 
attacking Left-wing trade unions.46 In 1994, the Tasman Institute’s Bruce Cohen 
took up a position as economics advisor to the Victorian Labor Opposition, and was 
instrumental in the drafting of the Victorian opposition’s strategy.47 Federal Member 
for Werriwa, Mark Latham, contributed to Policy and delivered one of the Centre’s 
                                                 
41  See ‘Contributors’ in H. R. Nicholls Society, Arbitration in Contempt, p. 6. 
42 Gerard Henderson, Australian Answers: Prominent Australians Speak About the Social, Political, 
Economic and Religious Shaping of Our Time, Random House Australia, Milsons Point, 1990, pp. 
223-224.  
43 Heinz Arndt was another. See Wolfgang Kasper, ‘The Art of the Economy: Stability, Growth and 
Philosophy – Wolfgang Kasper Talks to Heinz W. Arndt’, Policy, Spring 2000, pp. 24-25. 
44 Michael Porter, ‘Stabilization, Regulation and Misplaced Entrepreneurship’ Quadrant, September 
1978, pp. 12-16. 
45 Michael Porter, interview with the author. 
46 See Laurie Short, ‘Victoria: an Outpost of the Far Left’, IPA Review, Vol. 43, No. 4, Autumn 1990, 
p. 30; Laurie Short, ‘Can Unionism Survive: A Unionist’s View’, IPA Review, Vol. 43, No. 2, 
October/December 1909, p. 50; Laurie Short, ‘New Left Party Likely to Fail’, IPA Review, Vol. 43, 
No. 1, June/August 1989, p. 31; Laurie Short, ‘A Unionist’s View: Secret Union Ballots’, IPA 
Review, Vol. 42, No. 3, December/February, 1988/9, p. 31; Laurie Short, ‘Halfpenny’s Road to 
Power: A Unionist’s View’, IPA Review, Vol. 42, No. 2, August/October 1988, p. 24. 
47 Michael Magazanik, ‘ALP Picks an Adviser From the Other Side’, The Age, 5th March 1994, p. 7; 
Rowan Callick, ‘Vic ALP is Going Straight’, Sydney Morning Herald, 24th June 1994, p. 2. 
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Bert Kelly Lectures in 1996.48 Latham credits the CIS with introducing him to the 
notion of ‘social capital’.49 
 
Other prominent Labor figures have also given support to the movement, although 
the relationship has often been ambivalent. For example, although NSW Labor 
Council apparatchiks Michael Costa and Mark Duffy co-authored a chapter in the 
movement publication A Defence of Economic Rationalism, Costa would three years 
later publicly rebuke the IPA for its criticism of the public funding of trade union 
activities: ‘The IPA has a well-known anti-union agenda. I reject the [IPA’s] 
analysis.’50 Similarly Bob Carr, whose remark that the Centre for Independent 
Studies is the ‘jewel in Sydney’s crown’ would later adorn the think tank’s 
homepage, had in earlier years attacked Duffy and Costa for their leaked report to 
the NSW Labor Council which argued that the political debate in Australia was 
being won by the new right. They ‘really would be much more comfortable working 
for the H. R. Nicholls Society’, said then NSW Opposition leader Carr. Although a 
movement sympathiser, Peter Walsh also had a sometimes antagonistic relationship 
with the movement, particularly prior to his resignation as Labor’s Finance Minister. 
As a Labor minister Walsh was critical of the National Priorities Project, 
highlighting flaws in its estimates.51 When the Tasman Institute undertook research 
on the GST for the BCA in 1992, Walsh criticised this as well.52 In 1987 Walsh 
addressed a meeting of the H. R. Nicholls Society and criticised the radical neo-
liberal movement’s ‘confrontationalist’ approach to industrial relations.53 It was after 
his resignation from Cabinet, however, that Walsh became a public sympathiser with 
the radical neo-liberal movement. He launched the book A Defence of Economic 
                                                 
48 Mark Latham, ‘Making Welfare Work’, Policy. Vol. 12, No. 3, Spring 1996, pp. 18-24. 
49 Mark Latham, correspondence with the author. 
50 Costa quoted in Matthew Russell, ‘Union Grants Under Fire’, Sydney Morning Herald, 22nd July 
1995, p. 9. 
51 Peter Walsh, ‘GST ‘Advantages’ Do Not Quite Add Up’, p. 9. 
52 Peter Walsh, ‘GST ‘Advantages’ Do Not Quite Add Up’, p. 9. 
53 Amanda Buckley, ‘Walsh Warns Right on ‘Confrontationalism’, Sydney Morning Herald, 9th June, 
1987, p. 5. 
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Rationalism in 199354 and, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, often quoted 
approvingly from movement publications in his Cassandra column for the Australian 
Financial Review as well as enthusiastically embracing the movement’s ‘new class’ 
discourse. Finally, Bill Hayden, during his term as Governor General, gave qualified 
support to the movement, opening the new Sydney office of the Centre for 
Independent Studies in 1990.55 Despite their criticisms of the radical neo-liberal 
movement, all of these Labor figures were clearly, at one stage, sympathisers with 
the movement, and all also lent extra credibility to the movement by allowing 
themselves to be identified with it. 
 
The radical neo-liberal movement as ‘bogey’ 
 
The over-riding feature of the relationship between the Labor party and the radical 
neo-liberal movement was that the federal Labor government was able to portray the 
movement as a threat. As former caucus member, Stephen Martin argues, the Labor 
government attempted to portray the radical neo-liberal movement as a ‘bogey’.56 
This allowed the leadership of the Party on the one hand to use the movement as a 
‘wedge’ against the Liberals, and on the other hand to use the threat of the 
movement to draw the Party further to the Right and discipline the Party’s Left-wing 
factions.  
 
The public reaction of the federal Labor government to the radical neo-liberals was 
to attack them stridently. Prime Minister Hawke labelled the H R Nicholls Society 
‘troglodytes and lunatics’.57 John Dawkins described the ‘new right’ as 
‘treasonous’.58 Stephen Martin recalls that: 
 
                                                 
54 Rowan Callick, ‘Students’ Book Puts Case for Economic Rationalism’, Sydney Morning Herald, 5th 
October, 1993, p. 5. 
55 Tom Dusevic, ‘Hayden Backs Free Economy’, p. 3. 
56 Stephen Martin, interview with the author. 
57 Mike Taylor and Jenni Hewett, ‘Hawke Wades into Peko Row’, p. 1. 
58 Gregory Hywood and Mike Taylor, ‘ALP Unites Against Fragmented New Right’, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 2nd September, 1986, p. 4. 
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at different times ministers in the parliament would refer to comments 
made by people associated with those different [new right] organisations 
and use it to make political points about where they were wrong. And in 
debates you would often here MPs refer to individuals associated with 
those organisations and declare where they thought the organisations and 
their philosophies were wrong. I mean H. R. Nicholls Society was 
always a great one for kicking around.59 
 
 
Such tactics did much more than simply defend the interests of the organisations 
which constituted the major source of funds for the Labor party – trade unions. They 
also served to conjure the image of a brutish and ideologically motivated minority 
which was antithetical to, and threatened, not only the values of the labour 
movement, but the values of mainstream Australia.60 Such values could be portrayed 
as inimical to the inclusive image Labor fostered through its One Nation hegemonic 
project. The Labor leadership was then able to position itself in opposition to this 
threat. 
 
The effect of this was two fold. First, Labor was able to use the radical neo-liberal 
movement to exploit Wet/Dry divisions within the Liberal opposition (discussed 
later in this chapter). Thus, the radical neo-liberal movement was used by Labor as a 
wedge against the Liberals – senior Wet Liberals were torn between sublimating 
their philosophical convictions in the interests of party unity or expressing their 
antipathy towards the radical neo-liberals, thereby supporting the stance taken by the 
Labor government. Electorally, this worked to Labor’s advantage because the 
Coalition appeared divided, incoherent and captured by ideological interests. This 
                                                 
59 Stephen Martin, interview the author 
60 The following sentiments from former ACTU President, Jennie George, demonstrates that the trade 
union leadership took the threat from the radical neo-liberal movement seriously: ‘it was well known 
within the union movement that there was this conservative world view about industrial relations that 
we had to contend with, and of course it came at a time of declining union membership, so it made 
the future more problematic’ (Jennie George, interview with the author). 
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was exacerbated by the fact that several prominent movement activists were 
identified with the ‘Joh for PM’ campaign (also discussed later in this chapter). Even 
into the 1990s the Labor leadership was able to use the radical neo-liberals as a 
‘bogey’ to delegitimise the Opposition. For example, in 1990, ACTU Secretary Bill 
Kelty attacked the Coalition’s industrial relations policy, stating that they had 
embraced the ideas of their ‘new right friends’.61 Similar tactics were used by Labor 
to discredit the ‘Fightback!’ package, and on the issue of race. 
 
Second, by promoting the radical neo-liberal movement as a very real threat, the 
right-wing and moderate Labor leadership had extra evidence with which to 
persuade the Left-Labor factions to acquiesce to a less radical, but nonetheless neo-
liberal, policy agenda. Labor’s One Nation, neo-liberal agenda, was thus able to be 
maintained. ALP National President and Special Minister for State, Mick Young, 
employed such a tactic in 1986 when he implored the party to put aside its 
differences and unite against the common enemy in the form of the ‘new right’.62 
Young claimed the new right stood for ‘busting the unions and busting the welfare 
net’:63 that is, if the radical neo-liberals’ agenda was implemented it would destroy 
those egalitarian institutions at the core of Labor’s commitments. This strategy of 
using the radical neo-liberal ‘bogey’ to neutralise internal opposition to Labor’s own 
version of neo-liberalism was recognised at the time in a Sydney Morning Herald 
editorial. On the advantages to the ALP leadership in portraying the radical neo-
liberals as a radical threat, the editorial argues: 
 
they may galvanise those ALP members disenchanted both with the 
Government’s economic policies and now with its decision to resume 
uranium sales to France. For many ALP members and supporters the 
                                                 
61 Libby Moffet, ‘Kelty Calls Opposition Policies ‘Two-faced’’, Sydney Morning Herald, 23rd March, 
1990, p. 6. 
62 Mike Taylor, ‘New Push for Labour Deregulation’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1st September, 1986, 
p. 1. 
63 Mike Steketee, ‘Young’s Call to ALP: Fight the New Right’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1st 
September, 1986, p. 1. 
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distinction between Labor the [sic] Coalition has been blurred by the 
floating dollar, the cuts in real wages and the stringent 1986-87 Budget 
… What Mr Young, the Special Minister of State, and president of the 
ALP, plainly believes, is that the threat of the radical Right can be used 
to bring together a divided and demoralised party. From Mr Young’s 
point of view, the more radical and threatening the Right appears the 
better. 
 
The same, no doubt, is true so far as Messrs Crean and Kelty are 
concerned. For them the issue is the preservation of the Accord through 
a period of further real wage cuts and little or no progress on the unions’ 
superannuation claim … For those unions tempted to desert the Accord, 
the ACTU leaders have a frightening answer: the alternative to the 
Accord and wage restraint is a Coalition government determined to roll 
back union power.64 
 
As Paul Kelly writes, the radical neo-liberal movement (what he calls the new right) 
‘was not interested in popularity’.65 It was interested in installing neo-liberalism as 
the new political common sense. Movement activists were driven by ideology and, 
because they relied upon fractions of capital for their support, rather than upon a 
popular base, they had little need to temper their ideological pronouncements. The 
Labor leadership was thus able to use the radical neo-liberal movement to stifle 
internal Party, and public, opposition to its less radical neo-liberal agenda, while 
maintaining the Party’s commitment to the state project of neo-liberalism. Working 
class acquiescence to the general material suffering under Labor was assisted by 
Labor’s ability to point to the far worse option that people would face under the 
radical neo-liberal influenced Coalition. 
 
Policy influence 
                                                 
64 Editorial, ‘Both Sides Play the Right’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1st September 1986, p. 10. 
65 Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty, p. 269. 
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It is often assumed by some on the Left that the radical neo-liberal movement was a 
significant influence on the Labor Party’s embrace of neo-liberalism during the 
1980s and 1990s.66 Such an assumption often involves simply comparing the neo-
liberal policy agenda of the ALP with the neo-liberal policies advocated by the 
movement and finding a broad concurrence. Tempting though it is, such an 
assumption is misleading. Given that the radical neo-liberal movement, when it first 
came to public attention in the guise of the ‘new right’ during the mid 1980s, was 
very much identified as aggressively anti-union, it was always going to be unlikely 
that Labor would embrace its policy advice. Clearly Labor caucus members took 
notice of movement publications.67 Clearly, also, within the Labor Party there were a 
number of sympathisers with the movement.68 It is therefore probable that the 
movement contributed to the context for speculation about economic and social 
policy alternatives. Stephen Martin even concedes that: 
 
it can be said that we did probably take and steal some of the general 
agenda items of new right philosophy, like some privatisations.69 
 
However, the movement was primarily used strategically by the Labor leadership, 
rather than as a source for policy inspiration. The radical neo-liberal movement was 
not the only site of neo-liberal intellectual activity from the mid 1970s onwards, and 
Labor derived its neo-liberalism, primarily, from these other sources. Importantly, 
however, the fact that sections of capital were clearly aligned with the radical neo-
liberals gave an extra incentive for the Labor government to move further to the neo-
liberal Right, in order to stave off any possible capitalist revolt. 
                                                 
66 See for example Sharon Beder, Global Spin: The Corporate Assault on Environmentalism, Revised 
edition, Scribe, Carlton North, 2000, p. 89; Philip Mendes, ‘Australian Neo-liberal Think Tanks and 
the Backlash Against the Welfare State’, p. 50. 
67 Stephen Martin, interview with author. 
68 Jim Carlton states that the Crossroads Group attempted to target sympathetic Ministers in the Labor 
Government. According to Carlton, the two most sympathetic to the Crossroads position were John 
Kerin and Peter Walsh. (Jim Carlton, interview with the author). 
69 Stephen Martin, interview with the author. 
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Due to Labor’s integral relationship with the trade union movement and the One 
Nation hegemonic strategy it employed in government from 1983-1996, a 
sympathetic and close relationship between the radical neo-liberal movement and 
senior Labor figures was limited to a few individuals. The movement was, however, 
a catalyst for Labor’s embrace of neo-liberalism federally. On the one hand, the 
radical neo-liberal movement was constructed as a threat by the Party’s dominant 
Right faction in order to neutralise opposition to its program of neo-liberal 
restructuring. On the other, the movement’s alliance with key fractions of capital 
represented a perceived threat to Labor which could only be headed off through the 
adoption of policies which incorporated some of the values being espoused by the 
radical neo-liberals. 
 
 
The radical neo-liberal movement and the Coalition parties 
 
Of all the political parties in Australia, the radical neo-liberal movement has been 
closest to the Liberals. This should come as no surprise. The Liberal Party 
historically has been strongly allied with the capitalist class, more so than has Labor. 
Given the integral links between the radical neo-liberal movement and specific 
fractions of capital it is little wonder that the Liberal Party has been one terrain for 
movement activism. Furthermore, the Institute of Public Affairs, which was to 
become a key movement organisation, was crucial in the formation of the Liberal 
Party in the 1940s and in the articulation of early Liberal Party policy – although, at 
the time, the IPA and the Liberal Party were very much part of the Keynesian 
consensus. 
 
Given that the Liberal and National/Country parties have often formed an anti-Labor 
coalition during the period under review, the two will be considered together. This 
section will draw upon documents and interviews to identify the precise 
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relationships between the radical neo-liberal movement and the Coalition parties and 
analyse the impact that the movement has had upon the Coalition and its articulation 
of a neo-liberal hegemonic project. This section will seek to determine what impact, 
if any, the movement had upon the Coalition’s shift from being a part of the post-
war consensus to pursuing a Two-Nations neo-liberal hegemonic project. 
 
Movement activists within the Coalition parties 
 
As noted in Chapter Three, radical neo-liberal think tanks have been at pains to 
stress their independence from political parties. The IPA, for example portrays itself 
as ‘a political organisation in the sense that it influences the political agenda, but 
IPA carefully avoids political-party partisanship’,70 and the Centre for Independent 
Studies states that ‘its independent and non-partisan position places it uniquely to 
provide competition to government-sponsored research’.71 While such claims are 
true in a formal sense – the radical neo-liberal think tanks do not have any formal 
links with any political parties – as Table 7.2 illustrates, when considered as a 
movement, it is clear that there are significant overlaps between the radical neo-
liberals and the Liberal Party. More importantly, many of those movement activists 
who are also Liberal Party members have occupied influential, or even leadership, 
positions within the Party. Indeed, there has been a revolving door between the 
movement and the Liberal Party, with activists entering leadership positions within 
the Party and Party leaders taking active roles within the movement. Clearly, 
movement activists have been in positions to exert influence within the Liberal 
Party. With this in mind, the following discussion will analyse the specific areas in 
which the movement attempted to influence the Coalition parties, and the ways in 
which the Coalition parties responded. 
 
 
 
                                                 
70 IPA, IPA Report 1991, p. 1. 
71 CIS, ‘About the Centre for Independent Studies’, CIS Annual Review 1986-87, p. 14. 
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Table 7.2 Radical Neo-liberal Activists Within the Coalition Parties 
 
Movement Activist Coalition Activity Movement Activity 
Jim Carlton MP Founder, Crossroads Group 
Peter Costello MP Founder H. R. Nicholls Society 
David Kemp MP Crossroads Group, Regular contributor to 
IPA, Member, H. R. Nicholls Society 
Rod Kemp  MP Director, IPA 
Ian McLachlan  MP Board Member, IPA 
David Trebeck  Liberal Party Hierarchy Member, Crossroads, Regular contributor 
to movement publications 
Andrew Robb Liberal Party Hierarchy H. R. Nicholls Society 
Hugh Morgan Respected Liberal Party figure  Crossroads, CIS, IPA, Tasman Institute 
John Elliott Liberal President IPA 
Eda Ritchie Victorian Liberal President IPA 
John Hyde MP Founder, Crossroads, AIPP, IPA 
Bert Kelly MP Crossroads 
Gerard Henderson Staffer for John Howard H. R. Nicholls Society, IPA (NSW) 
Andrew Hay Staffer for Philip Lynch. Adviser 
to Michael Howson 
Crossroads, AIPP 
Tony Rutherford Adviser to senior several Federal 
Liberal MPs 
IPA 
Peter Kerr Senior Political Adviser to 
Andrew Peacock (1984-5); 
Principal Political Adviser to Jeff 
Kennett (1987-9) 
IPA Director, 1990 
David Russell QLD National Party H. R. Nicholls Society, Crossroads 
William Cole Head of Liberal committee into 
introduction of GST, 1993 
AIPP 
Tim Duncan Principal Press Secretary, 
Opposition Leader Jeff Kennett. 
IPA 
Michael Kroger President, Victorian Liberal 
Party 
H. R. Nicholls Society 
Charles Copeman Stood for Liberal Party in seat of 
Phillip, 1990 
Centre 2000 
John Stone Elected National Party Senator, 
1987 
IPA 
Gary Sturgess Staffer to NSW Liberal MP Crossroads 
Nick Greiner MP Crossroads 
Bruce Baird MP Crossroads 
Brian Buckley Staffer for Phillip Lynch Crossroads 
Peter Shack MP Crossroads 
Murray Sainsbury MP Crossroads 
Martin Rawlinson Liberal Research Director Crossroads 
John Hewson MP Crossroads 
John Rose Staffer for Fraser Crossroads 
Peter Philips MP Advisory Board, Centre 2000 
Cliff Walsh Staffer for Fraser Crossroads 
William Kerley Adviser to Howard Contributor to IPA Review 
Alistair Nicholas Staff of Alexander Downer CIS 
John Hay National Party Australian Free Enterprise Foundation 
Michael Warby Liberal Party Federal Council IPA 
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Shifting the Coalition to the Right 
 
Part of the impetus for the emergence of the radical neo-liberal movement was 
dissatisfaction with the Fraser Coalition government.72 For many radical neo-liberals 
the Fraser years promised much but delivered little. Fraser was unable, or unwilling, 
to match his sometimes fierce neo-liberal rhetoric with policy outcomes. One goal of 
the movement therefore was to shift the Liberal party further to the neo-liberal 
Right. Both of these sentiments are evident in Bruce Shepherd’s reflection upon the 
state of the Liberal Party in 1987:  
 
My big concern with the Liberal Party is that if it allows too much power 
to the poor thinkers in the group, then it will go back to the Fraser era 
and there might be a whole lot of flurry inside, but there will be no 
results coming out.73 
 
In order to bring about such a change the radical neo-liberal movement worked 
aggressively, both within and outside of the Liberal Party. 
 
Within the Liberal Party, two organisations were formed with the aim of pushing the 
Party towards neo-liberalism: the Dries and the Society of Modest Members. 
Movement activists were integral to the formation of both. John Hyde, Jim Carlton 
and Peter Shack formed both the Dries in 1980,74 and the Society for Modest 
members in 1981.75 The Dries were formed to mount an intellectual assault upon 
                                                 
72 Andrew Clarke for example attributes to Geoffrey Blainey the sentiment that the radical neo-liberal 
movement ‘was a group of people frustrated with the lack of change under the Fraser Government’: 
Andrew Clarke, ‘In Their Own Image’, Sydney Morning Herald Magazine, March 2001, p. 32. 
73 Shepherd quoted in Michael Cordell, ‘A Shepherd Who Steers His Flock Right’, Sydney Morning 
Herald, 7th February, 1987, p. 9. 
74 Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty, p. 39. Kelly suggests that Hyde, Carlton, Shack, as well as Brian 
Buckley, were involved in the formation of the Dries. Jim Carlton attests that he, Hyde and Shack 
were the founders (Jim Carlton, interview with the author). 
75 Marion Maddox, For God and Country: Religious Dynamics in Australian Federal Politics, 
Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2001, p. 143. Jim Carlton says that the founders 
of the Modest Members were the same as those who founded the Dries (Jim Carlton, interview with 
the author). 
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protectionist ministers within the federal Liberal caucus. Issues such as the 
protection of the clothing and textiles industry and regulations governing maximum 
numbers of self-service pumps at petrol stations were attacked by the Dries. They 
were highly organised: meeting regularly, producing pamphlets and organising 
seminars sometimes attended by international neo-liberal speakers.76 Although not 
as well-organised,77 the Society of Modest Members — formed, according to Peter 
McGauran, by Coalition MPs ‘suffering under the yoke of the Fraser socialist 
government’78  and named after the newspaper by line of long time anti-tariff 
crusader, Bert Kelly — was an attempt to broaden the radical neo-liberal sphere of 
influence within the Liberal Party, particularly to the State branches.79 Like the 
Dries, the Society of Modest Members would also host outside speakers, including 
radical neo-liberal activists, such as Lauchlan Chipman, who addressed the Society 
in 1985.80 In this endeavour Jim Carlton believes the Modest Members were 
successful. Of the Dries, Carlton also comments that although they probably 
commanded a majority in the Party room, they were a minority within the ministry, 
and given that policy direction depended heavily upon Fraser’s own political 
sensibilities, they had only one concrete victory: the deregulation of airport rental 
car markets.81 
 
Clearly, then, there was a group within the Liberal caucus, led by movement 
activists, who were vigorously pushing Coalition policy towards radical neo-
liberalism. While having only limited concrete victories during the Fraser years, the 
radical neo-liberals were to provide the impetus for quite bitter conflicts within the 
Liberal Party during the remainder of the 1980s. Importantly, although the radical 
neo-liberal movement was still emerging, leading Dries were, at this time, also 
involved in setting up one of the early movement organisations: the Crossroads 
                                                 
76 Jim Carlton, interview with the author. 
77 Jim Carlton, interview with the author. 
78 Peter McGauran quoted in Marion Maddox, For God and Country: Religious Dynamics in 
Australian Federal Politics, p. 143. 
79 Jim Carlton, interview with the author. 
80 Len Bosman, ‘Modest Members’, The Optimist, March-April 1985, p. 18. 
81 Jim Carlton, interview with the author. 
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group. So it is clear that these Liberals were also movement activists — not merely 
Party members who happened to share some of the movement’s ideas. 
 
They, and other radical neo-liberal activists, were integral to the struggle that 
occurred within the Liberal party between the ‘Wets’ and the Dries. Movement 
activists inside the federal caucus, and activists inside or close to the Party but 
outside of the parliamentary membership, attacked the Wets during the 1980s. 
Acting both collectively and individually, the goal was to create a new Liberal 
consensus approximating the values of the movement. Movement activists attempted 
to do this in three ways.  
 
First, movement activists who were also Party figures made public pronouncements 
criticising Liberal policy and calling for more radical measures. John Elliott, Liberal 
Party President and movement activist, broke ranks with the parliamentary 
leadership and called for $3 billion in cuts to Commonwealth expenditure as well as 
arguing that there was not enough policy debate within the Party82 — perhaps a 
suggestion that such discussion should have been provided by the radical neo-liberal 
movement and its think tanks. Andrew Hay, despite being a high-profile Liberal, 
also often used his position as head of various employer groups to make statements 
critical of the policies of both the Labor and Liberal Parties. 
 
Second, movement activists used the threat of electoral campaigns to pressure the 
Liberal Party to adopt radical neo-liberal policy platforms. The most obvious 
example of this is the ‘Joh for PM’ campaign. When Queensland National Party 
Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen announced his intention to make a bid for federal 
parliament – either as leader of the Coalition, of the Nationals, or of some 
unspecified new right-wing party – the conservative side of politics was thrown into 
disarray. Bjelke-Petersen free market populism to mobilise supporters at public 
rallies throughout the country. A number of movement activists lent their support to 
                                                 
82 Louise Dodson, ‘Elliott Breaks Party Ranks Again’, Sydney Morning Herald, 27th November, 1987, 
p. 5. 
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the ‘Joh-for-PM’ campaign. Both Bruce Shepherd and the IPA’s Des Moore spoke 
at least one of Joh’s public rallies.83 Andrew Hay gave public support to the 
campaign:  
 
I think that the community generally welcomes the move by the 
Queensland Premier to assume the leadership of the National Party. It 
will clearly strengthen the National Party’s commitment to radical 
conservatism in Australia.84  
 
Ian McLachlan flirted with Joh for a time but failed in the end to offer the Premier 
his endorsement.85 As discussed in Chapter Three, Centre 2000 enthusiastically 
endorsed and promoted the campaign. It is clear that such support served the purpose 
of pressuring the Coalition to shift to the Right in an attempt to appease populist 
sentiments. However, many movement activists thought such tactics to be 
dangerous. For example, on Bjelke-Petersen, John Hyde said: ‘Australia needs a 
person who accepts the law of arithmetic – we do not want cheap populism’.86 
Gerard Henderson was also scathing in his attacks upon those movement activists, 
such as Des Moore, who lent their support to the ‘Joh for PM’ campaign.87 As 
McEachern argues, the ‘Joh for PM’ campaign ‘defined the outer fringes of the 
business campaign to change the direction of policy and the character of politics in 
Australia’.88 Given the close association of the radical neo-liberals with capital, it is 
therefore not surprising that the movement was split on the issue. In the end Bjelke 
Petersen was not credible and was linked with extreme right elements, which 
                                                 
83 Des Moore shared a platform with Joh at a public rally in Newcastle: see John Edwards, ‘Is God on 
Joh’s Side?’, Sydney Morning Herald, 30th May, 1987, p. 41. Bruce Shepherd addressed a similar 
rally in Wagga-Wagga: see Michael Cordell, ‘A Shepherd who steers his flock Right’, p. 9. 
84 Hay quoted in Colleen Ryan, ‘How We’d Run Australia’, Sydney Morning Herald Review, 14th 
March 1987, p. 4. 
85 Sheryle Bagwell, ‘McLachlan Pads Up in Earnest’, Sydney Morning Herald Weekend, 10th 
November 1989, p. 1. 
86 Quoted in Louise Dodson and Wayne Burns, ‘Reduce Government Sector Says Right-wing Think 
Tank’, Sydney Morning Herald, 17th February 1987, p. 7. 
87 Gerard Henderson, ‘Beware False Prophets of the Lunar Right’, p. 11; Gerard Henderson, 
‘Comment on Stone’, pp. 557-55. 
88 Doug McEachern, Business Mates, p. 92. 
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offended the sensibilities of some movement activists. The other major use by 
movement activists of electoral pressure on the Coalition was by Andrew Hay and 
Peter Boyle through the employer associations which they headed. In 1986 Hay 
publicly warned that the Coalition had 12 months to shift to the Right or the radical 
neo-liberal movement would form a new party.89 In 1987, Hay and Boyle announced 
that the ACC and ASBA were combining to run a marginal seats campaign 
supporting candidates advocating lowered income tax and curbing the power of 
trade unions.90 Although aimed at eroding support for the federal Labor government, 
by mobilising voters these radical neo-liberals were demonstrating their potential 
power and giving the Coalition reason to take Hay’s threat of 1986 seriously. That 
this was taken seriously is evidenced by the fact that both the then Liberal leader, 
John Howard and the federal Liberal director, Tony Eggleton, met in private with 
Hay to discuss the marginal seats campaign.91  
 
Third, radical neo-liberal activists were actively involved in the selection of 
candidates, sometimes themselves standing for election. They set out to undermine 
and depose sitting Wets, such as Ian Macphee, Peter Baume and Steele Hall. At a 
pro-Bjelke-Petersen rally in Wagga Wagga, Bruce Shepherd attacked the 
aforementioned Wets and said that they should not be re-endorsed for the 1987 
election.92 A sense of how the movement viewed the Wets can be gleaned by Gerard 
Henderson’s comments in his history of the Liberal Party that Ian Macphee’s ‘views 
were to the left of the government’.93 Indeed, Macphee was to become one of the 
casualties of the radical neo-liberal movement. In 1989 he lost preselection for his 
seat of Goldstein to movement activist David Kemp. Kemp had been approached to 
run by a group of Liberals after fellow movement activist, Andrew Hay, had also 
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been approached and declined.94 That the preselection was ideologically motivated 
is clear from the fact that Macphee was under no threat of losing his seat at the 
federal election. As Geoff Kitney noted at the time:  
 
The Macphee pre-selection crisis is peculiar because the challenge 
involves a politician who has a remarkable record of success where it 
counts most: winning his seat and securing it for his party. There are few 
Liberals with a better track record.95 
 
However, it was not merely economic ideology that drove the coup against 
Macphee. According to Macphee the issue of race also played a part.96 As one of the 
four Coalition MPs who crossed the floor to vote with the Labor government in 
support of the exclusion of race from the determination of emigration to Australia,97 
Macphee became the target of many leading Party members. As noted in Chapter 
Two, many radical neo-liberals had embraced conservative positions many social 
issues. Thus, movement activists were able to attack Macphee on both economic and 
social issues. In addition to Kemp, successful transitions from movement to 
Coalition MP were made by Peter Costello, Rod Kemp, Ian McLachlan and John 
Stone. Charles Copeman also stood for the Liberals, but lost, in the seat of Philip.98 
 
Movement activists have been involved in the installation, or attempted installation, 
of other Coalition candidates as well. According to Paul Kelly, Hugh Morgan was 
keen to assist fellow movement activist John Elliott’s transition to political office, 
and on behalf of a small group of Liberals (including Greg Daniel, Ian Kortlang and 
Richard Alston) attempted to convince Roger Shipton, the member for Higgins, to 
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resign in favour of Elliott.99 Kelly writes that Shipton ‘was offered a position outside 
politics at a very generous salary, a package Shipton would not expect to match in 
any normal political retirement’.100 Although the move was unsuccessful it 
demonstrates the involvement of radical neo-liberals in the processes of Coalition 
candidate selection.  
 
How the Coalition viewed the movement 
 
In the early to mid 1980s, when the radical neo-liberal movement began to emerge 
from relative obscurity, attitudes toward it from the Coalition caucus were mixed. 
The Wets within the Party were openly antagonistic towards the movement. Partly 
this stemmed from the different ideological positions occupied by the two groups, as 
is evident from the following. The Wets were in the tradition of social liberalism 
exemplified by J. S. Mill and T. H. Green.101 Wets viewed liberalism as ‘the 
rejection of crude laissez faire’.102 Ian Macphee outlined the differences between the 
Wets, whom he saw as representative of liberalism, and the radical neo-liberal 
movement, whom he viewed as representative of libertarianism:  
 
[libertarianism] is the antithesis of the just society and essentially 
excludes the notion of compassion which is crucial in any enlightened 
liberal society … Libertarianism advocates selfishness to the point where 
the strong dominate the weak. By contrast, Liberalism encourages 
individual initiative whilst at the same time taking care of the less 
fortunate’.103  
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Primarily however, public antagonism by the Wets toward the radical neo-liberals 
stemmed from that movement’s outright hostility towards them. Such hostility 
prompted the Wets to form their own group – the Liberal Forum – in order to 
articulate a counter agenda to that of the radical neo-liberals.104 It also led to several 
public attacks by Wets upon the ‘new right’. Robert Hill, a Wet, released in 1987 an 
eight page statement attacking the radical neo-liberals and labelling them ‘fringe 
dwellers’.105 Steele Hall echoed these sentiments stating that radical neo-liberal 
attacks upon the Liberals threatened ‘ripping the guts out of the Liberal party with a 
butcher’s knife of extremes’.106 At the other extreme, Jim Carlton (a movement 
activist and Shadow Treasurer) declared ‘we will support the freedom fighters’107 in 
reference to the H. R. Nicholls Society and those capitalists taking militant action 
against unions.  
 
As the Coalition itself moved closer to the radical neo-liberal agenda, and as more 
movement activists entered the caucus, attitudes became more consistent and much 
more legitimacy was accorded to the movement and its think tanks. Those lone 
voices who attacked the radical neo-liberals were quickly reprimanded. So, when 
Wet Liberal Christopher Pyne described the IPA as ‘Dr Stragelove economists’ in 
1995, he was rebuked by Nick Minchin, describing the comments as ‘a 
contemptuous attack’ and not ‘a true reflection of current Liberal thinking’.108  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, Coalition MPs were regular attendees at movement 
functions, including as invited speakers. In 1990, John Howard used one such 
occasion – a meeting of the H. R. Nicholls Society —  to launch an attack upon 
those Wets opposed to the Coalition’s industrial relations policy, which allowed 
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employment contracts outside of the Industrial Relations Commission.109 Evidence 
of Liberal sympathy towards the movement can also be found in Jim Carlton’s 
argument that both the Dries and the Society of Modest members took an interest in 
the publications of the IPA and CIS. Particularly once movement activists ascended 
the Liberal hierarchy, becoming both MPs and party leaders, the Party in general 
became much more sympathetic to the movement, and those opposed became an 
increasingly less vocal minority. 
 
Policy and language 
 
Radical neo-liberal activists have had some success in directly shaping the policies 
of the Coalition parties. The Liberal’s 1986 industrial relations policy, which had as 
its aim the dismantling of the arbitration system, is a case in point. Deputy Liberal 
leader, Neil Brown, wrote the policy and, as part of the drafting process, consulted 
movement activists Peter Boyle, Andrew Hay, Peter Costello, Paul Houlihan and Ian 
Spry.110 Costello was one of the lawyers used to provide a draft of what the 
legislation itself would look like.111 In 1986 Costello explained the role played by 
the movement in influencing the Liberal Party: 
 
We are looking to influence the debate as much as possible. There are 
not many of us, so the ideas keep coming from the same people. 
Basically, we come up with ideas. The Liberals and others say, ‘Oh no, 
this is too radical for us. We have to get re-elected’. So we put them out 
into the public debate, writing articles and so on and the newspapers 
publish them and gradually people begin to talk about the ideas. Then 
the Liberals suddenly say ‘This sounds like a good idea. Who can we get 
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to help us on this.’ And the natural choice is one of us, because we’ve 
already been talking about the same thing.112 
 
If claims made by Andrew Hay and Peter Boyle are anything to go by, then it would 
seem that Costello’s assessment is correct. Hay claims that although he had ‘never 
been invited to any of their [the Liberal’s] policy committees’, he had met privately 
with both Howard and Neil Brown about industrial relations policy.113 Boyle also 
claimed that he was exerting strong pressure on the Liberal’s industrial relations 
policy: ‘We say to Brown, “How’s that policy going? Have you toughened up the 
wimps in the party room yet?” I go to Brown’s office and he comes to mine. And I 
talk to Howard if I think Brown’s not helping us.’114 Other direct policy input was 
provided by movement activists David Trebeck and Wolfgang Kasper. Trebeck, 
while Policy Director of the Liberal Party,115 enlisted Kasper and they jointly wrote 
the Liberals’ Policies for Business, which outlined a neo-liberal agenda for the 
Coalition.116 John Hyde argues that, in producing this document, Trebeck and 
Kasper ‘drew on the continuing Crossroads meetings’.117  
 
Boyle was once again influential in the formulation of Coalition industrial relations 
policy in 1993, as part of the Fightback package. He claimed ‘My relationship with 
[then Shadow Industrial Relations Minister] John Howard is a very close one’ and 
that although ‘It’s difficult for me to expect either Kennett or Howard to say 
specifically ‘This is what came from Peter Boyle’, nonetheless ‘there is absolutely 
no doubt that John Howard has recognised very publicly the contribution that we’ve 
made to aspects of their industrial relations policy’.118 Movement activists were able 
to directly shape other aspects of the ‘Fightback!’ package as well. Movement 
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activist Arvi Parbo was named as part of the team of six ‘special advisers’ to 
Opposition leader John Hewson, while movement sympathiser Judith Sloan, was 
named as part of the same body to advise on unemployment.119 John Freebairn of 
CoPS was also one of six advisers to the Coalition on taxation policy.120 Bruce 
Shepherd and the CIS’s John Logan addressed an Opposition health policy 
development seminar in 1991.121 
 
Clearly, once movement activists entered the leadership of the Liberal Party, they 
were able to exert direct influence over Party policy. However, even in such 
positions, these activists were constrained by the dictates of electoral politics, and 
thus it is not surprising that while some policies advocated by the movement have 
been adopted by the Liberal party, others, for reasons of electoral pragmatism, have 
not. Furthermore, upon entering parliamentary politics, movement activists have 
substantially curtailed their direct involvement in the movement. 
 
The greatest success of the movement has been in providing the Coalition parties – 
in particular the Liberal Party – with a language and framework with which to 
articulate a conservative neo-liberal policy agenda and, ultimately, to articulate its 
Two Nations hegemonic project. There were other groups advocating privatisation, 
deregulation and the cutting of government expenditure in Australia during the 
period under study, however the relationship between the radical neo-liberals and the 
Coalition was such that it was a natural forum from which Coalition MPs could draw 
rhetoric and broad policy frameworks to support such policies.  
 
The Crossroads group, for example, attempted to influence directly, key figures from 
both Labor and Coalition parties, but because of the group’s composition, the 
Coalition was always going to be more readily targeted. Because State governments 
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accounted for about 70 per cent of public sector employment – and therefore that 
any serious attempt to reduce the size of the public sector would prove fruitless 
unless cuts were made to this tier of government – the Crossroads Group adopted the 
strategy of inviting State-based Liberals and Nationals to their meetings. The 
following State-based members of the Coalition parties were brought into the 
Crossroads group – Richard Court (WA), John Olson (SA), Nick Greiner (NSW), 
Bruce Baird (NSW), Alan Stockdale (Vic), Don Hayward (Vic), David Russell (Qld 
National). No doubt this at least provided these leading Coalition members with a 
radical neo-liberal framework and network of movement contacts upon which to 
draw for policy.122  
 
What the radical neo-liberals provided that other groups did not was: the concept of 
marketisation; new class discourse; a philosophical justification for neo-liberalism; 
and a discursive framework that combined neo-liberal economics with conservative 
social values (as discussed in Chapter Two). The marketisation of public goods has 
been an agenda of the Coalition since the early 1990s — its most overt commitment 
coming in the form of the ‘Fightback!’ package. ‘Fightback!’ articulated an agenda 
that was close in many respects to that of the radical neo-liberal movement. It called 
for the marketisation of education, health care and welfare. As  the following excerpt 
demonstrates, the education policy agenda of Fightback was similar to what had 
been articulated by the radical neo-liberal movement during the previous decade-
and-a-half: 
 
Our strategy to the lift the standards of Australian education and training 
centres on the creation of flexible, financially autonomous, and locally 
managed institutions accountable to informed parent and student markets 
and on moving away from centralised, confrontational industrial 
relations. 
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We will increasingly move towards funding students rather than 
institutions and rewarding strengths and excellence rather than non-
performing providers.123 
 
‘Funding students rather than institutions’ referred to the Coalition’s proposed 
‘national Education Awards’ which were essentially education vouchers124 — the 
policy solution preferred by the radical neo-liberal movement. The Coalition argued 
that such a scheme would ‘establish an effective student market for higher 
education’.125 The possibility of education vouchers had already been mooted in 
1990 by Peter Reith, in his capacity as Shadow Education Minister.126 A similar 
scheme had been proposed by movement activist Richard Blandy in a report 
commissioned by the Fraser government’s National Inquiry into Education and 
Training in 1979.127 
 
Under ‘Fightback!’, the provision of health care was also to be marketised. 
‘Fightback!’ promised to: 
 
‘restore the balance between the public and private sectors by 
encouraging individuals to provide for their own health care by taking 
out private health insurance’.128  
 
The incentives would be financial — the Coalition was promising to subsidise the 
private health industry. Although the Coalition promised to maintain a strong 
commitment to Medicare, and thus differed from the radical neo-liberal movement, 
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the imprint of the movement on the policy of creating a private health market is 
apparent. This is particularly true when it is recalled that John Logan of the CIS was 
brought in to discuss health policy options with the Coalition.129  
 
The partial marketisation of welfare was also proposed through the contracting out 
of CES functions, providing a ‘significant increase in funds’ to, and ‘upgrading the 
role of’, charities and private enterprises in the provision of welfare services.130 
While this does not conform precisely to the prescriptions of the radical neo-liberal 
movement, it fits well with the movement’s advocacy of the devolution of welfare 
provision to the private sector. That the Coalition was influenced in its broad policy 
framework and language on welfare by the movement is made more compelling 
when it is considered that Alistair Nicholas, an adviser to Alexander Downer and 
previously to National Party MP Charles Blunt, was also the author of the CIS 
publication Voluntary Welfare: A Greater Role for Private Charities and from 1987-
89 worked for the CIS as a policy analyst on its Social Welfare Research 
Program.131 
 
Another area of movement influence upon the Coalition has been new class 
discourse. This discourse is evident in much of the rhetoric, and some of the policy 
detail, of the Coalition since the mid 1980s. In 1985, during his maiden speech to 
federal Parliament, Alexander Downer attacked Labor for representing ‘selfish and 
sectional interests’. Similar language was evident in the Coalition’s ‘Fightback!’ and 
‘The Things That Matter’ statements. Labor’s record on education was attacked for 
being hostage to ideologically correct minorities: ‘Labor’s teacher union allies 
continue to fight against external exams and skills testing while advocating fringe 
subjects based on ideological correctness’132 and ‘social engineers and powerful 
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interests’ were accused of trying to impose their own ideological agendas upon 
ordinary Australians.133 Labor was framed as ‘a sectional party, dominated by 
special interests’.134 In public speeches too, the Coalition leadership attacked interest 
groups and their relationship with the Labor government: 
 
We’ve seen a process develop where particular groups have had an 
unbelievable influence over the passage of government … Not just the 
union leadership … but, importantly, other groups that have emerged – 
groups like the extreme green lobby, some of the Aboriginal heritage 
movement – which have extracted deals and shifted government in a 
way that has seen them take decisions in the interest of a few people, but 
to the expense of all Australians.135 
 
The language and arguments are identical to those employed and developed by the 
radical neo-liberal movement. Given that the radical neo-liberal movement has been 
the main incubator of new class discourse in Australia, there can be little doubt that 
the radical neo-liberals influenced the framework and language from which the 
Coalition drew. 
 
Radical neo-liberals also provided the Coalition with a philosophical justification for 
neo-liberal policies. This is most evident in the ‘Fightback!’ package, in which the 
Coalition promised that the ‘expansion of freedom will be the absolute heart of the 
reform agenda of the Hewson Government’136 and argued: 
 
Economic freedom has as its centrepiece people’s right to buy and sell, 
invest, improve property, and freely contract with one another, without 
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needing permission from government. Free markets work because 
individual people, co-operating peacefully and voluntarily through 
markets, can achieve much that politicians and bureaucrats cannot 
achieve using compulsion and direction.137 
 
Again, such sentiments would have sat quite comfortably within the pages of Policy 
or IPA Review. Indeed, as the radical neo-liberal movement was the primary vehicle 
for arguments which linked markets and broader notions of freedom, it would seem 
that it was from the movement that the Coalition drew such rhetoric. 
 
Importantly, the movement’s ‘Markets Morals and Civil Society Project’ also 
provided the Coalition with a discursive framework with which to reconcile their 
contradictory commitments to both neo-liberalism and conservatism. In an attempt 
to ward off criticism that the Coalition’s commitment to neo-liberalism would 
undermine some of the values and institutions beloved of conservatives, 
‘Fightback!’ argued that the two were inextricably linked: 
 
Our emphasis on free markets does not suggest or imply that the most 
important relations between people are commercial ones. A decent 
society must be based on a strong sense of fair and ethical dealing and a 
commitment to the interests of the community beyond the marketplace. 
 
Moral community and economic freedom … are closely related to each 
other. Properly functioning markets are a by-product of an ethical 
community. Because markets are based on voluntary co-operation and 
decentralised decision-making, they also create the only conditions in 
which a moral community can emerge and be sustained.138 
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The Lyons Forum — formed by Coalition MPs in 1992 as a vehicle for promoting 
conservative values within the Coalition and which hosted movement speakers – 
was one conduit for such ideas between movement and Party.139 
 
The Howard ascendancy and the Coalition’s ‘Two Nations’ hegemonic project 
 
This thesis surveys the period until the end of 1996, and thus includes only the first 
ten months of the Howard Coalition government. The preceding discussion 
regarding the Liberal party however is important because it gives an insight into the 
nature of the hegemonic project of the Howard government – a project that was 
already evident in 1996. It is now possible to analyse the contribution of the radical 
neo-liberal movement to this hegemonic project. 
 
In 1996 the Howard Coalition government came to power, ending thirteen years of 
Labor rule federally. Their campaign slogan, ‘For all of us’, encapsulates the 
discursive strategy behind the Two Nations hegemonic project which they set about 
implementing once elected. As Noel Pearson perceptively argued immediately prior 
to the 1996 election, whilst promising to govern ‘for all of us’ the actual message 
behind the Coalition’s slogan was ‘For all of us, but not for them’.140 The ‘them’ in 
question was the new class. Under Labor, so the Coalition argued, government had 
become hostage to ‘special interest’ groups and ‘political correctness’. Although 
lacking in substance, such claims spoke to the insecurities and resentment of many 
who were suffering from over a decade of neo-liberal economic restructuring. New 
class discourse thus provided a powerful aid to the Coalition’s election strategy, and 
it was from the radical neo-liberal movement that this discourse was largely derived. 
 
Although the ‘For all of us’ campaign drew heavily upon the radical neo-liberals’ 
new class discourse, it avoided some of the more strident neo-liberal rhetoric that 
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characterised the ‘Fightback!’ package. The experience of the 1993 ‘Fightback!’ 
campaign, in which the Coalition lost the ‘unlosable election’, demonstrated that an 
electoral strategy based primarily upon a radical neo-liberal agenda was unlikely to 
win broad appeal. Strategically, the Coalition needed something more to knit 
together a stable electoral majority. The ‘something more’ was the construction of a 
series of ‘others’ – ‘special interests’, ‘politically correct elites’, the ‘guilt industry’ 
— who threatened the ‘mainstream’. As Pamela Williams demonstrates in The 
Victory, this strategy of mobilising opinion against ‘special interests’ was quite 
deliberate, and was developed in detail by the Coalition in its planning for the 1996 
election campaign.141 By representing the Labor government as hostage to such 
minority interests, the Coalition was able to position itself as representative of the 
mainstream. At the same time the Coalition jettisoned its public commitment to 
many of the more radical elements of ‘Fightback!’ In government, however, the 
Coalition has been clearly committed to expanding the neo-liberal agenda of the 
Hawke and Keating Labor governments. 
 
Prior and subsequent to the 1996 federal election, the Coalition mobilised the radical 
neo-liberal movement’s new class discourse in order to construct a series of ‘others’ 
upon which resentment and anxieties stemming from Labor’s One Nation neo-liberal 
project could be displaced. Although lacking substance, new class discourse spoke 
to many who had suffered under thirteen years of Labor’s neo-liberal restructuring. 
Ironically, the expansive conception of rights that characterised Labor’s One Nation 
strategy provided a series of targets for the Coalition to exploit. Thus, the radical 
neo-liberals were important in providing the Coalition with a rhetorical arsenal with 
which to construct its Two Nations project. More than this however, the activism of 
the radical neo-liberal movement assisted the Coalition’s Two Nations project. As 
was demonstrated in the previous chapter, by 1996 the radical neo-liberals were 
framed as legitimate, independent sources of comment in the commercial media. 
Through opinion pieces, guest commentary and coverage of events, the movement 
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used the media to attack, demonise and ultimately disorganise the opposition to both 
neo-liberalism and to the Howard government’s hegemonic project. Furthermore, 
other fellow-travelling sympathisers within the media adopted the same language to 
attack the same targets. Because of their lack of accountability, movement activists 
and their fellow-travelling columnists have been able to act with even more impunity 
in such attacks than even the Howard government. Once in power, the Howard 
government was able to use the radical neo-liberals to push political debate further 
to the Right. One such example is the appointment of  movement activist Robert 
Officer as chair of the government’s National Commission of Audit142 — 
established in March 1996 to recommend public expenditure cuts. Thus, the 
movement acted on the one hand as ideological shock troops, and on the other as 
vehicles for a critique which other sympathisers could mobilise. In both ways the 
movement helped to secure hegemony for Howard’s Two Nations project. 
 
The story of the radical neo-liberal movement and the Liberal Party, therefore, is one 
of the Party’s gradual development of its Two Nations hegemonic project to counter 
the One Nation project of Labor. During the 1980s the Coalition was riven by 
internal conflicts. These conflicts mirrored, in many respects, the conflicts within the 
capitalist class during the same period – and the radical neo-liberals played a similar 
role within both conflicts. As ideological warriors they attacked, demonised and 
disorganised opponents of neo-liberalism. Because of its historic relationship with 
the capitalist class, the Coalition was a natural terrain for movement activism, and 
many movement activists were also leading Party members. 
 
The radical neo-liberal movement and State-based liberals 
 
Although this thesis deals primarily with hegemonic conflicts at the federal level in 
Australia, the radical neo-liberal movement was also active at the level of individual 
States within Australia, and it is therefore worth briefly considering these 
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interventions, particularly in so far as they relate to hegemonic struggles at the 
national level. 
 
While the radical neo-liberal movement had little direct access to the federal 
government in the 1980s and early 1990s, the same is not true of State governments. 
Radical neo-liberal activists and organisations were active in shaping the agendas of 
Liberal State governments. In Western Australia the Coalition had its 1993 pre-
election promises costed by the IPA.143 The New South Wales Greiner government 
had clear sympathies with the movement. Premier Greiner and Minister Bruce 
Baird144 had been participants in the Crossroads group, and in 1989, Greiner opened 
the new IPA office in Sydney.145 In keeping with such sympathies, movement 
activist Dame Leonie Kramer, head of the IPA’s Education Policy Unit, was 
appointed to the executive of the NSW Board of Studies in 1990 — the body 
responsible for setting school curricula.146 Further evidence that the radical neo-
liberal approach to education was attractive to the Greiner administration is the 
attendance of Sir John Carrick, Chairman of the NSW Committee of Review into 
Education, at Greiner’s opening of the IPA.147 The Greiner government also 
awarded the Tasman Institute a consultancy to work on the corporatisation of the 
Hunter Water Board.148  
 
But it was with the Victorian Liberals, under the leadership of Jeff Kennett, that the 
movement had its closest relationship. The primary vehicle of this relationship was 
Project Victoria, which set out a radical neo-liberal agenda for the incoming 
Victorian government in the lead up to the 1992 elections. Project Victoria was 
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conducted jointly by the IPA and the Tasman Institute and funded by a number of 
Victorian Employer Associations. The Victorian Liberals took the Project seriously, 
and it is clear that, at least for a time, there was a level of reciprocity between the 
Party’s parliamentary leadership and the movement. For example, prior to the State 
election, Shadow Treasurer Allan Stockdale, himself a former participant in the 
Crossroads group,149 met privately with capitalist executives and movement 
activists, including Bob Officer and the IPA’s Des Moore, to discuss the 
privatisation of State-owned assets.150 Once elected to office, the Kennett 
government appointed Bob Officer to chair the Victorian Commission of Audit. 
Upon reporting the Audit’s recommendations to slash public sector jobs and 
spending, Bob Officer thanked the IPA for its ‘significant contribution’ to the 
process.151 Officer also briefed IPA members on the contents of the report.152 Such 
reciprocity was continued when the Tasman Institute became one of four consultants 
appointed to investigate options for privatising and deregulating Victoria’s 
electricity industry.153 Furthermore, Des Moore argues that he played a role in 
advising Stockdale on appropriate personnel for the bureaucracy:  
 
I did have quite a significant personal influence on Stockdale in that 
regard — in making recommendations about the structure, the new 
structure of the Victorian Treasury and who might be appointed to the 
Treasury.154 
 
Despite this, the precise influence of the radical neo-liberal movement on the 
Kennett government is difficult to determine. Allan Stockdale says he ‘had 
considerable contact with the Tasman Institute while the Coalition was in 
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Opposition’ which ‘helped to develop’ his ideas regarding privatisation.155 
According to Stockdale, it was movement activist Ray Evans who ‘crystallised’ for 
him the essential framework for the privatisation of electricity in Victoria.156 
Similarly, in 1996, Victorian Liberal Transport Minister, Alan Brown, spoke of the 
‘profound impact’ the Tasman Institute had on the government’s policies.157 As 
Fairbrother, Svensen and Teicher argue: 
 
The privatisation program embarked on by the Kennett Government 
from the time of its election in 1992 bears much more than a passing 
resemblance to programs developed by a group known as ‘Project 
Victoria’.158 
 
Against this needs to be considered the sentiment expressed by movement activist 
Des Moore that the IPA was able to exert ‘very little direct influence’ upon the 
Kennett-led Coalition once it was elected.159 Indeed, Moore was excluded from 
membership of the government’s Commission of Audit, despite being previously 
promised a place on it.160 There seems little doubt, however, that although Kennett 
may not have followed the Project Victoria blueprint in detail, what the radical neo-
liberals provided, at the very least, was a broad, radical neo-liberal policy framework 
for the Liberal government to draw upon. In addition, the media coverage generated 
about Project Victoria helped to put radical neo-liberal policy alternatives on the 
public agenda. Project Victoria’s findings helped to provide legitimacy for the 
Kennett government’s neo-liberal restructuring of the Victorian State. 
 
                                                 
155 Allan Stockdale, ‘The Politics of Privatisation in Victoria’, Privatisation International, November 
1999. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Brown quoted in Anon, ‘Victorian Transport Successes’, Tasman Update, October 1996, p. 1. 
158 Peter Fairbrother, Stuart Svensen and Julian Teicher, ‘The Withering Away of the Australian 
State: Privatisation and its Implications for Labour’, Labour and Industry, Vol. 8, No. 2, December 
1997, p. 18. 
159 Des Moore, interview with the author. 
160 Michael Gill, ‘Call to Slash 20, 000 Jobs From Victoria’s Public Sector’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
29th September, 1992, p. 5. 
 
 
316
The impact of the radical neo-liberal movement upon State Liberal governments is 
significant because such governments acted as a beacon for other neo-liberal 
restructuring throughout the rest of Australia. Both the Kennett and Greiner 
governments had considerably more aggressive and confrontationalist neo-liberal 
agendas than did the federal Labor government at the same time. As Labor 
exhausted the limits of its One Nation strategy, the examples of Victoria and New 
South Wales could be used by supporters of even more radical neo-liberal 
restructuring of the Australian state to provide impetus for their cause. Therefore, to 
the extent that they aided the agendas of the State-based Liberals, the radical neo-
liberal movement contributed to the momentum of the state project of neo-
liberalism.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the construction of the state project of neo-liberalism by the federal bureaucracy 
and by successive federal Labor governments from 1983 onwards, the radical neo-
liberal movement was not a major direct influence. To the regime-level strategies 
articulated and pursued by Labor and the Coalition, however, the movement was far 
more important. For Labor federal governments during the 1980s and into 1990s, the 
radical neo-liberal movement was a ‘bogey’ against which fear and prejudice could 
be mobilised. This allowed the Labor leadership to manufacture consent for its less 
radical, but nonetheless neo-liberal restructuring of the Australian state and 
economy. Such a portrayal of the movement actually strengthened the legitimacy of 
Labor’s One Nation hegemonic strategy, because it enabled Labor to position itself 
as inclusive, in contrast to the clearly exclusivist and fundamentalist radical neo-
liberals. However, the fact that the movement was allied with key fractions of capital 
created added impetus for Labor to move down the neo-liberal policy path, lest it 
face a capitalist backlash. Given its close links with the Liberals, it is not surprising 
that the radical neo-liberal movement had its greatest impact upon this party. The 
movement worked inside and outside of the Liberal Party to usher the Party towards 
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neo-liberalism – this occurred at both the federal and state levels.  The Two Nations 
hegemonic strategy that was gradually articulated by the Liberals during their years 
in opposition federally, owes a great debt to the radical neo-liberal movement. After 
gaining office in 1996, this provided the basis for the Howard governments 
discursive strategy as well as for its planned expansion of the state project of neo-
liberalism. Finally, the radical neo-liberal movement was able to intervene directly 
in high school curricula, thus helping to shape the hegemonic ‘common sense’ of 
economics teachers and students in a way that legitimated the neo-liberal 
restructuring of the Australian state. Clearly the radical neo-liberals were able to 
have a greater impact, relative to their size, than normal social movements. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis is the first full-length analysis of the impact of the radical neo-liberal 
movement upon Australian society. It is also the first attempt to theorise the new 
right as an elite social movement. Whereas other accounts have made numerous 
claims regarding the influence of the radical neo-liberal movement, this thesis has 
systematically analysed the movement’s impact upon a few select, although 
important, areas of Australian politics. The theory of hegemony, outlined in Chapter 
One, provided a framework for undertaking this analysis. 
 
The central problematic this thesis has sought to address is the relationship between 
the radical neo-liberal movement and the struggles to secure hegemony that occurred 
in Australia between 1976 and 1996. After critically analysing, in Chapter Two, 
radical neo-liberal ideology – the intellectual basis of the movement’s coherence – 
the thesis investigated, in Chapter Three, those non-intellectual aspects that 
contributed to the movement’s coherence and organisational strength. Having 
discussed the central dynamics of the movement itself, the thesis then outlined, in 
Chapter Four, the ‘hegemonic context’ in which the movement set out to effect a 
radical shift in political debate and a radical restructuring of the Australian state. 
Finally, this thesis examined the relationship between the radical neo-liberal 
movement and three institutions  - the capitalist class, the mainstream commercial 
media, and the state – all of which are both sites of hegemonic struggle and central 
to the construction of hegemony.  
 
This thesis has argued that the primary relationship between the radical neo-liberal 
movement and struggles to secure hegemony for neo-liberalism has been that the 
movement acted as a vanguard for neo-liberalism. There are four main aspects to 
this.  
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First, the movement played a crucial role in disorganising the opposition to neo-
liberalism and in breaking the old alliances underpinning the hegemony of welfare 
capitalism and domestic defence. The radical neo-liberal movement is composed of 
ideological warriors who have been relentless in their assault upon the Left, upon 
notions of social justice and upon those groups tied to the institutions of arbitration 
and protection. Through forums, movement publications and a largely sympathetic 
media, movement activists mobilised terms such as ‘political correctness’, ‘special 
interests’, the ‘new class’, the ‘guilt industry’ and the ‘industrial relations club’ to 
demonise as elitist and self-interested potential opponents of the state project of neo-
liberalism. Such language has demonised the movement’s enemies by framing them 
as self-interested and elitist. Success in this venture can be measured by the degree 
to which such terms and frames have entered mainstream media discourse.  
 
Second, the radical neo-liberal movement provided a language and conceptual 
arsenal from which those attempting to secure the hegemony of neo-liberalism have 
drawn. The movement provided the forces of neo-liberal hegemony with critiques of 
welfare capitalism as well as comprehensive alternatives which purported to be both 
more efficient and more moral. Not only have movement activists demonised the 
Left, social justice advocates and those tied to the older hegemonic order, but others 
have enthusiastically mobilised this language for the same purpose. With its 
fundamentalist, ‘messianic’ ideology, the movement offered a justificatory 
framework for neo-liberalism, portraying what is essentially the sectional interest of 
particular sections of capital as a universal interest. As demonstrated in Chapters 
Five, Six and Seven, capitalists, journalists and the Coalition made direct use of the 
movement’s language and ideological framework.  
 
Third, the radical neo-liberal movement was instrumental in shifting the goalposts of 
elite political debate in Australia further to the Right. As a group of fundamentalists 
convinced of the absolute correctness of their own ideology, radical neo-liberal 
activists had little concern for the compromises and pragmatic considerations that 
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characterise the political policy-making process. Rather, the public discourse  of the 
movement has been characterised by its radical and dogmatic character. Relatively 
good access to, and generally sympathetic treatment by, the mainstream commercial 
news media gave such radical neo-liberal discourse a public platform and lent it a 
certain legitimacy. Such radical discourse helped to draw the centre of debate to a 
position more favourable to neo-liberalism. The public exposure of the movement 
also allowed the Hawke and Keating governments to portray the movement as 
dangerously radical and, in doing so, cultivate support for the Labor leadership’s 
own less radical, but nonetheless neo-liberal, policy agenda. The movement 
therefore assisted not only the state project of neo-liberalism but also Labor’s One 
Nation regime level hegemonic strategy. 
 
Fourth, the movement was at the forefront of the Liberal Party’s embrace of neo-
liberalism. Publicly, movement activists attacked the ‘Wets’ in the Party and called 
on Liberals to embrace a radical neo-liberal policy agenda. On occasion these calls 
were backed up with threats of electoral pressure. Within the Liberal Party, radical 
neo-liberal activists worked and fought through the Party structures to reorient 
Liberal Party policy. For the Liberals, the radical neo-liberal movement provided a 
discursive underpinning for a Two Nations hegemonic strategy, which was gradually 
articulated during its years in Opposition. The radical neo-liberals equipped the 
federal Liberal Party with a framework – both conceptual and moral - for the 
commodification of public goods, and, through new class discourse, a discursive 
arsenal for focussing working class anxieties about neo-liberal restructuring onto the 
Liberals’ opponents: the Left, trade unions and the new social movements. 
 
The radical neo-liberal movement was able to make these important interventions in 
the hegemonic battles over neo-liberalism despite its relatively small size. As has 
been demonstrated, the audience for radical neo-liberal publications could be 
measured only in the thousands. Furthermore, the movement’s activist base was 
concentrated among capitalists and those occupying contradictory locations within 
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class relations, most notably academics, journalists and bureaucrats. That it was able 
to have an impact that overcame its small and limited social base was due primarily 
to the advantage conferred upon it through its links with particular fractions of the 
capitalist class, and its expressions of the interests of these fractions. While the 
movement’s various strategies and the development of its think tanks allowed it to 
capitalise upon this advantage, it is the movement’s relationship with class power 
rather than its specific organisational form that was most responsible for its impact. 
It is therefore primarily due to its links with capital that such a ‘non-class’ group was 
able to have an impact that was class relevant. 
 
There are, however, a number of important aspects of the struggles to secure neo-
liberal hegemony over which the radical neo-liberal movement had little direct 
influence. As has been demonstrated, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
movement played anything other than a minor role in influencing the Labor Party in 
its embrace of the state project of neo-liberalism. The same is true of the federal 
bureaucracy. Apart from the issue of education – in which the movement was 
successfully able to intervene directly in the Economics curricula – the apparatuses 
of the state were relatively untouched by the movement until 1996. However there is 
evidence which suggests the movement has enjoyed greater direct influence within 
the state after the election of the Howard government. 
 
The main reason the radical neo-liberal movement was unable to convert its agenda 
fully into a state project was that, as a blueprint, radical neo-liberal ideology is 
unsuited to the realities of the role of the state in capitalist society. As has been 
argued in this thesis, neo-liberalism in practice is not about reducing the role or size 
of the state, but about realising a fundamental transformation of power relationships 
and of the distribution of resources. It entails a transfer of power to capital and a 
transfer of resources from public to private. But this recognition of the failures of the 
movement reveals one of the radical neo-liberals’ greatest strengths: through 
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mystification, radical neo-liberal ideology masks the inevitable contradictions of 
neo-liberal capitalism. 
 
Given that the power bloc championing neo-liberalism included leading fractions of 
capital, the leadership of the Labor Party and large elements of the Liberal Party, it 
is likely that the neo-liberal transformation of the Australian state and economy 
would have proceeded even if the radical neo-liberal movement had not mobilised. 
Without, however, the vanguard role performed by the radical neo-liberal movement 
the hegemonic outcomes of such a transformation would have been different. 
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